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Does Climate Change Affect Firms' Innovative Capacity in Developing Countries?

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Abstract

We investigate the impact of climate change on firms' investment in research and development (R&D) in developing countries. The paper relies on two contrasting hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, we speculate an optimistic situation where climate change could induce firms to spend on R&D to both reduce their environmental impact and curb the effects of future climate shocks. In the second hypothesis, we propose a pessimistic scenario where climate change would reduce firms' incentives to invest in R&D. This second hypothesis would mainly be due to tighter conditions for access to finance from lenders, given the increased uncertainty about the firm's future returns in the face of climate change. The empirical results support the second scenario, small firms being more severely affected. Furthermore, we examine the underlying mechanisms and identify financial access as

Keywords: • Climate change • Firm innovation • Developing Countries

the key channel through which climate change reduces R&D investment.

JEL Classifications: D22, O3, Q54

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"Innovation is critical for the economic transformation required to address climate change." OECD (2018), "Unleash innovation to accelerate the transition", in Financing Climate Futures: Rethinking Infrastructure, OECD Publishing, Paris

### 1 Introduction

Climate change is one of the most pressing global problems of our time (Dessai et al., 2007). Increasingly adverse climatic conditions have created greater systematic risk for companies throughout the global economy (Huang et al., 2018). This is a result of uncertainties created by frequent natural disasters such as droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, landslides, and storms, which are expected to continue rising with global warming (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2018; Kundzewicz et al., 2018). Consequently, profit-seeking firms must adapt and deal with these uncertainties to ensure their survival and growth. Such adaptive strategies are particularly possible through innovation, research, and development (R&D).

Contemporary scholars have thoroughly addressed the effects of climate change on diverse sectors of the economy and its negative implications for sustainable development. Numerous studies emphasize that climate change has grave consequences on economic growth, health, and poverty (Noy, 2009; Burke et al., 2015; Hallegatte, 2016; Mejia et al., 2018; Solomon and LaRocque, 2019; Baarsch et al., 2020). Other studies have addressed the microeconomic consequences of climate events such as droughts, famine, and floods, especially at the household level. Focusing on developing countries, some of these studies have highlighted various coping strategies applied by households to smooth their consumption in the face of income shocks from climate events. Such strategies include mutual insurance systems, dependence on altruism, credit transfers, seeking wage employment, and selling assets such as livestock and jewellery, among others (Quisumbing et al., 2018; Ray, 1998).

At the firm level, an emerging branch of literature has brought to light the 'cost of climate change' to firms' operations. Authors find that climate change may negatively affect firm productivity, competitiveness, labour supply, and access to credit (Pilcher

et al., 2002; Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014; Kling et al., 2021; Cevik and Miryugin, 2023). Other studies have highlighted the role of product innovation in climate change adaptation (Oliva et al., 2022). This latter branch follows the argument that climate resilience is highly conditional on innovation (Denton et al., 2014). As R&D is one of the determinants of innovation (Love and Roper, 1999), some authors have studied the role of R&D and innovation in climate change adaptation and mitigation (Blanford, 2009; Meadow et al., 2015; Bremer and Meisch, 2017; Alam et al., 2019; Oliva et al., 2022).

The central interest of this study is the profound nexus between climate change and innovation, and to a great degree, firms' investment in R&D. Our study alludes to the literature on the 'cost of climate change' but also borrows from the latter branch of literature that views R&D as a critical component of climate action. As stated above, literature exists on the implications of R&D on climate change (Blanford, 2009; Meadow et al., 2015; Bremer and Meisch, 2017; Alam et al., 2019; Oliva et al., 2022). However, to the best of our knowledge, we found no existing literature targeting the implications of climate change on firm R&D investment.

Allied to the above, developing countries are more vulnerable and less resilient to climate change events (Noy, 2009; Fomby et al., 2013). Climate change-induced effects, such as natural disasters, are stronger in developing than in advanced countries, as developing countries lack the preconditions to withstand initial shocks (Fomby et al., 2013). Furthermore, the insurance system in most developing countries is not well established, exposing firms to greater losses in the event of catastrophic climate events (Gurenko, 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2009). Against this background, this paper seeks to study the effect of climate change on firms' innovation through R&D investment, focusing on developing countries.

We question the effect of climate change on firm R&D investment by presenting two contrasting hypotheses. In the first hypothesis, we speculate an optimistic situation where climate change could induce firms to spend on R&D to curb the effects of future climate shocks. In the second hypothesis, we propose a pessimistic view that climate change and its uncertainties reduce R&D investment. In the latter hypothesis, we propose that a possible channel through which climate change could reduce R&D investment

is through firms' access to credit, following bank reluctance to lend in periods of climate uncertainty (Cevik and Miryugin, 2023). Next, we discuss three other indirect channels. The first would stem from an increase in public spending to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change, which may lead to a crowding-out or a crowding-in effect on private-sector investment. The second channel is based on the Porter hypothesis, whereby the strengthening of environmental regulations in the face of climate change would provide firms with incentives to innovate. The last channel predicts a negative effect of climate change-induced environmental uncertainty on foreign investment, with a potential reduction in technology and innovation transfers by foreign firms. Our empirical results point to a negative effect of climate change on firms' incentives to invest in R&D in developing countries.

This study examines the effect of climate change on firms' R&D investment, using a panel of 103 developing countries over the period 2006-20. Combining firm-level characteristics from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) dataset with country-level characteristics, we find that climate change — captured by temperature deviations from the historical average — induces a significant decrease in the probability of R&D investment. We conduct a series of robustness tests that support our results. In addition, we examine some heterogeneity features and find that the negative effect of climate change is amplified for small firms, probably because they have the most difficulty accessing financing, but also because they are often less outward-looking and therefore less likely to benefit from the beneficial externalities of globalization compared to their larger counterparts. Finally, we empirically explore the underlying mechanisms and identify financial access as the key channel through which climate change reduces R&D investment.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the conceptual framework. Section 3 discusses our main hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the data. Section 5 details the econometric approach, and Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 examines the sensitivity of our results. Section 8 explores the main transmission channels. The conclusions and policy implications are presented in the last section.

