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TERRITORIAL REVITALIZATION STRATEGY: THE CASE OF FRANCE SINCE THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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ABSTRACT

The place occupied by territories in the functioning of global value chains has been highly topical since economies were hit by external shocks of great violence from February 2020 onwards. Many components and final products have been subject to sometimes lasting delivery disruptions, which has highlighted the dependence of Western assembly plants on international sources of supply, particularly in the automotive and microcomputer industries. Even more seriously, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, the lack of protective masks, the production of which was relocated to Asia, highlighted a vulnerability that could have deadly consequences for the population. Faced with this vulnerability, a virulent debate has been launched on the urgency of relocating industrial activities in Europe, which is part of a broader political approach to reindustrialization. This is particularly the case in France, where governmental authorities have decided to implement an ambitious plan for the revitalization of territories in 2021 under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron. This change of course is surprising after decades of –desired– development of global value chains, one of the consequences of which is a dramatic deindustrialization in terms of employment, with the explosion of unemployment in many regions whose development was based on the steel and textile industries. The objective of this article is to present the main elements of the French plan for the revitalization of territories and to underline the importance of considering the shared value for a successful relocation of industrial activities.

Keywords: Cluster, France, Global value chain, Relocation, Territory

INTRODUCTION

Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the revitalization of territories so that they no longer depend on global value chains seems to be a sort of “magic answer” to multiple economic diseases, foremost among which is unemployment in developed countries, the direct result of several decades of deindustrialization (High, 2020). It is a discourse that is increasingly used by politicians who wish to regain a sovereignty that has been lost over time. It is not uncommon to read in the trade press that companies involved in collective action within a territory are more innovative, particularly by positioning themselves in cutting-edge sectors that generate a powerful dynamic of highly qualified jobs. However, it would be a huge mistake to think that there is a generic model applicable to any situation. The forms taken by the revitalization of territories are diverse and complex, with a history and a cultural context determining the operating methods that can be envisaged. For example, the deindustrialization that Eastern European countries experienced during the post-Soviet era, directly linked to a profound political change (Kuttor and Hegyi-Keri, 2014), is very different from the deindustrialization of Western countries, linked to the emergence of a new international division of labor and the triumph of neoliberal order.

The French case presents itself as an emblematic illustration of the importance of political action in a process of territorial revitalization, like what is happening within Aerospace Valley in Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées where Thales Avionics has powerfully developed locally “its ability to organize and manage collaborative R&D projects bringing together a variety of actors” (Talbot, 2013:21). France is a country with an old industrial culture that underwent a major deindustrialization process starting in the 1970s. Step by step, factory closures followed one another, in many sectors of activity, notably the steel

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and textile industries, playing the “services card,” especially in tourism and culture, with the presence of famous historical sites and cities. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted dramatic situations of dependence that the French governmental authorities, under the leadership of the President Emmanuel Macron, are determined to reduce, through several programs to revitalize territories, accompanied by the relocation of some industrial activities, including a proactive decoupling policy of many international trade connections (Vargas-Hernández, 2023), and even an abrupt stop on the road to neoliberal globalization (Free and Hecimovic, 2021). In other words, political action must not be exempt from a societal vision, the importance of which is underlined by the notion of shared value in the context of successful territorial revitalization.

The aim of this article is to identify the weak signals of a change of trajectory in French industrial policy. On a methodological level, with reference to Serres (2002), the investigation is based on a set of “traces” providing clues for reconstructing the economic trajectory. Indeed, “any communicative or informational process, past or present, like any process of any kind, produces and leaves traces, written or unwritten: texts, data, but also imprints, clues of all kinds” (Serres, 2002:10). The traces selected here are texts published by both researchers and official agencies since the COVID-19 pandemic. Trace analysis is well known in historical work, where the aim is to understand the sequence of ancient facts from the interpretations made by contemporary specialists on the subject. Morsel (2016) refers to an epistemological approach to “*knowledge by traces*,” pioneered by Seignobos and Langlois (1891/2015), which stresses the crucial importance of studying a series of documents to determine the specific past facts of which the documents are a trace. Once these facts have been established, they need to be grouped together in a methodical construction to discover the relationships between them. This is the approach taken in this article, using and ordering a body of recent work on relocation policies.

