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VerifMSI: Practical Verification of Hardware and Software Masking Schemes Implementations

Quentin L. Meunier¹ ^a and Abdul Rahman Taleb^{1,2}

¹*Sorbonne Université, CNRS, Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6, LIP6, F-75005 Paris, France.*

²*CryptoExperts, Paris, France*

{quentin.meunier,abdul.taleb}@lip6.fr

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Abstract:

Side-Channel Attacks are powerful attacks which can recover secret information in a cryptographic device by analysing physical quantities such as power consumption. Masking is a common countermeasure to these attacks which can be applied in software and hardware, and consists in splitting the secrets in several parts. Masking schemes and their implementations are often not trivial, and require the use of automated tools to check for their correctness. In this work, we propose a new practical tool named **VerifMSI** which extends an existing verification tool called **LeakageVerif** targeting software schemes. Compared to **LeakageVerif**, **VerifMSI** includes hardware constructs, namely gates and registers, what allows to take glitch propagation into account. Moreover, it includes a new representation of the inputs, making it possible to verify three existing security properties (Non-Interference, Strong Non-Interference, Probe Isolating Non-Interference) as well as a newly defined one called Relaxed Non-Interference, compared to the unique Threshold Probing Security verified in **LeakageVerif**. Finally, optimisations have been integrated in **VerifMSI** in order to speed up the verification. We evaluate **VerifMSI** on a set of 9 benchmarks from the literature, focusing on the hardware descriptions, and show that it performs well both in terms of accuracy and scalability.

1 INTRODUCTION

Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) exploit the relationship between physical quantities such as power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, or timing information and secret data manipulated by cryptographic implementations, in order to retrieve the secret data. Since the first published differential power attack (Kocher et al., 1999), many other such attacks have proven to be very effective when the device contains no specific countermeasure (Mangard et al., 2008; Batina et al., 2011; Chari et al., 2003). With the advent of the Internet-of-Things, many embedded devices now use cryptographic implementations and are potential targets for these attacks (smart cards, mobile phones, or RFID tags). Protecting these devices against SCA has thus become a significant concern.

Masking is a protection technique against SCA, with a goal to remove the statistical dependency between intermediate computations and secret data manipulated by the program (Trichina, 2003; Ishai et al., 2003). The rationale behind masking is that intermediate computations' values are correlated to the power consumption, therefore a masked program should have no statistical dependency between the secret data and the observable physical quantities. Masking can be applied at any order, and masking at order d consists in splitting each secret variable into $n = d + 1$ parts, called shares. The higher the order, the better the security, as any recombination of up to d shares should not allow to deduce any information on the secret, and the recovery becomes exponentially hard with the number of shares as each observation comes with noise. The most practical and common way of achieving masking for a secret x is the linear masking: it consists in drawing d uniformly and in-

^a  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8848-8079>

dependently distributed variables and computing the n^{th} share by recombining x with the first d shares using the bitwise xor operation \oplus in the boolean case. Splitting the secrets is not the main part however, as the original program must then be transformed into a masked equivalent, using shares only, and avoiding any recombination of the secret variables. While this is quite straightforward for linear operations w.r.t. the xor, the transformation is more complicated for the non-linear parts of the program. When done manually, several security flaws may appear. Consequently, a critical need for automatic masking verification has emerged to check the correctness of masked implementations, both in hardware or software.

Masking is popular as masked implementations can theoretically be proven secure, and several methods have been proposed for proving the security of such implementations. They are all based on analyzing the intermediate expressions manipulated by the circuit or program and try to answer the question: does the distribution of a specific subset of intermediate computation results depend on secret data? The implementation is considered insecure if two different secret values lead to two different distributions. This requires enumerating all possible subsets of internal variables of the program and testing their independence from the secret. The sizes and the number of sets depend on the considered property. One way of testing the independence of a given subset of internal variables is to compute the actual distribution of the variables for each possible realization of the secret inputs. In order to avoid this non-scalable approach, recent works on masking verification use symbolic computation. These methods can be categorized into two families: methods by *inference* (El Ouahma et al., 2017; El Ouahma et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2019a; Gao et al., 2019b), and methods by *substitution* (Barthe et al., 2015; Barthe et al., 2019; Meunier et al., 2020; Meunier et al., 2023). In the former, the analysis of a symbolic expression relies on the results of analysing the sub-parts of the expression using inference rules. These results usually contain a distribution type and additional information, such as variable occurrences. In the latter, the analysis of a symbolic expression consists in iteratively replacing masked sub-parts of the expressions until there is no more secret occurrence. The verification can fail to conclude on some given expressions with either method. In this case, the set of expressions is

considered to be “possibly leaking”. Using an enumerative technique to determine the distribution type may help to conclude in this case, but this workaround is limited to small expressions and variable sizes due to the inherent non-scalability of distribution enumeration. Consequently, verification methods must be as accurate as possible to conclude for as many leakage-free expressions as possible and give as few false positives as possible.

