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Economix

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The logo for Université Paris Nanterre, featuring a stylized 'N' in red and blue followed by the text 'Université Paris Nanterre' in black.

Ambiguous consumer tastes and product differentiation

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Abstract

We introduce in the vertical differentiation framework an ambiguous demand. We consider a duopoly model where firms have multiple consumer taste distributions. We investigate the effects of ambiguity aversion on product differentiation and pricing choices. By specifying the distributions by Heaviside functions, we obtain results on the existence and form of several Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria. The associated equilibrium prices are decreasing with ambiguity aversion. Under the market coverage assumption, we show that the level of differentiation is always maximal whatever the degree of ambiguity aversion. Finally, we study which of the Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria is the solution of the game depending on the width of the taste distributions and the degree of ambiguity aversion.

Keywords: Vertical differentiation, Ambiguous consumer tastes, Ambiguous demand, Ambiguity aversion

JEL Classification: C72, D43, L13, D8

1. Introduction

The release of the Iphone 14 Plus was a failure. So Apple decided to temporarily reduce the production by 70% to 90% no more than two weeks after its launch.¹ How can the firm with the largest market capitalisation in the world, with a record of more than US\$ 3 trillion in 2022, heavily fail in the same year to market the new generation of its flagship product? It would seem that this gap between anticipated and real demand is linked to imperfect knowledge of consumer tastes for the different characteristics composing its products. From a practical point of view, Aghion *et al.* (1988) explain that the first method to obtain the demand curve is to resort to market studies. They enable to determine which characteristics consumers prefer as well as to produce estimates of sales volumes at a given price. However, at the most, they

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¹The difficult position of Apple's Iphone 14 and Iphone 14 Plus is notably reported by Kelly (2022) in the newspaper Forbes.

only reveal a point on the demand curve and not the entire curve. Tirole (1988) also points out that these studies are expensive and imperfect. Aghion *et al.* (1988) give a second method which consists in experimenting with price changes over time in order to interpolate/extrapolate the demand curve. Nonetheless, this approach suffers from the drawback of relying on the stability of demand over time and primarily on the pricing strategy of the firms.

Suppose that a firm could have obtained some points of the demand curve based on its current sales. Another form of imperfection in the knowledge of demand that we wish to highlight is related to the fact that the information obtained is aggregated for given product characteristics. Without additional information, it is impossible to disaggregate this demand and determine the distribution of consumer tastes (and their willingness to pay) for each of the characteristics. However, this knowledge is crucial as it allows the estimation of sales changes in response to changes in a product. Although market studies can help firms to capture the most relevant dimensions of products for consumers, they are expensive. In addition, the heterogeneity of tastes among consumers makes it difficult to precisely determine their distributions even for a few characteristics. This situation relates to ambiguity rather than risk, as there is no way in aggregated information to obtain objective probabilities for the different distributions of consumer tastes.

In this paper, we investigate the effects of ambiguity aversion on vertical differentiation and product pricing choices when firms face ambiguity about consumer tastes. Ambiguity aversion may indeed be a key behavioural factor in understanding the behaviour of firms when faced with such ambiguity. The literature on multidimensional differentiation only analyses cases where the distributions of tastes are perfectly known and from which a complete demand function can be deduced (in the sense that the demand function is known by firms for any characteristics and any price) (see Neven & Thisse (1989), Vandebosch & Weinberg (1995) or Irmen & Thisse (1998) for seminal papers). Considering ambiguity framework may help to improve the understanding of observed behavior of firms. We focus here on the pure case of vertical differentiation because establishing a benchmark for a single feature is a necessary step before studying multidimensional differentiation behavior in the presence of ambiguity. This allows us to establish a starting framework, to highlight some mechanisms and to give a first intuition. To the best of our knowledge, the vertical framework remains unexplored. Król (2012) and Kauffeldt & Wiesenfarth (2018) focused on horizontal differentiation with ambiguous consumer tastes in a modified framework of Hotelling (1929)'s model. The associated conclusions are that the level of risk, the level of ambiguity and the firms' attitude towards ambiguity have a contradictory impact on the equilibrium differentiation level. This latter increases with risk, decreases with the degree of ambiguity if firms are sufficiently pessimistic, and decreases with pessimism- the higher the degree of ambiguity is. Meagher *et al.* (2020) also studied, in a modified framework of the circular city model of Salop (1979), how ambiguity about consumer preferences affect market structure between an infant stage (with ambiguity) and a mature stage (where ambiguity is resolved) of an industry. They found that "there is excessive entry initially and, on average, positive shakeout in the number of firms in the market in the mature phase of the industry". Indeed, firms are incited to adopt the "fail fast" strategy, i.e. to launch a product precociously without fully knowing the consumers' tastes and then

to learn by experimentation and exploratory learning, even if they must retire from the market later.

