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Agency, functionalism, and all that. A Sraffian view

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Abstract

Former contributions examined the approach to institutions and economic history that can be derived from the classical and Marxian 'surplus approach' as particularly recovered by Piero Sraffa (1951) and Pierangelo Garegnani (1960). The present paper deals with the allegation levelled against historical materialism - and consequently against the surplus approach to institutions - of organicism or functionalism. Organicism is said to look at individuals as passive vectors functionally serving in various capabilities the reproduction and destiny of society as a whole. In this way human agency in the operation and change of society is excluded or at least restrained. Methodological individualism is the traditional alternative supported both by neoclassical and by (some) Marxist schools. The literature over the 'agency versus structure' determination of human behaviour in social and human sciences is immense. I will therefore limit myself to some episodes that may however provide enough food for thought on this field. I shall defend a functionalist view of society while giving space to individual intentional action and aspirations, albeit informed by historical conditioning circumstances. Historical reconstruction of the objective and subjective features of the economic formations under examination, rather than the empty and a-historical study of individual choices, unrelated to the social context, looks like the way to go. Agency must be historically contextualised.

Introduction*

The issue whether human beings enjoy real freedom of choice, or their behaviour is ultimately conditioned by a host of biological, social and cultural circumstances is one of the most discussed topics of moral sciences. As Gardner (2007, p. 95) puts it: 'The questions asked in developing theories of agency are primarily ontological in character – concerned with the nature of human being. What, fundamentally, are humans? Are we creatures with free and rational will, or are we the obedient followers of social (or genetic) programming?' The implications of this issue on the degree of individual responsibility under various profiles and circumstances (e.g. economic, social, political and juridical) are apparent (ibid, pp. 96-97). The issue is also extremely relevant in economic, social, and historical disciplines (including anthropology and archaeology) concerning the functioning and evolution of human societies. Socio-biologists are also deeply concerned with this topic.

Various traditions in social analysis recognize that economic and social textures, formal and informal institutions, and ideologies represent the context in which an individual as a social and historical being is moving. Related papers examined the approach to institutions that can be derived from the classical and Marxian 'surplus approach' as particularly recovered by Piero Sraffa (1951) and Pierangelo Garegnani (1960).ⁱ The economic surplus is defined as what the community can freely dispose of without affecting the reproduction of the system at least at its given levels of activity. Legal, political and customary institutions (including religions, beliefs and ideologies) can be seen as presiding over the extraction and distribution of the social surplus (see Ogilvie 2007 for a closer view). This approach has been compared to other main approaches, namely the Polanyian 'substantivism' and Douglass North's New Institutional Economics (Cesaratto 2023b). While criticising some aspects of Karl Polanyi's theory, particularly his identification of economic analysis with marginalism, we picked up his recommendation that the economic analysis of the social surplus in specific socio-economic formation should be intimately tied to the analysis of the institutions that preside over its existence and utilisation. On the other hand, though appreciating North's attempt to transfuse history and institutions into the anaemic marginalist theory, the troubles he encountered in this pursuit have been interpreted in the light of the challenge he felt coming from Marx's theory. Indeed, Marx's theory, drawing from the classical surplus approach, suggested an inseparable link between economics and institutions in every socio-economic formation, a link to be studied in its specific historical manifestations. However, while well established, Marx's (and Engels') historical materialism is not without problems which a century

and a half of Marxist debates has brought to light. Within a possibly much longer list, I envisaged two specific questions (Cesaratto2023c).

While Marx's idea of a strict relation, roughly expressed, between specific historical forms of extraction and distribution of the social surplus and accompanying institutions that defines a *given* socio-economic formation is basically sound and robust, the *dynamic* of change of these socio-economic formations is less clear. Simplifying, Marx deemed the clash between an evolving production base of the economy (forces of production) and a dominant social superstructure (relations of production) as the trigger of institutional change. In this view, either a change in production techniques appears as the ultimate driver, the *deus ex machina* of history; or tensions within the relations of production pave the way to those changes. A clarification of the interaction between material and institutional change is still badly needed.

This paper, however, is mainly concerned with a second issue concerning the allegation levelled against historical materialism, and consequently against the surplus approach to institutions, of organicism or functionalism. Organicism would look at individuals as passive vectors functionally serving, possibly through the mediation of the social groups they belong to, the functioning and destiny of society as a whole. In this way any human agency in the working and, more importantly, change of society is excluded or at least confined. (Remarkably, this topic is thus relevant also for the first issue, that of the dynamics of change).ⁱⁱ Notably, criticism to Marxism for neglecting individual or class subjectivism in favour of objectivism has also come from within Marxism itself, and roughly overlaps with the clash between so-called historicists and structuralists (Cesaratto 2023c). Methodological individualism is the traditional alternative to organicist theories supported both by neoclassical and by (some) Marxist schools.

The debate over the 'agency versus structure' determination of human behaviour in social sciences and humanities is limitless. Necessarily I will therefore limit myself to some episodes that may however provide enough food for thought on this field. In section 1 I move from Karl Popper's criticism to historicism basically denying full scientific credentials to complex interpretations of history, and then consider some counter criticism by Edward Thompson defending the necessity of studying social inter-connections. Section 2 finds John Elster's 'analytical Marxism' criticism to functionalism partially justified as long as it calls for the necessity of explaining how complex historical processes translate in granular individual choices. Edward Thompson's attempt at answering this question is discussed in section 3 along with Perry Anderson's criticism of

Thompson's ambivalences. As said, the agency/structure conundrum is pervasive in social science. Some insights from archaeology are considered in section 4 where particularly interesting is the idea, derived from evolutionary theory, of 'conditioned intentionality', in other words agency constrained by the inherited socio-cultural context. The agency/structure debate has had a specific declination in Marxism during the mentioned long controversy between scholars more sensible to historicism, paying therefore wider attention to human agency in the historical vicissitudes, and structuralists, more sensible to theoretical and systemic descriptions.ⁱⁱⁱ Recent Marxist authors have accentuated the emphasis on agency. In section 5 I wonder whether anything Marxist is left in these 'post-modernist' approaches. In section 6 I discuss whether we might arrive at a unified view of agency and structure. The conclusions underline some results. I shall defend a functionalist view of society while giving space to individual intentional action and aspirations, albeit informed by historical conditioning circumstances which condition agency. A historical reconstruction of the objective and subjective features of the economic formations under examination, rather than the aseptic and a-historical study of individual choices unrelated to the social context, looks like the most promising way to go. Agency must be historically defined and studied.

1. Popper versus Thompson on how to study history

The list of Popper's accusations against historicism, of which one manifestation is traditional historical materialism, is well known and includes: the historicist claim to interpret history based on an 'intimate understanding of social phenomena' or 'essentialism' (Popper (1957, pp. 20, 28); the consequent claim of identifying historical laws and being capable of historical predictions (ibid, pp. 3, 36 and passim); holism regarding a social group as 'more than the mere sum total of its members' where all 'social groups have their own traditions, their own institutions, their own rites' (ibid, pp. 17-18); organicism 'the theory which interprets social groups by analogy with living organisms' (ibid p. 19) where history is their memory: 'society, like an organism, possesses a sort of memory of what we usually call its history' (ibid, p. 9).