### 2 Background

Extensive literature exists on the global implications of climate change on economic performance. Various authors consider the macroeconomic aspect of climate change and find that climate change manifestations such as extreme temperatures and natural disasters negatively affect economic growth, infrastructure, productivity growth, poverty levels, and health (Noy, 2009; Burke et al., 2015; Hallegatte, 2016; Mejia et al., 2018; Solomon and LaRocque, 2019; Baarsch et al., 2020).

A different strand of literature highlights the micro-economic consequences of climate change, albeit often concentrating on the household level. These studies empirically illustrate the economic losses of climate change and bring to light the various coping mechanisms employed by households in the event of climate uncertainties such as droughts, famine, and floods. For instance, it has been shown that households tend to reduce the use of modern cooking energy in the event of climate shocks, plant low-risk crop varieties in anticipation of climate risks, use assets, savings, mutual insurance, or seek wage employment to smooth consumption (Ray, 1998; Quisumbing et al., 2018; Riziki, 2023).

As we approach the Anthropocene epoch, the impact of climate change on the natural environment will become irreversible and climate change events will become severe and unpredictable, causing more uncertainty (Gasparin et al., 2020; Oliva et al., 2022). Following this logic, a separate strand of literature has focused on the impact of climate change on firms' activities, underscoring 'the cost of climate change' on profit-seeking firms. There is evidence that climate change negatively impacts key firm performance measures such productivity and profitability of businesses (Pilcher et al., 2002; Huang et al., 2018; Traore and Foltz, 2018; Kling et al., 2021; Pankratz et al., 2023; Cevik and Miryugin, 2023). Other authors find that these effects are considerably larger in developing countries where industries are more climate-exposed (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014). Moreover, evidence shows that by creating uncertainty about future returns on investment, climate change may lead lenders to tighten lending conditions, thus reducing access to finance (Kling et al., 2021; Cevik and Miryugin, 2023).

Given the increasing global temperature that could trigger severe climate events,

one set of literature builds on climate uncertainty to study firms' adaptation and mitigation strategies through knowledge co-production among societal actors, innovation, research, and development (Meadow et al., 2015; Bremer and Meisch, 2017; Oliva et al., 2022). A branch of this literature addresses mitigation strategies put forth by firms to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (Su and Moaniba, 2017). While this strategy is indeed a step towards zero emissions, it is hardly sufficient on its own to reduce the impacts of climate change, especially at the firm level (Kahn, 2016). The other branch targets product innovation and firm adaptation to changing climatic conditions. However, authors in the field of management highlight the scarcity of literature addressing firms' adaptive strategies in dealing with changing climatic conditions (Linnenluecke et al., 2013). One such strategy is firm relocation as an adaptive response to climate change and weather extremes (Linnenlucke et al., 2011). With regard to innovation, the literature addresses both product and process innovation. In the former, authors find that consumers could either accept or reject, depending on consumer perception of the newly innovated version of the product, especially in the food industry (Ramirez et al., 2018; Oliva et al., 2022). In the latter, authors find that large firms devote a higher proportion of their R&D expenditure on process innovation than smaller firms (Fritsch and Meschede, 2001). Further studies found that environment-related process innovations are majorly determined by environmental regulation, as predicted by the Porter hypothesis (Porter and Linde, 1995; Cleff and Rennings, 1999).

R&D is one of the key determinants of innovation, together with technology transfer and networking effects (Love and Roper, 1999). In this view, various authors have addressed the role of R&D investment as a strategy for climate change. Authors find that market-based abatement policies are effective mechanisms that encourage knowledge diffusion through R&D (Blanford, 2009). Other authors find that R&D investment improves firms' environmental performance by reducing energy consumption and carbon emissions intensities (Alam et al., 2019). However, studies examining the reverse relationship — focusing on the impact of climate change on R&D investment — remain scarce or lacking. This paper addresses this issue, by empirically estimating the impact of climate change on firms' innovative capacity, proxied by R&D investment, in developing countries.

Developing countries often carry the weight of natural disasters, as they are more vulnerable and economically less resilient to climate change than their developed counterparts (Noy, 2009; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2009; Fomby et al., 2013). Moreover, the insurance system in most developing countries is weak (Gurenko, 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2009). Less than a tenth of losses were insured in emerging economy countries, and only 1-2 percent of losses from natural disasters were insured in low-income countries between the period of 1980-2004 (Gurenko, 2004; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2009). Insurance uptake equally improves creditworthiness and promotes investment in productive assets and higher-risk activities (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2009). Such low levels of insurance could exclude firms in developing countries from benefiting from risk reduction strategies and worsen the negative effects of climate change by placing an overbearing recovery burden on firms.

### 3 Theoretical predictions

In a nutshell, despite an emerging and growing literature on the impact of climate events on firm performance, so far, very little has been said about the implications of climate change on firms' R&D investment in developing countries. Climate change may influence firms' incentives to invest in R&D through various channels. Some are direct, while others are indirect. This section discusses these mechanisms.