TRACES 1: A POLITICAL WILL FOR RELOCATION

The COVID-19 pandemic acted as a kind of electroshock in Europe. It made governmental authorities aware of their heavy dependence on international sources of supply, particularly from Asia. From a political viewpoint, relocation decisions were taken to partially “reindustrialize” Europe. Very quickly, it became clear that in order to overcome all the difficulties and obstacles to relocation, and to maintain and create productive activity within the borders of Europe, and even more so in France, the role of the territories appears to be essential, bearing in mind that in France, 70% of industrial jobs are in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, even if the real attractiveness of “medium-sized cities” still gives rise to debates among researchers (Bouvard, Frocrain, Rais Assa, and Gomel, 2022). The economy of the future, or economy 4.0, with all the industries revolving around well-being, quality of life and health, whose importance will grow rapidly in the years to come, will be based increasingly on proximity to the consumer, making the territorial embedding of activities an essential factor of competitiveness. In addition, decarbonization, the circular economy and industrial ecology will in the future give physical proximity an important role in recycling and recovery of end-of-life products (Henrysson and Nuur, 2021).

Following Bahers and Durand (2020), it must be emphasized, however, that the scale of proximity varies according to the type of recycling and recovery of end-of-life products and waste, the geographic and social context, and the different stakeholders involved. There is no universal model, but rather specific contexts that impact territorial dynamics. The comparative advantage produced by the different proximities (geographical, cognitive, organizational, social, and institutional), which is often a determining factor in the microeconomic decision to locate, is nevertheless very present and has been well described by the French school of proximity for the last twenty years (Gilly and Torre, 2000). Table 1, adapted from Cuenod, Helfrich, and Ramonjy (2021) on the analysis of a territorial innovation ecosystem, summarizes its main characteristics. It highlights the key importance of a climate of trust, as opposed to opportunism in the sense of Williamson (1975, 1993), which creates positive interactions between stakeholders and thus reduces destructive value phenomena. Geographical proximity between customers and suppliers should thus allow for a better knowledge of each of the parties, and thus favor the emergence of a climate of trust, which in turn favors cognitive proximity (transfer of knowledge) and organizational proximity (disappearance of opportunistic behavior).

Table 1. Declination of the forms of proximity in a territorial perspective

Proximity	Major strengths and weaknesses
<i>Geographic</i>	Favors the territorial identification of the ecosystem, but can lead to its enclosure in a confined space
<i>Cognitive</i>	Favors the creation and transfer of knowledge within the ecosystem, but can lead to entropic phenomena
<i>Organizational</i>	Favors the reduction of opportunistic behaviors within the ecosystem, but can lead to a bureaucratization of relationships
<i>Social</i>	Increases trust between ecosystem actors, but can lead to a disconnection from the economic sphere
<i>Institutional</i>	Increases trust between the institutions of the ecosystem, but can lead to its closure due to the excessive weight of these institutions

Source: Adapted from Cuenod, Helfrich, and Ramonjy (2021).

Efficient collective management of proximities, also known as effective territorial governance, is therefore a necessary condition for maintaining and developing factories. Conversely, the negation of proximity leads to a progressive disintegration of industrial areas. One of the best-known examples is the port area of Fos-sur-Mer, in the South of France, which was organized in the 1970s not to create a local spatial dynamic favorable to employment, but to facilitate the connection of the Mediterranean with Northern Europe, by playing on exchange flows along the Rhone and Rhine rivers (Paché, 2015, 2017). In other words, the territory is not only a receptacle for investments guided by national macroeconomic data on costs and taxation. It is also in the territory that the notion of innovation ecosystem finds its full meaning, as it implies bringing into play the proximities between the following three dimensions, known as the *triple helix*: manufacturers grouped in clusters; local vocational training adapting to needs; and academic research in Universities providing operational results at the service of the cluster (Galvao, Mascarenhas, Marques, Ferreira, and Ratten, 2019).

