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Article Dans Une Revue (Working Paper) Journal of Philosophical Economics Année : 2024

The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum

Résumé

This paper testifies to the fact that the proclaimed independence of central banks, as conceived by its founders, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis ‘inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon’ does not substantiate the case for independence. Further, the portrayal of the conservative central banker, the imaginary principal-agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, along with the ban on budgetary financing, amount to flawed logic in arguing for the independence of the central bank. We also highlight that the idea of independence is not convincing due to the absence of well-defined outlines in its operational toolbox and the system of rules it relies upon.
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Dates et versions

hal-04183244 , version 1 (18-08-2023)
hal-04183244 , version 2 (05-03-2024)

Licence

Paternité - Pas d'utilisation commerciale - Partage selon les Conditions Initiales

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Ion Pohoață, Delia-Elena Diaconașu, Ioana Negru. The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum. Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2024, Volume XVII, ⟨10.46298/jpe.12256⟩. ⟨hal-04183244v2⟩
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