

# Online Appendix

## Appendix A. Tables

Table A1: Summary statistics for women born in 1700–1803.

	Mean	Std. deviation	Observations
Outcomes and treatment			
Completed fertility (net)	2.35	2.37	20,332
Completed fertility of mothers (net)	3.19	2.22	15,013
Childlessness	0.26	0.44	20,332
Completed fertility (gross)	3.38	3.20	20,332
Age at marriage	26.45	7.82	20,331
Age at first birth	26.51	5.61	14,964
Age at last birth	35.29	6.63	14,888
Birth year	1749.35	27.58	20,332
Birth year (husband)	1748.14	28.22	17,829
Partible inheritance before reform	0.59	0.49	20,332
Impartible inheritance before reform	0.41	0.49	20,332
Women excluded in inheritance before reform	0.46	0.50	20332
Women included in inheritance before reform	0.54	0.50	20332
Individual-level controls			
Wife's mother alive at marriage	0.56	0.50	20,332
Husband's mother alive at marriage	0.50	0.50	20,332
Wife's father alive at marriage	0.47	0.50	20,332
Husband's father alive at marriage	0.41	0.49	20,332
Literacy	0.18	0.39	20,332
Literacy of husband	0.39	0.49	20,332
Accuracy of Henry form	14.74	4.68	20,332
Age difference (husband-wife)	3.44	8.27	17,829
Municipality-level controls			
Wheat price (log)	0.95	0.30	20,332
Religiosity index	0.49	0.28	20,332
Distance to religious center	27.65	16.73	20,332
Distance to political society	6.24	4.80	20,332
Distance to rebellion in 1779–1789	23.32	18.47	20,332
Distance to legal center	13.12	10.02	20,332
Distance to tax center	17.04	11.33	20,332
Distance to territorial administration	12.10	7.70	20,332
Distance to paved road	1.72	1.98	20,332
Distance to horse post	12.12	9.41	20,332

*Notes:* This table shows summary statistics for women in the Henry sample born between 1700 and 1803. Gross fertility includes all children ever born; net fertility considers children who survived until age 6. Accuracy of Henry's form takes 10 values (in the range 11–15 and 21–25) depending on the availability of a) the woman's birth date and b) the end date of the marriage (see Appendix Table A2). Distances in kilometers.

Table A2: Accuracy of Henry's forms (*fiche*)

Value	Henry form	Woman's birth date	Marriage end date
11	MF1	Known	Known
21	MO1	Known	Unknown
12	MF2a	Calculated based on age at marriage	Known
22	MO2a	Calculated based on age at marriage	Unknown
13	MF2b	Calculated based on age at death	Known
23	MO2b	Calculated based on age at death	Unknown
14	MF3	Unknown	Known
24	MO3	Unknown	Unknown
15	MF	Calculated based on age at General Population Census	Known
25	MO	Calculated based on age at General Population Census	Unknown

*Source:* Codebook of the nominative part of the Henry database.

Table A3: Fertility control mechanisms.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	Age at marriage	Age at first birth	Time to first birth (years)	Years between first and last birth	Birth spacing (min)
Impartible	−0.611 (0.803)	−0.325 (0.554)	−0.514** (0.238)	1.419*** (0.469)	−0.156 (0.111)
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	0.073** (0.028)	0.058** (0.024)	0.021** (0.008)	−0.073*** (0.027)	0.014** (0.007)
Observations	20,237	13,954	13,969	11,555	9,435
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39
Adjusted R-squared	0.328	0.192	0.026	0.144	0.015
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Notes:* This table examines five mechanisms used to control fertility: age at marriage (column 1), age at first birth (column 2), years between marriage and first birth (column 3), years between first and last birth (column 3), and minimum years between two births (column 4). All variables are based on a mother's completed fertility, excluding infant deaths before age 6. The sample is women born in 1700–1803 in the Henry database. In columns 2 and 3, the sample is restricted to mothers. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is restricted to couples who completed their fertility cycle (i.e., died after age 40) and who had at least two children. Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2; Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table A4: The abolition of impartible inheritance and the probability to die as a child.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Dep. Variable is child died before age 6</i>			
	all	girls	boys
Impartible $\times$ Child born after reforms	−0.038 (0.035)	−0.070 (0.043)	−0.048 (0.042)
Adjusted R-squared	0.118	0.110	0.109
Mean dep. variable	0.314	0.300	0.317
<i>Panel B. Dep. Variable is child died before age 6, using first-name repetition technique</i>			
	all	girls	boys
Impartible $\times$ Child born after reforms	−0.019 (0.033)	−0.043 (0.046)	−0.037 (0.042)
Adjusted R-squared	0.116	0.137	0.138
Mean dep. variable	0.398	0.395	0.406
Cohort FE of child	Y	Y	Y
Parents FE	Y	Y	Y
Observations	50,385	22,048	23,563
N clusters	39	39	39

*Notes:* This table presents estimates of  $y_{i,t,p} = I_p \times post_t + \mu_t + \mu_p + e_{i,t,p}$ , where  $i$  denotes children,  $t$  their birth year, and  $p$  their parents.  $I_p$  is a dummy variable equal to one if the child's parents were born in an impartible municipality,  $post_t$  is a dummy variable equal to one if the child was born after the 1793 inheritance reforms, and  $\mu_t$  and  $\mu_p$  are birth year and parent fixed effects. The interaction  $I_p \times post_t$  captures the differential probability to die as a child in partible vs. impartible areas after the 1793 reforms, net of cohort factors and of genetic, social, or environmental factors affecting fertility at the family level. In Panel A, the dependant variable,  $y_{i,t,p}$ , is a dummy variable equal to one if child  $i$  died before age 6. In Panel B, the dependant variable,  $y_{i,t,p}$ , is a dummy variable equal to one if child  $i$  died before age 6 or if he/she is not linked to a death record and his/her first name is the same as that of a younger sibling—an indication for child mortality (Cummins 2020). The sample is 50,385 children (column 1), 22,048 girls (column 2), and 23,563 boys (column 3) born in 1700–1803 from the Henry database; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.



Table A5: Flexible-trend two-way fixed-effects estimates for the effects of abolishing impartible inheritance: Henry data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Dep. Variable:</i>	Completed fertility	Completed fertility	Completed fertility	Completed fertility	Completed fertility of mothers	= 1 if childless	Age at marriage
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.027*** (0.007)	−0.028*** (0.006)	−0.031*** (0.006)	−0.029*** (0.008)	−0.028*** (0.010)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.060** (0.028)
Observations	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	14,950	20,238	20,237
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39	39	39
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.198	0.200	0.204	0.118	0.229	0.353
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Municipality FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Local wheat price in decade	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE							
× Religiosity index	.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance religious center	.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance political society	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance rebellion	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance legal center	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance fiscal center	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance admin. center	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance paved road	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y
× Distance horse post	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y	Y

