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3 **On the place and role of ‘discourse’ in the *Functional Discourse Grammar* model. The**  
4 **interface between language system and language use\***

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10 **Abstract**

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12 Mackenzie (2020) is a defense of the position adopted by the architects of the standard model of Functional  
13 Discourse Grammar (FDG): namely that the model cannot (and even could never) be considered a  
14 ‘grammar of discourse’. The article examines the arguments given for rejecting the ‘discourse’ dimension  
15 from the FDG model, proposes an independent account of discourse, and suggests a means of dovetailing it  
16 within a model of the wider utterance context.

17 On the one hand, the author’s arguments are in the main valid: for ‘discourse’, as characterized in  
18 section 3, is not a formal, clearly delineated object amenable to systematic treatment within a grammatical  
19 model of a given language. Yet on the other, it is arguable that even the presence of the term ‘discourse’ in  
20 the model’s name is not *in fine* justified.

21 Notwithstanding, in order to include the ‘discourse dimension’ (section 3), it is argued that the Core  
22 FDG model could be integrated with a broader model of the utterance context involved. This would enable  
23 it to account more adequately, for example, for the ways in which indexical reference, the lexicon and  
24 adjectival modification operate in actual texts. In turn, it would influence certain of the other  
25 characterizations independently assigned within the Core model.

26  
27 **Keywords:** contextualization; discourse; Functional Discourse Grammar; illocution; the lexicon; text.

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30 **1. Introduction**

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32 At the very outset of their 2008 book (p. 9), Hengeveld & Mackenzie state explicitly that  
33 FDG ‘is in no sense a discourse-analytical model’, despite the presence of the term  
34 ‘Discourse’ in the model’s name.<sup>1</sup> Mackenzie (2020) is a defence of this position. The  
35 purpose of this article is, after examining the arguments given for rejecting the ‘discourse  
36 grammar’ dimension from the FDG model, to ascertain the extent to which the term  
37 ‘discourse’ is justified in its name, to provide an independent characterization of this  
38 dimension, and finally to outline a possible model of the wider utterance context in which  
39 discourse might take its place. The broader issue raised by the discussion is quite simply the  
40 interface between grammar and usage, between the language system and its potential for use  
41 of the resources it provides the user in context.

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<sup>1</sup> To avoid the impression given by the model’s English name, Mackenzie insists on its translation into languages such as Spanish and French as, respectively, Gramática Funcional-Discursivo (or Gramática Discursivo-Funcional) and Grammaire Fonctionnelle-Discursive, but not ‘Gramática Funcional del Discurso’ (cf. Mackenzie 2020: 76, n. 3) or ‘Grammaire Fonctionnelle du Discours’. However, it remains the case that the English version of the name is potentially misleading in this respect. As with the recommended Spanish and French variants, a simple way of rectifying this would be to insert a hyphen between ‘Functional’ and ‘Discourse’.

42 The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 assesses Mackenzie's (2020) arguments,  
 43 reflecting the standard FDG position laid down in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008), for  
 44 rejecting the idea that FDG can or even could be characterized as a 'grammar of discourse'; it  
 45 also discusses Mackenzie's (2014) application of certain parts of the standard model to  
 46 analyzing an authentic interactive dialogue. Section 3 puts forward the present author's  
 47 conception of the dimension 'discourse', contrasting it with Mackenzie's (2020). Section 4  
 48 evokes three areas (degrees of activation of referents in the flow of discourse, sense-selection  
 49 and the role of the lexicon, and adjectival modification and context) where recourse to  
 50 discourse factors is arguably necessary; while section 5 proposes various outline revisions to  
 51 the model, particularly in regard to its possible dovetailing with a Context-driven model of the  
 52 use of language and other resources for communication in context. This would make it  
 53 possible to take the discourse dimension fully into account. Section 6 draws together the  
 54 various strands of argument put forward in sections 2-5 and adumbrates certain conclusions.

55

## 56 **2. Mackenzie's (2020) arguments for excluding the dimension 'discourse' from the** 57 **purview of the FDG model**

58

### 59 *2.1 The standard model of FDG*

60

61 Mackenzie does not deny the potential relevance of discourse factors for the formalization  
 62 of grammatical phenomena within the FDG model. Indeed, he makes a good case for some of  
 63 the ways in which they operate strategically in any instance of communication between  
 64 humans. What he stresses throughout is that these are not hard and fast rules, unlike those  
 65 operating in terms of the purely linguistic expressions which may realize a Discourse Act.  
 66 They are merely 'tendencies', which are in principle defeasible (i.e. revisable). As in  
 67 Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 25), he supports the position adopted by Dik (1997b: 409)  
 68 that the model of the clause in Functional Grammar, and of the Discourse Act in its successor,  
 69 Functional Discourse Grammar, should be integrated with a wider model of verbal  
 70 interaction. Such a model would in principle take full account of the discursial and contextual  
 71 aspects which Mackenzie is arguing should not form part of the core model of FDG. Section 5  
 72 outlines some suggestions in this regard.

73 FDG is a modular functional–typological theory of language structure. It has two major  
 74 objectives: to put in place a typologically comprehensive model of grammar (including  
 75 pragmatics, semantics – both to a restricted degree –, morphology, syntax, phonology –  
 76 including prosody); and to characterize the potential expressions of any given language in  
 77 terms of the Discourse Acts which they may express, in relation to the speaker's perspective,  
 78 though in abstraction from any actual language use. That is, in forming and formulating a  
 79 communicative intention, specifying it pragmatically, semantically, morpho-syntactically and  
 80 phonologically. The four Components of the overall model (Grammatical, Conceptual,  
 81 Contextual and Output) and the Levels of the Grammatical component which constitutes FDG  
 82 as such (Interpersonal [pragmatic] (IL), Representational [semantic] (RL), Morphosyntactic  
 83 (ML) and Phonological (PL)), as well as the choice of Discourse Act at the Interpersonal  
 84 Level by a Speaker as the basic construct from which all else flows, are all simply tools that  
 85 serve this basic function. Thus it is the first of the two objectives indicated above that is  
 86 central, the second being instrumental to it.

87 The Contextual (henceforth Contx.Cpt) and the Conceptual (Conc.Cpt) components,  
 88 operate, for the first, at each Level in the process of characterizing a particular expression, and  
 89 for the second, at the initial stage of the formation of a particular expression in a given  
 90 language – i.e. its particular characterization acts as input to the two Levels that constitute  
 91 'Formulation', namely the IL and the RL.

92 The Contx.Cpt is closely interconnected to the operation of each Level of the core  
 93 grammatical module. Moreover, it is restricted to containing only contextual information that  
 94 is deemed relevant linguistically, including information that is non-linguistic, but  
 95 grammatically-relevant. This relates for example to certain aspects of the social relationships  
 96 holding between the interlocutors that are connected with the context of utterance.<sup>2</sup> The role  
 97 of this component is to provide a record of the preceding Discourse Acts represented in terms  
 98 of their linguistic expression, as specified at each of the Levels recognized in the grammatical  
 99 module. The restriction only to aspects of the context of a given utterance which  
 100 systematically influence the form of an element means that those aspects of that context  
 101 which are relevant as far as the interpretation, but not the form, of the incoming utterance is  
 102 concerned do not find themselves represented within the component's records of previous  
 103 utterances.

104 As for the Conc.Cpt, this is intended to contain representations of the (virtual) speaker's  
 105 communicative intentions in realizing his/her Discourse Act, as well as relevant conceptual  
 106 and world-knowledge information – but again, with the specific constraint that this  
 107 information should fulfil a systematic role in the selection and specification of given language  
 108 forms to express a particular Discourse Act. So the Conc.Cpt provides the starting point in the  
 109 progressive formation of a language expression at each of the four core Levels.

110 In Mackenzie's words (2020: 76),

111  
 112 (...) a defining principle of FDG is that elements are specified in the analysis only if they have some  
 113 consequences for the form in which a discourse act is expressed. Clearly, every  $A_1$  [the FDG variable  
 114 symbol for a Discourse Act] contains an illocution defining the type of speech act to be encoded  
 115 (distinguished in morphosyntactic and/or phonological structure), and no  $A_1$  lacks at least some  
 116 communicated content.  
 117

118 Just prior to this, he states that 'the discourse act (symbolized as  $A_1$ ) is the central concept of  
 119 the interpersonal Level of analysis within FDG. The inner structure of  $A_1$  contains four  
 120 elements (...):

121  
 122 An indication of the type of Illocution ( $F_1$ )  
 123 A variable identifying the Speaker ( $P_1$ )<sub>S</sub>  
 124 A variable identifying the Addressee ( $P_2$ )<sub>A</sub>  
 125 The Communicated Content ( $C_1$ )'  
 126

127 Let us look more closely at the four defining principles that are claimed to lie behind the  
 128 Discourse Act in FDG, the construct upon which the machinery of the core grammar operates  
 129 to terminate eventually in a language expression.

130 First, the 'indication of the type of illocution'. It is clear that a discourse act, in its usual  
 131 sense, carries a type of illocution, which is what essentially characterizes it: a promise, a  
 132 warning, an order, a request, and so on. However, this is not what is understood by  
 133 'Illocution' in an FDG derivation. See Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 68-84) on the way in  
 134 which this dimension is handled in FDG. What is of primary interest to the model is the

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<sup>2</sup> As with the FDG conception of 'Illocution' (see below), the Speaker and Addressee are represented as variables whose presence is simply to allow them to be set for values realised by grammatical factors: the Addressee is marked either for the familiar variant ('T') or the polite, distal one ('V') in languages which recognize the 'T/V' distinction for coding addressees. Another value is that of the Speaker's sex, again where languages (such as French or Spanish) recognize such a distinction grammatically (e.g. French 'Je suis heureux (m.)' for a male speaker, vs. 'je suis heureuse (f.)' for a female one, for 'I am happy').