The historicist aspiration to provide strong interpretive accounts of historical events based on functional explanations is not disputed per se, but rather because it would lead to the formulation of too generic laws (ibid p. 26), expressed in purely qualitative terms (ibid p. 24) and therefore hardly falsifiable.: 'wholes (...) can never be the object of any activity, scientific or otherwise' (ibid,

p. 77) while 'there is no motion of society in any sense similar or analogous to the motion of physical bodies' (ibid, p. 114).

To the historicist view Popper opposes *piecemeal research* that, to my eyes, represents the archetype of the current 'bright' and rampant marginalist economist: ideally dedicated to the study of circumscribed events describable by simple relationships on which to formulate clear and easily empirically verifiable (or falsifiable) hypotheses (ibid, p. 59). For her, historical research is 'characterized by its interest in actual, singular, or specific events, rather than in laws or generalizations' (ibid, p. 143).

Indeed, there are elements of Popper's openness to a more connective work of the historian at least in the meticulous study of the 'situational logic in history', i.e., the objective circumstances that can explain certain historical decisions, going beyond history as the vicissitudes of great personalities (ibid, p. 148-149). In this sense, Popper seems to transcend methodological individualism. The historian's work can also usefully reconstruct how social traditions are created, although the starting point remains methodological individualism: 'We need studies, based on methodological individualism, of the social institutions through which ideas may spread and captivate individuals, of the way in which new traditions may be created, and of the way in which traditions work and break down' (ibid, p. 149). The historian's work can even advance interpretive keys to history (economic, political, religious, etc.) that, however, would not be very falsifiable; therefore, the social scientist's point of view must clearly be expressed without claiming to advance general theories such as those possible in the natural sciences (ibid, pp. 150-152).

Before proceeding, I believe that one of Popper's objections to historicism and historical materialism can be removed, namely the claim of formulating prophecies about human destiny in scientific terms.^{iv} I believe that this is an unnecessary feature of holistic theories, at least of those with a materialist bias. In them, for instance in Marxism, the prophetic aspect can well be removed without renouncing to a degree of organicism, and without therefore falling back into the renunciatory 'piecemeal engineering' to which Popper wants to relegate the work of the social scientist.

This is also the position of Edward Thompson (1978a, p. 20) who denounces that 'the nineteenth and twentieth centuries engendered authentic and sometimes monstrous "historicisms" (evolutionary, teleological, and essentialist notions of "history's" self-motivation)', acknowledging 'that this same historicism permeated some part of the Marxist tradition, in the notion of a

programmed succession of historical "stages", motored towards a pre-determined end by class struggle. All this merited severe correction'. But this degeneration of historical materialism was often present in 'the work of ideologues rather than in the mature practice of historians'.

Thompson takes also issue with Popper's stance that 'we cannot know "history", or at best we may know only discrete fact' and that '[i]nterpretation consists in the introduction of a point of view' what 'may be legitimate (on other grounds) but it does not constitute any true historical knowledge' (ibid, p. 21).^v For Thompson this means surrender to 'the unknowability of any objective historical process', so that we 'must grope out way backwards in an empiricist dusk, making out the dim facts at our feet, piece-meal and one at a time' (ibid, p. 22). In this way, Thompson notes, we 'will make sure that no facts escape from their discrete prison cells, enter into relationships, or hold mass meetings' (ibid, p. 34). True, Thompson acknowledges, the casuistic connection between historical facts is not subject to strong empirical testing but only to 'weak empiricism': 'Popper disallows what cannot be sensed, tested by experiment, verified: but the inter-connections of social phenomena, causation within historical process – these seem to lie beyond any experimental test: hence a weak empiricism leaves us to stare uncomprehendingly at the world's most immediate manifestations, accepting them as what they are because that is what they seem to be' (ibid, p. 35). For Thompson while 'historians may take a decision to select' and 'write a history of discrete aspects of the whole (...), the real object remains unitary. The human past is not an aggregation of discrete histories but a unitary sum of human behaviour' (ibid. p. 40). And these processes are 'intelligible', in the sense that an 'understanding of the rationality (of causation, etc.) of historical process' or, in other words, 'an objective knowledge, disclosed in a dialogue with determinate evidence' is possible (ibid, p. 41).

Popper's criticism of historicism – letting aside the degenerative prophetic elements in some of its versions – mainly focuses upon the testability (falsifiability) of too complex historical interpretations. Agency and methodological individualism are involved insofar as piece meal methodology precisely regards the study of circumscribed situations in which testable hypothesis on agents' behaviour are feasible. Although sensitive to the argument of human agency, Thompson persuasively objected, with all due caution, that history should be treated as a whole and not in bits and pieces.^{vi} Not without effectiveness, agency and methodological individualism played a central role in later critiques to holistic approaches such as that by John Elster's 'analytical Marxism'.

2. Elster on functionalism and methodological individualism

Cesaratto (2023 b/c) examined some allegations of 'functionalism' made against historical materialism by exponents of (neoclassical) New Institutional Economics (NIE). More specifically, Heijdra et al. (1988) and Lowenberg (1990) maintained that the difference between Douglass North's NIE interpretation of history and Marx's own were not of substance but methodological: the first relying on methodological individualism and agency, the second on functionalism. A functional approach ultimately explains individual behaviour as part of social or institutional behaviours functional to the working of the whole system. Any system's component, in other words, is explained by the logic of the whole. This would, however, leave undemonstrated (or being indifferent to) how this functionality concretely takes place through individual micro-choices. This criticism has been anticipated by Popper who, as seen, associated the lack of testability of the holistic approaches to the lack of micro foundations. Particularly vehement and influential in this regard has been John Elster, one of the founder of 'analytical Marxism' (Veneziani 2012).

Elster (1982, p. 454) defines the *Main Functional Paradigm* as that in which 'the latent functions (if any) of an institution or behavior explain the presence of that institution or behavior'; while according to the *Strong Functional Paradigm*, 'all institutions or behavioral patterns have a function that explains their presence' (the distance between the two definitions is irrelevant for our present purposes). Both would make the basic mistake '*to postulate a purpose without a purposive actor or, in grammatical terms, a predicate without a subject*' (ibid, original emphasis). The wide adoption by Marxism of functionalism has devastating consequences since 'a firm knowledge about the mechanisms that operate at the individual level, the grand Marxist claims about macrostructures and long-term change are condemned to remain at the level of speculation' (ibid). Elster provides a provoking list of examples of functional analyses both in Marx and in Marxism in which 'various institutions of the capitalist era can be explained by their functions for capitalism' (ibid, p. 457). These analyses rely at times on conspiracy explanations, other times on a *cui prodest?* (or *cui bono?*) way of arguing. In these explanations behaviours can be either intentional or unintentional (or in between). A particularly striking example is Michal Kalecki's (1943) claim about the functionality of unemployment to the capitalist social order, which may look specious at least as long as this is not supported by a detailed account of the underlying decisional mechanism (intentional or unintentional). To prove the functionality of the

‘industrial reserve army’ to a well-functioning capitalism, Marx relied on the depressing effect of a lower normal profit rate on investment – when unemployment is too low and real wages higher. Lower investment would increase unemployment and restore profitability. Serrano (2004, p. 14) and Cesaratto (2015, pp. 167-169) argue that, however, a lower normal profit rate does not necessarily affect investment insofar as competition would lead capitalists to invest even at lower normal profit rates.^{vii} In fact, Kalecki excludes forms of collusion among capitalists on investment decisions (to lower them, in this case) – his aphorism that ‘(...) capitalists do many things as a class but they certainly do not invest as a class’ (Kalecki 1971, p. 152) is well known. He seems therefore to refer to economic policy decisions aimed to restore normal profitability by generation recessions as the *political* mechanism to assure social and distributive order. How this happens is not, however, detailed.