LeakageVerif (Meunier et al., 2023) is a substitution verification method implemented in an open-source tool, and provided as a python library. Compared to other tools, it has a good scalability and accuracy, while being easily adapted for different use cases (verification of algorithms, assembly code, hardware modules). In this work, we propose to extend **LeakageVerif** to overcome some of the limitations of this tool. We thus introduce **VerifMSI** for Verification of Masking Schemes Implementations. We claim **VerifMSI** to be a single tool including state-of-the-art techniques gathering all common masking verification types. If **VerifMSI** does not make a major breakthrough in masking verification techniques, it encompasses a wide range of use cases with optimized and scalable algorithm implementations, making it a very practical open tool for hardware and software masking verification. Compared to **LeakageVerif**, **VerifMSI** makes the following contributions:

- Addition of hardware circuits constructs (gates, registers) allowing for circuits description, taking into account glitches.
- Possibility to use shares for the masking scheme description, allowing to choose between the classical description using secrets and masks, and the share description. In the former, the program explicitly uses secrets and masks, e.g. a secret a is replaced with expressions ma and $ma \oplus a$. In the latter, the shares are atomic inputs of the program (e.g., a_0 , a_1), what allows to verify specific security properties based on shares: Non-Interference (NI), Strong Non-interference (SNI), Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) and a newly proposed Relaxed Non-Interference (RNI) property which we introduce in this work.
- Higher order verifications of security properties, including optimizations to reduce the number of tuples of expressions to check.

VerifMSI is available as an open-source tool at the following address:

<https://github.com/quentin-meunier/VerifMSI>.

The rest of the article is organised as follows: section 2 presents some background on masking verification and existing security properties; section 3 presents our verification tool `VerifMSI` and the different optimizations we designed; section 4 presents an experimental evaluation of `VerifMSI` on 9 benchmarks from the literature; section 5 compares `VerifMSI` to other existing approaches; finally, section 6 concludes.

2 SECURITY PROPERTIES FOR MASKING VERIFICATION

2.1 Existing Properties

Since the seminal work of (Ishai et al., 2003) which introduced the first definition of a security property, many other properties were proposed and used. We recall in the following the most important security notions for hardware circuits. **Threshold Probing Security** (TPS). The most common security property targeted with masking is known as *Threshold Probing Security*, for a given order t (Barthe et al., 2015). An implementation achieves t -order threshold probing security if any tuple of intermediate values of size t has a distribution of values which is independent from all secret variables. This security property can reason either on secrets and masks, or on share-based expressions. In the latter case, an expression using shares can be verified by replacing arbitrarily the shares with the corresponding expressions using the secret and masks. The general substitution algorithm is given in algorithm 1. For example, considering two secrets \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} split in two shares ($\mathbf{a}_0, \mathbf{a}_1$) and ($\mathbf{b}_0, \mathbf{b}_1$), the expression $\mathbf{a}_0 \oplus \mathbf{a}_1 \oplus \mathbf{b}_0$ is 1-threshold probing secure since \mathbf{b}_0 can be replaced with \mathbf{mb} or $\mathbf{b} \oplus \mathbf{mb}$. A replacement in this context is the fact to replace a sub-expression bijective in a mask with the mask itself, which requires the mask to not appear in the sub-expression (step 2 of algorithm 1). In either case, the whole expression of this example is masked with the mask \mathbf{mb} , guaranteeing secret independence.

Non-Interference (NI). Another common security property is known as t -order *Non Interference*, or t -NI (Barthe et al., 2019). It is defined informally as the following: an implementation is t -NI if all tuples of t observations (corresponding

to internal or output values) have a distribution of values which depends at most on t input shares, for each input. Since we consider the distribution, this allows to make an observation independent from an input share by masking it. Algorithm 1 can also be used for verifying NI with a modified stopping condition, but requires a share description in the implementation. The previous example expression, $\mathbf{a}_0 \oplus \mathbf{a}_1 \oplus \mathbf{b}_0$ is not 1-NI, as it contains two shares of the secret \mathbf{a} .

Strong Non-Interference (SNI). Non-Interference can be strengthened to achieve composition, by limiting the number of authorized input shares in each tuple to the number of probes in the tuple which correspond to internal values (as opposed to output values) (Barthe et al., 2019).

Probe Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) is a composable security notion introduced in (Cassiers and Standaert, 2020), which is less restrictive than SNI: a tuple must depend on at most k arbitrary input shares, k being equal to the number of internal probes in the tuple (like SNI), but can also depend on the input shares with the same index as the output shares contained in the tuple.