135 linguistic realization of a restricted set of illocutions, namely those relating to performative  
 136 verbs, certain interjections, and ‘abstract’ illocutionary predicates in the shape of the  
 137 grammatical moods (see (1) below for the latter). An abstract illocution is said to be an  
 138 ‘implicit performative’ (p. 70), with the participants in the communication at issue normally  
 139 remaining implicit too. Only those ‘abstract illocutionary primitives’ whose grammatical form  
 140 is recognized by a given language are retained by the model. To this end, the six grammatical  
 141 moods recognized for English are as follows.  
 142

- 143 (1) Declarative (DECL): ‘the Speaker informs the Addressee of the Propositional  
 144 Content evoked by the Communicated Content’ (p. 71)  
 145 Interrogative (INTER): ‘the Speaker requests the Addressee’s response to the  
 146 Propositional Content evoked by the Communicated Content’ (p. 71)  
 147 Imperative (IMPER): ‘The Speaker directs the Addressee to carry out the action  
 148 evoked by the Communicated Content’ (p. 71)  
 149 Optative (OPT): ‘The Speaker indicates to the Addressee his/her wish that the  
 150 positive situation evoked by the Communicative Context should come about’ (p.  
 151 71)  
 152 Hortative (HORT): ‘The Speaker encourages himself or an addressee together with  
 153 himself to carry out the action evoked by the Communicative Context’ (p. 72)  
 154 Mirative (MIR): ‘The Speaker expresses his surprise about the Propositional Content  
 155 evoked by the Communicated Content’ (p. 72)  
 156

157 Revealingly, Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 70) refer approvingly to ‘Illocution’ in their  
 158 sense as ‘...often called sentence type’. However, as is well known, in general there is no  
 159 one-to-one correlation between types of mood and types of illocution, as the authors also  
 160 recognize (cf. 2008: 68).<sup>3</sup> Also of course, illocutions may well be realized via expressions  
 161 other than the grammatical moods, performative verbs or certain interjections, even via  
 162 intonation alone. So the term ‘illocution’ is something of a misnomer here, it would seem.<sup>4</sup>  
 163 This also has implications for the characterization of speaker and addressee, as we shall see.

164 The contents of the six mood types specified in (1) are very general types of meaning  
 165 value, as befits grammatical meanings, as here. As a result, it is surely rare that only these will  
 166 be retained in context by an understander. Moreover, each mood type may give rise to a  
 167 variety of other illocution types in context.<sup>5</sup> Mey (2020: 86) characterizes such acts based on  
 168 speaker’s intentions, as in the classical definition of ‘speech acts’, as “‘egocentric’ acts,  
 169 originating in, and oriented toward a single speaker/hearer (in acts that are not just of speech)  
 170 ...vs. pluricentric acts, involving several interactants.’

171 Now, a discourse act as generally understood is carried out by a speaker in relation to at  
 172 least one addressee in some particular context in order to achieve a communicative goal,  
 173 where, as in Mey’s (2020: 86) characterization (cf. also Witek, 2015), the addressee in fact  
 174 has a crucial pro-active role to play in its successful realization. Hansen & Terkourafi (2023)  
 175 give as example the case of bets, where the nature of the addressee’s uptake (see Sbisà 2009)

<sup>3</sup> See Witek (2015) for a detailed discussion of how illocutions operate in interactive discourse.

<sup>4</sup> See also the point made in this respect in §2.2.

<sup>5</sup> See Eesa & Nayyef (2012) for a method of characterizing what they call ‘primary’ (i.e. indirect or implicit) illocutions within the standard FDG illocution frames, by involving both the Conc.Cpt and the Contx. Components within them for this very purpose. The Conc.Cpt is mobilized for characterizing the basic (“secondary”) illocution derived from the mood of the clause at issue, while the Contx.Cpt is harnessed to specify the “primary”, indirect illocution conventionally associated with it. However, given that no complementary model of the wider utterance context, such as that outlined in §5 below, is available to motivate the particular indirect illocution in question, it is not at all clear how the latter is to be derived.

176 has a major effect on the type of illocution at issue (either as a ‘bet’ if the latter commits to  
 177 the speaker’s proposal, or just as a prediction, if no overt uptake is forthcoming):

178 (2) A. I bet you £50 we’ll have a general election before the end of the year. – B. You’re  
 179 on. (Hansen & Terkourafi 2023: 102, ex. (6))

180 Clearly, as a default, there will be a particular speaker and an addressee involved, in the  
 181 context of the prototypical case of a spoken face-to-face interaction. However, although in  
 182 FDG there are in principle variables for Speaker and Addressee made available at the IL,  
 183 these are merely...variables. There is no actual speaker and no actual addressee to take part in  
 184 the Discourse Act at issue (see also note 2).

185 This is surely important for a functionalist model such as FDG that takes the Discourse Act  
 186 as its starting point. For if the crucial feature corresponding to a particular illocution, as this  
 187 term is generally understood in linguistics, is taken into account as a key aspect of such an  
 188 act, then according to the particular type of illocution selected, the relationship between  
 189 speaker and addressee will change. An order, for example, places the speaker at an advantage  
 190 with regard to the addressee, who, according to the degree of authority vested in the speaker,  
 191 may have no choice but to carry out the action ordered. But in the case of a request, the roles  
 192 are reversed, in the sense that it is the addressee who has the choice to grant or not grant what  
 193 is being requested. In the case of a warning, the speaker has an advantage, yet tacitly eschews  
 194 any responsibility for the addressee’s ignoring it (Sbisà 2009: 45); and the addressee, also  
 195 unlike with a canonical order, has a degree of leeway either to conform to the warning in  
 196 question, or not (see (3) in §2.2 for illustration). With a promise, it is the addressee who  
 197 clearly assumes the advantage, the speaker committing him/herself to the course of action or  
 198 object promised.

199 However, none of these types of psycho-socially relevant relationships may be represented  
 200 at the IL, since the actual illocution associated with a Discourse Act, which can effectively  
 201 only be characterized when the full communicative context of a given utterance is made  
 202 available, is not represented there. A further important feature needing to be potentially  
 203 assigned to the speaker (or to a reported speaker in the case of an indirect speech occurrence)  
 204 is the source of the point of view being expressed in any given utterance.<sup>6</sup>

205 Finally, within the Communicated Content, the potential sub-acts of Reference and  
 206 Predication (‘Ascription’) are once again represented by variables (respectively  $R_1$  and  $T_1$ ).

207 Regarding the indexed symbol ‘ $R_1$ ’ that occurs in Interpersonal representations in the  
 208 model, this variable (like those used for Speaker and Addressee) in no way involves a  
 209 representation of an actual referent: it is only present in IL schemas as a placeholder for a  
 210 Subact of Reference, in order to allow a potential predicate expression (verb, adjective etc.) to  
 211 ascribe a property to it, in accordance with the particular expression yielded at the Output  
 212 stage in a derivation. The content of a still only ‘virtual’ referent at this level is fleshed out at  
 213 the RL. This may be individual, set, generic or variable, as well as assuming a variety of  
 214 ontological statuses: physical object, eventive (i.e. an action, an activity or a state) or  
 215 conceptual, for example. Again, such entities may only be properly represented in a fully  
 216 worked-out discourse representation which takes into account the kinds of textual, contextual  
 217 as well as discourse features outlined in §§3-5 below.

218 Thus there is a fundamental ambivalence in the way the model is structured (cf. Butler  
 219 2013, Cornish 2013): it is said to parallel, but only in abstract, theoretical terms (from the  
 220 perspective of the analyst, not of a speaker *per se*), the stages gone through by a speaker of a

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Dancygier (2017) on viewpoint and its functioning in discourse.

221 language,<sup>7</sup> as we have seen. Indeed, the architects of the model are at pains to stress that the  
 222 model is **not** a model of the speaker *per se*, rather a device for accounting for the properties of  
 223 language expressions (potentially within any natural language) within a functional-typological  
 224 framework. So in effect, it is a model of grammar, not of language (cf. Butler 2013: 27), as  
 225 can also be deduced from the very title of Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008): *Functional*  
 226 *Discourse Grammar: A typologically-based theory of language structure*. Thus the outputs of  
 227 the core model are expression types, rather than tokens. Hence here is a tension between the  
 228 dual concerns of characterizing the language system and the demands made on it by the use of  
 229 its resources in actual communication in context. The terms and notions used by the model  
 230 (the abstract and indirect modelling of the grammar as a function of the stages a Speaker is  
 231 claimed to go through in forming a communicative intention, fleshing it out and subsequently  
 232 expressing it, ‘discourse’, ‘Discourse Act’, ‘illocution’, the participants involved in a DA  
 233 (‘Speaker’ and ‘Addressee’), and the ‘Subacts’ of ‘Reference’ and ‘Ascription’ within the  
 234 ‘Communicated Content’) all strongly suggest that we are dealing with the **use** of language in  
 235 context; however, this is not at all the case, in fact: for the overriding purpose of the model, as  
 236 already mentioned, is to characterize the range of language expressions potentially existing in  
 237 every language of the world. It is here that the FDG model’s basic ambivalence lies.

238 Now, on the one hand, it is certainly true that a model purporting to characterize the  
 239 multifarious expressions in the languages of the world could never take into account in a  
 240 systematic manner the whole, vast range of factors associated with the conceptualization of  
 241 the meanings of those expressions and their contextualization, as Mackenzie rightly claims.  
 242 But on the other, this is in a sense something of a ‘straw man’: for it is nonetheless true, more  
 243 restrictively, that it is still the case that there is a much greater variety of ways in which types  
 244 of context may impinge on the meaning and communicative function of these resources than  
 245 those recognized by the model (cf. in particular, Butler 2013). And it is here that the model  
 246 needs to take on board the influences that such ways have on the forms, conceived as  
 247 resources for communication, made available for the participants in any communicative  
 248 event. See section 5 below for some outline suggestions in this regard.

## 249 2.2. An application of the FDG model to instances of actual language use in context

252 Mackenzie (2014) analyses a series of recorded oral interactions drawn from Eggins &  
 253 Slade (2005) between a young Australian man, Brad, and his parents, Fran and Dave. At the  
 254 outset, he maintains that Fran’s turn 2 in extract (2) (p. 260), i.e. ‘Does he?’ in response to  
 255 Brad’s previous utterance ‘He plays the double bass’, should arguably not be characterized as  
 256 an Interrogative Illocution, since it counts as a ‘backchannel, although formally interrogative’  
 257 (p. 261). This characterization, via the use of the term ‘Interrogative Illocution’, is likely to be  
 258 misleading for a reader unfamiliar with either FG or FDG. For it reflects these models’  
 259 conception of illocution as being in one sense a property of the grammatical moods: see (1) in  
 260 §2.1 above. The mood is certainly ‘interrogative’ in this instance, but the way the speaker  
 261 intends it in relation to the preceding discourse has a different value (see the relevant  
 262 discussion above in §2.1): requesting confirmation of what has just been said, rather than  
 263 hearer-new information as such. This instance would seem to be analogous to what is going  
 264 on in example (3):

- 266 (3) [Printed sticker on rear window of cars in UK]  
 267 *Mind that child! He may be deaf*

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<sup>7</sup> See Levelt (1989) for an authoritative psycho-cognitive account of the speaker.