Beyond the conventional determinants of location that have been well documented in the economics and management literature (connectivity, infrastructure, R&D and education centers, the presence of clusters, the living environment in the broad sense), and the local variation of national initiatives, the territory is fundamentally an actor in its own right, a place of specific assets (Gumuchian and Pecqueur, 2007:6), where “the coordination between heterogeneous agents in terms of their attributes (spatial, cognitive, institutional, social and organizational)” takes place. Thus, for the territory to optimize its attractiveness, it must strengthen the local innovation ecosystem but also establish a relevant and shared diagnosis. The notion of a “territory brand” can be used to catalyze actions, give an image, define a project, develop labels, mobilize resources, and create and maintain a collective alignment around its industrial identity. The two Japanese cases studied by Fujimoto (2016) are excellent examples. The reasoning here is maieutic, particularly present in France given a culture based on “*terroirs*,” including for manufacturing activities (the mines of northern France, the hosiery of Troyes, etc.), which can be found, for example, in the work of the socialist writer Emile Zola, especially in *Germinal* (Zola, 1885/2008).

The specific difficulty that France faces is the fragility of its territories in attracting investments and projects, in a context of exacerbated global competition. The competence and depth of French territorial administrations are weak (measured in terms of budget per capita). Moreover, the overlapping of competences, what is maliciously called the territorial “*millefeuille*” (the decision-making layers are unnecessarily superimposed and end up resembling the French cake called *millefeuille*), the death of which is constantly announced... and postponed (Drevet, 2014), and the duplication of local and national administrations lead to poor organization, and sometimes to competition or conflict between the different stakeholders. The centralizing tradition leads to the fact that the public decision-makers, headquarters, and main R&D centers are in Paris, while the factories are in the provinces. Finally, French elites are highly internationalized and more sensitive to short-term views than those of other European countries, notably the German elites, who are oriented towards long-term planning and development. They thrive in a very porous environment between the State and large companies, in a still “*colbertist model*” (Cohen, 2007), and show less interest in the province and its local production system, and are therefore, in the end, less sensitive to its difficulties.

It is not surprising that the two countries most centralized around an ultra-dominant metropolis (London for the United Kingdom and Paris for France) are also the most deindustrialized. However, under the effect of the multiple recent crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, things are changing. In a short and stimulating essay, Ménascé and Victoria (2021) present multiple initiatives of companies committed to revitalizing territories (see for example the case of Veolia, one of the world leaders in water cycle management and waste management services for local authorities, extensively developed in their book). These initiatives are totally in line with the French policy initiative whose objective is to learn the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted many vulnerabilities, the most traumatic of which was the lack of protective masks at the worst moments of the crisis. Since 2021, a call for projects called “(Re)locations in critical sectors”, in French “*(Re)localisations dans les secteurs critiques,*” with a total envelope of 850 million euros, is thus dedicated to relocating projects in five sectors: health, agri-food, electronics, essential industry inputs (chemicals, materials, raw materials, etc.) and 5G. By 2022, there were 477 winning projects, 311 of which were led by SMEs (see Table 2).

Table 2. Relocation in critical sectors in France: active participation of governmental authorities

Critical sectors	Key features
<i>Health</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 128 winning projects • 158 million euros of support • 561 million euros in productive investments
<i>Agri-food</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 97 winning projects • 132 million euros in support • 602 million euros in productive investments
<i>Electronics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 107 winning projects • 141 million euros in support • 463 million euros in productive investments
<i>Essential industry inputs</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 120 winning projects • 317 million euros in support • 1,305 million euros in productive investments
<i>5G</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 winning projects • 98 million euros in support • 294 million euros in productive investments

Source: France Relance.

TRACES 2: TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SHARED VALUE

Political action to support territories did not wait for the COVID-19 pandemic to actively manifest itself, even if the health crisis was a key momentum for thinking about *resilience* (Ferru, Fouqueray and Navereau, 2023). As Morand (2022) notes in his analysis of public procurement, local authorities, whether cities, departmental councils, or regional councils, use a powerful logic of geographical proximity in awarding many public contracts. Over the period 2010-2020, 50% of these contracts were awarded to a supplier located less than 65 km away, with an average distance of 242 km. The virtues of the short circuit and the reindustrialization of territories in the context of public procurement, so much vaunted during the 2022 presidential campaign, from Jean-Luc Mélenchon (far left) to Marine Le Pen (far right), therefore correspond to an objective (and long-standing) reality, leading Morand (2022:39) to conclude: “Public procurement contracts are in fact awarded within a geographical perimeter that is probably much closer than imagined.” This is certainly a sign of the will of politicians to assert a strategy of support for their territory... where their voters also reside.