### 3.1 Direct channels

To explore the direct channels through which climate change could affect firms' R&D investment, we postulate two contradictory hypotheses. The first hypothesis is based on an optimistic scenario, in which climate change would encourage firms to invest in R&D as a strategy for mitigating their environmental impact and adapting to future climatic events. Firms can finance their investments (including R&D) through various ways, among others, bank credits, equity financing, savings, personal funds, and remittances. Most of these options are limited to a great extent. For instance, remittances are mostly

used to set up small firms and require transfers from other people (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2001). Other forms of financing such as personal funds and savings are conditional on having initial finances. Equity financing and venture capitalists only fund a very small fraction of technology-oriented businesses each year (Gompers and Lerner, 2010). Consequently, despite high interest rates and often tight collateral requirements, bank credit remains an important means of financing businesses in developing countries.

Existing literature has identified access to credit as one of the main obstacles to the development of the private sector in developing countries (Chauvet and Jacolin, 2017). Moreover, as discussed above, it has been shown that by creating uncertainty about the profitability of investment and firms' profits, climate change makes lenders reluctant, thereby reducing the likelihood of granting credit (Cevik and Miryugin, 2023). This is particularly true in developing countries where the insurance system is weak. Yet, access to finance is a major determinant of firm investment, as the empirical literature provides evidence that credit constraints tend to reduce firms' innovation projects (e.g., see Aghion et al., 2012; Brancati, 2015; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2016; Fombang and Adjasi, 2018; Kaur et al., 2022). This leads us to the second hypothesis: by tightening access to credit, climate change would reduce firms' R&D investment.

### 3.2 Indirect channels

The indirect channels result from the side effects induced by climate risks. These include government expenditure, environmental stringency, and foreign direct investment (FDI). First and foremost, climate change may lead governments to increase public spending, in a quest to adopt and mitigate the effects induced by climate risk. These expenditures can be directed towards increasing the capacity of renewable energy by financing hydroelectric, wind, geothermal, and solar power plants (ÓhAiseadha et al., 2020), forest and biodiversity conservation, disaster risk management, agriculture, and food security (Philibert, 2004; Eliasch, 2012). A rise in public spending could result in higher interest rates, particularly if public borrowing is financed by the domestic banking sector, which could crowd out private investment —including R&D investment. On the other hand, public spending allocated to infrastructure development and climate change mitigation

could improve the business environment and reduce environmental risks, which can be conducive to R&D investment (Braese et al., 2019; Chauvet and Ferry, 2021).

In the face of climate change, the government can tighten environmental regulations as a complementary mitigation mechanism to address environmentally damaging behavior. This can involve, for example, imposing an explicit or implicit price on the use of certain pollutants, greenhouse gas emissions, waste production, etc. This leads us to the second channel: environmental stringency. The Porter hypothesis (Porter and Linde, 1995) states that stringent environmental regulations should encourage firms to innovate to adhere to environmental policies aimed at mitigating climate change. From this point of view, climate change could indirectly impact R&D investment, through stricter environmental regulations. This effect is all the more plausible for the most polluting firms seeking to reduce their carbon footprint.

Last but not least, environmental uncertainty induced by climate change could reduce foreign investors' confidence in the domestic environment of the affected country. This may lead foreign firms to relocate to countries with better climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies, or with relatively less climate uncertainty. Foreign firms' relocation exposes the affected country to the loss of the positive side effects of FDI, such as the transfer of technology, knowledge, know-how, and innovation skills. In other words, by reducing FDI flows to the countries most exposed to climate risk, climate change could hurt R&D investments in these latter countries.

### 4 Data

### 4.1 Firm-level data

Our analysis combines country-level climate characteristics with firm-level characteristics for a set of 103 developing countries. Firm-level characteristics are drawn from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) database. The WBES provide microdata on the performance of formal enterprises, using a representative sample in the manufacturing and services sectors. The surveys are based on a standard questionnaire to ensure comparability from one country to another and from one year to another, and

are standardized over time and for all countries (repeated cross-sectional data). We use the latest dataset, covering the period 2006-20, and retain 103 developing countries from available data. Our dependent variable is captured by a dummy equal to 1 if, during the last fiscal year, the establishment spent on R&D, and zero otherwise. More precisely, R&D investment measures a firm's expenditure aimed at achieving a new discovery that may lead either to the development of new products, services or procedures, or to the improvement of existing products, services, or procedures.

We follow the existing literature (see, among others, Chauvet and Jacolin, 2017; Chauvet and Ehrhart, 2018; Kouamé and Tapsoba, 2019; Chauvet and Ferry, 2021) and include a series of firm-level controls, such as size, age, and ownership. Firm size is captured by an ordinal qualitative variable equal to 1 for small (less than 20 employees), 2 for medium (between 20 and 99 employees), or 3 for large firms (100 employees and over). Age measures the length of time an establishment has been in existence, from the year of its formal registration as a start-up. The firm's ownership structure is captured by two distinctive dummy variables equal to 1 if the State or a foreign entity owns part or all of the firm, and zero otherwise. The literature provides evidence that widespread internet adoption or access to telecommunication infrastructures boosts firm performance and innovation performance (e.g., see Harrison et al., 2014; Paunov and Rollo, 2016; Chauvet and Ferry, 2021). Similarly, as discussed above, it has been shown that access to finance is an important determinant of firm innovation. We therefore include two additional firm-level variables among the controls: access to telecommunication infrastructure and financial access. Access to telecommunication infrastructures is captured by a dummy equal to 1 if the firm has its website, and zero otherwise. Financial access is measured as a dummy variable that takes 1 if the firm has a credit line or an overdraft facility, and zero otherwise.