*Notes:* The sample is women born in 1700–1803 in the Henry database. The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to all women (columns 1–4), to mothers (column 5), the probability to be childless (column 6), and age at marriage (column 7). All variables consider “net” fertility, i.e., they are based on the number of children surviving until age 6. All specifications include cohort FE, municipality FE, and the full-set of individual-level controls in Table 2: literacy indicators for women and their husbands; accuracy of the Henry form fixed effects; and fixed effects for whether a woman’s father, mother, father-in-law, and mother-in-law was alive when the couple married. The remaining covariates capture flexible trends in fertility by municipality-level economic, religious, political, and economic-geography characteristics (see Section 5 for detailed descriptions). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table A6: Effects of including women in inheritances: Henry data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Dep. Variable is age at marriage</i>			
Women excluded	−1.206** (0.537)	−0.874 (0.572)	0.426 (0.574)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	0.041** (0.016)	0.052*** (0.018)	0.045* (0.025)
Observations	19,782	19,760	19,760
Adjusted R-squared	0.101	0.270	0.296
<i>Panel B. Dep. Variable is completed fertility</i>			
Women excluded	0.679*** (0.160)	0.587*** (0.137)	0.311** (0.131)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	−0.029*** (0.007)	−0.025*** (0.006)	−0.031*** (0.008)
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
Adjusted R-squared	0.056	0.179	0.197
<i>Panel C. Dep. Variable is =1 if childless</i>			
Women excluded	−0.030 (0.018)	−0.019 (0.016)	0.011 (0.023)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	0.004*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
Adjusted R-squared	0.043	0.215	0.223
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	.	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	.	Y
N clusters	39	39	39

*Notes:* The sample is women born in 1700–1803 in the Henry database. The dependent variable is age at marriage (Panel A), the number of children ever born to all women (Panel B), and the probability to be childless (Panel C). Fertility variables are based on the number of children surviving until age 6. Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2: literacy indicators for women and their husbands; accuracy of the Henry form fixed effects; and fixed effects for whether a woman’s father, mother, father-in-law, and mother-in-law was alive when the couple married. Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3: municipality-level wheat prices by decade; municipality-level religiosity index × Cohort FE; distance to closest religious center × Cohort FE; distance to the closest political society × Cohort FE; distance to rebellion against the state in 1779–1789 × Cohort FE; distance to the closest legal center × Cohort FE; distance to closest fiscal center × Cohort FE; distance to the closest territorial administrative center × Cohort FE; distance to paved road × Cohort FE; and distance to horse post × Cohort FE. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.



Table A8: Sensitivity to bandwidth choice for spatial regression-discontinuity analysis using Geni data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	15km bandwidth	15km bandwidth	20km bandwidth	20km bandwidth	25km bandwidth	25km bandwidth	30km bandwidth	30km bandwidth
<i>Panel A. Linear polynomial</i>								
Impartible	0.973*** (0.321)	0.977*** (0.371)	1.072*** (0.306)	0.996*** (0.316)	1.066*** (0.302)	0.967*** (0.303)	1.067*** (0.293)	0.894*** (0.292)
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.055** (0.020)	-0.039*** (0.015)	-0.052*** (0.016)	-0.037*** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.036*** (0.013)	-0.033*** (0.013)
<i>Panel B. Quadratic polynomial</i>								
Impartible	0.507 (0.404)	0.501 (0.516)	0.687* (0.366)	0.683* (0.407)	0.955*** (0.345)	0.758** (0.370)	1.088*** (0.340)	0.919*** (0.343)
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.040* (0.023)	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.044** (0.018)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.046*** (0.016)	-0.042*** (0.015)	-0.042*** (0.015)
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Border segment FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	Y	.	Y	.	Y	.	Y
Observations	3,176	2,716	4,476	4,002	4,973	4,437	5,692	5,091
N clusters	872	751	1,024	896	1,176	1,024	1,294	1,121

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of Equation (14) for different bandwidths. The sample is mothers born in France (1700–1810) within 15, 20, 25, 20, and 35 km on each side of the inheritance border and whose Geni record satisfies the horizontal restriction. All specifications use local-polynomial fits of order 1 and triangular kernel functions for local-polynomial estimation. The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to mothers, excluding children who died before age 6. Flexible trends include municipality-level wheat prices by decade, the municipality-level share of refractory clergy × Cohort FE; and an indicator variable for religious centers within 15km × Cohort FE, for political societies within 15km × Cohort FE, for rebellions against the state in 1779–1789 within 15km × Cohort FE, for legal centers within 15km × Cohort FE, for fiscal centers × Cohort FE, for territorial administrative centers × Cohort FE, for paved roads × Cohort FE, and for horse posts × Cohort FE; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table A9: Sensitivity to additional RD-DD specifications using Geni data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A. Two-dimensional running variable in latitude, longitude, latitude <math>\times</math> longitude</i>				
Impartible	−0.044**	−0.050*	−0.039**	−0.025
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.019)
N observations / clusters	3,176 / 872	2,716 / 751	5,692 / 1,294	5,091 / 1,121
Bandwidth	15 km	15 km	30 km	30 km
<i>Panel B. Running variable in distance varies by years fertile post-reforms</i>				
Impartible	−0.028	−0.062***	−0.036*	−0.051**
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
N observations / clusters	3,954 / 931	3,794 / 875	6,131 / 1,390	5,666 / 1,270
Bandwidth	16.97 km	18.85 km	35.06 km	41.78 km
<i>Panel C. Uniform kernel</i>				
Impartible	−0.044***	−0.044***	−0.034***	−0.026*
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.014)
N observations / clusters	2,644 / 754	3,686 / 844	6,350 / 1,442	5,552 / 1,226
Bandwidth	12.59 km	17.73 km	37.57 km	37.48 km
<i>Panel D. Eighteenth-century cohorts (as in Henry)</i>				
Impartible	−0.036**	−0.052***	−0.035**	−0.029*
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.015)
N observations / clusters	3,667 / 877	3,383 / 809	5,603 / 1,327	5,003 / 1,159
Bandwidth	17.63 km	19.43 km	37.37 km	40.81 km
<i>Panel E. Rural municipalities (as in Henry)</i>				
Impartible	−0.025	−0.053***	−0.032**	−0.031**
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)
N observations / clusters	3,825 / 844	3,743 / 823	5,913 / 1,321	5,362 / 1,171
Bandwidth	17.48 km	19.97 km	37.03 km	42.64 km
<i>Panel F. 100-kilometer border-segment fixed effects</i>				
Impartible	−0.034**	−0.044***	−0.038***	−0.029**
× Years fertile post-reform	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)
N observations / clusters	3,873 / 928	3,993 / 908	5,843 / 1,345	5,621 / 1,267
Bandwidth	16.23 km	19.5 km	31.74 km	39.89 km
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Border segment FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	Y	.	Y
Order polynomial	linear	linear	quadratic	quadratic

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of  $\beta$  from Equation (14) under different specifications. Panel A considers a two-dimensional running variable. The linear polynomial is  $x + y + x \cdot y$ , and the quadratic polynomial is  $x + y + x \cdot y + x^2 + y^2 + x^2 \cdot y + x \cdot y^2$ , where  $x$  is longitude and  $y$  is latitude. Panel B considers running variables in distance to the border interacted with 26 indicator variables for cohorts with 0, 1 ... 25 years fertile after the reforms. Panel C uses a uniform kernel. Panels D and E restrict the sample to that used in the design of the Enquête Henry: respectively, 18C cohorts from rural municipalities (i.e., not administrative centers of 19C-départements). Panel F uses 100-km border-segment fixed effects. The base sample and flexible trends are as in Table 4. All specifications use MSE-optimal bandwidths (except A) and triangular kernels (except C). The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to mothers, excluding infant deaths before age 6; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table A10: Spatial regression-discontinuity estimates for the effects of including women in inheritances: Geni data.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Dep. Variable: completed fertility</i>				
Women excluded	1.424*** (0.351)	1.393*** (0.372)	1.513*** (0.400)	1.507*** (0.411)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	−0.051*** (0.015)	−0.058*** (0.016)	−0.054*** (0.015)	−0.056*** (0.016)
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Border segment FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	Y	.	Y
Order polynomial	linear	linear	quadratic	quadratic
Kernel	triangular	triangular	triangular	triangular
MSE-optimal bandwidth	18.05	22.89	25.33	33.22
Observations	3,863	4,037	4,564	4,882
N clusters	878	876	1,049	1,067
Mean dep. variable	3.76	3.77	3.69	3.73

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of Equation (14). The sample is mothers born in France (1700–1810) whose Geni record satisfies the horizontal restriction, and born within a MSE-optimal bandwidth on each side of the inheritance border. We use local-polynomial fits of orders 1 and 2, and triangular kernel functions for local-polynomial estimation. The control group is restricted to municipalities with partible inheritance, including women (i.e., municipalities affected by none of the two reform treatments). The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to mothers, excluding infant deaths before age 6. Flexible trends include municipality-level wheat prices by decade, the municipality-level share of refractory clergy × Cohort FE; and an indicator variable for religious centers within 15km × Cohort FE, for political societies within 15km × Cohort FE, for rebellions against the state in 1779–1789 within 15km × Cohort FE, for legal centers within 15km × Cohort FE, for fiscal centers × Cohort FE, for territorial administrative centers × Cohort FE, for paved roads × Cohort FE, and for horse posts × Cohort FE; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.