We consider a duopoly model in which there is a continuum of consumers, each of them being uniquely characterized by his/her taste parameter for quality. We suppose that firms face different scenarios represented by possible density functions. Those density functions come from several possible breakdowns of the demand curve on the set of product characteristics, possibly influenced by market studies, or can be simply assimilated to different expectations from the entrepreneurs at the head of the firms. Entrepreneurs' preferences towards ambiguity are represented by the Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) criterion. This decision criterion is notably used by Król (2012) but also by Pasquier & Toquebeuf (2022) to study through strategic ambiguity the relationship between the firm's manager and a supplier. The use of this criterion enables to explain directly the set of probability distributions associated to the different demand functions. Indeed, to use such preferences amounts to saying that the probabilities associated with the two extreme scenarios are either (1,0) or (0,1) and that all intermediate scenarios have a zero probability.² Following the path initiated by Harter (1997), Król (2012) and Kauffeldt & Wiesenfarth (2018) consider that the distribution of consumer tastes is uniform over an interval of unit length and that the midpoint of this interval is a random variable. We depart from this specification by considering the weaker assumption of Heaviside functions. This leads to demand functions which are Ramp functions and which have some particular properties. They are continuous but piece-wise defined with respect to an endogenous parameter. This forces us to study for each piece a potential solution of the game, called "Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibrium", constituted by the prices and the level of differentiation. We show that, under the market coverage hypothesis, firms always choose to differentiate themselves to the maximum extent from their rival. This result is the same as in the certain case and allows firms to weaken price competition. Ambiguity aversion has the effect of decreasing the prices of each candidate equilibrium. Indeed, the greater a firm's ambiguity aversion, the greater the weight given to the worst-case scenario. The Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium is determined by studying for each firm which candidate offers the greatest profit and then the compatibility of this choice between the firms. In particular, an increase in ambiguity aversion can lead to a transition from the candidate equilibrium as the solution to the game since the firm that produces the better good can force the other firm to change its choice of candidate by lowering its price. If the width of taste distributions is large enough, the dominated firm can nevertheless refuse to play this candidate and then there is no longer a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, we study the number and form of the candidate equilibria as well as their conditions of existence. Finally, the section 4 concludes.

²The use of this criterion can also be assimilated to a situation of ignorance, i.e. a limit case of ambiguity in which the firms have no probability distribution, even though they know the demand functions. They just base their choices on the worst and best scenarios.

2. The model

There are two firms F_1 and F_2 interacting in a two-stage duopoly game and producing the same good that can be vertically differentiated by its quality level. At the first stage of the game, they set the quality of their product which are respectively l_1 and l_2 where $l_1, l_2 \in [0, 1]^3$ and $l_1 < l_2$. At the second stage, firms compete with respect to prices, respectively $p_1, p_2 \in \mathbb{R}_+$. To simplify the model we assume that they produce at a cost independent of quality and normalized to 0.

2.1. Consumers preferences and demand

There is a continuum of consumers of unit mass. Each of them is uniquely characterized by his/her taste parameter for quality $x \in [0, 1]$. The closer x is to 1, the more sensitive the consumer is to the quality of the product. Consumers have preferences *à la* Mussa & Rosen (1978) and we follow the approach of Belleflamme & Peitz (2015). Each consumer makes a discrete choice and has a unit demand (i.e. chooses one unit of one of the products in the market). Consumer's utility function writes

$$U = \begin{cases} U_0(x) = 0 & \text{if the consumer does not buy anything} \\ U_1(x) = R - p_1 + xl_1 & \text{for the purchase of the good produced by } F_1 \\ U_2(x) = R - p_2 + xl_2 & \text{for the purchase of the good produced by } F_2 \end{cases}$$

where $R \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$ is a constant that is the same for all consumers. We assume that $p_1, p_2 \leq R$. Hence, all consumers can buy the good with the lowest quality ($p_1 \leq R$ is called the market coverage hypothesis) but also have access to the good with the highest quality. This eliminates situations where only one of the two goods is available to some consumers, and thus allows to isolate the substitution effect for given qualities of the products from an insufficient reservation price effect. Note that the reservation price is specific to each consumer and depends on the sensitivity to the quality. It is equal to $R + xl_1$ ($R + xl_2$) for the good produced by F_1 (for the good produced by F_2).