In this regard, what Elster refutes is not the functionality per se, which can well be plausible, but claims that ‘a mass of detailed evidence is required to make an intentional explanation credible’ or that ‘some mechanism must be provided if the [unintentional] explanation is to be taken seriously’ (ibid, pp. 461-462).^{viii} As such, however, the criticism is not to functionalism per se, but to the incompleteness of its analytical usage, as we shall argue below.

We can, though, ask ourselves whether this *cui prodest* argument is so defective. Famously, the (supposed) champion of methodological individualism, Adam Smith (1776 pp. 68-69), in well-known passages openly talked of the tacit and sometimes open conspiratorial behaviour of capitalists meant to maintain the social order as a ‘natural state of things which nobody ever hears of’, a power that it is difficult to unveil, but that one should be ‘ignorant of the world’ to deny. This conspiracy power and collusion with politicians is therefore difficult to uncover also for the historian, and a *cui bono* argument remains therefore the only game in town.

Another founder of analytical Marxism, the late Gerald Cohen, engaged with Elster in a defence of functionalism in historical materialism.^{ix} Cohen (1982a, p. 28) refers to functionalism as ‘explanations in which, roughly speaking, consequences are used to explain causes’, what he would call ‘consequence law’. In his opinion historical materialism is irremediably functionalist with particular regard to the superstructure which is functional to the preservation of its economic foundations. For instance ‘the legal system is explained by its function, which is to help sustain an economy of a particular kind’ (1982a, p. 31; 1982b, p. 487). Cohen recognizes that, however, ‘to say that A explains B is not necessarily to indicate *how* A explains B’ (1982b, p. 487, original italics).

In other words, he acknowledges Elster's demand 'that the claim that B functionally explains A be supported by a plausible story which reveals *how* B functionally explains A' (1982a, pp 50-51, original italics; (2000 [1978]), p. 286). Within historical materialism, Cohen admits, 'no one has given excellent answers' (1982b, p. 488), conceding that if 'links with action cannot be forged, if the question how the functional explanations of historical materialism explain (...) cannot even in principle be answered, then that would have lethal significance for historical materialism' (1982a, p. 35). Persuasively, Cohen does not see a solution in game theory, as proposed by Elster, since it 'helps to explain the vicissitudes of the struggle, and the strategies pursued in it, but it cannot give a Marxist answer to the question why class wars (as opposed to battles) are settled one way rather than another' (1982b, p. 489). The Marxist answer must be a more structural one referring to the dominant class as that 'best suited, most able and disposed, to preside over the development of the productive forces at the given time' (ibid). Cohen seems to suggest a rather empirical way of solving the question finding 'instances', comparing historical situations in which similar institutions are generated functional to the working of the whole: 'For I think one can support the claim that B functionally explains A even when one cannot suggest what the mechanism is, if, instead, one can point to an appropriately varied range of instances in which, whenever A would be functional for B, A appears' (Cohen 1982a, p. 51; 1982b, p. 490). This comparative method is indeed typical of social sciences like anthropology and archaeology. In fact 'it would be a mistake to refrain from taking those explanatory steps which are open to us, just because we should prefer to go farther than our current knowledge permits' (Cohen 2000), p. 286). The situation would be somehow similar to Darwinism before genetics: functionality of natural behaviours explains their selection although the *how* was still unclear. Many, including Edward Thompson, have interpreted cultural history as (an additional) genetics of humans (we shall come back on this). Thompson also suggests historical work on the making of collective subjectivities and choices (active as well as passive) as a complementary way out. Comparative historical work must complete functional analysis.

3. Thompson between agency and structure

In view of the above, historical work on individual and collective subjectivities emerging in their specific context, as a combination of comparative economic and institutional analyses (economic analysis being based on the surplus approach), may represent the way out from the functionalist trap. Elements in this direction may be derived from a renowned exchange between Edward Thompson (1978a) and Perry Anderson (1980).

As well known, Thompson (1978) is a book-long polemic against the undervaluing of historical analysis by Louis Althusser (1969) and Althusser and Balibar (1970). These authors would deem human agency to be irrelevant in view of the conditioning of the structural forces of historical materialism, the only relevant ones: 'What Althusser overlooks is the dialogue between social being and social consciousness' (Thompson 1978a, p. 9). In other words, 'he evicts human agency from history, which then becomes a "process without a subject"' (ibid, p. 89), an expression we already found in Elster. Thompson looks at the idea of history as driven by forces independent of human action as a form of idealism (ibid, p. 4 and passim), one in which history is led by one exogenous metaphysical force.^x

In my opinion, Thompson's call for the study of *how* objective forces are translated in the historical process into human actions is not necessarily a slide into subjectivity, but a complement to the objective study of history. It is therefore not without justification to write that: 'For if a mode of production is proposed to entail a regular and rational form of sequential development, and a complex (but uniform) internal relational structuration, *independent of the rationality and agency of the human actors who in fact produce and relate*, then, very soon, the questions will be asked: whose is the divine will which programmed this automating structure, where is the ulterior "unconscious power"?' (ibid, p. 90, original italics).

What Thompson seems to be legitimately suggesting instead is the study of natural (material) forces through their historical unfolding in concrete human action (ibid, p. 85). The study of human agency in its historical evolving raises the question of 'intelligibility and intention' in human choices (ibid p. 84). Thompson considers a merit of Friedrich Engels to have got his hands into the very intricate issue of structure vs. human agency. Without great success indeed. In a famous letter Engels (1890) speaks of history as a vector resulting from component vectors representing the action of subjects. Engels is, however, inconclusive and even contradictory: while on the one hand he wants to assign a role to human agency, on the other hand he is very clear in identifying economic forces as the ultimate determinant, as Thompson points out (1978a, p. 87). But at least, Thompson concludes, 'he does not discount the crucial ambivalence of our human presence in our own history, part-subjects, part-objects, the voluntary agents of our own involuntary determinations' (ibid, p. 88). A solution is proposed by Thompson to Engels' vectors' parallelogram in recalling the class background of individual agency:

For these "individual wills", however "particular" their "conditions. of life", have been conditioned in class ways; and if the historical resultant is then seen as the outcome of a

collision of contradictory class interests and forces, then we may see how human agency gives rise to an involuntary result – "the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary" – and how we may say, at one and the same time, that "we make our own history" and "history makes itself" (ibid, p. 87, internal quotation from Engels' letter cited above).