## Appendix B. Figures




Figure B1: Bailliages of the Généralité of Amiens in 1789

*Notes:* Map reproduced from [Brette \(1904\)](#).



Figure B2: Customary Boundaries based on [Klimrath \(1843\)](#)

*Notes:* This figure reproduces the original map of customary boundaries in [Klimrath \(1843\)](#). It is available from [Fourniel and Vendrand-Voyer \(2017\)](#).




Figure B3: Written-Law and Customary-Law Country.

*Notes:* The left panel displays the division of France into a written-law (brown) and customary-law (gray) country based on [Klimrath \(1843\)](#). The left panel displays the same division based on [Gay, Gobbi, and Goñi \(2023a, 2023b\)](#).



3 Mari : LHERMITTE Prénom : ... Filles : clous  
 NOMS : LE HORIN Prénom : ... Filles : No. LOZNER  
 O femme : ... Prénom : ... Filles : Guel  
 ... HENRY

PROFESSION 14900

MARIAGE célébré à GUIMAEC (Finistère)

né à : ... demeurant à : ...

MARI : ... FEMME : ...

Groupe	Durée (ans)	Nbre de naiss.	Age de la mère	Durée du mariage	Inter-velle en mois	Sexe	Rang	NAISSANCES		DÉCÈS		MARIAGES		Prénom et NOM du conjoint
								Date	Age	Date	Age	Date	Age	
15-19	29	1	13	1	13	m	1	23.9.1755	12				Guel	
20-24	30	2	16	1	16	m	2	26.1.1757	11				clous	
25-29	33	5	24	1	24	m	3	19.12.1759	9				Ha	
30-34	35	7	26	1	26	m	4	5.1.1762	6				Yve	
35-39	37	9	26	1	26	m	5	15.3.1764	4				Jo. Ha	
40-44	40	11	26	1	26	m	6	23.4.1766	4				Y	
45-49	42	14	28	1	28	m	7	12.9.1768					Ha	
50-54							8							
55-59							9							
60-64							10							
65-69							11							
70-74							12							
75-79							13							
80-84							14							
85-89							15							
Total														
Garçons														
Filles														

OBSERVATIONS

Figure B4: Example of an entry in the nominative part of the Henry database.

Notes: Extract reproduced from Séguy (2001).






Figure B5: Demographic transition, Henry database.

Notes: This figure plots the completed fertility of 20,043 mothers born between 1650 and 1800 based on the Henry database. Gross completed fertility considers all children ever born; net completed fertility considers children who survived at least until six years old. Moving averages include a mother's birth year, two lags, and two forward years. The vertical line indicates the cohort who completed her fertile cycle immediately before the 1793 inheritance reform, i.e., who were aged 40 in 1793.



$$(a) \frac{r \text{ marriages}_{m,t}}{\text{All marriages}_{m,t}} \times \frac{365.25}{\text{days } r_t}$$



$$(b) \frac{\text{Lent} + \text{Advent marriages}_{m,t}}{\text{All marriages}_{m,t}} \times \frac{365.25}{46 + \text{days advent}_t}$$

Figure B6: Lent and advent marriages between 1700 and 1815.

*Notes:* In the formulae,  $m$  indexes municipalities and  $t$  years of marriage. Panel (a) shows yearly averages of  $\frac{r \text{ marriages}_{m,t}}{\text{All marriages}_{m,t}} \times \frac{365.25}{\text{days } r_t}$  for  $r=\text{lent}$  and  $r=\text{advent}$ ; and Panel (b) a 5-year moving average of  $\frac{\text{Lent} + \text{Advent marriages}_{m,t}}{\text{All marriages}_{m,t}} \times \frac{365.25}{46 + \text{days advent}_t}$  in municipalities with pre-reform partible (blue) and impartible (red) inheritance. The vertical dashed line indicates the year 1792, when civil marriage was introduced.




Figure B7: Balancedness on the religiosity index.

*Notes:* This figure shows means and 95 percent confidence intervals for  $R_m$  in equation (9), estimated separately in municipalities ( $m$ ) with pre-reform impartible vs. partible inheritance, and municipalities with pre-reform inheritance systems that included vs. excluded women;  $R_m$  is calculated based on lent marriages only (blue), advent marriages only (green), and lent and advent marriages (turquoise). Estimates are based on 6,472 marriages celebrated between 1792 and 1815 in the 39 municipalities in the Henry database.




Figure B8: Inheritance systems in four administrative centers.




Figure B9: Trends in completed fertility by inheritance system.

*Notes:* Each dot represents the average completed fertility of a given birth cohort. Pre- and post-reform trends (lines) and confidence intervals (shaded areas) are calculated from a local polynomial regression on each side of the 1753 cohort. Colors correspond to areas with different pre-reform inheritance systems. The vertical dashed line indicates the cohort who completed her fertile cycle immediately before the 1793 inheritance reforms; i.e., who were aged 40 in 1793. The gray line shows the remaining fertile years after the 1793 inheritance reforms for each cohort (left axis).




Figure B10: Balance RD plots.

*Notes:* This figure shows RD plots for various covariates, akin to Figure 9. The border is normalized at 0, with positive values for impartible areas. Circles show average values of each covariate within bins, where the number of bins are based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced selector. Lines show a polynomial fit of order 1. The bandwidth ca. 15km is based on the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. The unit of observation is mothers born in France (1700–1810) within ca. 15km of the inheritance border and whose Geni record satisfies the horizontal restriction (first panel), or their birthplaces (remaining panels).




Figure B11: Trends in completed fertility under partible and impartible inheritance, Geni.com.

*Notes:* Dots represent the average completed fertility of mothers by birth cohorts. Pre- and post-reform trends (lines) are calculated from a local polynomial regression on each side of the inheritance border. The vertical dashed line indicates the cohort who completed her fertile cycle immediately before the 1793 inheritance reforms; i.e., who were aged 40 in 1793. The gray line shows the remaining fertile years after the 1793 inheritance reforms for each cohort (right axis).





Figure B12: Locations in RD setting for women's right to inherit, Geni.com.

*Notes:* This figure displays the geo-located birthplace of women born in France (1700–1810) whose Geni record satisfies the horizontal sample restriction. Colored dots are within 30 kilometers of a women included-excluded inheritance border.

Panel A. Cohorts fertile before the reforms ( $F = 0$ )



Panel B. Cohorts fertile after the reforms ( $F > 0$ )




Figure B13: Fertility and distance to border determining women's right to inherit.