2.2 Relaxed Non-Interference

The problem with the NI property is that it ignores the masking order when looking at the verification order. Thus, an implementation comprising, among all its expressions, a single one with 2 shares will not even be considered secure at order 1, since for 1-NI, all single expressions should contain at most 1 share occurrence (after masks replacement). This is true even if all inputs are on 3, 4 or more shares, whereas in this case, there cannot be a secret leakage by looking at a single expression. We thus introduce Relaxed Non-Interference (RNI) to solve this problem: informally, it states that for achieving t -order security, all tuples of size t should not contain at least one of the shares for every input (after masks replacement). This definition also allows to remove an implicit condition of Non-Interference which is that all the inputs are split using the same number of shares. As such, we see RNI as an extension of the NI property when the security order is different from the masking order. This is for example the case in Threshold Implementations (Nikova et al., 2006) or the Generalized Masking Scheme (Reparaz et al., 2015).

More formally, we consider an implementation

Algorithm 1 Substitution algorithm for verifying threshold probing security, from (Barthe et al., 2018).

procedure THRESHOLDPROBINGSECURITY(e)

Inputs: tuple of expressions $V = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$, flag $simplified = 0$, set of masks $M = \emptyset$

Step 1: if a secret k is involved in the computation of at least one expression in V then go to Step 2. Otherwise return True.

Step 2: while there exists a mask $m \notin M$ involved in the computation of an expression v_i of V , then find a sub-expression e in v_i such that $m \rightarrow e + m$ is bijective and substitute m by $e + m$ in all expressions. Extend M with $\{m\}$.

If at least such a transformation occurred, go to Step 1. Otherwise go to Step 3.

Step 3: if $simplified \neq 0$, then return False. Otherwise, mathematically simplify the expressions in V . Then, set $simplified$ to one and go back to Step 1.

comprising N inputs I_k , each input I_k being split into $d_k + 1$ shares $I_{k_0}, \dots, I_{k_{d_k}}$. Such an implementation is RNI at order t if and only if any tuple of t observations can be perfectly simulated using at most d_k shares for each input I_k (following the notion of perfect simulation in (Belaïd et al., 2016)). For a hardware implementation, it is RNI with glitches if each observation is replaced with the set of input variables it contains in the same combinatorial logic set.

3 VERIFMSI

3.1 Overview

VerifMSI is a verification method implementing the substitution algorithm in a python library, seeking to overcome some of the limitations of LeakageVerif. It can thus be seen as an evolution of this tool. Compared to the latter, VerifMSI first adds hardware circuit constructs, allowing to describe circuits with gate and registers, and to take into account glitches in the verification. Second, VerifMSI allows to simply switch between a share-based and a secrets and masks based description, allowing to verify the NI, SNI, PINI and the proposed RNI properties as well as TPS. Third, VerifMSI implements optimizations in order to reduce the number of probes in the circuit, allowing it to efficiently perform higher order verifications.

Figure 1 shows a code fragment of a VerifMSI program for implementing a first order Domain Oriented Masking (DOM) AND circuit (Groß et al., 2017), and the associated circuit in Figure 2. Secrets are declared on lines 1 and 2, while their sharing is done on lines 6 and 7. The `getRealShares` function returns a specified number of shares of a secret, which are not equivalent to a secret and mask representation. Alternatively, one can use the `getPseudoShares` func-

tion, which does a sharing using secret and masks (typically $(m0, k \oplus m0)$ at order 1). The latter representation is useful for verifying TPS. Line 3 declares a 1-bit mask, while lines 10 to 14 create input gates associated to the inputs. Lines 17-20 make all the cross products between shares; note the gates are n-ary and can take an arbitrary number of parameters. Lines 23 to 30 implement the remaining gates and registers: registers stop the propagation of glitches. Indeed, without registers, a gate can leak all of its input wires (cf. Figure 2). Finally, line 33 checks the NI property on the outputs `c0` and `c1`, at order `order` (here `order` should be 1), with or without glitches according to the `withGlitches` parameters.

3.2 Optimisations

In order to reduce the number of tuples verified, especially for higher orders, VerifMSI implements some optimisations for hardware descriptions consisting in removing some of the observations, which for the most part are based on the optimisations made in (Belaïd et al., 2022). These optimisations are based on the fact that we do not just verify expressions, but a circuit, or gadget, allowing us to make additional assumptions. For instance, it is always possible to observe single input shares, what allows us to remove them when enumerating the tuples, by considering partial tuples (Belaïd et al., 2022). The optimisations implemented are the following:

- Removal of observations constituted of at most one share per input and no random (optimisation **v0**). This optimisation includes the two optimisations of IronMask consisting in removing observations made of input shares (optimisation **i0**) and input share products (optimisation **i1**), and also comprises other cases not covered by IronMask.
- Removal of observations which are redundant with some others (optimisation **v1**). An ex-

```

1 a = symbol('a', 'S', 1) # 1-bit secret
2 b = symbol('b', 'S', 1) # 1-bit secret
3 z10 = symbol('z10', 'M', 1) # 1-bit
   mask
4
5 # Do the sharing for 'a' and 'b'
6 a0, a1 = getRealShares(a, 2)
7 b0, b1 = getRealShares(b, 2)
8
9 # Create input gates
10 a0 = inputGate(a0)
11 a1 = inputGate(a1)
12 b0 = inputGate(b0)
13 b1 = inputGate(b1)
14 z10 = inputGate(z10)
15
16 # Cross products
17 a0b0 = andGate(a0, b0)
18 a0b1 = andGate(a0, b1)
19 a1b0 = andGate(a1, b0)
20 a1b1 = andGate(a1, b1)
21
22 # Remaining gates and registers
23 a1b0 = xorGate(a1b0, z10)
24 a1b0 = Register(a1b0)
25 a0b1 = xorGate(a0b1, z10)
26 a0b1 = Register(a0b1)
27 c0 = a0b0
28 c0 = xorGate(c0, a0b1)
29 c1 = a1b1
30 c1 = xorGate(c1, a1b0)
31
32 # Check the NI security property
33 checkSecurity(order, withGlitches, 'ni
   ', c0, c1)

```

Figure 1: Example of VerifMSI program implementing a first order DOM AND circuit




Figure 2: Order 1 DOM AND circuit from (Groß et al., 2017), with the leakage associated to each wire when glitches are considered

pression $e0$ is considered redundant and is omitted when there exists an expression $e1$ such that:

- all the mask occurrences in $e0$ (resp. $e1$) are bijective occurrences w.r.t. $e0$ (resp. $e1$);
- $e0$ and $e1$ have the same mask occurrences;
- All the input shares appearing in $e0$ also appear in $e1$.

This optimization is also implemented in IronMask with minor differences (optimisation i3).

An optimisation implemented in IronMask which is not implemented in VerifMSI is the removal of observations comprising a single random (optimisation i2). This is because IronMask imposes a constraint on how masks are used, which is not the case in VerifMSI. However, in practice, such observations will often be removed with the removal of redundant expressions.

Table 1 compares the optimisations implemented in VerifMSI and IronMask, taking as example the ISW AND.

We can notice that all the expressions in the table can be removed in both approaches, and that both end up with the same number of observations before starting enumeration. This step is crucial, as for example with 7-share inputs, it allows to go from 168 intermediate values to 56.

Besides, we can notice that when glitches are considered, the number of probes to keep for enumeration is largely reduced, as the probes corresponding to wires which are not preceding a register can be ignored: the leakage associated with them will be part of the leakage associated with the output of the next gate.

3.3 Reducing the number of tuples

In order to reduce the number of tuples to verify, we implemented the pairwise splitting algorithm from (Barthe et al., 2015). It tries to build larger tuples until the verification fails, what allows to skip the verification of all sub-tuples. Taking the algorithm from the article, preliminary results showed a speedup factor of 2. However, we noticed a probable error in the algorithm, and when we corrected it, the overall time was the same as without this optimisation – basically, the gain in the reduction of the number of tuples to verify was compensated by the overhead of the approach. The description of the error and our proposed correction is described in appendix A. In the end, even if VerifMSI still implements this optimisation, we did not use it in our experiments.

Table 1: Comparison of simplifications based on observations removal in **IronMask** and **VerifMSI** for the ISW AND implementation, for N -share inputs. The first column gives the expression forms which can be removed for one of the presented simplifications, the second column gives the number of occurrences, and the following columns which simplification rules allow to remove the corresponding expressions.

| Expression form | # occurrences | v0 | v1 | i0 | i1 | i2 | i3 |
|---|--------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| a_i, b_i | $2N$ | ✓ | | ✓ | | | |
| $a_i.b_j$ | N^2 | ✓ | | | ✓ | | |
| $z_{i,j}$ | $N(N - 1) / 2$ | | ✓ | | | ✓ | |
| $a_i.b_j \oplus z_{i,j}$ | $N(N - 1) / 2$ | | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| $a_0.b_j \oplus a_j.b_0 \oplus z_{0,j}$ | $N - 1$ | | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| $a_0.b_0 \oplus z_{0,1}$ | 1 | | ✓ | | | | ✓ |
| Removable Observations | $2N(N + 1)$ | | | | | | |
| Total Observations | $2N + N^2 + 5N(N - 1)/2$ | | | | | | |
| Remaining Observations | $N(3N - 5)/2$ | | | | | | |

3.4 Improving the Mask Choice for Replacements

While running through the process of benchmarking, we encountered a few false positives in the verification of one benchmark (ISW AND), i.e. a potential leakage was reported by **VerifMSI** while there was actually none. After investigation, it appeared that in these cases, the sequence of mask selections for replacement led to the impossibility to conclude, whereas another sequence of choices would allow it.

Going into the details, we noticed two distinct problems. First, the algorithm in Figure 1 allows a mask to be taken only once, in order to guarantee termination. Yet, we encountered some cases in which taking an already taken mask is necessary in order to conclude. This can happen when the mask originally has several occurrences, and after some replacements and simplifications, only has a single occurrence (see appendix B, step 6 of first scenario for example). In order to take this into account while still guaranteeing termination, we authorize a mask to be taken several times only if it has a single occurrence. Since the expression necessarily decreases in size during a replacement using a mask having a single occurrence, this can happen only a finite number of times.