In other words, it is the conflict among component vectors, representing class-agency, that characterise history. The latter is thus generated by class agency and conflict, where individual class affiliation and interests – which may include the pursuit of technical change by the capitalist class and class conflict over its fruits – are deeply affected by objective socio-economic forces (see also Anderson 1980, p. 17).^{xi}

Strikingly, in the same vein, in his early manuscripts Sraffa talks of "class mind" and refers to the importance of the 'historical side' along the analytical part. In studying prices and distribution, he argues, it "will be thought that the important part is the analytical and constructive". In this way, however, the "significance of the historical side will be missed. And yet, this is the truly important, that which gives us a real insight into the mystery of human mind and understanding, into the deep unknown relations of individuals between themselves and between the individual and society (the social, or rather the class mind)" (quoted by Le Donne 2022, p. 1120; cf. also Ginzburg 2016).^{xii}

Less consensual I feel about Thompson's allegation of ahistoricism to Marx himself. By the end of the 1850s, the latter is said to have been caught in the trap of political economy by focusing on the abstract core of economic elements of capitalism whose historical dimension he had lost (Thompson 1978a, p. 59). On the one hand, Thompson seems to miss Marx's Herculean effort to refine the classical surplus approach particularly in addressing the unresolved problems of classical economics in the determination of the inverse relationship between the profit rate and the wage rate (Garegnani 1984, 2018).^{xiii} On the other hand, however, it is true that many pages of *Capital* (or *Grundrisse*) may convey the impression that 'capital' stands as an immanent force, 'the logic and forms of capital, to which men were subordinated' as Thompson (1978a, p. 60) puts it:

This is an extraordinary mode of thought to find in a materialist, for capital has become Idea, which unfolds itself in history. We remember so well Marx's imprecations against idealism, and his claims to have inverted Hegel, that we do not allow ourselves to see what is patently there. In the *Grundrisse* – and not once or twice, but in the whole mode of presentation – we have examples of *unreconstructed* Hegelianism. Capital posits conditions "*in accordance with its immanent essence*", reminding us that Marx had studied Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, and had noted of "the Idea as nature" that "reality is posited with immanent determinateness of form." Capital posits this and that, creates this and that, and if we are to conceive of capitalism ("the

inner construction of modern society") it can only be as "capital in the totality of its relations." (ibid, p. 61, original emphasis, internal quotations from Leszek Kolakowski)^{xiv}

Reasoning based on the 'logic of capital' may be misleading. As an example, in his polemic against Friedrich List's economic nationalism, Marx (1845) overstated the transnational nature of capital (Cesaratto 2013). The cosmopolitan 'logic of capital' led him to pay little attention (at this juncture) to the complexities of the history of capitalism – of national capitalisms in this case. According to Thompson (1978a, pp. 53-54), more prudent than Marx had been the late Engels who presented economic laws as laws of tendency, imperfectly realised (in truth, Thompson concedes, elsewhere Marx also repeatedly emphasises the historical nature of economic laws).

In his book-long criticism of Thompson's *Poverty of Theory*, Perry Anderson (1980, p. 8) notes, to begin with, that 'Thompson does not attempt to expound or justify the specific set of categories that defines historical materialism', that is he does not provide his own version of historical materialism, an absence of great momentum. In actual fact, Thompson (1978a, p. 68) criticises Althusser and his colleagues for seeking 'to thrust historical materialism back into the prison of the categories of Political Economy'. He acknowledges that Marx employed the concept of the circuit of capital to characterise the capitalist society, arguing however that 'historical materialism (...) must be concerned with other "circuits" also: the circuits of power, of the reproduction of ideology, etc., and these belong to a different logic and to other categories'. Moreover, he adds, 'historical analysis does not allow for static contemplation of "circuits", but is immersed in moments when all systems go and every circuit sparks across the other' (ibidem). As a result, historical materialism 'offers to study social process in its totality' (ibid, p. 70), where the emphasis is on the word 'process' that the English historian opposes to Althusser's (static) structure. In this way 'History' is 'put back upon her throne as the Queen of the humanities' (ibidem). So far so good. The dethroning of political economy, however, goes against the very centrality Thompson attributes to the concept of social class (and related class agency), unless it is defined on mere subjective and not on objective elements, leading the theory into indefiniteness. For Thompson political subjectivity is in fact a defining feature of the existence of social classes. In this sense Thompson argues for instance that: 'class struggle is the prior concept to class, class does not precede but arises out of struggle [...] classes arise because men and women, in determinate productive relations, identify their antagonistic interests, and come to struggle, to think, and to value in class ways: thus the process of class formation is a process of self-making, although under conditions which are "given"' (ibid, p. 106-107). While an objective circumstance is present (the

classes' antagonistic interests), this factor is for Thompson historically irrelevant as long as social class awareness does not arise. This is unacceptable and has been object of terse criticism by the late Oxford Marxist historian Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, who emphasised the objective nature of social classes with their existence being totally independent of class consciousness (see Cesaratto 2023d, pp. 26-30). The existence of classes is independent of class consciousness. In a similar vein, Anderson notes that in spite of the importance attributed to 'the productive relations into which men are born' and in which they mature the 'experience' later converted in 'class consciousness', the most celebrated of Thompson's works (Thompson 2013 [1966]) almost lacks 'objectives coordinates' surrounding the process of (subjective) class formation. Anderson also notes that: 'Classes have frequently existed whose members did not "identify their antagonistic interests' in any process of common clarification or struggle' (1980, p. 40, see also pp. 41-43). A similar stance in Cohen (2000) is quoted. Anderson notes that elsewhere, indeed, Thompson would present a less unbalanced view of agency versus conditioning:

Where *The Making of the English Working Class* claimed that this making 'owed as much to agency as to conditioning', 'The Peculiarities of the English' [Thompson 1978d] warns its readers: 'Let us look at history *as* history – men placed in actual contexts which they have not chosen, and confronted by indivertible forces, with an overwhelming immediacy of relations and duties and with only a *scanty opportunity* for inserting their own agency (Anderson 1980, p. 48, original emphasis).

Recourse to subjective factors like 'experience' and 'class consciousness', moreover, would be of little help to reconstruct the social texture or order that must find other, more objective foundations. For Marxism these would lie in the dominant mode of production:

The problem of *social order* is irresoluble so long as the answer to it is sought at the level of intention (or valuation), however complex or entangled the skein of volition, however class-defined the struggle of wills, however alienated the final resultant from all of the imputed actors. It is, and must be, the dominant *mode of production* that confers fundamental unity on a social formation, allocating their objective positions to the classes within it, and distributing agents within each class. The result is, typically, an objective process of class struggle. To stabilize and regulate *this* conflict, the complementary modalities of political power, which include repression and ideology, exercised *inside* and *outside* the State, are thereafter indispensable. But class struggle itself is not a causal prius in the sustentation of order, for *classes are constituted by modes of production, and not vice versa* (Anderson 1980, p. 55, original emphasis).

Anderson is therefore critical of Thompson's thesis that Marx, having discovered historical materialism in the 1840s as a 'unitary knowledge of society' (in Thompson's own words), in the 1850s was 'hypnotized by the intricacies of bourgeois political economy' focusing only on the economic aspect of human activities' (Anderson 1980, p. 59).