*Notes:* This figure displays RD plots and estimates from Equation (13). The sample is mothers in Geni satisfying the horizontal restriction and who were born in France (1700–1810) within ca. 15km of the inheritance border. Panel A is for cohorts who completed her fertile cycle before 1793; Panel B is for cohorts who were fertile after 1793. Completed fertility is the number of children ever born to mothers, excluding infant deaths before age 6. The border is normalized at 0, with positive values for areas that excluded women from inheritances. Circles show average fertility within bins, where fertility is partialled out of cohort and border segment fixed effects, and bins are based on the IMSE-optimal evenly-spaced selector. Lines show a polynomial fit of order 1. The bandwidth ca. 15km is based on the MSE optimal bandwidth selector; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

## Appendix C. Historical context: estimates of land ownership based on the TRA database

de Brandt (1901, p. 56) estimates that 80 percent of French households owned their land at the eve of the Revolution. Such estimate can however be an over-estimation of reality since it is based on counting owners in a municipality and then aggregating them all, which double counts owners of large, or several, plots of land.

More accurate estimates can be obtained through the TRA database (Bourdieu, Kesztenbaum, and Postel-Vinay 2013). These data are based on marriage civil records and succession acts between 1793 and 1902 for individuals whose surname starts by the letters “Tra”. The choice of such three letters was carefully selected based on the stability of surnames, having a good regional representation, and the tractability of the sample size.

The individual sample of the TRA database recomposes the wealth at death based two sources: the *Tables de Successions et Absences* (TSA) that contain for all deceased individuals some information on their belongings, and the *Registres de mutations par décès* (RMD) that contains the details of the wealth composition for those who have some. Based on these primary sources, 73.6% of TRA male individuals born in the eighteenth century who died after the age of 30 left some inheritance. Among these, there is information on whether the succession contained non-movable assets for 62.5% of them (of which 92.1% left non-movable assets). Hence, the overall share of the population who dies with non-movable assets depends on whether we assume that, among the 47.5% for whom we do not have the information on whether they left non-movable assets or not, either none of them had non-movable assets or they all had non-movable assets. The share of individuals under each assumption is 42.5% and 69.9% respectively.

## Appendix D. Maximization problems

**Maximization problem under impartible inheritance.** The maximization problem under impartible inheritance writes as follows

$$\max_{n_I} \ln((1 - \phi n_I)y_I) + \beta \ln\left((L - \bar{L})^{1-\alpha} n_I^\alpha\right),$$

which can be rearranged as

$$\max_{n_I} \ln(1 - \phi n_I) + \ln(y_I) + \alpha\beta \ln(n_I) + (1 - \alpha)\beta \ln(L - \bar{L}),$$



and is only defined for  $0 < n_I < \frac{1}{\phi}$ .

The first order condition writes as follows,

$$-\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi n_I} + \frac{\alpha\beta}{n_I} = 0 \quad (1)$$

$$\iff n_I^* = \frac{\alpha\beta}{(1 + \alpha\beta)\phi} ,$$

where  $n_I^*$ , is the solution to the maximization problem with impartible inheritance.

Taking the derivative of Equation (1) with respect to  $n_I$ , we have

$$-\frac{\phi^2}{(1 - \phi n_I)^2} - \frac{\alpha\beta}{n_I^2} < 0 ,$$

which satisfies the second order condition for a maximum.

**Maximization problem under partible inheritance.** The maximization problem under partible inheritance writes as follows

$$\max_{n_P} \ln((1 - \phi n_P)y_P) + \beta \ln \left( n_P \left( \frac{L}{n_P} - \bar{L} \right)^{1-\alpha} \right) ,$$

which can be rearranged as

$$\max_{n_P} \ln(1 - \phi n_P) + \ln(y_P) + \alpha\beta \ln(n_P) + (1 - \alpha)\beta \ln(L - \bar{L}n_P) ,$$

and is only defined for  $0 < n_P < \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\phi}, \frac{L}{\bar{L}} \right\}$ .

The first order condition writes as follows,

$$-\frac{\phi}{1 - \phi n_P} + \frac{\alpha\beta}{n_P} - \frac{(1 - \alpha)\beta\bar{L}}{L - \bar{L}n_P} = 0 \quad (2)$$

$$\iff \frac{\alpha\beta}{n_P} - \left( \frac{\phi}{1 - \phi n_P} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)\beta\bar{L}}{L - \bar{L}n_P} \right) = 0$$

$$\iff \alpha\beta(1 - \phi n_P)(L - \bar{L}n_P) - n_P [\phi(L - \bar{L}n_P) + (1 - \alpha)\beta\bar{L}(1 - \phi n_P)] = 0 .$$

Where the left hand side of the first order condition is a second order polynomial and is negative for  $n_P = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\phi}, \frac{L}{\bar{L}} \right\}$ . This implies that out of the two solutions to Equation (2) (respectively below and above  $\min \left\{ \frac{1}{\phi}, \frac{L}{\bar{L}} \right\}$ ), only the one below,

denoted  $n_P^*$ , is a solution to the maximization problem and equal to

$$n_P^* = \frac{\beta\bar{L} + (1 + \alpha\beta)\phi L - \sqrt{(\beta\bar{L} + (1 + \alpha\beta)\phi L)^2 - 4\alpha\beta(1 + \beta)\phi\bar{L}L}}{2(1 + \beta)\phi\bar{L}}.$$

Taking the derivative of Equation (2) with respect to  $n_P$ , we have

$$-\frac{\phi^2}{(1 - \phi n_P)^2} - \frac{\alpha\beta}{n_P^2} - \frac{(1 - \alpha)\beta\bar{L}^2}{(L - \bar{L}n_P)^2} < 0,$$

which satisfies the second order condition for a maximum.

## Appendix E. Control variables

Our analyzes include a host of municipality-level control variables to capture local economic conditions as well as local support to (and information about) the Revolution: decade-average wheat prices; proximity to administrative centers for tax collection, legal authorities, territorial administration, and Church authority; proximity to political societies in 1793; proximity to rebellions against State authorities that occurred in the decade preceding the Revolution; proximity to paved roads as well as the postal network; land suitability for agriculture and terrain ruggedness. This appendix provides details on their content and sources.

**Wheat prices.** To capture local economic conditions, we attribute a decade-average wheat price to each municipality based on 8,616 quotes (in *sous tournois* per liter) over 117 locations in France between 1700 and 1800, collected from 51 secondary sources by [Ridolfi \(2019\)](#).<sup>1</sup> Specifically, we first compute decade-average wheat prices in each of these locations. We then generate decade-specific rasters of wheat prices through spatial interpolations over a 135-by-146 grid dividing France’s territory, where we use an inverse-probability weighting procedure. Finally, we compute spatially weighted averages for each municipality polygon—Appendix Figure D1 displays the corresponding raster for prices in the 1780s along with the locations of price quotes and municipalities in the Henry database. In the analysis dataset, we attribute the resulting wheat price to the decade in which a woman in our sample reached 15 years old, i.e., the beginning of her fertile cycle.

**Distances to administrative centers.** Our analysis flexibly controls for the proximity of municipalities in the Henry database to various administrative cen-

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<sup>1</sup>We are grateful to Leonardo Ridolfi for sharing his raw price series data with us.




Figure D1: Raster map of wheat prices in the 1780s.

Notes: Raster map based on wheat price quotes from [Ridolfi \(2019\)](#). Prices are in *sous tournois* per liter.

ters. In particular, for each municipality, we calculate the distance to the closest center for Church administration (*évêché* capitals), judicial district seat (*bailliage* capitals), tax collection (*recettes des finances* capitals), and territorial administration (*subdélégation* capitals). We collect the locations of these administrative centers from [Nordman, Ozouf-Marignier, and Laclau \(1989, pp. 74–80\)](#) and display their spatial distributions in Appendix Figure D2.