Despite the support of governmental authorities, it remains true that there are territories that are successful, i.e., that adapt to the changing conditions of their economic environment, and others that are much less successful, for example because the local authorities and the inhabitants are unable to turn the page of a glorious but definitively bygone industrial past. Moreover, Marchesnay (2001) emphasized, more than twenty years ago, that the dynamics of a territory stem from the presence of a *history* and a


collective will, which are not data but constructs that are part of both the long term and a strategic entrepreneurial project. In short, not all territories are identical in terms of relocation perspectives, and it would be awkward to ignore this reality at the level of public policymakers. From this viewpoint, we suggest a three-level typology that makes it possible to describe competitive strategy for relocation, and to highlight the key factors behind them:

- *The old “traditional” industrial territory.* The key factor is a techno-organizational change that builds on the existing, but with modernization and diversification both based on new manufacturing technologies and/or a major organizational change in the way production or goods physical distribution processes are managed. The example of the plastics and mechanical engineering sector in northern France (Douai) and eastern France (Mayenne and Rouen) can be taken as good illustrations.
- *The territory driven by a pivotal firm.* The key factor is the existence of a large company and significant public support. Examples include Grenoble in microelectronics (GlobalFoundries and STMicroelectronics), Toulouse in aeronautics (Airbus), and Béthune and Douvrin in plastics and mechanical engineering (battery mega-factories). For the region to fully benefit from the presence of the pivotal firm, relations with local subcontractors must be based on a sense of solidarity within the industry, and relations between the head office, the subsidiary and the subcontractor must be rich in sharing and pooling of resources.
- *The new industrial territory.* The key factor is innovation, with the emergence of new industries, sometimes of modest size, based on radical innovations linked to the activities of local R&D centers. We will mention here the local variations of innovative approaches, from French Tech to French Lab, notably in relation to the ecological transition (electric bikes, home automation), consumer demands in terms of well-being and quality of life, and the development of local raw materials, such as organic chicken feed (Roinsard, Bordeaux, Lubac, Brachet, Germain, and Juin, 2016).

More broadly, this raises the main question introduced by Porter and Kramer (2011) in the early 2010s: how can we think of value chains that integrate an objective of creating societal value? According to the authors, a narrow vision of capitalism considers that social and/or community issues do not fall within its scope; all that can be expected is the company’s contribution to economic dynamism through employment, wages, investments, and taxes. Such a narrow view has led to a shortening of investors’ time horizon and a wave of outsourcing and offshoring that has weakened the link between companies and their various territorial communities, with companies indifferent to how social weaknesses affect their value chains. Top managers have thus focused on their competitive environment and failed to understand the effect that location can have on productivity and innovation. According to Porter and Kramer (2011), the time has come to think of *shared value* as involving policies that improve a company’s competitiveness and, simultaneously, the social conditions of the communities (local ecosystems) in which it operates.

How to create shared value? While Porter and Kramer (2011) do not hesitate to use the value chain to identify the core and supporting activities that may be involved (see Figure 1), the focus is on the *value of territories*. Every company needs other companies and multiple infrastructures around it to succeed (academic institutions and Universities, standardization bodies, local authorities, etc.). Companies will then create shared value by relying on territories to improve their productivity through an active policy of inclusion of their communities. Indeed, no business is a self-sufficient unit –to use Håkansson and Snehota’s (1989) famous expression: “*no business is an island*–” and it needs a prosperous community not only to generate a solvent demand for its products, but also to benefit from qualified jobs. In this community, networking between companies in the same territory can support efficient cooperative projects, by combining resources, competences, and knowledge. This is the explicit objective of the “*Territoires d’industrie*” operation mentioned above, which seeks to bring agglomeration effects into play at four levels: additional value created by the spatial clustering of companies; access to suppliers and highly specialized labor; economies of scale made possible by complementarities; and R&D spillover effects.

Figure 1. Shared value: main and support activities concerned



Source: Adapted from Porter and Kramer (2011).