On the contrary, for Anderson historical materialism found its 'full sense' only in the *Grundrisse* and in the 'Preface' of 1859 (Marx 1859):

It was this progressive theoretical discovery that finally made possible the full-scale exploration of a *new historical object* in *Capital*: the capitalist mode of production. Marx's essential movement after 1848, in other words, was not "away" from history, but deeper into it. (...) Genetically and functionally, Marx's discovery of the concept of mode of production marks a decisive exit from the world of political economy; with it, he embarked on a new kind of history (Anderson 1980, pp. 63-64, original emphasis).

It is also surprising that on the one hand Thompson asserts the unity of socio-economic analysis in historical materialism, while on the other hand he claims the autonomy, of 'the many activities and relations (of power, of consciousness, sexual, cultural, normative) which are not the concern of Political Economy' (Thompson 1978a, p. 59).

Drawing the threads of this section, the interest Thompson shows for the missing link 'between a mode of production and historical process' is stimulating. A link to the actual mechanism of change was missing, before Mendel, also in Darwinian theory:

For just as Darwin proposed and demonstrated an evolutionary process which proceeded by means of a hypothetical transmutation of the species – species which had hitherto been hypostasised as immutable and fixed – and yet remained wholly in the dark as to the actual genetic means of this transmission and transmutation – so, in an analogous way, historical materialism, as a hypothesis, was left unprovided with its own "genetics." If a correspondence could be proposed – and, in some part, demonstrated – between a mode of production and historical process, how, and in what ways, did this come about? (Thompson 1978a, p. 164).

Thompson identifies the missing link in 'human experience'. But while genetics is an objective, material process (see next section), 'human experience' is a subjective outcome of something else, otherwise the term is an 'ambiguous void' (Anderson 1980, p. 80). For Thompson 'human experience' has contents of its own like morality and affectivity. 'Such a position – Anderson comments – has a respectable liberal pedigree, but it is not – plainly not – a Marxist one'.^{xv} In fact, Anderson (1980, p. 83) points out, Thompson 'remains far more materialist as a historian' insisting that a 'materialist examination of values must situate itself, not by idealist propositions, but in the face of culture's material abode: the people's way of life, and, above all their productive and familial relationships' (Thompson 1978a, p 176). In this sense, I believe that in spite of some ambivalences, Edward Thompson's insistence on history must be welcomed, reconstructing human choices as the agency manifestation of deeper forces. His inconsistencies may be justified in view of the existential 'crucial ambivalence of our human presence in our own history, part-subjects, part-objects, the voluntary agents of our own involuntary determinations' (ibid, p. 88).

4. Contextualizing agency in archaeology

The discussion over agency and structure is lively in archaeology (Bentley, Maschner, and Chippindale 2007). Gardener (2007, p. 96) points out that whatever the degree of freedom humans have on their choices, agency is not an atomistic but a social action since ‘what allows humans to fulfil their capacity for agency is their relationships (involvement) with other people and objects’. In other terms, ‘Individuals only exist in relation to a physical and social world, and it is in the relationships that agency is manifested (...) agency is social and relational, and therefore situational’ (ibid, pp.100, 103).^{xvi} Notably, in section 1 we saw Popper also using the term ‘situational’, while Marx (1857-8, p. 18) famously observed that ‘[t]he human being is in the most literal sense a ζῷον πολιτικόν, [A political animal] not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society’.

Bentley, Lipo, et al. (2007, p. 111) point out that ‘it is now understood that culture constitutes a second (in addition to genes) mechanism by which inheritance occurs.’ Genetic selection is based on (i) a casual generation of genetic variations, (ii) an exogenous (environmental) selection mechanism, and (iii) a vertical transmission among genetically related people. Humans intervene in the cultural transmission through ‘intentional’ actions while diffusion is also horizontal, among unrelated people (ibid, pp.110-111). Interestingly, *evolutionary archaeology* (EA) would limit the extent of intentional choices given that the range of pursued intentions is itself part of the socially inherited context:

human behavior is random with respect to natural selection through the evolutionary process of variation generation and then sorting of that variation (...). This does not mean that EA claims that people act randomly (which would be nonsense), but instead that *intentions cannot themselves be an explanation for behavioral change because intentions are part of behavior*, and therefore the subject of inheritance and natural selection of behavioral regularities. In this way, the intentions themselves are also potentially subject to evolution. (...) Human behavior is certainly nonrandom and imbued with intention, but EAs argue that this is only an observation of the fact that our behavior is strongly inherited (culturally and genetically) using systems that include the inheritance of traits as well the inheritance of grammar (i.e., rules for generating traits and additional rules) (ibid, pp. 115-116, emphasis added).

Intentions are themselves part of the received cultural background, confirming Thompson’s view of humans as ‘the voluntary agents of our own involuntary determinations’.

This position puts some order in Engels’s and Thompson’s ambivalences about human agency, part subject and part object of history.^{xvii} And, of course, the memory also goes to Marx’s (1852, chapter 1, pp. n/a) famous sentence that ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as

they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’.

Conversely, *rational choice theories* emphasize the ability of humans to make rational decisions in the given environment. Critics point out that, paradoxically, this is more plausible in simple societies, like the hunter-gatherers’ communities, and much less in complex communities where individual behaviour is part of and conditioned by a much larger set of social mechanisms (Bentley, Lipo, et al. 2007, p. 119). My impression, moreover, is that ‘rational choices’ are often confused with socially beneficial choices, again a legitimate liberal stance but not a Marxist or political realist one.^{xviii} Rational choices may well be socially conflictual, reflecting specific interests. In this sense I do not see any inconsistency between rational choices and social conflict.

Within archaeology, the agency/structure dualism is central also in the ‘processualism versus post-processualism’ debate.

Processual or New Archaeology spread in Anglo-Saxon countries in the 1960s under the influence of a distinguished American archaeologist, the late Lewis Binford. It seems still currently prevailing in America despite post-Processualism, which sounds however more like a British or North European approach (Watson 2007, p. 33; Shanks 2007, pp. 133-134). New Archaeology explicitly searches for general laws, sharing materialism and functionalism with ‘subsistence systems occupying center stage’ (Watson 2007, p. 30; Trigger 2007, p. 407). Little attention is paid to individual agency and to the subjective points of view, concerns, or values of the studied populations (Trigger 2007, p. 401). Human groups react rationally to stress produced by environmental change in a progressive process of adaptation (ibid, p. 395). Contiguity with Marxism’s materialism has been noted (Trigger 1993, p. 186; Rosenswig 2012, p. 34; Saitta 1995, p. 557).

On the opposite front, interest in subjectivity became central in post-processualism. Dismissing any grand theory, particularism is the dominant trait of post-processualism, while processual archaeology is considered ‘too one-sided, too deterministic, too inflexible’ (Shanks 2007, p. 135; Trigger 2007, p. 445). Post-processualism faces the old analytical conundrum of people being conditioned by pre-existing norms and structures that ensure social reproduction, emphasizing the chance of modifying these preconditions or anyway being proactive in their environment (Shanks 2007, p. 135):

instead of social systems and other social totalities, post-processual archaeology is interested in social subjects, thinking and plotting agents who work their way through society and history seeking goals, constantly sending out signals and signs, constantly interpreting the cultural signification around them (ibid, p. 136).