**Political societies.** To capture the local adherence to the principles of the Revolution and the availability of information about revolutionary events, we control for the proximity of municipalities to a political society (*société politique*) in 1793. Between 1789 and 1793, about six thousand political societies were created. These were associations in which citizens met to discuss political affairs, social issues, and the reforms passed by the National Convention—including the 1793 inheritance reforms. They played a critical role in the diffusion of the ideas of the Revolution: the famous eminent Saint-Just qualified these societies as “temples for the principle of equality” ([Boutier, Boutry, and Bonin 1992, p. 10](#)). These were also groups that had privileged access to information regarding the events of the Revolution, for instance through the *Bulletin de la Convention*, which was sent to all political societies. We gather the locations of these political societies from [Boutier, Boutry, and Bonin \(1992, pp. 77–101\)](#) and display their distribution in




Figure D2: Spatial distribution of administrative centers in 1789.

*Notes:* This figure displays the locations of évêché centers in Panel (a), bailliage centers in Panel (b), recettes des finances centers in Panel (c), and subdélégation centers in Panel (d). Data are from [Nordman, Ozouf-Marignier, and Laclau \(1989, pp. 74–80\)](#).

Panel (a) of Appendix Figure [D3](#).

**Rebellions against State authorities.** To further capture the extent of local support for the Revolution, we consider the proximity of municipalities in the Henry database to rebellions against State authorities that occurred in the decade




Figure D3: Spatial distribution of political societies and rebellions.

*Notes:* In Panel (a), this figure displays the spatial distribution of political societies created between 1789 and 1793 based on [Boutier, Boutry, and Bonin \(1992, pp. 77–101\)](#). In Panel (b), it displays the spatial distribution of 734 rebellions against State authorities across 510 municipalities from [Gay and Hamon \(2023\)](#), based on archival material assembled by [Nicolas \(2002\)](#).

preceding the Revolution—the historiography highlights that support for the Revolution was relatively stronger in locations where such rebellions occurred ([Nicolas 2002](#)). Here, we use the *Rebellions in France* database constructed by [Gay and Hamon \(2023\)](#) based on archival material assembled by Jean Nicolas over the course of 30 years ([Nicolas 2002](#)). In particular, we extract the 734 rebellions that occurred over 510 locations between 1779 and 1789 and that concerned disputes over State taxation, the judiciary, or the military. We display the distribution of these rebellions in Panel (b) of Appendix Figure D3.

**Paved roads** To capture the proximity of municipalities with respect to economic and information flows, we control for the proximity to a paved road. We display the distribution of such roads in Panel (a) of Appendix Figure D4. The shapefile of this paved roads network is from [Perret, Gribaudi, and Barthelemy \(2015\)](#), which proceeded with a manual vectorization of Cassini’s map of France surveyed between 1756 and 1789 ([de Dainville 1955](#); [Pelletier 1990](#)).

**Postal network** To further capture the proximity of municipalities with respect to information networks, we control for the proximity to a horse post in the 1780s. We display the distribution of horse posts in Panel (b) of Appendix Figure D4.






Figure D4: Spatial distribution of paved roads and horse posts.

*Notes:* In Panel (a), this figure displays the spatial distribution of paved roads in the late eighteenth century based on [Perret, Gribaudi, and Barthelemy \(2015\)](#). In Panel (b), it displays the spatial distribution of horse posts (white dots) as well as postal roads linking these posts (red lines). The network of horse posts in 1780 was vectorized based on the *Livre de poste* of 1780.

This network of horse posts was first created in the sixteenth century, then gradually expanded over time, especially in the eighteenth century as close to 1,800 posts existed in the mid-1780s. This network was instrumental in the monarchy’s apparatus for disseminating information through a tight network of postal relays that enabled the integration of peripheral areas into national networks ([Arbellot 1973](#); [Bretagnolle and Franc 2020](#)).

**Land characteristics** To capture geographical features of the land, we calculate two different measures at the level of municipalities: land suitability for agriculture and terrain ruggedness. More precisely, we use the post-1500 average caloric suitability index developed by [Galor and Özak \(2016\)](#) and the terrain ruggedness index developed by [Nunn and Puga \(2012\)](#), where we average raster values across cells within municipalities—see Appendix Figure [D5](#).




Figure D5: Land characteristics.

*Notes:* In Panel (a), this figure displays the post-1500 average caloric suitability index developed by [Galor and Özak \(2016\)](#) after the discretization of the raster file to polygons representing France's municipalities. Darker areas indicate lower caloric suitability. In Panel (b), it displays the average terrain ruggedness based on the data of [Nunn and Puga \(2012\)](#) after the discretization of the raster file to polygons representing France's municipalities. Darker areas indicate higher terrain ruggedness.

## Appendix F. Robustness of DD results

Here, we report the details, tables and figures of our robustness analysis summarized in Section 6.2.

### F.1 DD robustness details

**Permutation tests.** We use a permutation test to reshuffle exposure to the 1793 inheritance reforms across municipalities. Specifically, we reshuffle the pre-reform inheritance system across the 39 municipalities included in the Henry database. That is, we reshuffle whether the reforms altered the inheritance system in each municipality or not, keeping the total share of municipalities under each pre-reform inheritance system fixed.

Figure E1 reports 10,000  $\beta$ -coefficients from estimating Equation (12). Panel A reports permutation tests for the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance; Panel B, for the effect of including women in inheritances. Panels C and D report analogous permutation tests where we also permute municipality-level wheat prices,  $p_{\tilde{m}c}$ , and the vector of municipality-level religiosity, political factors, and economic geography,  $\mathbf{Z}_{\tilde{m}}$ . Our true estimate from Equation (11) is plotted as a vertical line in the histograms.

Estimated coefficients in the placebo regressions have a distribution centered around zero. The percentage of placebo coefficients that are larger in magnitude than the true estimate is only 0.14 percent for the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance (Panel A) and 0.08 percent for the effect of including women in inheritances (Panel B). Similarly, only 0.35 percent and 0.07 percent of the placebo coefficients are larger than the true estimates when permuting both the pre-reform inheritance system and the set of flexible time trends across municipalities (Panels C and D).

**Heterogeneous treatment effects.** Our estimation strategy compares cohorts of fertile age to cohorts too old to be fertile in 1793 between areas where the reforms altered and did not alter the inheritance system in place. Because our measure of exposure to the reforms corresponds to the remaining fertile years after 1793, the treatment effect may not be constant across cohorts, e.g., one additional fertile year may have a different effect at age 15 than at age 30. To account for this possibility, we perform two exercises. First, we estimate Equation (11) replacing our continuous measure of reform exposure,  $F_c$ , with a set of indicator variables for women with 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–24, and 25 fertile years after the reforms.



Figure E2 shows that relative to women who completed their fertile cycle before 1793, women exposed to the reforms had a lower completed fertility by 0.6–0.7 children. The impact of the reform is similar for abolishing impartible inheritance and including women in inheritances. The effect size is smaller for cohorts with only up to 10 fertile years after the reforms than for younger cohorts more exposed to the reforms, although the estimates are not statistically different. The effect size for older cohorts is biologically plausible and consistent with the demography literature showing that, at the start of the demographic transition, women at the end of their reproductive cycle limited their fertility by not having their “last child” (Knodel 1987; Cinnirella, Klemp, and Weisdorf 2017).