### 4.2 Country-level data

Climate change is measured at the country level, as annual changes in mean surface temperature, in degrees Celsius, using temperatures between 1951 and 1980 as a baseline (higher values indicate warmer weather compared with the historical average). The

variable is from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Climate Change Indicators Dashboard. At the country level, we consider as control variables the inflation rate — as the literature shows that macroeconomic uncertainty undermines firms' performance, including their ability to invest in R&D (Bambe et al., 2022)— and the level of education, as knowledge is essential to firms' ability to innovate (Acemoglu et al., 2018; Medase and Abdul-Basit, 2020). The inflation rate and the level of education are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database. The inflation rate is measured as the percentage change in the consumer price index, while the level of education is approximated by the secondary school enrollment rate.

### 4.3 Descriptive statistics and stylized facts

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on firm and country characteristics for the sample. The sample is dominated by manufacturing firms (76% of the total sample) compared to the services sector, and is mostly made up of small firms (around 49% of the total sample). On average, 21% of firms operating in the developing countries (DCs) in the sample invest in R&D. This rate is lower in low-income countries — LICs — (about 17%) compared to the whole sample of DCs. Similarly, LICs report a lower rate of access to telecommunications infrastructure (about 24%) than the overall sample of DCs (around 47%). Finally, firms operating in LICs tend to have less access to finance (around 31%) than the overall sample of DCs (around 55%). We then look at the differences in characteristics between manufacturing firms and those in the services sector. On average, a higher proportion of manufacturing firms invest in R&D compared to those in the services sector (23% versus 12%), rely on telecommunications services (49% versus 42%), and have access to finance (56% versus 51%). Looking at the differences by firm size, a higher proportion of medium-sized and large firms (jointly considered) invest in R&D compared to small firms (28% versus 12%), use telecommunications infrastructures (62% versus 28%), and have access to finance (66% versus 40%).

With regard to country-level variables, the data suggest a rise in temperature in developing countries over the period 2006-20 of around 1.03 degrees Celsius compared to the historical average (1851-1980). In other words, this pattern suggests a transition




Figure 1: Temperature change and the proportion of firms investing in R&D: five-year trend over 2006-20

Notes: Temperature change is measured in degrees Celsius, using temperatures between 1951 and 1980 as a baseline.

to warmer temperatures. LICs register a slightly higher inflation rate compared to the overall sample of DCs (around 10% versus 7%), and a much lower level of secondary education than the whole sample of DCs (around 34% versus 77%). Figure 1 displays the five-year trend in the proportion of firms investing in R&D and temperature variations in the countries in our sample, over our study period. There is a clear upward trend in temperature, while over the same period, the proportion of firms investing in R&D has fallen significantly. Statistical tests suggest a negative and significant correlation at 1% between climate change and R&D investment, with a magnitude of around 16%. Table A1 (see Appendix) reports the countries in the sample and the year of the surveys.

### 5 Methodology

We investigate the impact of climate change on firms' innovative capacity in developing countries, proxied by R&D investment. The study combines firm-level characteristics from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) dataset and country-level data, for a panel of 103 countries over the period 2006-20. As our dependent variable (R&D investment) is binary, the literature suggests using appropriate econometric methods such

Table 1: Summary statistics

			All DCs					LICs		
Variables	Obs.	Mean	$_{\mathrm{PS}}$	Min	Max	Obs.	Mean	$\mathbf{p}\mathbf{s}$	Min	Max
		Firm-level variables					Firm-level variables			
R&D investment	79,708	0.211	0.408	0	1	5,495	0.169	0.374	0	
Age	84,868	18.739	15.288	0	340	6,410	13.356	12.032	0	132
Size	108,239	1.763	0.777	1	က	9,070	1.461	0.673	1	3
State	108,239	0.024	0.155	0	1	9,070	0.028	0.164	0	1
Foreign	108,239	0.105	0.307	0	1	9,070	0.185	0.388	0	1
Website	108,239	0.468	0.499	0	1	9,070	0.239	0.427	0	1
Financial access	102,218	0.545	0.498	0	1	8,779	0.309	0.462	0	1
		Country-level variables					Country-level variables			
Temperature change	104,789	1.029	0.584	0.007	2.584	7,934	0.951	0.284	0.485	1.942
Inflation	104,638	7.274	5.592	-2.431	59.220	9,070	9.708	7.994	-1.537	36.522
Education	85,467	77.109	23.073	12.984	120.651	6,106	33.514	9.727	12.984	55.998
	A	Manufacturing (All DCs)					Services (All DCs)			
R&D investment	64,049	0.234	0.424	0	1	15,659	0.117	0.322	0	П
Age	63,142	19.657	15.813	0	340	21,726	16.071	13.294	0	150
Size	80,638	1.860	0.784	1	က	27,601	1.477	0.678	П	33
State	80,638	0.024	0.154	0	1	27,601	0.025	0.155	0	1
Foreign	80,638	0.109	0.311	0	1	27,601	0.094	0.292	0	1
Website	80,638	0.486	0.499	0	П	27,601	0.415	0.493	0	П
Financial access	76,306	0.556	0.497	0	1	25,912	0.513	0.499	0	1
		Small firms (All DCs)				N	Medium & large firms (All DCs)	()		
R&D investment	34,601	0.124	0.329	0	1	45,107	0.279	0.448	0	1
Age	36,623	15.475	12.298	0	211	48,245	21.216	16.796	0	340
State	48,554	0.015	0.122	0	П	59,685	0.032	0.176	0	1
Foreign	48,554	0.055	0.229	0	П	59,685	0.146	0.353	0	1
Website	48,554	0.282	0.450	0	П	59,685	0.619	0.486	0	1
Financial access	45,923	0.403	0.490	0	-	56,295	0.661	0.473	0	