269 Here the initial clause *Mind that child!* is imperative in terms of grammatical mood, but its  
 270 illocutionary import in context amounts to a warning rather than an ‘order’ etc. Hence, as  
 271 already pointed out, it is misleading to seek to specify the ‘illocution’ chiefly in terms of  
 272 given sentence types within a Discourse Act: after all, the principal linguistic correlate of this  
 273 pragmatic value, which is all that the core FDG model is intended to capture, is the  
 274 grammatical mood at issue: the actual ‘illocution’ with which it may be associated is only  
 275 invocable when the utterance is associated with a relevant discourse context; and this of  
 276 course will inevitably involve an interlocutor or an anticipated reader (in the case of the  
 277 written message in (3)).

278 In conformity with FDG’s founding principle, Mackenzie’s interest in analysing these  
 279 dialogic extracts lies in their purely formal aspects, such as priming, ellipses, repetitions and  
 280 so on, which operate on the record of previous utterances made by the Contx.Cpt. The author  
 281 insists throughout on the usefulness of FDG’s Contx.Cpt in providing a record of the  
 282 preceding co-text in dialogues such as these, in the sense that it enables the model to capture  
 283 these kinds of features. But retaining only these formal features in a dialogue, and excluding  
 284 any characterization of the upshot or point of such features in terms of the interaction at issue,  
 285 is to cover only part of the process – though of course this latter concern is beyond the  
 286 model’s stated scope. See Haselow (2017) in particular for an in-depth analysis of how such  
 287 formal features and many others actually serve users’ motivations in engaging in spoken  
 288 interactive dialogues in English.

289 Notwithstanding, Mackenzie does pick up a number of important aspects of what is  
 290 actually going on in these exchanges –i.e. what I would argue should come under the heading  
 291 of ‘discourse’, in the present sense: see §3. Yet none of these can possibly be captured within  
 292 the FDG model as currently constituted, since it only takes into account aspects that relate  
 293 systematically to language structure and form. In connection with the extract in (10) (pp. 264-  
 294 265) (reproduced below as (4)), he writes (p. 265) that ‘The temporary failure to communicate  
 295 does not undermine the process of mutual alignment and does not jeopardize the continuance  
 296 of the conversation; rather the entire incident passes unnoticed and un-commented’.

- 297  
 298 (4) 20 Dave *When are you gonna do...all your odds ’n sods subjects?*  
 299 21 Brad *Whaddya mean ‘odds ’n sods subjects’?*  
 300 22 Dave *Well, y’know, you can’t just do languages can you?*  
 301 23 Brad *Whaddya talking about?*  
 302 24 Dave (i) *If you’re going to do an Arts degree*  
 303 (ii) *You got a lot of other garbage to do*  
 304 25 Brad (i) *No*  
 305 (ii) *I*  
 306 (iii) *If I wanted to*  
 307 (iv) *I could do French, German and Russian...*  
 308  
 309  
 310 31 Brad (i) *In an Arts degree*  
 311 (ii) *As long as you do...a few General Studies subjects*  
 312 32 Dave (i) *That’s what I mean*  
 313 (ii) *And when are you gonna do your General Studies?* (Extract (10) from  
 314 Eggins & Slade 2005: 67-71 cited by Mackenzie 2014: 264-5)  
 315

316 But this does not in fact seem to characterize what is going on in this extract. Mackenzie  
 317 mentioned earlier (p. 265) that both Brad and Dave are ‘using egocentric processing’, a  
 318 feature which the author endorses elsewhere in the article: see his comment on p. 260 that  
 319 ‘egocentric processing is partner-adjusted processing’. However, see Dickinson & Givón  
 320 (2000: 163) on the incorrectness of such a claim: ‘The curious fiction that some forms of

321 human discourse are not hearer-oriented is just that: fiction.’ For in reality, it is surely  
 322 precisely ‘egocentric processing’ that is the source of the difficulties in understanding each  
 323 other that is clearly evident here, as elsewhere in the transcript of the full recording given at  
 324 the end of Mackenzie’s article.

325 Dave’s initial question in turn 20 in (4) refers indirectly to the ancillary or subsidiary  
 326 University subjects which his son Brad will inevitably be taking in addition to his main  
 327 degree one(s) as ‘odds ’n sods subjects’. However, he does not take Brad’s question about  
 328 what he means by this expression as relating to what exactly is intended; but, still referring  
 329 indirectly to the referent at issue dismissively as ‘other garbage’, rather as insisting that he  
 330 (Brad) would not in fact be obliged to register for such subjects at all (hence Dave’s turn 22).  
 331 So the misunderstanding evident from Dave’s initial question in fact gives rise to yet another  
 332 misunderstanding from Brad’s initial answer. It is not until Brad refers to the notions at issue  
 333 in turn 31(ii) in saying ‘As long as you do... a few General Studies subjects’ that Dave  
 334 realizes his son has hit on what it was he wanted to ask him about, and confirms this  
 335 interpretation.

336 At a more general level, it would seem that Brad’s parents have continual difficulties in  
 337 fully understanding what their son is saying throughout the extracts given, for two basic  
 338 reasons. First, Brad’s often incoherent, inexplicit, fragmentary mode of expressing himself,  
 339 and second, his parents’ relative unfamiliarity with the University courses he mentions. So it  
 340 is not at all unexpected that there would be so many communicative breakdowns throughout.  
 341 For the record, these occur in extracts (7) (p. 263), (8) (p. 264) and (10) (pp. 264-5: ex. (4)  
 342 above). Here, the communicative difficulty raised by Brad in turn 21 with regard to Dave’s  
 343 unclear question in turn 20 is not totally cleared up until Dave’s turn 32 (‘That’s what I  
 344 mean’), i.e. after fully 10 intervening turns. The complete transcript at the end of the article  
 345 shows yet another such hitch, in turns 12-13 (p. 267). So all these **are** in fact ‘jeopardizing the  
 346 continuance of the conversation’, and are not ‘incident[s] pass[ing] unnoticed’, even though  
 347 they are indeed ‘uncommented’.

348 See e.g. Jefferson (2017) for a large number of attested examples of communicative errors,  
 349 disfluencies and hitches of different sorts in extracts from unplanned American English  
 350 dialogic speech, and the ways in which the speakers and/or their interlocutors repaired them.

351

### 352 **3. What exactly is ‘discourse’?**

353

#### 354 *3.1 Defining discourse*

355

356 Mackenzie (2020: 76) gives the following characterization of the dimension ‘discourse’:

357

358 ...discourse is seen as actional in nature, the result of one human being’s expenditure of  
 359 energy in an effort to communicate thoughts, feelings, requests, warnings, etc. to other human  
 360 beings. This overall activity is divided into discourse acts: many are expressed as clauses, but  
 361 they may just as well show up as a non-clausal succession of phrases, a single phrase, a single  
 362 word or a combination of clauses.

363

364 The attribute ‘actional’ (or ‘dynamic’) in connection with ‘discourse’ is entirely accurate, as is  
 365 the claim that discourse is the result of participants’ efforts to communicate a variety of  
 366 feelings and ideas to others. But this characterization omits the crucial factor of the  
 367 contribution of the ‘other human beings’ (i.e. addressee(s)) in this activity. That is, discourse



368 is the result of a **co**-construction (see Haugh 2010), rather than simply involving a one-way  
 369 transfer from speaker to addressee(s).<sup>8</sup>

370 Hence the definition clearly needs expanding and refining. In the present sense, discourse  
 371 is the situated, ever-evolving, revisable interpretation of a particular communicative event,  
 372 which is jointly constructed mentally by the discourse participants as the text and a relevant  
 373 context are perceived and evoked, respectively. This interpretation will subsequently be  
 374 converted into an overall mental representation, capable of being stored in long-term memory  
 375 (see also Langacker's 2001: 180 comparable notion of 'consolidation', as well as Dickinson  
 376 & Givón 2000: 159 and Dik 1997b: 213-214). See Cornish (2022) for further details of this  
 377 conception. The characterizations given in Langacker (2001), as well as Van Dijk (2008),<sup>9</sup>  
 378 correspond closely to the present conception of discourse, as outlined above.

379 Discourse is created by the co-participants in a communicative event initially by  
 380 contextualizing the incoming utterance, using a variety of contextual cues for this purpose:<sup>10</sup>  
 381 not only the text of the utterances, conceived broadly to include prosody and paralinguistic as  
 382 well as gestural signals in the spoken medium, and punctuation, underlines, italics, boldface  
 383 as well as text layout in the written: see the second quotation from Van Dijk (2008: 116),  
 384 given in note 9; but also features of the context of utterance, the occasion of the  
 385 communicative event, the preceding co-text as well as the discourse already constructed, the  
 386 domain of reference involved in the exchange, the ever-evolving relationship between the  
 387 discourse partners, and so on. A short written informative newspaper text illustrates:

388  
 389 (5) ***Business groups brand UK's quarantine plan for arrivals 'isolationist'***

390 (...) *From 8 June, almost everyone arriving at ports and airports, including UK*  
 391 *citizens, will be required to travel directly to an address they provide to the*  
 392 *authorities, where they must then self-isolate for a fortnight. The French interior*  
 393 *ministry expressed its 'regret' that it would not be exempt from the quarantine*  
 394 *plan, after assurances this month that the country would be. (The Guardian On-*  
 395 *Line, 22/05/20)*

396  
 397 First of all, the year in which the date 8<sup>th</sup> June is relevant is of course the year of publication  
 398 by this edition of *The Guardian On-Line*, namely 2020. Given the source of this extract, it  
 399 will be understood that the 'ports and airports' referred to in line 1 are British ones. The  
 400 restriction to 'almost everyone' in line 1 clearly implies that there will be certain exemptions  
 401 from the new ruling, which is indeed the case, as a companion article in the same edition  
 402 states. The phrase in apposition in line 1 'including UK citizens' is added since British  
 403 citizens reading this short text may well feel prior to this point that the restriction in question  
 404 would apply only to **non**-UK citizens; thus that they themselves would not be concerned by  
 405 the new ruling. In fact, this phrase refers to members of the British armed forces, medical  
 406 specialists and so on. The journalist has anticipated this possible misinterpretation, and hence  
 407 has rectified it.

---

<sup>8</sup> As Mey (2020: 92) expresses it, '...A **dis**-course deserving of its name is based on interaction (...). The prefix in 'discourse' is rather like the Latin '*dis*-', when conveying a sense of 'to and fro', 'back and forth', of 'going over' a topic in various separate moves in order to shed light on the latter from many different angles.'

<sup>9</sup> Van Dijk's conception of discourse is 'any form of language use manifested as (written) text or (spoken) talk-in-interaction, in a broad semiotic sense' (2008: 116). He goes on to write 'This includes visual structures, such as layout, letter type or pictures for writers of printed text, and gestures, facework and other semiotic signs for spoken interaction'.

<sup>10</sup> See also Taylor (2012: 155) who argues that 'compositionality' of complex expressions occurs in understanding, not in terms of the 'stored meanings of the constituent words', but rather in terms of their 'contextualized readings'. This is also the case, Taylor claims, as far as the entailments and presuppositions derived from the expression are concerned.