The second false positive problem we noticed happened when selecting for a replacement a mask being itself an element of the tuple. Such a scenario is described in the first scenario of appendix B. However, when removing entirely the possibility to select such masks for replacements,

other failures were reported, as illustrated in the second scenario of appendix B.

Finally, we modified the mask selection algorithm to make it possible to select such masks for replacement, but with the lowest priority. Using this heuristic, no false positives due to mask selection arose in any benchmark.

4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We perform an evaluation of **VerifMSI** on several benchmarks from the literature. We focus the evaluation on hardware circuits as the software implementations descriptions are similar to those of **LeakageVerif**. The experiments comprise the following programs:

- ISW AND: The logical AND masking scheme (Ishai et al., 2003)
- ISW AND refresh: A combination of the ISW AND with a circular refresh on one of the input (De Cnudde et al., 2016)
- DOM AND: The Domain Oriented Masking implementation of the AND gate (Groß et al., 2017), resistant to glitches;
- Refresh $N \log N$: The $N \log N$ refresh scheme (Battistello et al., 2016);
- NI Mult and SNI Mult: The NI and SNI multiplication schemes (Bordes and Karpman, 2021);
- PINI Mult: The PINI multiplication scheme (Wang et al., 2023);

- **GMS AND:** Two implementations of the AND gate using the Generalized Masking Scheme, described in the article, using respectively 3 and 5 shares (Reparaz et al., 2015);
- **TI AND:** The balanced Threshold Implementation of the AND gate (Nikova et al., 2006).

All benchmarks were run on a single core on a server with an Intel CPU Xeon E5-2637v2@3.5GHz, under the CentOS 9 operating system. For all benchmarks, we set a timeout to 6 hours, and a memory limit to 110 GB (which was never reached).

Table 2 presents the verification results of the different circuits we implemented. All of these circuits implementations are provided along with the code of `VerifMSI`. Only the configurations for which the verified property was known to be true were run, and only the configurations which did not exceed the 6 hours timeout are presented in the table. The verification order is set to the designed security order: this is always the number of shares minus one, except for GMS AND with 3 shares (order 1), GMS AND with 5 shares (order 2) and TI AND (order 1).

From the results in table 2, we can make the following observations: `VerifMSI` can verify all the preselected hardware masking schemes, up to a certain order (between 5 and 7 shares). We notice that the verification of the TPS property scales significantly less than the other properties, due to the fact that the optimisation targeting the reduction in the number of probes do not apply with a representation using secrets and masks.

We also notice that the GMS AND and TI AND circuits can only be verified with TPS and RNI, as the order of security is not equal to the number of shares minus one – they typically contain tuples of size 1 depending on several input shares. This underlines the interest of the RNI property, which is the only property based on shares adapted to the verification of such masking schemes.

Finally, we can see that there are a few false positives on PINI mult with five shares or more. Analysing them in more details reveals that the tuple does not contain anymore mask, and that the problem occurs because `VerifMSI` is not able to factorize an expression and make some products disappear. We currently do not know how to take this into account as the factorization in the failing tuples requires to temporarily develop the expression and make its size grow, which is against the simplification rules design.

5 RELATED WORKS

A certain number of tools target the verification of security properties in masked software or hardware implementations.

LeakageVerif. `LeakageVerif` (Meunier et al., 2023) is a flexible and open-source verification tool achieving good accuracy and scalability, provided as a python library. `LeakageVerif` can verify implementations at different abstraction levels (algorithmic, code, assembly, circuit), but can only verify threshold probing security on a description using secrets and masks. Moreover, it cannot take glitches into account in hardware descriptions. The fact that the tool is provided as a python library allows to have simulable descriptions, and to support all python’s control mechanisms.

MaskVerif. `maskVerif` (Barthe et al., 2019) is a tool written in OCaml designed for the verification of circuits, which proposes a *software scenario* for the verification of algorithms, in which glitches can be considered, and in which the sequential aspect of the program is simulated using a register-like behaviour: each expression computed by the program is written into a register. The strength of `maskVerif` is its ability to scale well with higher orders. However, it is not very well adapted for some masking schemes implementations. In particular, it lacks support for arithmetic operations or array accesses. It also does not support arbitrary size variables and expressions, since the only possible sizes for variables are 1, 8 and 32 bits, and there are no bit concatenation and extraction operations. Finally, `maskVerif` does not permit to express a non-linear control flow, allowing only for function calls.

IronMask. `IronMask` (Belaïd et al., 2022) is an open-source tool designed for the verification of masked hardware implementations. The tool has an excellent scalability due to its optimized writing in C, and can verify many security properties. On the downside, it is not able to verify TPS, and is limited to certain types of implementations in which the masks must be linearly added to given shares.