as the linear probability model (LPM), probit or logit models. Logit and probit models have serious shortcomings in our design. Indeed, accounting for fixed effects (country, industry, and year) when using such models would be problematic, as a large one would yield inconsistent slope estimates due to the incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, the inclusion of fixed effects would eliminate all observations for which the independent variable perfectly predicts the R&D investment outcome from the analysis (see Zorn, 2005; Belloc et al., 2016). In short, probit and logit models expose us to a serious identification issue. The omission of fixed effects would not allow us to capture unobserved factors specific to each country or industry, or common time-varying shocks, which could be correlated with both climate change and the outcome variable. Therefore, we rely on the LPM which is appropriate in our design, as it allows us to include a wide range of country, industry, and year-fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity (see Belloc et al., 2016). The econometric specification we estimate is the following:

$$Y_{i,k,j,t} = \alpha + \beta Temperature_{j,t} + \eta X_{i,k,j,t} + \gamma Z_{j,t} + \mu_k + \phi_j + \psi_t + \epsilon_{i,k,j,t}$$
 (1)

where  $Y_{i,k,j,t}$  is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm i located in the industry k, in the country j invested in R&D in the year t, and 0 otherwise.  $Temperature_{j,t}$  is the variable of interest, i.e., climate change, captured at the country level, approximated by an annual rise in temperature using temperatures between 1951 and 1980 as a baseline.  $X_{i,j,k,t}$  is a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics described in Section 4, i.e., size, age, ownership, access to telecommunication infrastructure, and financial access.  $Z_{j,t}$  includes country-level controls, i.e., the inflation rate and the level of education.  $\mu_k$ ,  $\phi_j$ , and  $\psi_j$  account respectively for industry, country, and time-fixed effects, and allow capturing specific characteristics. Country (industry) fixed effects take into account the fact that countries (industries) may differ in many important and permanent unobservable characteristics, which are likely to be correlated with both the country's temperature change and the firms' probability of investing in R&D. Time-fixed effects absorb any potential contemporaneous climate change event for all countries that could affect the probability of the firm investing in R&D. Finally,  $\epsilon_{i,k,j,t}$  is the idiosyncratic error term. Following Paunov and Rollo (2016), robust standard errors clustered at the country-industry-year

level are applied systematically to account for the fact that the variable of interest is an aggregate variable.

### 6 Main findings

The results are presented in Table 2 for our global sample of 103 countries. Columns [1] and [2] rely on the LPM. In the first column, we consider our baseline model, but exclude fixed effects from the regression. The results show a negative correlation between temperature rises and the probability of a firm investing in R&D. Column [2], which reports our main results, includes country, year, and industry fixed effects among the controls to account for unobserved heterogeneity, as discussed above. The inclusion of fixed effects leads to a drop in the effect of the variable of interest (from 10.9% to 4.7%), suggesting that the omission of unobserved factors leads to an overestimation of the effect of climate change on the probability of firms investing in R&D. Similarly, there is an improvement in the value of the R-squared (from around 12% to 18%), suggesting that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the analysis improves the model's fit.

Our main results (Column [2] of Table 2) suggest a negative and significant impact of temperature change on firms' probability of investing in R&D. More specifically, a 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature compared with the average between 1951 and 1980 reduces the probability of a firm investing in R&D by 4.7%. This effect is economically significant, given that only 21% of the firms in the sample invest in R&D. With regard to the controls, the results suggest that firm age and size, foreign ownership, access to finance and telecommunications infrastructure, and the level of education are positively correlated with the probability of investing in R&D, in line with the theoretical predictions made in Section 4.

### 7 Sensitivity analysis

We conduct a series of robustness tests in subsection 7.1 before exploring some heterogeneity analyses in subsection 7.2.

Table 2: Climate change and firms' innovative capacity

	LPM		Probit	Logit
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
Temperature change	-0.109***	-0.047***	-0.114***	-0.110***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Firm age	0.001***	2.514e-04*	0.001***	4.944e-04***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm size	0.056***	0.058***	0.052***	0.049***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
State	-0.027*	0.018	-0.018	-0.019
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Foreign	0.045***	0.041***	0.041***	0.038***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Financial access	0.102***	0.061***	0.105***	0.102***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Website	0.127***	0.100***	0.129***	0.122***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	-4.031e-04	0.001*	-4.577e-04*	-3.891e-04
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Inflation	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	49010	49010	49010	49010
R-squared	0.116	0.184	0.1217	0.1215
Country & Industry & Year FE	No	Yes	0.1211	0.1210

This table reports the results of the impact of climate change on firms' innovative capacity (R&D investment). Column [2] displays the baseline results, estimated from the linear probability model (LPM). Columns [3] and [4] re-estimate the baseline model using probit and logit models, respectively (the coefficients reported are marginal effects). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant is included, but not reported in the table. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

### 7.1 Robustness

### 7.1.1 Alternative models

As argued in Section 5, logit and probit models are not suitable for our design, as accounting for fixed effects when using these models is problematic. Furthermore, the results of Columns [1] and [2] of Section 6 show that the inclusion of fixed effects in our study is relevant as it improves the fit of the regression, which strongly reinforces the usefulness of the LPM, at least in our design. Nevertheless, for robustness purposes, we re-estimate our baseline model using probit and logit models, in Columns [3] and [4] of Table 6, respectively. Such an exercise is relevant since it provides a means of estimating the direction and magnitude of the potential estimation bias induced by probit and logit

models compared with the LPM. The new estimates suggest that climate change reduces the likelihood of investing in R&D, in both probit and logit models. However, the new coefficients are slightly higher (around 11%) than those provided by the LPM (around 5%), suggesting a slight overestimation of the probit and logit models. This is probably because, as previously discussed, the latter do not account for fixed effects, especially as the new estimates are almost similar to those obtained by LMP when we omit fixed effects from the regression (Column [1] of Table 6). Even so, the new results remain qualitatively similar to those provided by the LPM, which reinforces our conclusions. Regarding the control variables, the new results suggest a favorable impact of firm age and size, foreign ownership, access to finance, and telecommunications infrastructure on R&D investment, while the effect of education is not robust.