To determine the demand functions, we need to define the notion of indifference point. For a given set (l_1, l_2, p_1, p_2) , the indifference point x^* is the taste parameter associated to the consumer which is indifferent between the purchase of the two products, i.e. $U_1(x^*) = U_2(x^*)$, that is $x^* = \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}$. Note that the indifference point is endogenous because it depends on pricing and differentiation choices of the firms. Note also that all consumers with $x < x^*$ ($x > x^*$) choose to purchase the good with the lowest quality (the highest quality). Figure 1 illustrates that if $x^* \leq 0$, i.e. $p_2 \leq p_1$, consumers, who all prefer the good with the highest quality, buy exclusively this one. So for this case, the demand functions are $q_1 = 0$ and $q_2 = 1$. Figure 2 depicts that if $x^* \geq 1$, the whole demand is addressed to F_1 and the demand functions are $q_1 = 1$ and $q_2 = 0$. Finally figure 3 illustrates the case where $0 < x^* < 1$. For a given density function f of x , the demand functions are $q_1 = \int_0^{x^*} f(x) dx$ and $q_2 = \int_{x^*}^1 f(x) dx$.

³The interval $[0,1]$ can be interpreted as a differentiation based on the percentage of a characteristic, for example the purity rate of a precious metal. We can also normalize a minimum characteristic level to 0 and a maximum characteristic level to 1, like the power of an engine between 100 and 1000 horsepower, to retrieve our model.

Since F_1 does not make profits if $x^* < 0$ and F_2 does not make profits if $x^* > 1$, we must have $0 < x^* < 1$.




Figure 1: Utility functions in the case $x^* < 0$




Figure 2: Utility functions in the case $0 < x^* < 1$




Figure 3: Utility functions in the case $x^* > 1$

2.2. Distributions of x

In contrast to the consumers tastes distribution in the literature about horizontal differentiation with ambiguous tastes, the distribution of x is non-uniform and not unique. More precisely, we suppose that firms face the same density functions f_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$ with $n \geq 2$, of sensitivity x defined as

$$f_i : \begin{cases} [0, 1] & \longrightarrow \mathbf{R}_+ \\ x & \longmapsto f_i(x) \end{cases} .$$

They verify the following properties : *i*) f_i is (piece-wise) continuous on $[0, 1]$, *ii*) $\int_0^1 f_i(x) dx = 1$. Those different distributions come from several possible breakdowns of the demand curve (obtained for a given value of the product characteristic). Hence, we suppose that the knowledge of the curve demand is the same for both firms. They end up with the same set of density functions and have a set of possible demand scenarios $Q = \{(q_1^1, q_2^1); \dots; (q_1^n, q_2^n)\}$.

2.3. Model specification

The model is specified with two⁴ Heaviside functions (represented in figures 4 and 5)

$$f_1 = \begin{cases} \Psi & \text{if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ 0 & \text{if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \text{ and } f_2 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \\ \chi & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \end{cases}$$

⁴We can also consider that there are "intermediate" scenarios, but then we use the Hurwicz criterion, which implies that only the worst and best of them are considered. We therefore do not specify such scenarios.

with $\Psi = \frac{1}{\epsilon}$, $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ and $\chi = \frac{1}{1-\xi}$, $\xi \in (0, 1)$. The case of ϵ tends to 1 (ξ tends to 0) corresponds to the case of a uniform distribution. The case of ϵ tends to 0 (ξ tends to 1) is a "Dirac delta" distribution. These functions allow to approximate a distribution of consumers' taste which varies suddenly in the population and can represent a variety of situations, such as those where consumers are very insensitive (ϵ close to 0) or very sensitive (ξ close to 1) to the quality as well as much wider distributions. The demand functions associated with f_1 are

$$q_1^1(x^*) = \begin{cases} \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ 1 & \text{if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \text{ and } q_2^1(x^*) = \begin{cases} 1 - \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ 0 & \text{if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} .$$

