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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2023

GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges

Résumé

Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) have become a key building block in many security products as they provide interesting efficiency/security trade-offs. Indeed, a PAKE allows to dispense with the heavy public key infrastructures and its efficiency and portability make it well suited for applications such as Internet of Things or e-passports. With the emerging quantum threat and the effervescent development of post-quantum public key algorithms in the last five years, one would wonder how to modify existing password authenticated key exchange protocols that currently rely on Diffie-Hellman problems in order to include newly introduced and soon-to-be-standardized post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). A generic solution is desirable for maintaining modularity and adaptability with the many post-quantum KEM that have been introduced. In this paper, we propose two new generic and natural constructions proven in the Universal Composability (UC) model to transform, in a black-box manner, a KEM into a PAKE with very limited performance overhead: one or two extra symmetric encryptions. Behind the simplicity of the designs, establishing security proofs in the UC model is actually non-trivial and requires some additional properties on the underlying KEM like fuzziness and anonymity. Luckily, post-quantum KEM protocols often enjoy these two extra properties. As a demonstration, we prove that it is possible to apply our transformations to Crystals-Kyber, a lattice-based post-quantum KEM that will soon be standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
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Dates et versions

hal-04238146 , version 1 (12-10-2023)

Identifiants

Citer

Hugo Beguinet, Céline Chevalier, David Pointcheval, Thomas Ricosset, Mélissa Rossi. GeT a CAKE: Generic Transformations from Key Encaspulation Mechanisms to Password Authenticated Key Exchanges. Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS '23), Jun 2023, Kyoto, Japan. pp.516-538, ⟨10.1007/978-3-031-33491-7_19⟩. ⟨hal-04238146⟩
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