I feel deeply suspicious of these descriptions of human behaviour in which, ultimately, this is hanged to subjective beliefs and cultures. I feel for instance distant from 'culturalism' – a current of post-processual archaeology – which tries 'to capture "the native's point of view" as much as possible' (Viglietti 2018, pp. 226). However, I appreciate 'native conceptualization, experience, and cosmology' as an essential part of materialist interpretations – as long as beliefs are not taken at their face value and are somehow reconducted to some material basis. In this sense I underline the complementarity between structural (or processual) analyses and the historical and anthropological reconstruction on how social groups and classes are the actual carriers of structural forces.^{xix}

Post-processualism is said to be part of so-called post-modernism, a late XXth-century movement that has emphasised the subjective nature of knowledge, relativism and agency, refusing 'modernist' grand theories and functionalism (e.g. Trigger 2007, pp. 446, 452). Post-modernism has also been influential in neo-Marxist theories in which an echo of the old diatribe between historicists and structuralists still resonates.

5. A recent Marxist debate

A recent paper by Knafo and Teschke (2020) defends historicism and interpret Marxism as the study of human agency.^{xx} The paper rejects historical explanations based on the functionalist (or structuralist) 'logic of capital' with all privileges accorded to the production sphere, in favour of an agency-based 'historicist tradition... more directly inspired by E.P. Thompson' (ibid, p. 31). More specifically, this

historicism builds on Marx's famous proposition that people make their history, even if not under the condition of their own making. Most scholars have read this proposition in ontological terms to highlight that people confront capitalist compulsions, which leave them limited choices. They thus focus on the second part of this proposition, the conditions that are not of their own making. (...) There is very little making of history in these accounts and agency is mostly confined to exceptional phases of transitions rather than being an integral component of the wider story (...). The aim of the radical historicism we put forward is to invert this classic framing of Marx's dictum. Instead of putting the emphasis on the conditions that are not of people's making, we seek to reaffirm the fact that even if people do not determine the conditions they are placed in, *it is still people who make history*' (ibid, p. 20, original emphasis).

These arguments sounds however scarcely persuasive, reducing themselves to affirming that since it is people that make history (who can deny it?), therefore ‘even if people do not determine the conditions they are placed in’, people’s action is the relevant issue, not the background circumstances. We are far away from the ‘historical determined intentions’ evoked above.

Benevolently, Lafrance (2021, p. 88)^{xxi} finds Knafo and Teschke’s uneasiness with traditional Marxism justified if referred to “orthodox historical materialism” inspired by ‘Marx’s 1859 Preface to *The Critique of Political Economy* (...) elaborated by Engels (1878) in his *Anti-Dühring* (...) developed by leading Second International intellectuals, vulgarised by a Stalinised Third International, and revived by G.A. Cohen’s *Karl Marx’s Theory of History*’. This version of historical materialism

asserts a determination of ‘superstructural elements’ such as law, state institutions and culture by an ‘economic base’. It offers a technological-determinist reading of history as a pre-ordered sequence of modes of production, and understands the progression of forces of production as a transhistorical tendency being first facilitated and later impeded by a given set of relations of production, with class struggle playing a peripheral role as the conduit toward new relations of production, in line with this transhistorical tendency (Lafrance 2021, p. 88).^{xxii}

In truth, Marx left us with two hypotheses about the ‘laws of change’ of modes of production referring, respectively, to the change in the ‘forces of production’ (the production technologies) and to class struggle. The first hypothesis may look like a deus ex machina yet incapable to provide a systematic explanation of change in social formations, but further research is needed.^{xxiii} My limited historical knowledge does not allow me to judge if the second cause, class struggle, can provide such a systematic account either. As anticipated in the introduction, in my opinion, given the state of our knowledge, historical materialism is on a firmer base when concerned with the nature of a *given* mode of production by looking at institutions as regulating the historical forms of extraction and distribution of the social surplus (Cesaratto 2023c). Yet, historical materialism is much less well defined as a ‘grand theory’ of economic and institutional *change* (as traditional Marxism has perhaps believed). Reaction against technological determinism may sound therefore tolerable, without however arriving at the rejection of the foundations of institutions (formal and informal) in the material modes of exploitation and related evolution.

In a similar vein, Lafrance (2021, p.86) finds little merit in Knafo and Teschke’s reliance on Edward Thompson to support their claim about the centrality of agency against structural analysis, and corroborates his judgment by quoting the English historian arguing that:

I hope that nothing that I have written above has given rise to the notion that I suppose that the formation of class is independent of objective determinations, that class can be defined simply as a cultural formation, etc. This has, I hope, been disproved by my own historical practice, as well as in the practice of many historians. Certainly, these objective determinations require the most scrupulous examinations (Thompson 1978b, p. 149).

The French student then concludes (Lafrance 2021, p. 87)

Contrary to Knafo and Teschke's suggestion, then, Thompson does not call for a focus on agency at the expense of structure, and he would reject the idea that we could ever understand the former without a serious investigation of the latter. He does however have much to say about the way in which such investigations should be carried out and what they should be looking for, as is amply substantiated by his historical depiction of the social basis of economic production in *The Making of the English Working Class*. As he puts it himself: 'What I am calling in question is not the centrality of the mode of production (and attendant relations of power and ownership) to any materialist understanding of history. I am calling in question [...] the notion that it is possible to describe a mode of production [only] in 'economic' terms'. (quotations from Thompson 1978c, pp. 17-18)

I have added "only" to the quotation so as to make it fully congruent with my point of view about the codetermination of historical forms of surplus production and distribution and the related institutional arrangements and behaviours (Cesaratto 2023a).

In actual fact, in approaches such as that of Knafo and Teschke all traces of the classical and Marx's surplus approach seem irretrievably lost. Saitta (1994, p. 204) properly notes in this regard that from a "Marxist perspective (...) the most important problem with agency approaches in archaeology is their relative neglect of the surplus labour process in social life and the differential role of individuals and groups within it".

6. Toward an encompassing theory of structure and agency? Individuals as social agents

Ianulardo and Stella (2022) set out to overcome the dichotomy between agency and structure. In synthesis, they argue that apart from a few extreme cases defined as 'methodological atomism' – for instance the proponents of the famous dictum that society does not exist (ibid, p. 200) – also the supporters of methodological individualism admit that individual choices cannot be independent of context (ibid, pp. 197, 215 and passim). For instance, sharp advocates of methodological individualism, such as Keith Arrow, admit that taking preferences as given in the analysis of choices (or technology in the case of production choices) without further investigation of the social background that generates them, is a limitation (ibid, pp. 208-209).

In holistic theories, conversely, 'individuals' beliefs, desires, and actions' are explained by the 'social framework' (ibid, p. 201 and passim). Individuals are by definition social entities who do not

live on their own initiative but, through the network of social relationships, in a way that is functional to the whole (ibid, p. 219). This considered, some authors would go so far as to argue that 'agency and structure are only two sides of the same coin' (ibid, p. 204), as in a system in which the whole depends on its parts. However, according to Ianulardo and Stella (ibid), this presumed Solomonic compromise leads to an analytical impasse: 'this is precisely what is problematic in the systemic view', namely that, 'if "agency" and "structure", or the components of a system and the system, are seen as two entities (or determinate identities), then this leads to the circle of presupposition'. In other words, 'it is true that individual preferences are determined by the social context, but so is the latter by the former. And, this would make any explanation circular' (ibid). Therefore 'the systemic model does not represent an answer to the inadequacies of methodological individualism, but amounts to nothing else than the vicious circle of presupposing' (ibid, p. 219), a chicken and egg puzzle.