408 The ‘address they [i.e. travelers arriving at a UK port or airport on or after 8<sup>th</sup> June 2020]  
 409 provide to the authorities’ [in this case, certainly, the UK Immigration Office] will also be  
 410 assumed necessarily to be somewhere within the UK. The pronoun *it* in line 4 would seem at  
 411 first sight to refer back to ‘the French Interior Ministry’. However, this interpretation would  
 412 clearly result in an incoherent discourse segment, since this institution could not be  
 413 understood as ‘potentially travelling to the UK after 08/06/20’. It must be read as referring  
 414 metonymically to France, in particular, the French citizens travelling to the UK whom the  
 415 ministry concerned is designed to protect; and indeed, this interpretation is confirmed by the  
 416 more explicit anadeictic<sup>11</sup> reference of the definite NP *the country* [i.e. ‘France’] in line 5,  
 417 also a metonymic reference.

418 The ‘assurances’ given prior to the announcement of the starting date for self-isolation by  
 419 travelers will be assumed to have been made by the UK government. Furthermore, these may  
 420 be inferred as having been given in May 2020: cf. the occurrence of the deictic NP *this month*,  
 421 i.e. the month in which the edition containing the article appeared.

422 The title of the article (‘Business groups brand UK’s quarantine plan for arrivals  
 423 “isolationist”’) will be interpreted as giving rise to what Relevance theorists term a ‘higher-  
 424 level explicature’, relating to what the reader will understand had motivated the source of the  
 425 claim in making it: namely, that an ‘isolationist’ move corresponding to the government’s  
 426 quarantine plan would inevitably mean fewer business, tourist and other travelers to Britain,  
 427 the majority being put off by this somewhat draconian decision at what is the highpoint of the  
 428 holiday season; hence there would be fewer opportunities for ‘business groups’ to profit from  
 429 their trade. Note also the difference in viewpoint associated with this title, in relation to the  
 430 primary one expressed in the text proper: namely that of the UK government of the time.

431 It is clear from this analysis that texts, even carefully elaborated written ones,  
 432 underdetermine the discourse that may be derived from them, together with the invocation of  
 433 a relevant context. The many inferences drawn by the reader of (5) serve to ‘fill in’ the gaps  
 434 (incomplete connections) left by the journalist. Such inferences are often drawn on the basis  
 435 of the recipient’s knowledge of the world and the culture and communicative conventions (in  
 436 particular, genre-based ones) which the language used assumes. Contextualization also  
 437 involves selecting for given lexemes the sense which fits most coherently with the prevailing  
 438 context, where there are several possible ones,<sup>12</sup> setting the value of modal auxiliaries,  
 439 invoking the most likely illocution associated with the utterance, and of course resolving any  
 440 indexical expressions.

441 The majority of these expansions correspond to what are termed ‘explicatures’ in  
 442 Relevance Theory. An explicature in RT is a context-derived interpretation establishing the  
 443 full proposition expressed by an utterance: e.g. by resolving ellipses and other indexical  
 444 markers, carrying out disambiguations, invoking the unexpressed actors involved in the state  
 445 of affairs at issue, situating the event evoked in both time and space, and so on. Once  
 446 established, the explicatures can serve as premises for the drawing of implicatures: see

---

<sup>11</sup> An anadeictic reference involves a hybrid of deictic and anaphoric values, in various different proportions according to the particular use. It is used prototypically for indexical retrievals of referents which were previously topical and salient, but whose topicality has faded at the point of use, or which have only just been introduced into a discourse and are not yet topical and salient. Examples are *that child* in (3), a ‘recognitional’ anadeictic occurrence, *that* in Dave’s turn 32(i) in (4), and *the country* in (5) (line 5).

<sup>12</sup> See Levelt (1989: Ch. 6) on the lemmas associated with given lexemes: a lemma comprises the semantic and syntactic properties of a given lexeme, minus its phonological ones. The choice of a given lemma by speaker/writer as well as addressee/reader is crucial in the construction of a discourse representation based on a text and a relevant context. In (3), for example, the transitive verb *mind* will be understood as meaning ‘watch out for’ or ‘pay attention to’, rather than ‘look after’ (as in the phrase *child-minding*), or ‘be disturbed by’, as in ‘Would you mind if I smoked?’. This is yet another instance of an explicature (cf. Carston & Hall 2012: 60-62).

447 Carston & Hall (2012) for the distinction. The interpretation (i.e. the discourse) which the  
 448 understander constructs is clearly constrained by the principle of coherence, as we have seen.

449

### 450 3.2 Discourse: structure-building aspects

451

452 Regarding discourse-internal structure, once the incoming utterance has been appropriately  
 453 contextualized, the resulting construct will be converted into a discourse unit. What then  
 454 needs to occur is its integration with the discourse already constructed upstream of the current  
 455 utterance, i.e. the creation of a higher-level discourse unit. It is here that the principle of  
 456 coherence comes into play, based on the nature of what is predicated of particular entities, the  
 457 event structure involved, and other such factors (see §5 for further details). Discourse is  
 458 conceived mentally and is hierarchically structured (cf. e.g. Parisi & Castelfranchi 1977),  
 459 unlike text, which, at the initial stage of processing, is arguably purely linear, being the  
 460 physical trace left by a speaker for the recipient to interpret the former's communicative  
 461 intentions: see Cornish (2022) for this claim.

462 To illustrate, in (3), it is the first discourse unit, corresponding to the initial sentence, that  
 463 constitutes the central unit, constituting a warning to motorists. The second discourse unit is a  
 464 discursively dependent one, despite its main clause status as a unit of text. Witness the  
 465 presence in subject position of a 3<sup>rd</sup> person pronoun, picking up the variable representation of  
 466 one type of child pedestrian introduced by the first discourse unit. This representation is  
 467 further narrowed to a type of deaf child, implied as being potentially incautious (as a function  
 468 of his/her deafness) regarding the oncoming traffic. This unit will be integrated with the first  
 469 in terms of the relation *Explanation*, overlain by *Justification*.

470 In (4), Dave's utterance in turn 22 will be integrated as a discourse unit with his previous  
 471 question in turn 20, presupposing that his son Brad will inevitably have to take certain  
 472 ancillary subjects ('odds 'n sods subjects') at his University. This integration will again occur  
 473 in terms of an *Explanation* relation overlain with a *Justification* one – given Brad's evident  
 474 indication in turn 21 that he cannot understand what his father meant by 'odds 'n sods  
 475 subjects'. The discourse unit corresponding to turn 22 is thus the dependent one, that  
 476 correlating with turn 20 being the central one.

477 Finally, in (5), the complex modifying PP introduced by *after* in the second sentence will  
 478 be integrated discursively with the unit corresponding to the first clause of the second  
 479 sentence in terms of a *Concession* relation. Here there is a mismatch between the textual and  
 480 the discourse ordering: for the dependent discourse unit corresponding to the subsequently  
 481 occurring PP will precede discursively the unit correlating with the prior textual constituent,  
 482 i.e. the first clause of the second sentence of this short text: ALTHOUGH X, NONETHELESS Y,  
 483 where X corresponds (informally) to 'The UK government gave the French government  
 484 assurances in May 2020 that travelers entering the UK from France as from 08/06/20 would  
 485 be exempt from the new restrictions on entry to the UK'; and Y to 'Travelers from France  
 486 were in fact affected by the entry restrictions post-08/06/20'.

487 In terms of the broader structure of discourse, Mackenzie (2020: 79), for his part, briefly  
 488 evokes Dik's (1997b: 424-5; 430-431) reporting in general terms the structure of two types of  
 489 discourse: namely, the abstract structures of a job interview (see (12) in Dik 1997b: 424) and  
 490 of an oral narrative (see (20), p. 431). The first type, Mackenzie dismisses as merely an  
 491 administrative convenience in order to avoid the interview turning into a kind of 'stream-of-  
 492 consciousness' series of digressions on the part of the interviewee, and nothing more than  
 493 this. The second is criticized for being purely *ad hoc*, with no claim attached to it as ruling in  
 494 permissible structures and excluding impermissible ones: i.e. it would have no pretention to  
 495 being a formal model of discourse, analogous to a canonical grammar of a language.

496 Regarding the job interview structure cited by Dik (1997b) from Komter (1987, 1990), on  
 497 p. 425 the former reports the latter as stating that the type of structure presented as (12) (p.  
 498 424) ‘is a recurrent pattern in a great variety of job interviews’, is therefore ‘not simply an  
 499 observer’s artefact’, and is ‘continuously reflected in the actual behaviour of the participants’.  
 500 So such structures would indeed seem to bear a degree of psychological reality for the  
 501 subjects involved. Mackenzie’s dismissal of such analyses as being theoretically  
 502 unsubstantiated would seem in fact to have no force: after all, discourse is not a strictly rule-  
 503 governed, formal phenomenon; rather, it is essentially a defeasible (i.e. revisable) process  
 504 involving decisions based on defaults which may or may not turn out to be grounded. See also  
 505 Parisi & Castelfranchi’s (1977: 66) point that ‘Much of the structure of discourse (...)’  
 506 remains implicit and cannot be directly observed’. This important property clearly rules out  
 507 the possibility of discourse ever being characterized in terms of a ‘grammar of discourse’.

508 Notwithstanding, at the end of his insightful chapter 18 on discourse (1997b: 441), Dik  
 509 claims that ‘FG should ultimately develop into (...) [a grammatical] model [that takes entire  
 510 discourses rather than clauses into account as its input]’. But this highly ambitious project,  
 511 rejected for FDG by the model’s architects, as we have seen, can only be envisaged in terms  
 512 of its being dovetailed with the clause-based (FG) or Discourse-Act-grounded (FDG)  
 513 grammar model, but not incorporated **within** either of the latter, as Dik is implying for FG;  
 514 rather, conceived as a separate, Context-driven model in complementarity with the core,  
 515 pattern one. See §5 for an outline of some suggestions in this regard.

516

#### 517 **4. Areas where a discourse dimension is arguably needed**

518

519 Three such areas are the relative degrees of activation of referents in the flow of discourse,  
 520 sense selection and the role of the lexicon, and adjectival modification and context.

521

##### 522 *4.1 Relative degrees of referent activation*

523

524 Regarding the first area, as an integral part of the construction of a developing discourse  
 525 representation, there should be a device that assigns and re-assigns, as the discourse unfolds,  
 526 particular saliency or activation levels to each of the referents evoked in the discourse. This  
 527 requirement is covered, in large part, by the ‘Update’, ‘Embark’, ‘Retrieve’ and  
 528 ‘Differentiate’ functions, in addition to the concept of ‘Standpoint’, posited by Connolly  
 529 (2018: 12-13) as developments of the Conceptual component.