Second, we use insights from de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020) that two-way fixed-effect estimators consist of a weighted average of heterogeneous average treatment effects (ATEs). Because weights may be negative, these estimators may be negative even when all ATEs are positive. There are only two groups in our estimation: a treatment group where the reforms altered inheritance rules and a control group where they did not. That said, our measure of exposure to the reforms – the remaining fertile years after 1793 – takes on 25 values. Out of the resulting 50 weights, only 8 are negative. The amount of treatment heterogeneity needed to explain away our baseline estimate is implausibly large. For instance, if all ATEs were to average 0, we would only obtain our estimate of 0.024 (Panel A of Table 2, column 1) if the standard deviation of heterogeneous ATEs was 0.56. To see that this number is implausible, note that it would imply that the heterogeneous ATEs would be in the interval  $[-0.1, 0.1]$  under a uniform distribution and that 95 percent would be in the interval  $[-0.11, 0.11]$  under a normal distribution. This means that, in some cohorts, the heterogeneous ATEs would have to be more than four times larger than our estimated effect. In other words, we would have observe cohorts reducing their completed fertility by more than 2.5 children, equivalent to reducing the fertility of the average woman below 0.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>We cannot report de Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020)’s  $DiD_M$  because our treatment is always zero in the control group and increases by one unit with every cohort in the treated group. Hence, the  $DiD_M$  would only compare two cohorts with very limited exposure to the reform: the cohorts aged 39 and 40 in 1793. To see why, note that the  $DiD_M$  compares the outcome evolution among *switchers*, the groups whose treatment changes from  $d$  to some other value between  $t - 1$  and  $t$ , to the outcome evolution among *non-switchers*, the control groups whose treatment is equal to  $d$  in  $t - 1$  and  $t$ . In principle, it does so for all treatment values  $d$ , but since here the control group always has a treatment equal to 0, only  $d = 0$  would be considered. Because treatment values only increase by one unit with every cohort, looking only at  $d = 0$  implies that the switchers comprise only one cohort: the cohort aged 39 in 1793 whose treatment increased from 0 to 1 in impartible areas and remained at 0 in partible areas. Finally, because the  $DiD_M$  only compares consecutive cohorts, it would only report the fertility change between the switchers’ cohort aged 39 in 1793 and the previous cohort aged 40 in 1793.

**Placebo test.** We conduct a placebo test using cohorts that had all their children before the 1793 inheritance reforms. Specifically, we define the placebo sample and treatment as in our baseline specification, but for this set of cohorts whose fertility was unaffected by the actual reforms. First, we identify the cohorts that had all their children before 1793. Although the average woman did not have children above age 40 (Appendix Table A1), the 1739 cohort was the last full cohort that had all their children before the 1793 reforms. Second, we construct a placebo sample of 103 cohorts. We include the aforementioned cohort and the 102 preceding cohorts. We do this to match the number of cohorts in our baseline sample—103 cohorts born between 1700 and 1803. Third, we assume that a placebo reform was passed. Since our baseline specification uses a reform that was passed 10 years before the birth of the last cohort in the baseline sample, we assume that the placebo reform was passed 10 years before the birth of the last cohort in the placebo sample. Figure E4 visually compares the placebo sample and treatment to that in our baseline specification. Fourth, we estimate Equations (10) and (11) using this placebo sample and reform. In the absence of pre-trends, the placebo reform should not significantly affect the completed fertility of women in impartible-inheritance areas relative to those in partible-inheritance areas (or in areas where women were excluded versus included from inheritances).

Table E1 presents the results from this placebo exercise. In Panel A, the coefficient on the treatment group (Impartible) is not statistically significantly different from the pre-reform fertility gap between partible and impartible areas (see Sections 5, 6.1, and 6.2), illustrating that this gap remained constant up to 1793. Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction between impartible areas and the years fertile after the placebo reform is close to and not significantly different from zero. Panel B presents similar results for the placebo test comparing areas excluding versus including women in inheritances. Altogether, this suggests that our baseline estimation captures the effect of the 1793 inheritance reforms and not that of pre-trends in completed fertility.

**Alternative sample, treatment, and control group.** Table E2 examines the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the sample, treatment, and control group. The table presents estimates of Equations (10) and (11) using completed fertility as the dependent variable. In Panel A, we restrict the sample to women born between 1720 and 1780 instead of using all women born in the eighteenth century (1700–1803). That is, we restrict the sample to cohorts whose fertile cycle was closer to the 1793 inheritance reforms. Note that the 1753 cohort

was the last cohort that completed its fertile cycle before 1793. Hence, we now derive our estimates by comparing the completed fertility of about 30 cohorts of fertile age to about 30 cohorts too old to be fertile when the inheritance reforms were passed. The resulting estimates are almost identical to our baseline estimates. This further suggests that the large drop in completed fertility observed in eighteenth-century France was carried by cohorts of fertile age during the reforms in areas where the inheritance system was altered.

In Panel B, we consider an alternative definition of our treatment variable. Note that we capture the effects of the 1793 inheritance reforms through  $I_m \times F_c$ , the interaction term between the pre-reform inheritance system in municipality  $m$  and the length of exposure to the reforms for women in cohort  $c$ . So far,  $F_c$  is the remaining fertile years after 1793, based on a 25-year fertile cycle between ages 15 and 40. Although, in our sample the average woman had her last child at age 35 (with a standard deviation of 6 years), some women had children beyond age 40. Here, we consider instead a 30-year fertile cycle between ages 15 and 45 which encompasses 97 percent of all births. Specifically, the years fertile in the post-reform period,  $F_c$ , is now equal to 0 for cohorts aged 45 or more in 1793, equal to  $f \in \{1, \dots, 29\}$  for cohorts aged  $45 - f$  in 1793, and equal to 30 for cohorts aged 15 or less in 1793 (see Figure E5). We do not find significant differences between these and our baseline estimates. This suggests that the fertility changes induced by the reforms were concentrated around ages 15 to 40.

In Panel C, we redefine the control group to account for the fact that the 1793 inheritance reforms contained two treatments: abolishing impartible inheritance and including women in inheritances. Instead of comparing women in municipalities with pre-reform impartible (treatment group) and partible (control group) inheritance, we now restrict the control group to women in municipalities where the pre-reform system had *both* partible inheritance and women included in inheritances. We use the same restricted control group to estimate the effect of including women in inheritances (columns (4)–(6)). Our estimates are unchanged, suggesting that the control group in the baseline specification was unaffected by anyone of the two treatments in the reform. That said, the Henry database does not allow to fully disentangle the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance from the effect of including women in inheritances. The reason is the strong spatial correlation between areas where inheritance is impartible and excludes women.

**Migration and mortality.** As explained in Section 4.2, the Henry database is based on the family reconstitution method. This technique reconstitutes families

by linking records of birth, marriage, and death within and between individuals. A well-known limitation of the family reconstitution method is that families that emigrate from their parish of birth are difficult to trace later in life. Such emigration can underestimate the completed fertility of women. Similarly, a woman’s completed fertility may be underestimated if she died before completing her fertile cycle. Because the early stages of the demographic transition were characterized by changes in mortality, this potential issue is particularly relevant in our setting. If emigration or mortality evolved differently across areas with different pre-reform inheritance systems, our estimates would be biased.

Table E3 shows that this is not the case. It reports results from extended specifications of Equation (11), where samples are restricted to account for the emigration- and mortality-biases described above. Panel A shows the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance on completed fertility, and Panel B, the corresponding effect of including women in inheritance. We restrict the sample to women who were alive at age 40 (column (2)) and to women who were alive and whose husbands were alive at age 40 (columns (3)–(5)). Because the Henry database retrieves death dates from parish and hospital records – especially before 1792 – this restriction effectively captures women whose records were not missed because of migration. Similarly, completed fertility is not underestimated because we are certain that these women completed their fertility cycle before dying. In addition, we include municipality-specific trends in mortality to account for its local evolution in the early stages of the demographic transition: we add the average longevity by municipality and birth decade (column (4)) and the share of women that reached age 40, i.e., who completed their fertile cycle, by municipality and birth decade (column (5)). Across these different specifications, we find very similar effects to our baseline results. These results suggest that our estimates capture the local effects of the 1793 inheritance reforms on completed fertility and that they are not biased by migration patterns or by changes in mortality associated with the demographic transition.