SILVER. `SILVER` (Knichel et al., 2020) is a tool able to verify common security properties on hardware descriptions. It takes as input either a Verilog implementation or an instruction list and checks the TPS, NI, SNI and PINI notions with or without glitches, as well as the uniformity of some output sharing. The tool suffers however from a limited scalability.

Table 2: Verification times and number of tuples verified with VerifMSI, for higher order hardware masking schemes from the literature. Column #Sh. indicates the number of shares. Values between parenthesis indicate the number of tuples for which the verification failed (false positives).

| Gadget | #Sh. | Property | Verif. Time | # Tuples | |
|--------------------|---------------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| ISW AND | 4 | TPS | 12s | 24804 | |
| | | NI | <1s | 469 | |
| | | SNI | <1s | 469 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 469 | |
| | | PINI | <1s | 469 | |
| | | | | | |
| | 5 | TPS | 25m15s | 2024785 | |
| | | NI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | | SNI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | | RNI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | | PINI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | | | | | |
| | 6 | NI | 8m31s | 667927 | |
| | | SNI | 9m4s | 667927 | |
| | | RNI | 8m41s | 667927 | |
| | | PINI | 8m36s | 667927 | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| ISW AND refresh | 3 | TPS | <1s | 741 | |
| | | NI | <1s | 325 | |
| | | SNI | <1s | 325 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 325 | |
| | | PINI | <1s | 325 | |
| | 4 | TPS | 27s | 45760 | |
| | | NI | 5s | 17343 | |
| | | SNI | 6s | 17343 | |
| | | RNI | 5s | 17343 | |
| | | PINI | 5s | 17343 | |
| | 5 | TPS | 1h1m | 3921225 | |
| | | NI | 10m54s | 1356201 | |
| | | SNI | 12m3s | 1356201 | |
| | | RNI | 10m49s | 1356201 | |
| | | PINI | 10m46s | 1356201 | |
| DOM AND | 5 | TPS | 45m36s | 4780230 | |
| | | NI | 25s | 59535 | |
| | | SNI | 26s | 59535 | |
| | | RNI | 25s | 59535 | |
| | | PINI | 26s | 59535 | |
| | | TPS w/ g. | 15s | 12650 | |
| | | NI w/ g. | 8s | 12650 | |
| | | RNI w/ g. | 9s | 12650 | |
| | | PINI w/ g. | 9s | 12650 | |
| | | | | | |
| | 6 | NI | 35m19s | 3505050 | |
| | | SNI | 36m18s | 3505050 | |
| | | RNI | 35m42s | 3505050 | |
| | | PINI | 38m1s | 3505050 | |
| | | TPS w/ g. | 11m35s | 376992 | |
| | | NI w/ g. | 6m11s | 376992 | |
| | | RNI w/ g. | 6m11s | 376992 | |
| | | PINI w/ g. | 6m23s | 376992 | |
| | | | | | |
| | | 7 | NI w/ g. | 5h13m | 13983816 |
| | RNI w/ g. | | 5h11m | 13983816 | |
| PINI w/ g. | 5h15m | | 13983816 | | |
| Refresh N log N | 5 | TPS | 9s | 23751 | |
| | | NI | 2s | 7546 | |
| | | SNI | 2s | 7546 | |
| | | RNI | 2s | 7546 | |
| | | PINI | 2s | 7546 | |
| | | | | | |
| | 6 | TPS | 7m23s | 850668 | |
| | | NI | 1m58s | 284273 | |
| | | SNI | 1m58s | 284273 | |
| | | RNI | 1m58s | 284273 | |
| | | PINI | 118s | 284273 | |
| | | | | | |
| | 7 | TPS | 3h50m31 | 20358520 | |
| | | NI | 47m16s | 5358577 | |
| | | SNI | 48m30s | 5358577 | |
| | | RNI | 47m17s | 5358577 | |
| | | PINI | 47m53s | 5358577 | |
| | | | | | |
| | PINI Multiplication | 4 | TPS | 13s | 24804 |
| | | | NI | <1s | 469 |
| | | | RNI | <1s | 469 |
| | | | PINI | <1s | 469 |
| | | | | | |
| | | 5 | TPS | 26m36s | 2024785 (98) |
| NI | | | 7s | 15275 (1) | |
| RNI | | | 7s | 15275 (1) | |
| 6 | | NI | 7m24s | 667927 (77) | |
| | | RNI | 7m20s | 667927 (79) | |
| | | PINI | 7m29s | 667927 (79) | |
| | | | | | |
| NI Multiplication | 5 | TPS | 10m21s | 916895 | |
| | | NI | <1s | 385 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 385 | |
| | | PINI | <1s | 385 | |
| | 6 | NI | 36 | 55454 | |
| | | RNI | 36s | 55454 | |
| | | PINI | 37s | 55454 | |
| | 7 | NI | 28m19s | 2007327 | |
| | | RNI | 28m34s | 2007327 | |
| | | PINI | 28m52s | 2007327 | |
| SNI Multiplication | 5 | TPS | 26m18s | 2024785 | |
| | | NI | 7s | 15275 | |
| | | SNI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | | RNI | 7s | 15275 | |
| | | PINI | 8s | 15275 | |
| | 6 | NI | 1m59s | 174436 | |
| | | SNI | 2m7s | 174436 | |
| | | RNI | 2m1s | 174436 | |
| | | PINI | 2m2s | 174436 | |
| | | | | | |
| GMS AND | 3 | TPS | <1s | 30 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 9 | |
| | 5 | TPS | 1s | 3570 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 630 | |
| TI AND | 4 | TPS | <1s | 34 | |
| | | RNI | <1s | 4 | |