Those associated with f_2 are

$$q_1^2 = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \\ \chi[x^* - \xi] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \end{cases} \text{ and } q_2^2 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \\ \chi[1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \end{cases} .$$

All these functions are Ramp functions (represented in figures 6 and 7), have the property to be continuous but are piece-wise defined. They depend on the endogenous variable x^* . Note that the best demand scenario for F_1 is always q_1^1 and the worst is always q_2^1 . Note also that the best demand scenario for F_2 is always q_2^2 and the worst is always q_1^2 . Firms do not have an objective probability distribution on this demand functions, so the demand is referred to as an "ambiguous demand". It can also be referred to as a situation of ignorance.




Figure 4: Specification of the function $f_1(x)$




Figure 5: Specification of the function $f_2(x)$




Figure 6: Demand functions q_1^1 and q_2^1




Figure 7: Demand functions q_1^2 and q_2^2

2.4. Entrepreneurs preferences

We suppose that entrepreneurs' preferences towards ambiguity are represented by the Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) criterion i.e.

$$v \succcurlyeq w \Leftrightarrow \alpha \min_{s \in S} v(s) + (1 - \alpha) \max_{s \in S} v(s) \leq \alpha \min_{s \in S} w(s) + (1 - \alpha) \max_{s \in S} w(s)$$

where v and w are two acts - that is, mappings from the state space S to the outcome space Θ ⁵ which respectively associate to each state of nature $s \in S$ a possible consequence $v(s)$ and $w(s)$. The coefficient $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is a measure of the degree of pessimism or ambiguity aversion of the decision maker. If $\alpha = 1/2$, entrepreneurs are ambiguity neutral. F_1 and F_2 are associated to the degrees of ambiguity aversion α_1 and α_2 which are common knowledge.⁶ One can imagine that each firm can observe the decisions previously made by the competing firm and infer its ambiguity aversion. In our model, to assign a score to a given action, decision makers choose among the set of proposed demand functions the one that minimizes and the one that maximizes profit and respectively weight the corresponding profits by the coefficients α and $(1 - \alpha)$ before summing them. Each firm then determines among all possible actions the one with the highest score, which results in a maximization program.

To determine the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we proceed by backward induction. At the first stage of the game, firms set the quality of their product. At the second stage, they compete with respect to prices. Thus, for a given quality (l_1, l_2) , we first resolve the following maximization programs

$$\underset{p_1}{Max} \Pi_1(p_1, l_1; p_2, l_2) = \alpha_1 p_1 q_1^2(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 q_1^1(x^*)$$

$$\underset{p_2}{Max} \Pi_2(p_2, l_2; p_1, l_1) = \alpha_2 p_2 q_2^1(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 q_2^2(x^*).$$

We then resolve the following maximization programs

$$\underset{l_1}{Max} \Pi_1(p_1, l_1; p_2, l_2) = \alpha_1 p_1(l_1, l_2) q_1^2(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1(l_1, l_2) q_1^1(x^*)$$

$$\underset{l_2}{Max} \Pi_2(p_2, l_2; p_1, l_1) = \alpha_2 p_2(l_1, l_2) q_2^1(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2(l_1, l_2) q_2^2(x^*).$$

3. Analysis

3.1. The price stage

In this subsection, we analyse the price stage of the game. The demand functions faced by the two firms are piece-wise defined, so the profit functions are too. The

⁵The outcome space Θ can contain any relevant aspect of the problem considered. It can be the returns on a financial asset for example but also a set of lotteries or state of health. In this paper we only consider outcomes contained in the set of real numbers.