**Adjusted fertility using the first-name repetition technique.** Our main measure of completed fertility is the number of children surviving until age 6 ever born to a woman. However, it has been documented that the Henry dataset under-reports infant deaths from the burial registers (Houdaille 1984). To show that our results are not driven by these omissions, we apply the first-name repetition technique of Cummins (2020) to construct adjusted fertility measures. This technique is based on the fact that, in pre-industrial Europe, it was not uncommon that par-

ents of a deceased child would name a newborn with the same first name. Hence, repeated first names within a family can be used to infer child mortality even when these children are not linked to a death record. We calculate the adjusted completed fertility as  $N_{born} - N_{dead} - N_{RN}$ , where  $N_{born}$  are the children born to a parental union,  $N_{dead}$  the number dying before age 6, and  $N_{RN}$  the number of repeated first names that are not linked to a death record. To calculate  $N_{RN}$ , we use the information in Henry on the first three characters of children's first name. Tables E4 and E5 present our main estimates based on Equations (10) and (11), using this adjusted fertility measure. Reassuringly, we find robust estimates for the effect of the 1873 inheritance reforms on adjusted completed fertility (Panel A), adjusted completed fertility of mothers (Panel B), and adjusted childlessness (Panel C).

## F.2 DD robustness tables

Table E1: Placebo test.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dep. variable: completed fertility			
<i>Panel A. Placebo reform abolishing impartible inheritance</i>			
Impartible	1.069*** (0.215)	1.066*** (0.235)	0.889*** (0.237)
Impartible × Years fertile post-placebo reform	−0.010 (0.010)	−0.010 (0.009)	0.001 (0.009)
Observations	14,618	14,596	14,596
Adjusted R-squared	0.080	0.156	0.181
<i>Panel B. Placebo reform including women in inheritances</i>			
Women excluded	0.917*** (0.217)	0.850*** (0.245)	0.364 (0.233)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-placebo reform	−0.006 (0.009)	−0.005 (0.009)	0.012 (0.007)
Observations	14,618	14,596	14,596
Adjusted R-squared	0.075	0.150	0.176
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	.	Y	Y
Flexible trends <sup>†</sup>	.	.	Y
N clusters	39	39	39

*Notes:* The placebo sample and treatment are equivalent to those used in our baseline estimation, but for to cohorts who had all their children before the 1793 reforms. See Section 6.2 for details. Completed fertility is based on the number of children surviving until age 6. Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2; <sup>†</sup>Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3 except for municipality-level wheat prices by decade, which are not available for the earlier cohorts in the placebo sample; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table E2: Alternative definitions of sample, treatment, and control group.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Completed fertility						
<i>Panel A. Alternative sample: women born in 1720-80</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.020** (0.009)	−0.017** (0.008)	−0.030*** (0.009)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	.	.	.	−0.023** (0.008)	−0.017** (0.008)	−0.028*** (0.009)
Adjusted R-squared	0.056	0.192	0.208	0.054	0.190	0.208
Observations	13,239	13,222	13,222	13,239	13,222	13,222
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39	39
<i>Panel B. Alternative treatment: Years fertile post-reform based on 30-year fertile cycle (ages 15 to 45)</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform (alt.)	−0.022*** (0.006)	−0.021*** (0.006)	−0.027*** (0.007)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform (alt.)	.	.	.	−0.024*** (0.006)	−0.022*** (0.006)	−0.027*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.059	0.182	0.197	0.056	0.179	0.197
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238	20,261	20,238	20,238
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39	39
<i>Panel C. Alternative control group: Municipalities with pre-reform partible inheritance &amp; including women</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.028*** (0.007)	−0.026*** (0.007)	−0.036*** (0.009)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	.	.	.	−0.029*** (0.007)	−0.025*** (0.006)	−0.031*** (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared	0.054	0.177	0.195	0.056	0.179	0.197
Observations	19,167	19,144	19,144	20,261	20,238	20,238
N clusters	35	35	35	39	39	39
Pre-reform partible/wom. excluded FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	.	Y	Y	.	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	.	Y	.	.	Y

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance and of including women in inheritances on completed fertility under alternative definitions of the sample, the treatment, and the control group. In Panel A, the sample is restricted to cohorts born between 1720 and 1780, i.e., who entered or exited their fertile cycle immediately around the time of the reforms. In Panel B, we consider a 30-year fertile cycle between ages 15 and 40 for women. Hence, we re-define the “Years fertile post-reform (alt.)” as equal to 0 for cohorts aged 45 or more in 1793, equal to  $f$  for cohorts aged  $45-f$  in 1793, and equal to 30 for cohorts aged 15 or less in 1793—that is, for women whose entire twenty-five-year fertile cycle was after the reforms. In Panel C, the control group is restricted to women in municipalities where the pre-reform inheritance system had *both* partible inheritance and women included in inheritances. Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2; Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table E3: Robustness to migration and changes in mortality.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Sample:</i>	baseline sample	women alive at 40	spouses alive at 40	spouses alive at 40	spouses alive at 40
<i>Panel A. Effect of abolishing impartible inheritance on completed fertility</i>					
Impartible	0.516*** (0.151)	0.539*** (0.164)	0.524*** (0.173)	0.517*** (0.165)	0.535*** (0.169)
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.032*** (0.009)	−0.032*** (0.008)	−0.032*** (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.239	0.261	0.261	0.261
<i>Panel B. Effect of including women in inheritances on completed fertility</i>					
Women excluded	0.311** (0.131)	0.293** (0.141)	0.294** (0.142)	0.306** (0.136)	0.319** (0.142)
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.033*** (0.008)	−0.034*** (0.007)	−0.034*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.238	0.261	0.261	0.261
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Municipality trends in longevity	.	.	.	Y	Y
Municipality trends in share wom. who completed fertility cycle	.	.	.	.	Y
Observations	20,238	17,955	16,946	16,861	16,861
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of Equation (11) on the Henry database of women born in 1700–1803 in column (1), who were alive at the end of their fertile cycle in column (2), and whose husbands were also alive at the end of their fertile cycle in columns (3)–(5). The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to all women, based on the number of children surviving until age 6. The last columns include municipality-specific, time-varying trends by birth decade on longevity in column (4) and on the share of women who died after completing their fertile cycle in column (5). Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2: literacy indicators for women and their husbands; accuracy of the Henry form fixed effects; and fixed effects for whether a woman’s father, mother, father-in-law, and mother-in-law was alive when the couple married. Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3: municipality-level wheat prices by decade; municipality-level religiosity index × Cohort FE; distance to main religious centre × Cohort FE; distance to political society × Cohort FE; distance to rebellion against the state in 1779–1789 × Cohort FE; distance to legal center × Cohort FE; distance to fiscal center × Cohort FE; distance to territorial administrative center × Cohort FE; distance to paved road × Cohort FE; and distance to horse post × Cohort FE. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.