The problem thus becomes how to overcome the partiality of the two opposing visions, holistic-systemic and individualistic, by recomposing the unity between agency and structure. However, the solution put forward by the two authors is unsatisfactory given its prescriptive or aspirational peculiarity. The authors talk of a 'sense of unity that is immanent in the relation' which 'is reflected on the individual side, in its drive towards others (...) as an internal push for the individual to go beyond himself and to create a unity', that is 'a communion that goes to constitute the society itself'. Symmetrically, society, 'cannot only be opposed to it, but must also be conceived as that communion, that is to say, that unity, in which the individual intends to achieve himself' (ibid, p. 221).

The presence of a (sort of) communitarian teleologism or aspiration in their solution is openly admitted by Ianulardo and Stella (ibidem, original emphases) who interpret 'the social process not so much in the light of the starting point, that is to say the difference that exists between the individual and society, as both methodological individualism and holism tend to do, but in the light of the *end* point, that is to say, the *telos* of the process itself and that is from the *perspective of the unity of the individual and society*'. They explicitly talk of a '*teleological perspective*' (ibidem, original emphases).

This image of individuals striving to reunite in a social communion is reminiscent of the obsolete organicist theories that the authors had negatively valued some pages before (ibid, p. 205) –

where they include, alas, also Marx – precisely because they assumed imaginary collective entities hovering above individuals, like social memories, national spirits, or communitarian spiritualities.

What ‘this emergent sense of unity that arises from each individual’s self-transcendence’ (ibid, p. 221) has to do with social and historical investigation of the concrete socio-economic formations is unclear and sounds like a step back towards idealism.

Nonetheless, there are two aspects that I find valuable in Ianulardo and Stella’s ‘solution’: the search for a ‘sense of unity’ of the two terms of the dualism we are dealing with, and the idea of dialectics linking the two apparent opposites (on dialectics see also ibid, p. 211). Dialectics is again reminiscent of Hegelian idealism, and it is from this that, in actual fact, Marx moved, but with a view to overcoming it in a materialist direction. The ‘human essence’, wrote Marx in the VI thesis on Feuerbach (Marx 1945 [1969]), ‘is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations’. *In Marx the intimate unity between the individual and the social structure was based in fact on the material reproduction of life and on their dialectic interaction.*^{xxiv}

A reference to the reproductive sphere, although in more edulcorated forms, is also present in Polanyi (see Cesaratto 2023a, p. 10).

In the *German ideology* Marx (1845-46 [1968]) argued in this direction:

[Human beings] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life.

(...) This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production. (...)

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production (pp. N/A).

It is the materiality of productive relations, the related production and distribution of social surplus, and the accompanying formal and informal institutions, that constitutes the inescapable link between structure and agency making the individual a *social agent*. Agency is shaped up by the structure reproduction patterns changing them guided by socially and historically conditioned

intentions. It is somewhat paradoxical to note that in a sense functionalism *presupposes* and explains human agency and ingenuity, both as a passive instrument of reproduction^{xxv} and as an active instrument of change.^{xxvi}

There is not such a thing as the individual agency, there is only social agency.

Conclusions

My thesis in this essay is that the functionalism that accompanies historical materialism is defensible when accompanied by the socio-historical analysis of the choices of agents, individual and collective. Such analysis is aimed at reconstructing how structural relations, in particular the ways in which social surplus is extracted and distributed, translate into choices aimed at reproducing and possibly transforming the structure itself. Of course, what is described does not exhaust all human action, which also takes place on other levels, but it is a central aspect of it.^{xxvii} This is because it is in the fabric of social relations, basically related to the economic texture, that individuals as a social being, and their motivations and opportunities, are defined.

In this sense, it seems to me that we should pick up Edward Thompson's lesson, despite his many ambivalences over a slipping topic. Thompson captures the discomfort with mechanical formulations of historical materialism aimed at encapsulating in a simple formula the variety and complexity of given historical structures and their changes. To the best of current knowledge, it does not seem to me that such simplifications are possible, although archaeological research confirms the importance of material change. Possibly Marx himself falls in *Capital* into some form of Hegelianism in which the immanent force of capital governs everything, as Edward Thompson denounces. Yet, we must take inspiration from Marx, not always take him literally. It seems to me, nonetheless, that the core of historical materialism – the idea that the forms of exploitation, i.e. the extraction and distribution of surplus, are at the core of the socio-historical analysis *co-determined* with the institutions that regulate these forms – is sound and solid.

Methodological individualism, on the other hand, seems like a dead end. As is well known, Marx labelled as 'Robinsonades' the idea of '[p]roduction by an isolated individual outside society' arguing that it would be 'as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to each other' (1857-8, p. 84). However, Marx forgives Smith and Ricardo for sharing this absurdity as a reflection of the selfish individualism that characterises modern civil society. In fact for Marx this is a liberating passage from more stifling past social orders as in 'this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural

bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate' (ibid, p. 83). Genuine and altruistic individual freedom is in principle possible for Marx by the potential of modern science and technology and the consequent liberation from the world of paucity and human exploitation. However, this utopia is shattered by the genetic or social endurance of egoism and exploitative behaviours, as well as the difficulty of organising complex societies on new foundations.

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ⁱ See Cesaratto and Di Bucchianico (2021 a/b); Cesaratto (2023a).

ⁱⁱ An example of this criticism is Schumpeter's allegation to Adam Smith that in the *Wealth of Nations* everything is explained by division of labour leaving no space to individual agency. He for instance argued that 'With A. Smith [division of labour] is practically the only factor in economic progress' being 'attributed to an inborn propensity to truck and its development to the gradual expansion of markets. ...It thus appears and grows as an entirely impersonal force, and since it is the great motor of progress, this progress too is depersonalised' (Schumpeter 1954, pp. 187-188). It is well known that for the Scottish scholar talent was not innate but rather the result of division of labour, which might as well generate obtusity in the most repetitive jobs (cf. the classic Rosenberg 1965, and Cesaratto 1999). Certainly, Smith cannot be charged of organicism, but he shared methodological individualism in a very prudent way.

ⁱⁱⁱ Taccola (2022) provides a complete account of the lively debates among Italian Marxists on historicism over the last century. Thompson (1978a) represent an historicist criticism of structuralism *a là* Althusser.

^{iv} Popper's association of historicism/organicism and piecemeal research to, respectively, revolutionary or reformist political positions is not well founded. I believe that one can bend on the functionalist side and still believe in piecemeal social reforms.

^v Thompson draws a parallel between Althusser's and Popper's criticisms of historicism, although carried out from almost opposite points of view: the privilege assigned to theory by the former, piecemeal engineering by the latter. Thompson's criticism of Althusser is evoked later in section 3.

^{vi} For Thompson methodological individualism corresponds to explaining a soldier without defining an army or, out of metaphors, to define individuals independently of their class background (ibid, p. 30). We shall see in the next section Thompson defending the role of agency in history rejecting, however, individual agency in favour of 'class agency'.