### 7.1.2 Additional controls

Our main model considers some well-selected controls, as the inclusion of many variables exposes us to multicollinearity and sample size reduction due to missing data. For robustness, we augment our baseline model by including a series of additional controls. First, we include the logarithm of sales to capture the level of firm performance. Next, as our sample includes a large panel of countries with heterogeneous income levels, we include the logarithm of per capita income to account for this. The literature also highlights the importance of institutions in economic performance (Acemoglu et al., 2008). Hence, we control for the quality of institutions, captured by the level of political stability and human rights protection. Third, the world has become increasingly globalized in recent decades, with increasing interaction between countries and sectors that exchange not only goods and services, but also ideas. Firms' participation in global value chains (GVCs) offers them the opportunity to acquire new knowledge, better technologies, and know-how, which can be conducive to R&D innovation (Ernst and Kim, 2002; Gereffi, 2014). Therefore, following Del Prete et al. (2017) and Reddy et al. (2021), we capture firms' participation in GVCs by a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exports, imports or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The human rights protection variable indicates how the state protects rights and freedoms equally across all social groups (higher values indicate better performance) and is from Our World in Data. The political stability variable measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism (higher values indicate better performance), and comes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database.

trades bilaterally with international quality certificates, and 0 otherwise. Fourth, we include the firm's legal status, considering the three most representative statuses in the sample: sole proprietorship, shareholding company with non-traded shares or shares traded privately, and limited partnership, respectively. Fifth, we include an environmental stringency variable, the Environmental Performance Index (EPI).<sup>2</sup> As discussed above, given the adverse effects of climate change on economic performance, the government could reinforce its environmental stringency, for example through measures aimed at penalizing environmentally harmful behavior (use of certain pollutants, greenhouse gas emissions, waste production, etc.). The Porter hypothesis (Porter and Linde, 1995) states that greater environmental stringency may lead firms to adopt more innovative production methods. Sixth, we include energy inflation, as higher energy prices contribute to higher input costs for firms, but can also lead to higher prices for other goods and services. Finally, we also include a linear trend to capture long common movements that could be correlated with climate change and firms' propensity to innovate.

The new results reported in Columns [2]-[12] of Table B1 (see Appendix), where the additional controls are included cumulatively, suggest a robust negative effect of climate change on R&D investment. In addition, the new coefficients of the variable of interest, which range from -2.9% to -3.4%, remain qualitatively comparable to the coefficient of the baseline model (-4.7%). Overall, the effect of the control variables of the baseline model also remains highly robust. With regard to the new controls, the results suggest that firm sales and their participation in GVCs increase the likelihood of investing in R&D.

### 7.1.3 Alternative subsamples

Our third robustness check consists of re-estimating our baseline model from alternative subsamples. First, we exclude from the sample the years during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008-09 global financial crisis, respectively, since these events led to major imbalances in many countries. Next, some outliers could induce bias in our estimates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The Environmental Performance Index can range from 0 to 100 (best performance) and captures a country's progress in improving environmental health, mitigating climate change, and protecting the vitality of ecosystems. Source: https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2022/component/epi

Although excluding them from the sample is sometimes considered dealing with this issue, the main problem with such an approach is that it reduces the sample size. We therefore winsorize our variable of interest at 95% to account for outliers.<sup>3</sup> The new estimates reported in Panel A of Table B2 (see Appendix), respectively, remain stable.

### 7.1.4 Alternative measures

We conduct some additional robustness by considering alternative measures in Table B2 (see Appendix). In Column [1] of Panel B, we consider a dummy equal to 1 if, over the last 3 years, the establishment has introduced a new/significantly improved process or new products/services, and zero otherwise. The results suggest that a 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature relative to the long-term average reduces the probability of a firm introducing a new production process or product by around 6%, which reinforces our conclusions. In Column [2] (Panel B), we re-estimate our baseline model using climate shocks (or temperature volatility) as the variable of interest. We calculate climate shocks from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, since this approach does not rely a priori on any assumption regarding the presence and nature of the trend in the series.<sup>4</sup> The new estimates yield similar conclusions. Last, we rely on a climatic drought index, the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), provided by Vicente-Serrano et al. (2010).<sup>5</sup> The SPEI is based on precipitation and temperature data, and has the advantage of combining multiscalar nature with the capacity to include the effects of temperature variability on drought assessment. The literature shows that climate change is associated with an increase in global temperature, but also with an increase in evapotranspiration rates and a decrease in rainfall in certain regions, which has an impact on the severity of droughts (Solomon, 2007; Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). Over our study period, the data suggest a negative correlation between temperature change and the SPEI, with a magnitude of around 30%, suggesting that higher temperatures are associated with lower precipitation. For the sake of comparability with our climate change measure, we construct a dummy equal to 1 for SPEI values indicating extreme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The results remain robust when we winsorize at 90% or 99%.

 $<sup>^4</sup>$ We use observed annual temperature data from the World Bank Group (Climate Change Knowledge Portal).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The data is available on the World Bank's WDI dataset.

drought periods, and zero otherwise. The results reported in Column [3] of Table B2 indicate that extreme drought periods reduce the probability of R&D investment by almost 7%. Finally, it is well known that climate change is associated with frequent natural disasters, such as droughts, extreme temperatures, floods, landslides, storms, etc. Therefore, in the last column, we approximate our variable of interest using the monetary damage (as a percentage of GDP) induced by climate change-related disasters. This variable is taken from the EM-DAT database. The results hold.

