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Article Dans Une Revue Games and Economic Behavior Année : 2023

An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Résumé

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-based Winter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell mechanism better induces players to cooperate and to agree on an efficient outcome, whereas the demand-based Winter mechanism better implements allocations that reflect players' effective power, provided that the grand coalition is formed.
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hal-04194465 , version 1 (03-09-2023)

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Michela Chessa, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Aymeric Lardon, Takashi Yamada. An experiment on the Nash program: A comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value. Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, 141, pp.88-104. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.010⟩. ⟨hal-04194465⟩
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