530 As for FDG’s Contextual Component, see Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2014) on the way this  
 531 is claimed to function. As each incoming clause is represented at the four core Grammatical  
 532 Levels, these representations are copied within the Contextual Component in stacked form in  
 533 terms of the order of occurrence of their exponent expressions. The claim is that this purely  
 534 linear relationship, by having each individual referent’s saliency level ‘supplanted’ by a more  
 535 recently-introduced entity, models the latter’s relative degree of saliency. However, by being  
 536 retrieved anaphorically via an attenuated indexical expression, a given referent’s previous  
 537 saliency level is maintained.

538 Yet this purely quantitative, co-textual method, based solely on the order of mention of the  
 539 referents involved, does not always accurately predict the actual cognitive centrality of  
 540 referents at the point of retrieval. For this, it is necessary to take discourse considerations into  
 541 account: see §3 and Cornish (2022: 99-101) for details. Examples (6)-(8) show that the FDG  
 542 procedure would make unfounded or misleading predictions regarding the interpretations in  
 543 context of the indexical expressions therein:

544

545 (6) *We've grown used to Cameron being the smartest person on screen, but there's a*  
 546 *real danger here of him being outwitted by a Banksy-style street artist with whom*  
 547 *he has past beef. This mysterious man with an aerosol can once dissed the*  
 548 *magician in a very public way (...). (ex. (4), Cornish 2022: 96: Synopsis of an*  
 549 *episode in the TV series 'Alibi', Radio Times 14-20.08.21, p. 101)*  
 550

551 In (6), it is because the proximal demonstrative NP at the start of the second sentence  
 552 specifically switches the discourse spotlight onto the second-mentioned referent that it  
 553 receives local salience, and not simply because this entity is more recently mentioned *per se*.  
 554 The local topic entity then is, temporarily, Cameron's rival, the street artist. It is this  
 555 discourse-related factor that confers a provisionally higher saliency level onto the latter than  
 556 to the former.  
 557

558 (7) *A militant Palestinian splinter group, the Islamic Army, has demanded that*  
 559 *Britain release a Muslim cleric in return for the freedom of BBC reporter Alan*  
 560 *Johnston. He was kidnapped on March 12. (ex. (5), Cornish 2022: 96: Article*  
 561 *'Militants want cleric freed', Guardian Weekly, 18/05/07, p. 2))*  
 562

563 Here, a pronoun is used in line 3 to retrieve the second-mentioned of the two male humans  
 564 evoked; and yet, for the reasons given in Cornish (2022: 96-7), the resulting discourse is  
 565 infelicitous (i.e. locally incoherent). This is so since its intended referent is manifestly not yet  
 566 salient at the point of the attempted retrieval, despite its having been second-mentioned: for  
 567 the predication on Alan Johnston constitutes in discourse terms a background comment on the  
 568 latter. It clearly does not continue the main line of the discourse, dealing with the Muslim  
 569 cleric then held in custody in the UK. It is this factor which has made it unnatural to refer  
 570 back to AJ via a pronoun, as opposed to using a definite NP.

571 Finally, in (8),  
 572

573 (8) *Enver [father of artist Tracey Emin] went bankrupt and left when she was seven,*  
 574 *and she squatted with her mother Pam and twin Paul in a staff cottage. 'Mum*  
 575 *crept into the hotel to steal lead piping to sell so we could eat.' She disliked*  
 576 *school and was not happy – a useful incubator for creativity... (ex. (7), Cornish*  
 577 *2022: 98. Interview with T. Emin, Radio Times 18-24/08/01, p. 32)*  
 578

579 the referent 'TE's mother' is second-mentioned in regard to 'Tracey Emin'; and yet the  
 580 pronoun *she*, subject of the final sentence, could in no way be interpreted as referring back to  
 581 the former of the two female referents. For the quotation in the second sentence by the subject  
 582 of the interview, Tracey Emin, interrupts the main line of this expository discourse. Once the  
 583 parenthetical is complete, it is 'closed down', in discourse terms, and the pronoun *she* in the  
 584 unit-continuing sentence that follows can only refer back to TE. So again, TE's mother being  
 585 second-mentioned here cannot be seen as *ipso facto* conferring relatively higher saliency to it  
 586 than to the previously mentioned one.<sup>13</sup>  
 587

#### 588 4.2 Sense selection and the role of the lexicon

589  
 590 As regards the question of sense-selection and the role of the lexicon, as suggested in §3 (see  
 591 notes 10 and 12), for the purposes of discourse construction, the operation of Formulation in

---

<sup>13</sup> See also the critical remarks in Cornish (2013: 91-3) on FDG's accounts of the operation of 'phoric' and 'deictic' uses of pronouns and demonstratives.

592 FDG (the output of the IL and RL representations) needs to be guided at the highest level by  
 593 the lemmas of given lexemes. This of course implies that the lexicon should be represented at  
 594 this level, as claimed notably by Butler (2013). In Connolly's (2018: 10-11) development of  
 595 the Conceptual Component (cf. also Honselaar & Keizer 2009: 1228), it is recognized that  
 596 "“meaning” in FDG is a strictly linguistic phenomenon', rather than being a wholly  
 597 conceptual one. So the specific sense configurations associated with given lexemes in every  
 598 language ought to be able to imprint a variety of different perspectives upon the concepts  
 599 which they point towards (cf. also Carston & Hall 2012: 61, as well as Maienborn 2021: 85-  
 600 7). Hence the need for a lexicon recording the lemmas of the lexemes of a given language at  
 601 this level. However, 'meaning definitions' as well as (semantic) selection restrictions are  
 602 specifically excluded from the Core grammar FDG model (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2016:  
 603 1135).

604 In this respect, by contrast, Honselaar & Keizer (2009) is one of the few FDG studies, to  
 605 my knowledge, which recognize the need to distinguish amongst different senses of given  
 606 lexemes (cf. also Cornish 2002). The authors analyze three Dutch lexemes, *bekend zijn* 'to be  
 607 familiar, well known', *behandelen* 'to treat' and *trouwen* 'to marry'. Not only do they rightly  
 608 distinguish between different, but related, senses of the three lexemes, and give each sense a  
 609 distinct number in order to differentiate them; but also, they view these distinct senses as  
 610 prior, each instigating the selection of an appropriate predication frame (PF) from within the  
 611 Fund<sup>14</sup> (p. 1228).

612 However, in their actual analyses (see the Tables included in the text, as well as the  
 613 Appendix), the key information given on these different senses relates not so much to the  
 614 sense *qua* sense at issue, but to the possible accompanying arguments and modifiers for each.  
 615 It is clear that the authors' primary interest lies in how to set up the relevant PFs which these  
 616 senses would select for eventual expression at the Morphosyntactic Level in an FDG  
 617 derivation. The distinguishable senses of each lexeme retained are simply presented  
 618 informally at the head of given PFs. No attempt is made, for example, to adopt Dik's (1978)  
 619 'Stepwise Lexical Decomposition' method, even though the authors allude to this approach.  
 620 Obviously, this means that given lexical-semantic units within the definitions are not  
 621 highlighted, or assigned a structure within the sense at issue. The fact remains, however, that  
 622 standard FDG still maintains the priority in a derivation of the selection of a relevant PF,  
 623 followed by the insertion of a given lexeme within it, rather than the reverse. Hence the  
 624 particular sense of a lexeme selected in context cannot be invoked to motivate the selection of  
 625 an appropriate PF, thereby justifying the choice semantically. See Norén & Linell (2007) on  
 626 the more accurate notion of 'meaning potentials' associated with given lexemes, which are  
 627 modulated, re-construed or re-shaped by users via interactions in context.

628 See also Cornish (2002) for a proposal to replace the classical Dikian FG predicate frame,  
 629 the initial structure in an FG clause derivation, by a semantically perspicuous construct  
 630 similar in some ways to the FDG predication frame (see (10)-(12) in §4.3 for examples of the  
 631 latter). Such a construct decomposes the internal semantic structure of potential predicates in  
 632 terms of a hierarchized series of predications formulated in terms of the formers' sub-eventual  
 633 structures (causation, action, process and state). The semantic functions of the arguments of  
 634 each component predication are determined via the aspectual nature of the latter; and the  
 635 particular ontological status of each argument is specified as an integral part of this complex  
 636 semantic structure (thereby avoiding the need to indicate the relevant selection restrictions as  
 637 annotations on them). (9) illustrates:

---

<sup>14</sup> A 'predication frame' in FDG is an abstract structure containing a nucleus and one or more dependents (arguments and/or modifiers). Particular lexemes are inserted at the RL in a derivation into the PF selected, subject to semantic compatibility. The construct 'Fund' is a kind of storehouse providing frames and templates into which lexemes, grammatical morphemes and so on are inserted during the derivation of an expression.

- 638  
639 (9) *tear* [Vt] : (e<sub>1</sub>: [<sub>ACTION</sub>*cause* (e<sub>2</sub>: [<sub>EVENT</sub> [<sub>α control</sub> *act* (x<sub>1</sub>) ]]) (e<sub>3</sub>\*: [<sub>STATE</sub>*be\_torn* (x<sub>2</sub>:  
640 <thin flexible material> ]))]) (Item (16) in Cornish 2002: 266)<sup>a</sup>

641  
642 <sup>a</sup> The annotation ‘α’ for the parameter ‘control’ on the ‘Event’ sub-structure is a variable for setting according to  
643 whether a given act of tearing is deliberate, accidental or neutral. The asterisk preceding the ‘State’ sub-eventual structure  
644 indicates that this component is profiled; hence, its arguments will correspond to the syntactic expressions selected at the  
645 clausal expression level.

646  
647 These ‘semantic predication frames’ are able in principle to capture the dynamic construal  
648 of predicate-argument configurations, whereby certain semantic types of argument inserted  
649 result co-compositionally or via coercion in modifications of the predicator’s Aktionsart  
650 (lexical-aspectual) status. Such modifications may also occur via the adjunction of Level 1  
651 and even Level 2 satellites (adverbial modifiers). A third type of effect may be produced via  
652 the assignment or otherwise of the pragmatic function *Focus* to the syntactic exponent of a  
653 predicate, resulting in the singling out of a given part of the latter’s semantic structure to act  
654 as a predicator.

655 All these dynamic effects on a predicator and the structures it projects assume a  
656 semantically transparent underlying predication structure on which to operate; yet in the  
657 standard FG model, as also in the FDG one, no such structure is available either via the FG  
658 predicate frame or the FDG predication frame. For in both cases, the predicate which is the  
659 basis both of predications and of terms is conceived as a function of the **lexical unit** to which  
660 it (in its core or basic sense) corresponds within the object language. Hence, there is no  
661 internal semantic structure available within a verbal predicate for the dynamic modifications  
662 mentioned above to operate upon.