### 7.2 Heterogeneity

We now explore some heterogeneity in the relationship between climate change and R&D investment. We consider our main specification, augmented by an interactive term (a significant effect of the interactive term suggests that there is heterogeneity). Among the potential sources of heterogeneity, we consider firm size, export status, and sector of activity (manufacturing vs. services). Firm size is approximated by the level of sales. More precisely, we consider respective dummy variables equal to 1 if the sales of the firm i in a year t are higher than the first (small firms), second (medium-sized firms), and third (large firms) quartile of all observations for the country j, and zero otherwise.

The results are reported in Table 3, where vector X variables in isolation (without interaction with climate change) and controls are included but not reported for the sake of space. In all cases, the results suggest that climate change reduces the likelihood of investing in R&D. However, when examining the interactive terms between climate change and the potential variable of heterogeneity, we observe that the negative effect of climate change is amplified for small firms, probably because they have the most difficulty accessing finance (as shown in Table 1), but also because they are the most likely to be less outward-looking, and therefore less likely to benefit from the positive externalities of globalization, through technology or skills transfers, compared to larger firms. Finally, with regard to the other factors examined, the results suggest that neither the sector of activity (manufacturing versus services) nor the export status significantly affect the relationship between climate change and R&D investment.

Table 3: Heterogeneity

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]
Temperature change (TC)	-0.037***	-0.043***	-0.045***	-0.059***	-0.044***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)
TC * Small firms	-0.013**				
	(0.006)				
TC * Medium-sized firms		-0.010			
		(0.007)			
TC * Large firms			-0.009		
			(0.007)		
TC * Manufacturing				0.014	
				(0.011)	
TC * Export status					-0.009
					(0.006)
Observations	49010	49010	49010	49010	49010
R-squared	0.184	0.184	0.184	0.184	0.186
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Industry & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table reports the results of the heterogeneity effects of the impact of climate change on R&D investment. The equation is estimated by considering the main model augmented by the interactive term. Vector X variables in isolation (without interaction with environmental stringency) and controls are included but not reported for the sake of space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant is included, but not reported in the table. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

### 8 Main transmission channels

This section examines the main channel through which the negative effect of climate change on the likelihood of investing in R&D can be transmitted, i.e., financial access. Drawing on existing literature (e.g., see, Apeti, 2023; Bambe, 2023), we adopt a simple two-stage approach to testing the potential channel. In the first two columns of Panel A (Table 4), we report Pearson correlations between R&D investment and financial access. The results suggest a positive and significant correlation between financial access (both in terms of credit line and overdraft facility) and R&D investment.<sup>6</sup> In Panel B, we report the results of univariate regressions of the potential channel on climate change. We observe that climate change is associated with a lower probability of access to finance, suggesting that the latter is a relevant channel explaining our results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The WBES defines an overdraft facility as a flexible account that allows firms to draw upon in the event their account balance becomes negative. On the other hand, a credit line is an available amount of credit that the establishment can draw upon or leave untapped.

Another factor, power cuts, could also play a role. Indeed, it has been shown that high temperatures and heat waves lead to failures in electricity networks and contribute to increased energy losses, reducing the distribution of electricity from power stations to households and firms (Schaeffer et al., 2012; Campbell and Lowry, 2012; Ward, 2013). Thus, we argue that by affecting firms' energy distribution, heat waves can also indirectly impact firms' innovation. Although Column [3] of Panel B (Table 4) suggests that temperature rise is associated with an increase in the duration of power cuts, the correlation between the length of power cuts and R&D investment, albeit negative, is rather weak (around 3%) and not significant.

To sum up, although the power cuts channel seems to emerge as a potential mechanism explaining our results, we identify financial access as the key channel through which climate change reduces R&D investment.

Table 4: Transmission channels

Pannel A	[1]	[2]	[3]
	R&D investment	R&D investment	R&D investment
Credit line	0.1727***		
Overdraft facility		0.2024***	
Power outages			-0.0027
Pannel B	[1]	[2]	[3]
	Credit line	Overdraft facility	Power outages
Temperature change	-0.024**		
	(0.010)		
Temperature change		-0.084***	
		(0.014)	
Temperature change			0.544**
			(0.221)
Observations	97671	95982	44493
R-squared	0.001	0.009	0.0003

Panel A reports Pearson correlations between RD investment, financial access, and power cuts. \*\*\* indicates significance at the 1% threshold. Panel B reports the effect of climate change on the potential channels, using univariate regressions. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

### 9 Conclusion and policy implications

The literature is unanimous on the role of R&D investment in climate action. However, it is equally important to understand the inverse relationship to ensure a multifaceted comprehension of the nexus between climate change and R&D. This study addresses this question, providing empirical evidence of the implications of climate change on firms' R&D investment. Using a large sample of 103 developing countries, we find evidence that climate change reduces the probability of firms' R&D investment. The effect is statistically and economically significant and robust to a wide range of robustness checks. We also find that the adverse effects of climate change are greater for small firms, and identify firms' access to credit as the key channel through which climate change reduces firms' R&D investment.

Our findings bring to light another 'cost of climate change' for firms in developing countries. Our main conclusion is that climate change appears to be a major impediment to firm innovation in developing countries, through a reduction in R&D investment, as it tends to exacerbate constraints on access to credit. Our result underlines a conundrum given the central role of R&D investment in climate mitigation and adaptation. We highlight important policy implications. It is crucial to promote measures aimed at combating the substantial inertia of climate, in order to limit the adverse consequences of climatic events. This means, among other things, encouraging firms' innovation (through R&D investment) aimed at adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. Moreover, such policies must be complemented by measures to promote access to credit, given that access to credit remains an essential determinant of R&D investment and hence, innovation.