^{vii} In a Sraffian model of capital accumulation investment mainly depends on expected demand.

^{viii} Functional analysis would be admitted in biological sciences where behaviours (due to casual genetic variations) are selected as a function of environmental or sexual fitness. 'Functional analysis, however, has no place in the social sciences, because there is no sociological analogy to the theory of natural selection' (Elster 1982, p. 463). Admittedly, a role to natural selection is allowed in 'a natural-selection model of competition between firms' (ibid, p. 455). In this case a 'Lamarckian' rather than a Darwinian selection mechanism is often evoked in which variations

during the agent's lifetime directly respond to environmental stimulus and are then transmitted to the offspring. This is refused by Darwinian theory where lifetime variations, called phenotypic changes, do not affect the genetic endowment and are not therefore transmitted.

^{ix} Cohen (2000) distinguishes between functionalism and functional explanations. The first would be a conservative perspective 'explaining institutions as sustaining (existing) society' (ibid, p. 285). Functional explanations would instead admit social conflict consistently with Marxism. This distinction is not particularly relevant for us. Indeed, the functional interdependence of institutions do not exclude systemic disequilibrium and change.

^x As seen, Thompson also condemns teleological historicism.

^{xi} Thompson's suggestion is not diminished by his inconsistencies as when he defines classes as a sum of individuals, as Anderson (1980, pp. 50-51) complains.

^{xii} These passages were written in 1927, while Sraffa was on the way to break with Marshall's heritage and proceed into the direction of the recovery of the classical surplus approach.

^{xiii} For instance, according to Ernst Mendel ([1967] 1971) only in the late 1850s Marx arrived at the distinction between labour and labour-force completing his theory of exploitation (by buying the labour force at its reproduction value the capitalist purchases its use value).

^{xiv} Kolakowski (1927-2009) was a repented Polish Marxist. This aspect is not relevant for us here.

^{xv} As also noted in the case of Douglass North's New Institutional Economics (Cesaratto 2023b).

^{xvi} Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu are frequently quoted in this regard. Both appear to limit human agency within the scope of the reproduction of social structures. As Gardener (2007, p. 99) aptly sums up: 'The most prominent theorist, from a sociological background, associated with such an approach is Anthony Giddens. While exploiting some of the ideas just discussed, as well as elements of structuralism, Giddens has charted an original path in laying out his structuration theory, which connects agency and structure in a strongly recursive way (...). His notion of the duality of structure makes the actions or practices of agents-particularly those that are routine-squarely responsible for the reproduction of social structures over time, while accepting that these actions themselves depend on structural conditions and rules. Structuration refers to this recursivity as a process overtime. The other social theorist that can be labelled as structurationist is Pierre Bourdieu. Though he does not use this word and comes from a more anthropological background than Giddens, he has also tried to unite agency and structure in a single framework, that of the habitus (...). This is Bourdieu's term for the shared cultural dispositions within a particular social group, which both constrain and enable action.'

^{xvii} In this regard, Anderson (1980, p. 18) acutely points out two meanings of the term 'agent': as 'active initiator and passive instrument'. Most of the authors considered here intend the term in the first sense, although, at the end, many see humans as 'the voluntary agents of [their] own involuntary determinations', as Thompson (quoted above) put it.

^{xviii} As is well known, political realism finds its ascendants in Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes who identified forces such as the thirst for power and wealth, and the fear of losing them, as the dominant motives of human action which, in fact, Machiavelli wants to make as rational as possible (separating, with ethical regret, politics and morality).

^{xix} To be sure, I do not believe that any human subjective experience is necessarily linked to material economic factors and interests. The genetic background (e.g. Wisman 2023), the intimate and personal/family experiences that permeate our deep psychology, and the mysteries that

surround our existence, are other determinants of the human experience, thought, and behaviour. As socially defined agents, respective social positions constitute the framework in which all determinants of the individual experience unfold. All components interact in yet not well understood ways. Once again, organicism is unavoidable!

^{xx} The journal *Historical Materialism* (vol. 29 (3), 2021) hosted a special issue devoted to discussing this paper.

^{xxi} This paper is part of the symposium on Knafo and Teschke (2020) mentioned in the previous footnote. We leave the other contributions to readers more initiated to the wordy intricacies of these Marxist debates.

^{xxii} Lafrance (2021, p. 88) is less benevolent with Engels who late in his life, ‘attempted to lessen this economic determinism by asserting the “relative independence” of superstructures from the “economic foundation”. This, however, proved largely counterproductive, as it “inadvertently reinforced an economistic conception” of the economic base – “hiving off superstructures drained production itself of its social and cultural dimensions.”’ (internal quotations from Sayer 1987).

^{xxiii} For instance, recent mainstream research on the early emergence of inequality and related institutions has tried to generalize well-known archaeological findings and theories emphasising the role of material (say geographical) and technological circumstances as triggers of social change, for instance the cultivation of storable and taxable cereals (Mayshar, Moav, and Pascali 2022), the time-honoured ‘hydraulic hypothesis’ (Allen, Bertazzini, and Heldring 2023), or the adoption of the ox-drawn plough (Bogaard, Fochesato, and Bowles 2019). These studies unnecessarily adopt a neoclassical interpretive framework and openly reject the surplus approach often in conflict with their sources of inspiration in archaeology.

^{xxiv} Moreover, in Marx the final aspiration is not a merge of individual and structure, a sort of dilution of the individual in the community, but on the contrary individual freedom – once the reproduction of life is not anymore conditioned by scarcity and distributive injustice. Ianulardo and Stella’s ‘sense of unity’ is instead reminiscent of certain studies in socio-biology that focus upon ‘ultrasocial’ species of insects that practice division of labour and even agriculture, and are socially stratified (Wilson and Wilson 2008; Wilson and Gowdy 2015). No doubt that in these societies there is not tension, not even dialectic, between individuals and the community, but perfect unity. Students of ultra sociality are however careful to apply these results to humans where culture, besides genes, determine behaviour and sense of social belonging.

^{xxv} See above footnote 17.

^{xxvi} The philosopher John Davis (2008), often sympathetic to classical and Sraffian Economics, provides in my opinion an unsatisfactory answer to the question he poses himself ‘how is it (...) that individuals are indeed agents when social structures are said to affect them?’ (ibid, p. 94). In answering this question he argues that: ‘social factors influence how individuals form self-concepts, but the idea that they are able to reflexively take themselves as subjects as objects of their thinking and activity, or objectify themselves as subjects, implies that *individuals can detach themselves in some degree from the determining effects of social factors influencing them*. This relative detachment allows us to suppose that individuals also influence social structures, just as social structures influence individuals, and enables us to then treat the idea of the individual being socially embedded as a coherent and meaningful conception’ (ibidem, emphasis added). It seems to me that Davis attributes an excessive capacity to economic agents to act in a somewhat critical manner in relation to the context in which they move. I would be more tempted to say that it is rather material interests that move choices, proactive or acquiescent of the status quo. Reflexivity,

at least understood as the ability to question the status quo, would seem to be a privilege of the few, generally frowned upon by the ruling elite.

^{xxvii} See footnote 19.