Table E4: Adjusted fertility using the first-name repetition technique (1/2).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Dep. Variable is Adjusted completed fertility</i>			
Impartible	0.502*** (0.145)	0.474*** (0.117)	0.352*** (0.122)
Impartible $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.005)	-0.024*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.049	0.175	0.190
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
<i>Panel B. Dep. Variable is Adjusted completed fertility of mothers</i>			
Impartible	0.481** (0.180)	0.514*** (0.161)	0.379** (0.143)
Impartible $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	-0.017*** (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.007)	-0.023*** (0.008)
Adjusted R-squared	0.029	0.072	0.095
Observations	14,969	14,950	14,950
<i>Panel C. Dep. Variable is Adjusted childlessness</i>			
Impartible	-0.076*** (0.020)	-0.065*** (0.017)	-0.048* (0.025)
Impartible $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared	0.043	0.193	0.200
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	.	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	.	Y
N clusters	39	39	39

*Notes:* This table examines the robustness of our results to adjusting fertility variables using the first-name repetition technique. The dependent variable is the number of children ever born to all women (Panel A), to mothers (Panel B), and the probability to be childless (Panel C), all based on the number of children surviving until age 6. To correct for infant death omissions in the Henry dataset, we apply the first-name repetition technique. This technique is based on the fact that it was not uncommon to name a newborn with the same first name as a deceased sibling. We calculate the adjusted completed fertility as  $N_{born} - N_{dead} - N_{RN}$ , where  $N_{born}$  are the children born to a parental union,  $N_{dead}$  the number dying before age 6, and  $N_{RN}$  the number of repeated names that are not linked to a death record. The sample is women born in 1700–1803 in the Henry database. Individual-level controls are those in the full-specification in Table 2; Flexible trends include all trends in the full-specification in Table 3; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table E5: Adjusted fertility using the first-name repetition technique (2/2).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A. Dep. Variable is Adjusted completed fertility</i>			
Women excluded	0.484*** (0.143)	0.423*** (0.116)	0.248** (0.105)
Women excluded $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.026*** (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared	0.049	0.174	0.190
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
<i>Panel B. Dep. Variable is Adjusted completed fertility of mothers</i>			
Women excluded	0.512*** (0.173)	0.504*** (0.155)	0.376*** (0.127)
Women excluded $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)
Adjusted R-squared	0.030	0.072	0.096
Observations	14,969	14,950	14,950
<i>Panel C. Dep. Variable is Adjusted childlessness</i>			
Women excluded	-0.063*** (0.021)	-0.050*** (0.017)	-0.012 (0.020)
Women excluded $\times$ Years fertile post-reform	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
Adjusted R-squared	0.043	0.192	0.200
Observations	20,261	20,238	20,238
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	.	Y	Y
Flexible trends	.	.	Y
N clusters	39	39	39

Notes: As in table above; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

Table E6: Robustness controlling for soil, climate, and terrain characteristics.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: Completed fertility						
<i>Panel A. Controlling for land's caloric yield index, based on soil and climatic suitability for post-1500 crops</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.030*** (0.009)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	.	.	.	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.032*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.197	0.197	0.197	0.197	0.197
Observations	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238
Caloric suitability of land	.	Y	Y	.	Y	Y
Caloric suitability of land × Cohort FE	.	.	Y	.	.	Y
<i>Panel B. Controlling for terrain ruggedness</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.029*** (0.008)	−0.021** (0.008)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	.	.	.	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.028*** (0.007)	−0.023*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.199	0.200	0.197	0.200	0.201
Observations	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238
Terrain ruggedness	.	Y	Y	.	Y	Y
Terrain ruggedness × Cohort FE	.	.	Y	.	.	Y
<i>Panel C. Controlling for both caloric yield index and ruggedness</i>						
Impartible × Years fertile post-reform	−0.031*** (0.009)	−0.029*** (0.008)	−0.021** (0.008)	.	.	.
Women excluded × Years fertile post-reform	.	.	.	−0.031*** (0.008)	−0.028*** (0.007)	−0.023*** (0.007)
Adjusted R-squared	0.197	0.199	0.200	0.197	0.200	0.201
Observations	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238	20,238
Caloric suitability of land	.	Y	Y	.	Y	Y
Terrain ruggedness	.	Y	Y	.	Y	Y
Caloric suitability of land × Cohort FE	.	.	Y	.	.	Y
Terrain ruggedness × Cohort FE	.	.	Y	.	.	Y
Pre-reform partible inheritance FE	Y	Y	Y	.	.	.
Pre-reform women excluded FE	.	.	.	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cohort FE of husband	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Flexible trends	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N clusters	39	39	39	39	39	39

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of the effect completed fertility of abolishing impartible inheritance and including women, based on extended specifications controlling for land characteristics. Panel A considers [Galor and Özak \(2016\)](#)'s post-1500 caloric yield index in each municipality, which is based on soil and climatic suitability for different crops. Panel B considers the average value of [Nunn and Puga \(2012\)](#)'s terrain ruggedness index within a municipality's borders. Panel C considers both of these characteristics. Columns 1 and 4 report baseline estimates from the full flexible-trends specification in Equation (11). Columns 2 and 5 add land characteristics in levels. Columns 3 and 6 the interaction between cohort FE and land characteristics, hence allowing fertility to follow different trends in municipalities with different land characteristics. All specifications include an indicator for areas treated by the reform (pre-reform partible areas in columns 1-3, areas that excluded women from inheritances in columns 4-6); birth cohort FE; birth cohort FE of husbands; all individual-level controls from the full-specification in Table 2, column (5); and all flexible trends from the full-specification in Table 3, column (4); Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by municipality; \*p<.05; \*\*p<.01; \*\*\*p<.001.

### F.3 DD robustness figures




Figure E1: Permutation tests.

*Notes:* This figure plots 10,000 estimated coefficients for  $\beta$  in Equation (12), where we reshuffle the pre-reform inheritance system across the 39 municipalities in the Henry sample. In Panels A and B, the procedure only reshuffles the pre-reform inheritance system; In Panels C and D the procedure also reshuffles the municipality-level characteristics used to estimate flexible trends. The dependent variable is the completed fertility of women, excluding children who did not survive until age 6. The vertical line indicates the “true” estimate from Equation (11).




Figure E2: Non-linear effects of the 1793 reforms on completed fertility.

*Notes:* This figure shows estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the set of  $\beta_f$  in a regression of the form of Equation (11), where the continuous measure of reform exposure for different cohorts,  $F_c$ , is replaced with a set of indicator variables for women who had 1–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21–24, and 25 remaining fertile years after the 1793 reforms, i.e.,  $Y_{icm} = \alpha + \sum_{f \in \{1-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; 21-24; 25\}} \beta_f I_m \times \mathbf{1}[F_c \in f] + \gamma I_m + \mu_c + p_{mc} + \mathbf{X}_i' \theta + \sum_t \mathbf{1}[c = t] \times \mathbf{Z}_m' \delta_t + \epsilon_{icm}$ . Individual-level controls,  $\mathbf{X}_i$ , include the full set of controls in Table 2, column (5);  $p_{mc}$  and  $\sum_t \mathbf{1}[c = t] \times \mathbf{Z}_m' \delta_t$  capture our flexible-trends specification and include all trends in the full specification in Table 3.





Figure E3: Sensitivity of main estimates to outliers.

*Notes:* This figure shows estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the effect of abolishing impartible inheritance (top panel) and of including women in inheritances (bottom panel) on women's completed fertility. Estimates and confidence intervals are derived from the full-specification of Equation (11), estimated using the full sample (blue) and samples that sequentially omitting one of the 39 municipalities in the Henry database (gray).




Figure E4: Baseline versus placebo exercise

*Notes:* The placebo sample and treatment are equivalent to those used in our baseline estimation, but for cohorts who had all their children before the 1793 reforms. See Section 6.2 for details.






Figure E5: Alternative definitions of treatment.

*Notes:* Baseline treatment (solid line) are years fertile post-reform, based on a 25-year reproductive cycle between ages 15 and 40. Alternative treatment (dashed line) are years fertile post-reform, based on a 30-year reproductive cycle between ages 15 and 45.

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