663 Arguably, it is the strict separation of meaning definitions (lexical semantics) and predicate  
664 or predication frames (semantically-based syntax) within F(D)G, rendering impossible the  
665 perspicuous mapping between syntax and semantics, that lies behind the problems raised. See  
666 §4.3 for a similar issue confronting the FDG model, in relation to adjectival modification.

#### 667 4.3 Adjectival modification and context

668  
669 A final issue, specifically concerning the need for recourse to relevant context for certain  
670 types of adjectival modification, is raised through work on the lexicon by García Velasco  
671 (henceforth GV) (2022). The author claims that the FDG model’s strict separation between  
672 linguistic (i.e. conventional) meaning and utterance meaning in context denies it the ability to  
673 capture certain semantic changes that may be effected by attributive adjectives in the head  
674 nouns they modify. He proposes that a weakening of the principle of compositionality in  
675 interrelating the senses of lexemes in complex expressions would be necessary (see also  
676 Norén & Linell 2007: 410, n. 27), in order to allow their contextual modulation as a  
677 prerequisite for the compositional creation of higher-level meanings: see also the points made  
678 in §3 above on the need for prior modulation via context of a lexeme’s chosen conventional  
679 sense value.

680  
681 Briefly, the author claims that so-called non-subjective<sup>15</sup> adjectives (see GV 2022: 532-3),  
682 which Partee (2007) divides into ‘privatives’<sup>16</sup> (e.g. *former*, *fake*) and ‘plain non-subjectives’  
683 (e.g. *alleged*, an adjective which signifies that the concept denoted by the modified noun may

---

<sup>15</sup> A ‘subjective’ adjective, such as *skilful* in combinations such as *skilful surgeon*, denotes a subset of the extension of the head noun. That is, the meaning is ‘a person who is skilful as a surgeon’. Hence the categorization of this class of adjectives as ‘subjective’.

<sup>16</sup> A ‘privative’ adjective is one which excludes the noun it modifies from the class the noun designates (e.g. a *former friend* is no longer a ‘friend’, etc.).

684 or may not hold of the individual the NP as a whole may refer to), alter the denotation of the  
685 noun they modify.

686 This means that, if, as FDG does for *alleged* (as in *an alleged murderer*) and similar  
687 adjectives, these are treated as interpersonal modifiers, then what is left at the RL in this case  
688 is a description of an individual ‘x’ as a ‘murderer’, which is incorrect: see the formalisms  
689 given at IL and RL in (9) in GV (2022: 532). After all, this subclass of adjectives clearly has  
690 an impact on the denotation of the noun at RL. However, given the strict independence of the  
691 IL and the RL in FDG (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 128-9), an interpersonal modifier  
692 such as *alleged* cannot be represented at RL. The author rightly claims that the interpretation  
693 of the noun depends on the local context (or co-text), hence it is constructed dynamically.

694 There are two main issues regarding the necessary recourse to aspects of context raised  
695 here: first, the prior need for ‘contextual modulation’ of a lexeme’s conventional sense before  
696 compositionality applies; and second, the appeal to relevant context for a proper  
697 characterization of privative, subjective and plain non-subjective adjectives. Degree or  
698 gradable adjectives should be included here, such as *tall*, *warm* etc., as does GV; for example,  
699 a *tall jockey* and a *tall basketball player* will not manifest the same degree of ‘tallness’, the  
700 standard for each type being a function of users’ world knowledge.

701 Regarding the first issue, the author claims that the notion of ‘internal dynamic  
702 implementation’ of the expression formation process, in terms of the possible types of  
703 interrelation between the various Levels of the core FDG model, as well as the ‘stepwise’  
704 construction of the meaning of a complex expression at RL, would be sufficient to handle it.  
705 However, this does not take into account the kinds of context-external factors that we saw  
706 operating in fleshing out the text in example (5), in particular (see §3 as a whole on this  
707 aspect).

708 As for the second, see the formalizations reproduced below that are claimed to account,  
709 respectively, for the effects of privative, subjective and ‘plain non-subjective’ adjectival  
710 modification on the head noun:

711 (10)<sup>b</sup> (1x<sub>i</sub>: [Ant e<sub>i</sub>: [(f<sub>i</sub>: neighbour<sub>N</sub> (f<sub>i</sub>) (e<sub>i</sub>))]: [(f<sub>j</sub>: former<sub>A</sub> (f<sub>j</sub>) (e<sub>i</sub>)) (x<sub>i</sub>)] (GV 2022:  
712 537, item (13))

713 (11) a. A tall boy (1x<sub>i</sub>: [(f<sub>i</sub>: boy<sub>N</sub> (f<sub>i</sub>) (x<sub>i</sub>)): [(f<sub>j</sub>: tall<sub>A</sub> (f<sub>j</sub>) (x<sub>i</sub>) (x<sub>j</sub>)<sub>Standard</sub>]] (GV 2022:  
714 538, item (16))

715 (11) b. A skilful surgeon (1x<sub>i</sub>: [(f<sub>i</sub>: surgeon<sub>N</sub> (f<sub>i</sub>): [(f<sub>j</sub>: skilful<sub>A</sub> (f<sub>j</sub>) (f<sub>k</sub>) (f<sub>2</sub>)<sub>Standard</sub>]]] (x<sub>i</sub>))  
716 (GV 2022: 539, item (19))

717  
718 (12) (1x<sub>i</sub>: [ p<sub>i</sub>: [(f<sub>i</sub>: murderer<sub>N</sub> (f<sub>i</sub>) (p<sub>i</sub>))]: [(f<sub>j</sub>: alleged<sub>A</sub> (f<sub>j</sub>) (p<sub>i</sub>)] (x<sub>i</sub>)) (GV 2022: 540,  
719 item (24))

720  
721 <sup>b</sup> The symbols used in these representations are as follows. ‘1’: ‘single individual’, ‘x’: ‘individual object variable’;  
722 ‘Ant’: ‘anterior’; ‘e’: ‘event variable’; ‘f’: ‘predicate variable’; ‘p’: ‘proposition variable’. Subscript letters on lexemes  
723 indicate their part of speech category (here ‘N’ for ‘noun’, ‘A’ for ‘adjective’). The initially placed predicate in a PF  
724 conventionally represents the head of the expression concerned.

725  
726 In all these representations at RL, the effects of the modifications at issue are not  
727 demonstrated in terms of the sense combinations involved (cf. §4.2 above); it is simply the  
728 bare lexemes involved which are represented here, the effects on the denotation of the head  
729 nouns being indicated indirectly as well as abstractly via technical symbols (co-indexed  
730 variables) and differential bracketing, familiar from purely syntactic representations. No  
731 explicit characterization within a lexical-semantic representation is made available to mark



732 the semantico-denotative effects involved. Moreover, the ‘standards of comparison’ in terms  
 733 of the ‘tallness’ of a ‘boy’ in (11a), and of the ‘skilfulness’ of a ‘surgeon’ in (11b) are simply  
 734 marked by a variable bearing the subscript ‘standard’, in terms of which the property assigned  
 735 is to be determined. There is no indication at all as to how these standards are to be invoked in  
 736 terms of users’ knowledge of the world.

737

### 738 **5. Proposals for revisions to the FDG model in the light of sections 2-4**

739

740 Let us now attempt to outline certain proposals for revisions of the model as it stands, as a  
 741 result of the conclusions from sections 2-4.

742 What is clearly needed is a ‘Context-driven’ account to complement the ‘pattern-oriented’  
 743 one, as in the FDG model (cf. Butler 2013: 24). Such an account is provided by Haselow’s  
 744 (2017) in-depth study of spontaneous spoken English from both the speaker’s and the  
 745 recipient’s points of view: see in particular his section 5.3 (pp. 219-229). Indeed, such a  
 746 model is specifically invoked by Dik’s (1997a: 4, point (iii)) that

747

748 (...) although in itself a theory of linguistic expressions is not the same as a theory of verbal interaction, it is  
 749 natural to require that it be devised in such a way that it can most easily and realistically be incorporated into  
 750 a wider pragmatic theory of verbal interaction. (...)

751

752 This is precisely the approach which needs to be adopted in order to take discourse into  
 753 account, in the sense outlined in §3. Such an account must inevitably be rooted in a  
 754 comprehensive model of the broader utterance context, both verbal and non-verbal, within  
 755 which the language resources already characterized in the standard FDG grammar are  
 756 embedded. Thus the output of this larger, more encompassing model would be actual  
 757 utterance tokens as well as defeasible (i.e. revisable) discourse representations.

758 As a purely programmatic proposal for revisions of the model to take account of the  
 759 characterization of discourse in §3, I propose that two of the external Components within the  
 760 core model, the Conc.Cpt and the Contx.Cpt, be re-conceived, suitably augmented, as integral  
 761 parts of this process model of the wider utterance context. For this to occur, the Conc.Cpt,  
 762 like the Contx. one, will need to apply at each Level in the formation of a language  
 763 expression, at least within the Context model line of derivation. For the purposes of the core  
 764 FDG grammar model, the various Levels of that model could continue to draw from these  
 765 components all and only the aspects of conceptualization and context which impact  
 766 systematically upon the grammatical form of the expressions output, as is currently the case.

767

768 These two Components would now be enriched with the kinds of context- and use-relevant  
 769 properties put forward by Butler (2013), Connolly (2018: 11), García Velasco (2022), Cornish  
 770 (2013) and others. In particular, the augmented Conc.Cpt would include an encyclopedia,  
 771 reflecting the general world knowledge exploited in language production and reception, and  
 772 an ontology: see Butler (2012) for an FDG-compatible proposal regarding the latter. Both of  
 773 these are in fact represented in Connolly’s (2018) proposal for the incorporation of Construal  
 774 within the existing Conc.Cpt. An appropriate lexicon should also be included alongside the  
 775 set of lexemes in the Fund (cf. Figure 2 in Hengeveld & Mackenzie: 2008: 13), listing the  
 776 lemmas of the lexemes that will eventually form part of a particular output expression (cf.  
 777 Butler 2013: 38).

778 The Contx.Cpt would also need to contain the wherewithal to construct a mental discourse  
 779 representation of the prior and current utterances in a text. This representation could be  
 780 developed, for example, on the basis of Allen’s (1995: Ch. 16) model of discourse  
 781 construction, but expanding it into a more functionalist-oriented framework. As indicative  
 782 instances, see the partially formalized representations of examples (5)-(7) in Cornish (2009:

783 585-9) and (6) in Cornish (2013: 90-91), as well as Connolly (2004) for an early attempt to  
 784 represent discourse structure within FDG. See also Charolles (2020) for a range of discourse  
 785 representations of extracts from a French newspaper – though here in terms of the text, not the  
 786 discourse, *stricto sensu*, involved.