TRACES 3: A SOCIETAL VISION FOR THE TERRITORIES

It is possible to analyze the thinking on shared value as harbingers of a “renewed” capitalism. Tomorrow’s value chains will aim to create value that focuses on the permanence of social benefits rather than seeking to reduce them, for example with massive job-destroying relocation policies. It would then be up to business schools to include in their Bachelor and Master programs reasoned thinking on this shared value and its implications for location, innovation, and the consideration of societal factors. In short, this is a real break with Friedman (1970/2007), who vigorously proclaimed in the early 1970s, after a period of virulent contestation in the United States at the end of the 1960s, that the social responsibility of the company must stop at maximizing shareholder value. With all the traditional verbal violence of the “*Chicago boys*” (Altheman, González García and Martínez, 2022), the idea was thus defended that an executive who devoted his company’s income to the defense of some social interest would be spending capital investors’ money unduly. There is no doubt that shared value explicitly turns its back on a vision that ultimately updates the Smithian invisible hand, by being totally disconnected from the social space in which any company operates.

In an interview published by *Les Echos* on September 19, 2019, the French Commissioner for the Solidarity Economy & Social Innovation said no different: “To build a new system, the State cannot act alone, nor can businesses. We need a coalition between the State, companies, and investors. The first challenge is to mobilize as many companies as possible. It is in the territories that the transformation will take place, so it is essential to also involve SMEs. The second challenge consists in creating an ecosystem –economic, fiscal, regulatory– that favors the development of companies and investors who have put social and environmental impact at the heart of their model. The third challenge is training. We need to train future generations in these new macro and microeconomic approaches, and to emancipate ourselves from the old models: everyone has understood that Milton Friedman is dead, now it is time to stop teaching him” (Le Bolzer, 2019:online). By reintroducing ethics into the center of the economic game, the societal perspective becomes a way of thinking differently about the collective creation of value within territories. The central question is to know the place that the societal perspective really occupies when applied to a territory in which companies (recently relocated or historically “entrenched”) drive a clustering approach.

Gianfaldoni (2016) thus proposes a distinction between clusters, localized systems of production and innovation and territorial poles of economic cooperation (PTCE). For this author, localized systems of production and innovation, like clusters, are primarily based on a narrow specialization around specific professions or techniques with high added value. This fundamentally distinguishes them from innovation and territorial poles of economic cooperation for two reasons: on the one hand, the latter rely on a wide range of products, both traditional and innovative, whose low added value is sometimes synonymous with lower profitability; on the other hand, the dominant logic of innovation and territorial poles of economic cooperation is to privilege a societal approach by valorizing an “interweaving of socio-professional, socio-economic and socio-cultural networks which generates organic proximities (common rules), proximities of similarity (adherence to shared values) and geographic proximities (situated social embedding)” (Gianfaldoni, 2017:47). The risk here is to think that territorial revitalization is totally free of social dimensions, whereas it is an important element of the “renewed” capitalism that Porter and Kramer (2011) call for.

Moreover, if we return to the French case, it is essential to recognize the increasingly visible presence of transformation levers in the way we think about the management of value chains, especially through the action plan for the growth and transformation of companies of May 2019, known as the PACTE Act (in French: *Plan d'Action pour la Croissance et la Transformation des Entreprises*). While the latter opens the way for enlarged employee participation in governance in a perspective of “codetermination” (Aubert and Hollandts, 2022), its purpose is also –and above all– to lead companies to question their social and environmental impacts, certainly in a global way, on a societal scale, but why not on a more territorial scale. This is the position taken by Daudigeos and Ottaviani (2021), who have the merit of emphasizing that the integration of a territorial dimension in the strategic analysis conducted by top managers is essential to consolidate a *raison d'être* in the eyes of multiple stakeholders. Legitimacy is then manifested at two levels: (1) a clear social utility in terms of job creation; and (2) a participation in the effort to reduce the environmental footprint linked to the efficient functioning of value chains.

CONCLUSION

As Serres (2002) states, the use of traces makes it possible to clarify the key elements of a very distant history that remains “opaque” due to the lack of direct testimonies that it is possible to gather from the actors. From this viewpoint, the use of a trace-based methodology to understand contemporary developments in organizational management or industrial policy may seem surprising. It would be enough to interview active decision-makers to identify the new trajectories that are taking shape. But is this the case? Clearly, strategic choices affecting the future of companies, public organizations and countries are most often confidential, and as such, information is difficult to access. Socially acceptable answers will be submitted to the researcher (Krosnick, 1999), preventing an in-depth understanding of the issues at stake. Even if traces do not always provide access to the essence of the decision, they do provide interesting elements for getting as close as possible to it. One of the best examples is Allison's (1971) analysis of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The trace methodology used in this article has uncovered three main traces that shed light on the post-COVID-19 world that might emerge with reference to the French case.