If `VerifMSI` is not the fastest of these tools for most hardware implementations and configurations at high orders, it is the only tool which can verify all common security properties, using both share-based and secrets and masks descriptions, for both hardware and software masking schemes, and having the benefits of using all of the python constructs.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We presented `VerifMSI`, a practical tool implemented as a python library for verifying masking schemes implementations. It extends the existing `LeakageVerif` tool with constructs targeting hardware implementations, and enriches it with the verification of four security properties (NI, SNI, RNI, PINI). The experiments presented in the article, focusing on 9 hardware schemes, show that `VerifMSI` is able to successfully verify many implementations from the literature, for masking orders of up to 7 shares.

Future work includes enriching the software side of `VerifMSI` with support for Galois Field operations, as well as implementing less common security properties, and in particular the ones defined in the random probing model. We also plan to write the core of `VerifMSI` in a compiled language to reduce the cost of enumeration.

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A Error found in (Barthe et al., 2015) and proposed correction

We recall in algorithm 2 the pairwise splitting algorithm from (Barthe et al., 2015).

Algorithm 2 Pairwise splitting algorithm, from (Barthe et al., 2018).

```

1: function CHECK( $x, d, e$ )  $\triangleright$  every  $x, y$  with  $y \in P_d(e)$  is independent from the secrets
2:   if  $d \leq |e|$  then
3:      $y \leftarrow \text{choose}(P_d(e))$ 
4:      $h_{x,y} \leftarrow \text{NI}((x, y))$   $\triangleright$  if  $\text{NI}((x, y))$  fails, return false
5:      $\hat{y} \leftarrow \text{extend}(y, e \setminus y, h_{x,y})$ 
6:     CHECK( $x, d, e \setminus \hat{y}$ )
7:     for  $0 < i < d$  do
8:       for  $u \in P_i(\hat{y})$  do
9:         CHECK( $(x, u), d - i, e \setminus \hat{y}$ )
10:   else
11:     return true

```

The algorithm contains the following invariant: $|x| + d = t$, t being the verification order. In the original article, it is written: *After line 5, we know that all t -tuples of variables in \hat{y} are independent, jointly with x , from the secrets.* However, it is not necessarily the case as the extension from y to \hat{y} does not consider x . The following example shows how some tuples are missed. We consider an order of verification $t = 3$. Let us suppose that when entering the function, $x = \{e_0\}$, $d = 2$, and $e = \{e_1, e_2, e_3, e_4\}$. When exiting this function call, all tuples of size 3 containing e_0 should have been checked. Suppose that $y \leftarrow (e_1, e_2)$ (line 3). We then verify that (e_0, e_1, e_2) is independent from the secrets (line 4). Suppose next that \hat{y} extends y to e , i.e. $\hat{y} = (e_1, e_2, e_3, e_4)$ (line 5). The call to check line 6 will not verify anything since $e \setminus \hat{y} = \emptyset$, and x contains a single expression. Then the series of calls to check line 9 will be made with $i = 1$, so u will contain a single element, resulting in calls in which the parameter x contains two expressions, and $e = \emptyset$. As a consequence, tuples (e_0, e_1, e_3) , (e_0, e_1, e_4) , (e_0, e_2, e_3) , (e_0, e_2, e_4) and (e_0, e_3, e_4) have been missed.

We propose a modified version in algorithm 3 in order to take into account the missing tuples.

The main idea is to extend not only y but (x, y) to \hat{y} . Then, in the nested loops lines 9-11, the x parameter of the call to check is made with the current x and expressions from $\hat{y} \setminus x$.

Algorithm 3 Modified pairwise splitting algorithm

```

1: function CHECK( $x, d, e$ )  $\triangleright$  every  $x, y$  with  $y \in P_d(e)$  is independent from the secrets
2:   if  $d \leq |e|$  then
3:      $y \leftarrow \text{choose}(P_d(e))$ 
4:      $h_{x,y} \leftarrow \text{NI}((x, y))$ 
5:      $\triangleright$  if  $\text{NI}((x, y))$  fails, return false
6:      $\hat{y} \leftarrow \text{extend}((x, y), e \setminus y, h_{x,y})$ 
7:      $\triangleright$  We have  $e \setminus y = e \setminus (x, y)$ 
8:     CHECK( $x, d, e \setminus \hat{y}$ )
9:     for  $0 < i < d$  do
10:      for  $u \in P_i(\hat{y} \setminus x)$  do
11:        CHECK( $(x, u), d - i, e \setminus \hat{y}$ )
12:   else
13:     return true