This study uses R&D investment as a proxy for innovation. The data used does not differentiate between green investment and non-green investment in R&D. Future research could explore such a distinction to better understand the effect of climate change on green R&D investment.

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## Appendix A Sample

Table A1: Sample

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# Appendix B Robustness

Table B1: Robustness: Additional controls

	[1]	[2]	<u>c</u>	4	<u> </u>	[9]	[2]	×	[6]	[10]	[11]	[12]
Temperature change	-0.047***	-0.034**	-0.034**	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.031*	-0.031*	-0.030*	*670-	-0.033*	-0.033*	-0.034*
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Firm age	2.514e-04*	2.852e-04*	2.852e-04*	2.395e-04	2.408e-04	6.405e-05	5.686e-05	7.060e-05	6.668e-05	6.757e-05	4.080e-05	4.052e-05
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Firm size	0.058***	0.033***	0.033***	0.034***	0.034***	0.026***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025***	0.025
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
State	0.018	0.031*	0.031*	0.027	0.027	0.028	0.025	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.036	0.036
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Foreign	0.041	0.030***	0.030***	0.032***	0.032***	0.018**	0.017*	0.017*	0.017*	0.017*	0.016*	0.016*
·	(0.008)	(0.00)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.000)	(0.00)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.009)	(0.000)
Financial access	0.061***	0.049***	0.049***	0.050***	0.050***	0.048***	0.047***	0.047***	0.047***	0.047***	0.050***	0.050***
Wohsite	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Websine	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	0.001*	0.002*	0.002*	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.00	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Inflation	0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.000
·	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Sales		0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.008***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log.GDP per capita			-0.041	-0.011	-0.014	-0.014	-0.010	-0.002	-0.002	-0.030	-0.034	-0.033
D Trees of the Control of the Contro			(0.070)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Political stability				0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.002
1				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
numan ngnts protection					-0.007	-0.020	-0.016	-0.017	-0.018	-0.051	0.037	0.039
					(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.152)	(0.151)
Giobai value chams						(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.103)	(0.010)
Sole proprietorship						(0000)	-0.013**	-0.007	-0.009	-0.009	-0.006	-0.006
disconnected and once							(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Shareholding (non-traded shares/traded privately)								0.012*	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.011
								(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Limited partnership									900.0-	-0.006	-0.004	-0.004
									(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Environmental stringency										-0.002	-0.004	-0.004
Knower inflation										(enn.n)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Energy mnadon											(0.007)	-0.007
Trend											(0.00)	(0.001) 5.676e-06
												(0.000)
Observations	49010	33766	33766	32424	32329	32329	32213	32213	32213	32213	29930	29930
R-squared	0.184	0.194	0.194	0.198	0.198	0.206	0.206	0.206	0.506	0.206	0.210	0.210
Country & Industry & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table reports the results of the impact of climate change on firms' innovative capacity (R&D investment), using the linear probability model (LPM). Column [1] displays the baseline results. Columns [2]-[12] report the robustness results, where we include a series of additional controls. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant is included, but not reported in the table. \* p < 0.1, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Table B2: Robustness: Alternative samples and measures

Panel A: Alternative samples	[1]	[2]	[3]	
Temperature change	-0.048***	-0.047***	-0.050***	
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	
Observations	45940	49010	49010	
R-squared	0.182	0.184	0.184	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country & Industry & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Panel B: Alternative measures	[1]	[2]	[3]	
Temperature change	-0.055**			
	(0.022)			
Temperature volatility		-0.079***		
		(0.020)		
Extreme drought			-0.065**	
			(0.027)	
Climate-related natural disasters				-0.067*
				(0.035)
Observations	49399	50284	50284	50082
R-squared	0.242	0.183	0.183	0.183
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country & Industry & Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

This table reports the results of the impact of climate change on firms' innovative capacity (R&D investment), using alternative samples (Panel A) and measures (Panel B). In Columns [1] and [2] of Panel A, we exclude from the sample the years during the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008-09 global financial crisis, respectively. In the last column, we winsorize our variable of interest at 95% to account for outliers. In Column [1] of Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if, over the last 3 years, the establishment has introduced a new/significantly improved process or new products/services, and zero otherwise. In Column [2], we calculate temperature volatility from the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. In Column [3], relying on the Standardized Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), we consider as variable of interest a dummy equal to 1 for SPEI values indicating extreme drought periods, and zero otherwise. In the last column, Therefore, in the last column, we approximate our variable of interest using the monetary damage (as a percentage of GDP) induced by climate change-related disasters. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The constant is included, but not reported in the table. \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

## Appendix C Figures




Figure C 1: Changes in average global temperature around the world (2006-2020)

Notes: This map displays the average trend in global temperature around the world. Temperature change is measured in degrees Celsius, using temperatures between 1951 and 1980 as a baseline.

### Appendix D Variables and their sources

Table C1: Sources of variables

Variables		Nature	Sources
R&D investment	1. Main model variables	Dummy	World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES)
Climate change		Index ranging from $0$ to $1$	International Monetary Fund's Climate Change Indicators Dashboard
Firm age		Continuous	WBES
Firm size		Multinomial	WBES
State		Dummy	WBES
Foreign		Dummy	WBES
Website		Dummy	WBES
Financial access		Dummy	WBES
Inflation		Continuous	World Development Indicators (WDI)
Secondary education		Continuous	WDI
Firm sales	2. Additional variables	Continuous	WBES
GDP per capita		Continuous	WDI
Trade openness		Continuous	WDI
Capital openness		Approximately between -2 and $2$	Chinn and Ito (2006)
Political stability		Between 0 and 100	Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
Human rights protection		Between 0 and 1	Our World in Data
Foreign inputs		Continuous	WBES