

The role of Producer Organisations (POs) in the allocation and consumption of fishing quotas:

case study on Bay of Biscay sole

May 2023

EAFE Conference - Athens



DUDOUET Benjamin MACHER Claire et THEBAUD Olivier À l'Ifremer au sein de l'UMR AMURE



<u>Context</u>

This work was carried out as part of a six-month end-of-study internship for the Master's degree in Marine and Coastal Sciences, specialising in Economics Applied to Agriculture, the Sea and the Environment.

The master is co-accredited by the Institut Universitaire Européen de la Mer and the Institut-Agro Rennes-Angers. The internship was carried out at Ifremer in the Joint Research Unit AMURE (6308)

This work was supported by the ISblue project "Interdisciplinary graduate school for the blue planet" co-financed by a government grant managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the "Investissements d'avenir" programme integrated into France 2030, bearing the reference ANR-17-EURE-0015.














Why this study ?





The question

What are the mechanisms used by the POs to allocate sole fishing opportunities among the actors in the fishery and their reallocation during the year, and how are they determined?




(Source : Ifremer)



Bay of Biscay common sole (Soléa Soléa)

- Recruitment variability
- Forerunner in management measures
 - Subject to a TAC since 1984
 - Introduction of individual quotas in 2006



Anne Steillein – Flickr.com

- 3rd most valuable species in France in 2020 (source : FranceAgriMer)
 - 39 million euros (Source : Ifremer/SIH)



329 vessels > 1 ton / year

1,068 crew members



Methods

- litterature review of the work carried out on the sole fishery.
- A series of qualitative surveys of the main actors in the sole fishery.
 - With PO representatives (6 interviews)
 - With fisheries stakeholders (7 interviews
- A characterisation of the Bay of Biscay sole fishery fleet

•Fisheries Information System data from Ifremer •PO data (LPDB, OPPAN, PDA)





Results



Distribution of the quota to POs





Diagram of the allocation of sub-quotas by POs in 2022. (Reference: Own realisation according to the survey results, the national orders for the allocation of fishing sub-quotas)




Track records transfer system



-> A growing proportion of prior rights are held by POs



Management of sole sub-quotas by POs



Allocation of Bay of Biscay sole fishing opportunities by PO in 2022 (reference: Own realisation according to the survey results.)



Management of sole sub-quotas by POs


Distribution of sole sub-quotas according to POs' allocation methods for the year 2022.

groups	Track records 2001-2003 as main limitation criteria			Other main limitation criteria		
РО	FSO	OPPAN	La Cotinière	PDA	LPDB	OP Vendée
Share of sole quota by PO	14,2 %	13,7%	10%	13,3%	25%	18,5%
Share of sole quota by group	37,9%			56,8%		

(*Reference*: Own realisation according to the survey results)

Management of sole sub-quotas by POs Role and strategies of POs at different time scales

• Main objective: guarantee access to resources for members




remei



Exploratory data analysis

Variation between initial allocation and final consumption by PO between 2016 and 2020.



3 main strategies :

- The initial allocation is restricted and reallocations are made during the year
- Over-allocation at the beginning of the year and individual under-allocation.
- very little annual adjustment, but a great deal of variability within the fleet



Conclusion

- Decisive role of POs
- Generalisation of ship-by-ship allocations (compared to 2012)
- Importance of PO size (carry-over options)



Discussion

- Obtain all the data for each PO and carry out more detailed quantitative analyses
- This work opens up the question of management objectives thanks to distribution criteria.
- Which limitation criterion paves the way for greater fairness?



Thank for your attention



References

- Lagière Rachel, Claire Macher, et Olivier Guyader. 2012. « Bilan et évolution des mesures de gestion mises en œuvre dans le golfe de Gascogne »
- Innes, James, Olivier Thébaud, Ana Norman-López, et L. Richard Little. 2014. « Does Size Matter? An Assessment of Quota Market Evolution and Performance in the Great Barrier Reef Fin-Fish Fishery ». *Ecology and Society*
- Hamon Katell G, Olivier Thébaud, Stewart Frusher, et L. Richard Little. 2009. « A Retrospective Analysis of the Effects of Adopting Individual Transferable Quotas in the Tasmanian Red Rock Lobster, *Jasus Edwardsii*, Fishery ». *Aquatic Living Resources*
- ICES 2021 et 2022. « Sole (Solea Solea) in Divisions 8.a–b (Northern and Central Bay of Biscay) »
- Bellanger, Manuel. 2017. « Modelling Institutional Arrangements and Bio-Economic Impacts of Catch Share Management Systems: Application to the Bay of Biscay Sole Fishery »
- Boncoeur et Troadec. 2003. chapitre 2 (« Le mécanisme de la surexploitation des ressources halieutiques ») et chapitre 9 (« La régulation de l'accès », avec J.P. Troadec) in L. Laubier (Ed.) Exploitation et surexploitation des ressources marines vivantes



PO	Method of limiting the sole sub-quota	Groups	Limitation Criteria	
		Specialist netters	Track records 2001-2003, vessel size, stock dependency	
LPDB		Diversified netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group	
	Individual limits (100%)	Trawlers (divided into 4 sub- groups)	Individual limitation homogeneous within each subgroup	
		Norway lobsters fishers (divided into 5 sub-groups	Individual limitation homogeneous within each subgroup	
		accessory catchs	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group	
OP Vendée		Offshore netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group	
	Individual limits (87%) Collective limits (13%)	Coastal netters	Individual limitation homogeneous within the group (except for some small vessels)	
		Trawlers	Collective limitation	
OPPAN	Individual limits (92%)	Vessel production > 2T	Track records 2001-2003	
	Collective limits (8%)	Other vessels Collective limitation		
FSO	Individual limits (95%)	Vessel production > 1T	Track records 2001-2003	
	Collective limits (5%)	Other vessels	Collective limitation	
La cotinière	Individual limits (100%)	All members	Track records 2001-2003	
PDA	Individual limits (98,5%) Collective limits (1,5%)	Vessel production > 1T	individual limits defined in 2012 when the CAPSUD and ARCACOOP POs merged	
		Vessel production < 1T	Collective limitation (4T)	



	Reallocation methods					
PO	Individual reallocation on a case-by-case basis	Homogeneous individual reallocation according to subgroups	Collective consumption			
LPDB		х				
OP Vendée		х				
OPPAN	х					
FSO	х					
OP Cot	х		Х			
PDA	х		х			

Mode de réallocation des possibilités de pêche en cours d'année. (Source : Réalisation propre d'après les résultats d'enquêtes)