```

B Mask Selection Scenarios

This appendix contains two scenarios, taken from the verification of ISW AND with 5 shares for the TPS property. The first scenario illustrates the fact that when selecting a mask for a replacement, selecting a mask appearing as an element of the tuple can prevent the verification to conclude. This scenario is as follows:

Secret $a = a_0 \oplus a_1 \oplus a_2 \oplus a_3 \oplus a_4$
Secret $b = b_0 \oplus b_1 \oplus b_2 \oplus b_3 \oplus b_4$
Masks: $z_{0_4}, z_{1_4}, z_{2_4}, z_{3_4}, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3$

Initial tuple:

```

a2,
z3_4,
((b  $\oplus$  b3).a3)  $\oplus$  z1_4  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z3_4  $\oplus$  z0_4
 $\oplus$  (a.b3),
z1_4  $\oplus$  ((a2  $\oplus$  a).b3)  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z0_4  $\oplus$  ((b  $\oplus$ 
b2  $\oplus$  b3).a3)

```

1. Selecting mask b_2 (single occurrence)

```

a2,
z3_4,
((b  $\oplus$  b3).a3)  $\oplus$  z1_4  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z3_4  $\oplus$  z0_4
 $\oplus$  (a.b3),
z1_4  $\oplus$  ((a2  $\oplus$  a).b3)  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z0_4  $\oplus$ 
(b2.a3)

```

2. Selecting mask a_2 (appears as a tuple element)

```

a2  $\oplus$  a,
z3_4,
((b  $\oplus$  b3).a3)  $\oplus$  z1_4  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z3_4  $\oplus$  z0_4
 $\oplus$  (a.b3),
z1_4  $\oplus$  (a2.b3)  $\oplus$  z2_4  $\oplus$  z0_4  $\oplus$  (b2.a3)

```

3. Selecting mask z_{1_4} (occurrence in third line)
(After simplification)

$a2 \oplus a,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $((b \oplus b3 \oplus b2).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z3_4$

4. Selecting mask b2 (single occurrence)

$a2 \oplus a,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z3_4$

5. Selecting mask z3_4

$a2 \oplus a,$
 $(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $z3_4$

No mask can be selected and the secret a is remaining: a possible leakage is detected. Alternatively, if we forbid to select a mask which appears as an element of the tuple, this scenario becomes:

2'. Selecting mask z1_4 (occurrence in third line) (After simplification)

$a2,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $((b \oplus b3 \oplus b2).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z3_4$

3'. Selecting mask b2 (single occurrence)

$a2,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z3_4$

No more secret in tuple: Threshold Probing Secure!

The second scenario illustrates the fact that selecting a mask appearing as an element of the tuple is still necessary in some cases:

Secret $a = a0 \oplus a1 \oplus a2 \oplus a3 \oplus a4$
 Secret $b = b0 \oplus b1 \oplus b2 \oplus b3 \oplus b4$
 Masks: $z0_4, z1_4, z2_4, z3_4, a0, a1, a2,$
 $a3, b0, b1, b2, b3$

Initial tuple:

$((b \oplus b3).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z2_4 \oplus z3_4 \oplus z0_4$
 $\oplus (a.b3),$
 $(a2.b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4 \oplus ((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z2_4 \oplus z0_4 \oplus ((b \oplus$
 $b2 \oplus b3).a3),$
 $z3_4$

1. Selecting mask b2 (single occurrence)

$((b \oplus b3).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z2_4 \oplus z3_4 \oplus z0_4$
 $\oplus (a.b3),$
 $(a2.b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4 \oplus ((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z2_4 \oplus z0_4 \oplus$
 $(b2.a3),$
 $z3_4$

2. Selecting mask a2

$((b \oplus b3).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z2_4 \oplus z3_4 \oplus z0_4$
 $\oplus (a.b3),$
 $((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4 \oplus (a2.b3) \oplus z2_4 \oplus z0_4 \oplus (b2.a3),$
 $z3_4$

3. Selecting mask z1_4 (third line) (After simplification)

$((b \oplus b3 \oplus b2).a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z3_4 \oplus ((a \oplus$
 $a2).b3),$
 $((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $z3_4$

4. Selecting mask b2 (single occurrence)

$(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z3_4 \oplus ((a \oplus a2).b3),$
 $((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $z3_4$

If $z3_4$ cannot be selected, the secret a is remaining! Otherwise:

5. Selecting z3_4 (After simplification):

$(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z3_4,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $((a2 \oplus a).b3) \oplus z3_4$

6. Selecting mask a2 (single occurrence)

$(b2.a3) \oplus z1_4 \oplus z3_4,$
 $z3_4,$
 $z1_4,$
 $(a2.b3) \oplus z3_4$

No more secret, Threshold Probing Secure!