787 The range of heuristics needed in order to construct a discourse representation of a given  
 788 text should include the following. First of all, determining *what is predicated of what* in each  
 789 unit, and how these predications may be related in terms of one or another (or sometimes even  
 790 two simultaneously) coherence relations. In (5), for example, the initial sentence predicates a  
 791 future government ruling constraining the movements of most travelers to the UK, while the  
 792 second one reports the reaction to this by the French Interior ministry, signaling *Contrast* –  
 793 the isotopy here being marked by the definite anaphoric NP *the quarantine plan* in lines 4-5.

794 Second, the *tense* carried by the verb in the dependent unit in ‘subordinating’ coherence  
 795 relations such as *Circumstance*, *Claim–Evidence*, *Elaboration*, *Occasion* or *Explanation* may  
 796 be the past perfect, signaling a shift of event time to a state of affairs preceding the one  
 797 evoked by the dominant proposition. The simple present tense together with the stative  
 798 *Aktionsart* (lexical aspect: see below) of the main verb may favor a ‘generalizing’ reading of a  
 799 text sentence, as may also the present perfect tense/aspect: see the use of the latter in two of  
 800 the verbs of the initial topic sentence in (6), as well as in the initial, presentational sentence in  
 801 (7). Both these texts contain a second, relatively background sentence in the preterit tense,  
 802 marking a punctual event elaborating part of the broader situation introduced by the first. Past  
 803 tenses may also have a modal use, signaling irrealis.<sup>17</sup> The heuristic at issue here is the  
 804 temporal and aspectual relations signaled as holding between the propositions and illocutions  
 805 expressed by each unit in a text. See Gennari (2004) and Binnick (2009) on the discourse-  
 806 pragmatic significance of tense.

807 Next, the *Aktionsart* of each of the two predicators – whether state, activity, or event  
 808 (achievement or accomplishment) –, in conjunction with the aspectual, tense, mood and voice  
 809 selections made for each clause, and in a wider context, the *event structure* of the two units  
 810 involved as a whole (cf. Maienborn 2021), clearly play a role in the invocation of an  
 811 appropriate coherence relation, and hence the potential integration of two discourse units. See  
 812 Binnick (2009) on *Aktionsart*, as well as grammatical aspect and tense, and their respective  
 813 contributions to local discourse structuring in terms of coherence relations.

814 A further relevant factor is the *Information Structure* (IS, i.e. message organization) of the  
 815 textual units subject to integration – that is, whether one or other is athetic (“all new”) or  
 816 categorical utterance; and if categorical, whether it manifests unmarked predicate focus (a  
 817 topic–comment articulation) or marked argument (contrastive) focus. The combination of a  
 818 thetic followed by a categorical utterance, as in (5) and (7), is a frequent one in discourse. The  
 819 IS dimension is already marked in the core FDG model at the IL, and can be harnessed as  
 820 such to a certain extent. However, as Butler & González-García (2014: 224) point out, the  
 821 range of IS types recognized by the model is limited only to those which are relevant to  
 822 determining grammatical forms and structures outputted by the model as a whole. The  
 823 ongoing inference of subsuming local as well as superordinate discourse topics is essential for  
 824 interpreting an incoming utterance in context.

825 Yet another heuristic involves establishing the connective (a conjunction or sentence  
 826 adverbial) linking two units; or in its absence, selecting the one that it would be most  
 827 appropriate to insert between the two units, in order to make the nature of their relation  
 828 explicit. In (3), the connective *after all*, signaling an *Explanation* relation, could be inserted  
 829 before the second sentence, with no change in interpretation as compared with the original

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<sup>17</sup> E.g. *if I were you, ...* or the past perfect construction involving subject-auxiliary inversion as in *Had she turned left instead of right at the junction, things would have turned out differently.*

830 version of this text. In (4), there are already two discourse markers preceding Dave's second  
 831 utterance in turn 22, namely *Well* and *y'know*. These take account of Brad's evident lack of  
 832 understanding of Dave's initial question in turn 20. And in (5), the PP headed by the temporal  
 833 preposition *after*, which simply indicates the purely temporal relation holding between the  
 834 two events involved, could be replaced by *even though* or *although*. Such substitutions would  
 835 make explicit the *Concession* relation holding between the two states of affairs at issue.

836 A final factor, whose invocation will enable the participants to draw particular inferences,  
 837 is *knowledge of the world*: see e.g. Taylor (2003: Ch. 5) on the encyclopedic factors involved  
 838 in specifying word meanings, in particular. In (3), the interpreter will invoke the stereotype of  
 839 an incautious child stepping out from the pavement across the trajectory of an oncoming  
 840 vehicle, with potentially catastrophic consequences – particularly if s/he is deaf, as the text  
 841 indicates may be the case. In (5), the many 'explicature' connections noted all derive from  
 842 readers' knowledge of the relevant government bodies in the UK as well as France, and their  
 843 legal possibilities of action. Moreover, the 'higher-level explicature' corresponding to the  
 844 contextualization of the article's title is based on the knowledge of commercial firms' typical  
 845 operations and motivations.

846 These heuristics fall into two types, several partaking of both: *Aktionsart* has to do with  
 847 unit-internal structure, while *Predication relations*, *Information Structure* and *Connectives*  
 848 operate essentially to interrelate units. *Tense*, *Event structure* and *Knowledge of World*,  
 849 however, may apply unit-internally but also unit-relationally.

850 The contextual cues needed to motivate such (probabilistic, hence defeasible) assignments  
 851 would need to be recorded in the newly-adapted Contx.Cpt, on the basis of features of the  
 852 ongoing text, and be specifically marked out as such.<sup>18</sup> Hence the Contx.Cpt would now  
 853 consist of two parallel parts: one part recording the representations of the preceding and  
 854 current text, highlighting in particular the textual and discursive cues to contextualization as  
 855 well as certain features of the situational context of utterance; and another housing the  
 856 developing discourse representation that will have been evoked. There would need to be a  
 857 constraining device included here, which would mark in particular those features of the  
 858 preceding co-text which serve specifically to signal discourse structure: continuations,  
 859 expansions, closures, digressions, new departures and so on. The Conc.Cpt and the Contx.Cpt  
 860 would work in tandem and in parallel, the one recording and taking account of the  
 861 information provided by the other.

862 This wider utterance context model can be seen as applying to the outputs of each level of  
 863 representation already specified within the existing FDG model, and fleshing them out as a  
 864 function of the values determined by setting the relevant contextual parameters made  
 865 available at this level. The analogues of the standard FDG Contextual and Conceptual  
 866 Components would characterize the global as well as local state of the discourse at the point  
 867 where a new utterance enters the system. That is, they would specify the macro as well as  
 868 more local topics at issue up to this point, together with the hierarchical relations obtaining  
 869 between the discourse units already constructed. See §5.1 for the ways in which I would  
 870 envisage the Context model being integrated with the Core pattern one, within FDG.

871

### 872 *5.1 Integrating the Context-driven model with the Core FDG pattern one*

873


874 As already indicated, it is envisaged that, apart from certain cases,<sup>19</sup> the Context-driven model  
 875 would apply to the outputs of each Level of the Core grammar model (see Figure 1) by

---

<sup>18</sup> See Allen's (1995) Figure 16.5, p. 509 and Box 16.1, p. 518 for sets of English cue phrases together with their typical functions in signaling discourse structure.

<sup>19</sup> There are several areas where the Core grammar model would diverge from the requirements of the Context one. In particular, the absence in the former of any 'meaning definitions' (lexical-semantic specifications) or of

876 copying them for elaboration into the matching Level of the Context model. This means that  
 877 the advantages attaching to the standard model of FDG, in the eyes of the model's architects,  
 878 can be maintained essentially intact; the Context model would then in most cases operate  
 879 upon copies of an already existing set of units at each of the relevant Levels. The first set of  
 880 constructs provided via the operations at the Core Levels would represent the 'literal',  
 881 somewhat idealised, outputs of each such representation, as utterance types (analogous to the  
 882 concept of 'System sentences' proposed by Lyons 1977: 29-31); and those of the Context  
 883 model would correspond to their in-context values in terms of discourse, as utterance tokens  
 884 (broadly corresponding to Lyons's 1977: 30 'Text sentences').  
 885



886  
 887  
 888

Figure 1: Proposed interfaces between the Core Grammar and Context-driven models for FDG

889 A common provision would be an initial characterization at the level of the Augmented  
 890 Conc.Cpt. Here, Time and Place coordinates of the utterance to be represented would be  
 891 specified. Values would be specified for the (sub-)genre of text at issue, as well as for its style  
 892 and tone. This Component would also contain an Encyclopaedia and possibly also an  
 893 Ontology, as already mentioned. Once all the values are set, a specific communicative  
 894 intention (CI) would then be represented within a new construct, the 'Prelinguistic message'  
 895 (for example "SPEAKER (S<sub>1</sub>) WANT ADDRESSEE (A<sub>1</sub>) LET S<sub>1</sub> HAVE TEMPORARILY A<sub>1</sub>'S LAWN-  
 896 MOWER"). This would also contain representations of an actual speaker/writer (for example,  
 897 one associated with an attested utterance of some kind), as well as an intended  
 898 addressee/reader. Once it is established, the Contx.Cpt would transfer to the Conc.Cpt a

---

semantic selection restrictions, and the priority in the selection of relevant predication frames in regard to the insertion of appropriate lexemes in the open positions available in the former. To allow these contradictory moves to co-exist, the two models would apply for the most part independently one from the other. After all, each comes with differing overall objectives.

899 synthesis of the text converted into discourse, prior to the incoming utterance. This would  
900 enable the Conc.Cpt to derive a discourse topic for the integration of the latter.

901 In Formulation, at Level 1 (the IL), the conceptual configuration corresponding to a  
902 particular message intended by the speaker in the Prelinguistic message construct would make  
903 available the predicator with its linguistically appropriate sense selected by the language  
904 being modelled (cf. Step 2 in Honselaar & Keizer 2009: 1227), together with its arguments  
905 (though not actual lexemes, whose selection and insertion would be the province of the RL-  
906 equivalent stage). In the case of the sample prelinguistic message given above, the sense  
907 configuration would be LET HAVE TEMPORARILY, for which the most relevant choice of  
908 lexeme at the RL-equivalent stage would be ‘lend’.