The economic history of the last 40 years is now widely known and studied. Lower transportation costs and the opening of markets to the global economy have contributed to the transformation of the French manufacturing system to adapt it to the worldwide market. The acceleration of trade and the lowering of customs barriers have created opportunities for companies, but also for Western consumers: the former have been able to lower their costs by relocating their production to countries where labor is cheaper, while the latter have benefited from more affordable convenience goods. On the other hand, globalization has made supply chains more fragile, and the interruption of one of their links disrupts their functioning. During the COVID-19 pandemic, several French automotive and pharmaceutical assembly plants had to stop production and delivery to consumers because of a supply shortage of components from China. By putting the spotlight on these risks, the health crisis has revealed the inability to produce consumer goods that are essential to the population. As part of a recovery plan, the French government has launched a call for relocation projects in 2021, with the hope of reducing the risks associated with the disruption of global supply chains by bringing suppliers and customers closer together in the same local areas.

France has experienced massive deindustrialization since the first oil crisis. In 1975, industry accounted for a little less than 30% of GDP, compared to just over 10% in 2022. For a long time, the dominant

economic analysis was that this decline was inevitable. The diagnosis is erroneous if we refer to the German case, where deindustrialization stopped in 1990, unlike in France. The medium-sized cities were then depopulated, even though they had managed to attract industries, by having an abundant workforce and a land area that was less expensive than that of the metropolises. The “Yellow Vests” (in French “*Gilets Jaunes*”) movement, which shook France during the fall of 2018 (Fulconis and Paché, 2020), is arguably the latest protest the depopulation of medium-sized cities. Political authorities have apparently heard the message, and they are making numerous efforts to revitalize the territories. The key idea is to get companies to produce “Made in France” again, by reducing dependence on distant sources of supply. Is this path credible? In a globalized world, it seems unlikely that industrial relocation will be massive. However, it will be successful if a few companies play the game and reorganize their value chain, once again focusing on proximity.

The trace analysis carried out in this article constitutes a preliminary stage in the reflection on territorial revitalization strategy. However, it is possible to highlight the managerial implications of the change in trajectory intended by the French political authorities. At the beginning of June 2023, following the call for relocation projects launched in 2021, President Emmanuel Macron indicated that drug shortages being unacceptable, a relocation to France of the manufacture of some 50 drugs deemed *critical* would be undertaken in the next few years, if not in the next few months. The drugs in question are morphine, pediatric amoxicillin and six anti-cancer drugs. More broadly, a list of 450 *essential* drugs has been drawn up as part of an ambitious relocation plan. However, we must not jump to conclusions from these political pronouncements, for two main reasons:

- On the one hand, the relocation mentioned only concerns a very limited portfolio of products, which may be important in terms of public health, but whose economic weight remains limited: while sales of medicines in France in 2021 will represent 23 billion euros, imports of textile-clothing products will represent five times as much (105 billion euros)
- On the other hand, President Emmanuel Macron’s position remains very measured, as he emphasizes the urgent need for action at European level. In his view, relocation and the reinforcement of production capacities should be considered at European Union level, with quantified targets to coordinate the efforts of individual countries.

The second point is crucial in terms of managerial recommendations. Rather than a national policy of revitalization, it should be organized and implemented at a “regional” level. The region in question is Europe, understood as an economic entity founded on economic, political, and social solidarity. Relocation within the framework of regional (European) supply chains requires a rigorous mapping of the actors and resources available, as well as logistical facilities to organize the exchange of work-in-progress (WIP) and goods between the various supply chain nodes (for a recent literature review on supply chain mapping, see Fabbe-Costes, Lechaptois and Spring [2020]). In other words, purely national territorial revitalization strategy has virtually no chance of success for countries –like France– that have irretrievably lost major industrial tools and competences over the decades. It is therefore important to act at an extended geographical level, by thinking about coordination between European countries that goes beyond national egoism. This is a major challenge, and against a backdrop of high geopolitical tensions, it is by no means certain that it will be met in the next few years.

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