

# The role of Producer Organisations (POs) in the allocation and consumption of fishing quotas:

case study on Bay of Biscay sole

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## Context

This work was carried out as part of a six-month end-of-study internship for the Master's degree in Marine and Coastal Sciences, specialising in Economics Applied to Agriculture, the Sea and the Environment.

The master is co-accredited by the Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer and the Institut-Agro Rennes-Angers. The internship was carried out at Ifremer in the Joint Research Unit AMURE (6308)

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 **ISblue** The interdisciplinary graduate school for the blue planet


 Ifremer

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# Why this study ?



# The question

What are the mechanisms used by the POs to allocate sole fishing opportunities among the actors in the fishery and their reallocation during the year, and how are they determined?



(Source : Ifremer)

# Bay of Biscay common sole (Soléa Soléa)

- Recruitment variability
- Forerunner in management measures
  - Subject to a TAC since 1984
  - Introduction of individual quotas in 2006
- 3rd most valuable species in France in 2020 (source : FranceAgriMer)
  - 39 million euros (Source : Ifremer/SIH)



Anne Steillein – Flickr.com



**329** vessels > 1 ton / year

**1,068** crew members

# Methods

- literature review of the work carried out on the sole fishery.
- A series of qualitative surveys of the main actors in the sole fishery.
  - **With PO representatives (6 interviews)**
  - **With fisheries stakeholders (7 interviews)**
- A characterisation of the Bay of Biscay sole fishery fleet
  - **Fisheries Information System data from Ifremer**
  - **PO data (LPDB, OPPAN, PDA)**



# Results

# Distribution of the quota to POs





Diagram of the allocation of sub-quotas by POs in 2022.

(Reference: Own realisation according to the survey results, the national orders for the allocation of fishing sub-quotas)




# Track records transfer system



-> A growing proportion of prior rights are held by POs

# Management of sole sub-quotas by POs



Allocation of Bay of Biscay sole fishing opportunities by PO in 2022  
(reference: Own realisation according to the survey results.)

# Management of sole sub-quotas by POs

*Distribution of sole sub-quotas according to POs' allocation methods for the year 2022.*



groups	Track records 2001-2003 as main limitation criteria			Other main limitation criteria		
	FSO	OPPAN	La Cotinière	PDA	LPDB	OP Vendée
Share of sole quota by PO	14,2 %	13,7%	10%	13,3%	25%	18,5%
Share of sole quota by group	37,9%			56,8%		

*(Reference: Own realisation according to the survey results)*

# Management of sole sub-quotas by POs


Role and strategies of POs at different time scales

- Main objective: guarantee access to resources for members



# Exploratory data analysis

*Variation between initial allocation and final consumption by PO between 2016 and 2020.*



3 main strategies :

- The initial allocation is restricted and reallocations are made during the year
- Over-allocation at the beginning of the year and individual under-allocation.
- very little annual adjustment, but a great deal of variability within the fleet

# Conclusion

- Decisive role of POs
- Generalisation of ship-by-ship allocations (compared to 2012)
- Importance of PO size (carry-over options)

# Discussion

- Obtain all the data for each PO and carry out more detailed quantitative analyses
- This work opens up the question of management objectives thanks to distribution criteria.
- Which limitation criterion paves the way for greater fairness?

Thank for your attention



# References

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PO	Method of limiting the sole sub-quota	Groups	Limitation Criteria
LPDB	Individual limits (100%)	Specialist netters	Track records 2001-2003, vessel size, stock dependency
		Diversified netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group
		Trawlers (divided into 4 sub-groups)	Individual limitation homogeneous within each subgroup
		Norway lobsters fishers (divided into 5 sub-groups)	Individual limitation homogeneous within each subgroup
		accessory catches	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group
OP Vendée	Individual limits (87%) Collective limits (13%)	Offshore netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group
		Coastal netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group (except for some small vessels)
		Trawlers	Collective limitation
OPPAN	Individual limits (92%) Collective limits (8%)	Vessel production > 2T	Track records 2001-2003
		Other vessels	Collective limitation
FSO	Individual limits (95%) Collective limits (5%)	Vessel production > 1T	Track records 2001-2003
		Other vessels	Collective limitation
La cotinière	Individual limits (100%)	All members	Track records 2001-2003
PDA	Individual limits (98,5%) collective limits (1,5%)	Vessel production > 1T	individual limits defined in 2012 when the CAPSUD and ARCACOOP POs merged
		Vessel production < 1T	Collective limitation (4T)

PO	Reallocation methods		
	Individual reallocation on a case-by-case basis	Homogeneous individual reallocation according to subgroups	Collective consumption
LPDB		X	
OP Vendée		X	
OPPAN	X		
FSO	X		
OP Cot	X		X
PDA	X		X

*Mode de réallocation des possibilités de pêche en cours d'année. (Source : Réalisation propre d'après les résultats d'enquêtes)*