909 Moreover, in the Core Grammar line of derivation, the ‘secondary’ or literal illocution  
910 corresponding to the clause’s mood choice (see item (1) in §2.1), as in Eesa & Nayyef’s  
911 (2012) account (see note 5 in §2.1), would be retained as such. However, the ‘primary’ (i.e.  
912 indirect) illocution corresponding to the utterance at issue, where it differs from the so-called  
913 ‘secondary’ (or ‘literal’) one, would be specified in the Context model derivation. This of  
914 course would be the case insofar as it is conventionally intended by speakers or writers and  
915 understood by addressees or readers (e.g. as in the well-worn examples *Can you pass the*  
916 *salt/open the window/turn down the volume?*: these are literally interrogatives, but  
917 conventionally understood as realizing requests). Where the connection is less conventional,  
918 the more elaborate representation of the Context of utterance within the Conc.Cpt would in  
919 principle make such inferences possible. The particular psycho-social relationship between  
920 speaker and addressee that flows from the type of ‘primary’ illocution invoked (see §2.1)  
921 would also be represented here.

922 As for the Subacts of Ascription and Reference, and the provisions made within the  
923 Communicated Content, these would be further specified in the Context model derivation.  
924 These constructs would similarly be developed as a function of the more elaborate  
925 characterization now available in the Conc.Cpt. The latter would also make it possible to  
926 mobilise additional relevant Information-Structure articulations, having relevance to discourse  
927 considerations over and above those carrying systematic implications for grammatical form,  
928 where needed.

929 A (particular sense of a) predicate capable of acting as predicator would already be  
930 available at the IL, rather than, as proposed notably by Honselaar & Keizer (2009), in terms  
931 of the RL in the Core grammar model: cf. the discussion in §4.2. A Lexicon would need to be  
932 available within the Fund, complementing the set of lexemes already present in the Core  
933 Grammar model. Lexemes corresponding to the selection of the predicator lemma and its  
934 arguments would then be represented at a first stage in the RL-equivalent, in terms of the  
935 predicator’s semantic predication frame (SPF) (cf. §4.2); this could correspond broadly to the  
936 one presented as (9) in §4.2 for one sense of the verb *tear*: that is, the transitive variant, with  
937 its ‘achievement’ Aktionsart. The SPF would of course need to be expanded in order to  
938 accommodate any non-obligatory conceptual constituents represented at IL (e.g. modifying  
939 elements). Another possible sense of this verb would be the intransitive motion verb, which  
940 could be associated with the following possible SPF:

941  
942 (9) a. *tear* [Vi] : (e<sub>1</sub>: [<sub>ACTION</sub> *cause* (e<sub>2</sub>: [<sub>EVENT</sub> *act* (x<sub>1</sub>))] (e<sub>3</sub>: [<sub>PROC</sub> *move\_along* (x<sub>1</sub>:  
943 <autonomous\_mobile physical object>): [<sub>MANNER</sub> (e<sub>3</sub>: *very\_fast*))]) (e<sub>4</sub>: [<sub>PATH</sub> (x<sub>2</sub> :  
944 <segment\_of\_physical\_space>)))]

945  
946 (9a) could be realized by an utterance such as *Phil tore down/along the beach/the drive/the*  
947 *high street*.

948 A further elaboration of the SPF selected at the first RL stage within the Context model  
 949 would in principle be able to take account of the mutual semantic and denotational influences  
 950 holding between lexemes in construction with each other, as illustrated in §4.3 with regard to  
 951 adjectival modification. This would now be possible, since SPFs contain semantically  
 952 perspicuous units.

953 The existing predication frame that would be available at RL in a standard FDG  
 954 derivation would need to be retained, however, since it is indispensable for the complete  
 955 characterization of an utterance type within the model. The method of selecting particular PFs  
 956 for representing specific senses of predicates at RL illustrated in Honselaar & Keizer (2009),  
 957 could be adapted to English (or to whatever other language happens to be being modelled).

958 The SPF associated with (a particular sense of) a predicator already selected prior to the  
 959 selection of a relevant PF would clearly need to be adjusted in the Context-driven line of  
 960 derivation, in order to fit its requirements. For example, in the case of the SPF given in (9a),  
 961 the PATH involved would need to be represented as an obligatory directional PP.

962 As for the ML, no potential contribution appears to be applicable to the provisions of the  
 963 Core model by the Context one at this stage. However, at the PL, account will need to be  
 964 taken of certain phonetic processes such as assimilation, elision and lenition etc., particularly  
 965 in the case of utterances relating to particular (sub-)genres or registers of speech, as well as of  
 966 certain marked intonation and rhythmic patterns.

967 Finally, as noted in §4.1, the marking of the changing levels of cognitive activation of the  
 968 referents evoked in successive utterances will need to be specified at the discourse level, once  
 969 such a representation is available within the Augmented Contx.Cpt, fed by the Augmented  
 970 Conc.Cpt as well as by Levels 1-4 of the Context model derivation. This would obviate the  
 971 need for the existing Core Grammar version of the Contx.Cpt to copy the representations at  
 972 the four Levels. As we saw in §4.1, the latter approach cannot adequately capture the evolving  
 973 activations of referents in the flow of text. The discourse representation constructed as part of  
 974 the Context model would more accurately account for these, and the textual representation  
 975 would capture the relevant primings, repetitions and so on.

976 Clearly, the above are simply outline proposals. They will obviously need to be refined  
 977 and made fully operational through future work.

978

## 979 6. Conclusions

980

981 We have seen in the above both that FDG's claim to be a Functional **Discourse** Grammar (my  
 982 emphasis) and its broad conception of 'discourse', according to Mackenzie (2020), quoted in  
 983 §3, are not in fact consonant with what this phenomenon actually involves: see sections 3-5  
 984 for the details. The model falls short of properly taking into account discourse properties and  
 985 concepts, through the following characteristics of the framework: it is avowedly not a model  
 986 of the speaker, as we have seen, and the notion of Discourse Act is but a pale reflection of any  
 987 actual discourse act: for the various dimensions of a DA are simply represented in terms of  
 988 variables at the IL for the Illocution, the Speaker and Addressee, as well as for the Sub-acts of  
 989 predication and reference within the Communicated Content.

990 As a result, the outputs of the model are utterance types, not tokens; and finally, and most  
 991 importantly, the contributions of conceptualization and context are severely restricted by the  
 992 requirement that they be limited only to those that have systematic implications for  
 993 grammatical form and structure.

994 Butler & González-García (2014) report on a detailed, systematic survey the authors  
 995 carried out amongst 16 mostly functionalist models of language. The project was to map each  
 996 model in terms of its relative position within what they call 'functional-cognitive space', as a  
 997 function of their proponents' responses to some 59 statements. The aim was to assess how

998 closely (if at all) they regarded each one as corresponding to their own particular model.  
 999 According to the responses given by the three FDG respondents, the authors placed this  
 1000 model at the extreme ‘formal’ pole of functionalist-oriented models within the space at issue.  
 1001 The model’s proponents’ responses to the two questions relating to ‘discourse’ were  
 1002 contradictory: significantly, a majority of the answers to (13a) were negative (a conclusion  
 1003 argued independently in the present study), but positive in the case of (13b) (cf. Butler &  
 1004 González-García 2014: 224):

- 1005  
 1006 (13) a. This approach is designed to account for the structure and functioning of  
 1007 extended stretches of discourse/text, such as complete written texts,  
 1008 conversations, etc., as well as of the smaller units of which such texts are  
 1009 composed. (2014: 156, item 9a)  
 1010 (13) b. This approach is designed to account for phenomena which extend beyond the  
 1011 bounds of individual clauses and clause combinations. (2014: 156, item 9b)  
 1012

1013 The responses to (13b) would seem to be motivated by the presence of a potentially higher-  
 1014 level structure above the clause in FDG, namely ‘Move’ (the highest level which can be  
 1015 analyzed in purely grammatical terms, according to the model) at IL, and by what are termed  
 1016 ‘episodes’ at RL. Moreover, the authors (p. 372) cite the unanimously positive FDG  
 1017 responses to statement 44: ‘Formal (syntactic) patterns have real theoretical status – they are  
 1018 not just epiphenomena which ‘emerge’ from discourse/use’.

1019 Mackenzie’s (2020) broadly accurate arguments against conceiving the standard FDG  
 1020 model as a ‘grammar of discourse’ seem in a sense beside the point in relation to the  
 1021 objections raised by a number of critics to its current organization – notably by Butler,  
 1022 Connolly, García Velasco and Cornish. On the one hand, it seems indeed clear that a  
 1023 ‘grammar of discourse’ would be an impossible objective to achieve. As Mackenzie argues,  
 1024 not only are the contributions to a characterization of communication in context made by the  
 1025 various factors connected with discourse not ‘rule-bound’ or systematic, but have, rather, the  
 1026 character of differing probabilities of occurrence, tendencies etc.; but also, they are too wide-  
 1027 ranging and disparate to be amenable to formalization within a grammar model.

1028 However, this is not in fact what is intended by critics of the standard model of FDG. The  
 1029 issues raised have to do, rather, with the fact that the existing devices purporting to account  
 1030 for the diverse expressions made available for use by participants in communication do not  
 1031 take sufficient account of the contextual factors that impinge on their potential uses, meanings  
 1032 and discourse functionality: see §4 for three areas in which this is arguably the case. Such  
 1033 factors would go some way to justifying the presence in the model’s name of the term  
 1034 ‘discourse’. These claims, however, invariably come up against the same basic objection from  
 1035 the model’s architects: that since the factors at issue do not have systematic implications for  
 1036 the grammatical forms of the expressions concerned, then they have no place in the model.  
 1037 Nonetheless, the suggested model of the wider utterance context adumbrated in §5 could in  
 1038 principle, when fully worked out and implemented, provide a plausible solution to this  
 1039 situation.

1040 On the other hand, it is ironic to observe that, when we look closely at the central feature  
 1041 of the model, namely the Discourse Act as it is envisaged by FDG, the model’s defining  
 1042 principles are only obliquely, if at all, even, relevant to what an actual discourse act involves  
 1043 in context: see the comments on the quotations from Mackenzie (2020) in §2.1. This in fact  
 1044 actually reinforces, ironically, Mackenzie’s arguments against FDG’s potentially being a  
 1045 model or grammar of ‘discourse’. It argues, rather, in favor of the removal of the term  
 1046 ‘discourse’ from the model’s name altogether. Instead, a perhaps more appropriate name  
 1047 might be ‘Functional-Structural Grammar’ (FSG) (cf. Butler & González-García’s 2014: 202

1048 characterization as a ‘Structural-functional’ model); or even better, no doubt, ‘Functional-  
1049 Typological Grammar’ (FTG).<sup>20</sup> Thus Mackenzie’s general argument would in the end come  
1050 full circle.

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<sup>20</sup> These suggestions for changes to the model’s name relate only to FDG as it currently stands. If and when a Context model for discourse is fully worked out and applied, then of course the qualification ‘discourse’ should be retained.



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