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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2023

Another Break in the Wall: Harnessing Fault Injection Attacks to Penetrate Software Fortresses

Résumé

Internet of Things (IoT) devices manipulate sensitive data leading to strict security needs. They face both software and physical attacks due to their network connectivity and their proximity to attackers. These devices are usually built around low-cost and low-power processors. In this paper, we study the impact of Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) on Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) mechanism of the D-RI5CY processor. Our results highlight the high sensitivity of this protection mechanism to multiple fault types at multiple spatial and temporal locations. Out of 3318 simulations, we achieved 74 successes (2.23%), mainly due to bit-flips.

Dates et versions

hal-04286507 , version 1 (15-11-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

William Pensec, Vianney Lapôtre, Guy Gogniat. Another Break in the Wall: Harnessing Fault Injection Attacks to Penetrate Software Fortresses. SensorsS&P: First International Workshop on Security and Privacy of Sensing Systems, Nov 2023, Istanbul Turkiye, France. pp.8-14, ⟨10.1145/3628356.3630116⟩. ⟨hal-04286507⟩
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