⁶For simplicity, we use the name of the firm to designate the firm's entrepreneur.

maximization programs associated to this stage can be rewritten (see Appendix A) as follow

$$\begin{aligned}
Max_{p_1} \Pi_1 &= \begin{cases} (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} - \frac{(1 - \alpha_1) \psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) \\ + p_1 \left(\frac{\alpha_1 p_2 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} + \frac{(1 - \alpha_1) p_2 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} + \alpha_1 (1 - \chi) \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{(1 - \alpha_1) \psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_1 \left(\frac{(1 - \alpha_1) p_2 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_1 \left(-\alpha_1 \chi + 1 + \frac{\alpha_1 \chi p_2}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
Max_{p_2} \Pi_2 &= \begin{cases} (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_2 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} - \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) \\ + p_2 \left(\frac{\alpha_2 p_1 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} + \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) p_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} + \alpha_2 (1 - \chi) + \chi \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_2 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_2 \left(\frac{\alpha_2 p_1 \psi}{l_2 - l_1} + 1 \right) & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{(1 - \alpha_2) \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_2 \left((1 - \alpha_2) \chi + \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) p_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

Since x^* is endogenous and depends on the levels of differentiation and prices, it is not possible to indicate *a priori* which case (and which associated equilibrium) each firm would like to obtain. A price equilibrium $\{p_1(l_1, l_2), p_2(l_1, l_2)\}$ associated with a particular case is called a Price Candidate Equilibrium (PCE). We obtain that there exist at most three price candidate equilibria while there are four possibles cases. Indeed, only the first three cases are associated with strictly concave functions, the last case is associated with linear functions. Yet under the market coverage hypothesis, we get $p_1 = p_2 = R$ and all the demand goes to F_2 . F_1 has no interest to play this PCE and so it is not a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

Lemma 1 (Price Candidate Equilibria) *There exist at most three price candidate equilibria simultaneously, whose reduced forms are given by*

$$\begin{aligned}
PCE_1 &= \left(p_1 = \frac{l_2 - l_1}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi]}{[\alpha_2 \Psi + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi]} + \frac{2(l_2 - l_1)}{3} \frac{\alpha_1 (1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1 \chi + (1 - \alpha_1) \Psi]}, \right. \\
&\quad \left. p_2 = \frac{2(l_2 - l_1)}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi]}{[\alpha_2 \Psi + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi]} + \frac{(l_2 - l_1)}{3} \frac{\alpha_1 (1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1 \chi + (1 - \alpha_1) \Psi]} \right), \\
PCE_2 &= \left(p_1 = \frac{(l_2 - l_1)}{3 \Psi \alpha_2}, p_2 = \frac{2(l_2 - l_1)}{3 \Psi \alpha_2} \right), \\
PCE_3 &= \left(p_1 = \frac{(l_2 - l_1)}{3} \left[-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha_1 \chi} \right], p_2 = \frac{(l_2 - l_1)}{3} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\alpha_1 \chi} \right] \right).
\end{aligned}$$

PROOF See Appendix A.

Note that we need to check if the prices are positive. This is doing *a posteriori* when we give existence conditions for the Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria

in the subsection 3.3. Note also that we cannot compare the PCE since, at this stage of the game, there is no reason why l_1 and l_2 would be the same for each possible case. Remembering that $x^* = \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}$, we can deduce the value of the indifference point associated with each price candidate equilibrium

$$x_1^* = \frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} - \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]} \right], \quad x_2^* = \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha_2}, \quad x_3^* = \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{1}{\alpha_1\chi} \right].$$

3.2. The differentiation stage

In this subsection, we analyse the differentiation stage of the game. The profit functions are still piece-wise defined. But for each case, we can replace the prices $p_1(l_1, l_2)$ and $p_2(l_1, l_2)$ by the PCE obtained previously.⁷ Hence, the maximization programs associated to this stage rewrite (see Appendix B) as follow

$$Max_{l_1} \Pi_1 = \begin{cases} (l_2 - l_1) \times \left(\frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{2}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]} \right] \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \times (\alpha_1\chi[x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi x^*) & \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{(1 - \alpha_1)}{3\alpha_2} x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{1}{3} \left[-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha_1\chi} \right] \times (\alpha_1\chi[x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1)) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}$$

$$Max_{l_2} \Pi_2 = \begin{cases} (l_2 - l_1) \times \left(\frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]} \right] \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \times \left(\alpha_2 \left[1 - \frac{x^*}{\epsilon} \right] + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi[1 - x^*] \right) & \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{4}{3} x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{1}{3} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\alpha_1\chi} \right] \times (1 - \alpha_2)\chi[1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}$$

All these maximization programs are linear in l_1 and l_2 . Moreover, taking into account the conditions associated with each case and assuming that prices are strictly positive (which is checked *a posteriori* when we give existence conditions for the Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria in the subsection 3.3), the slope associated to l_1 (l_2) is always strictly negative (strictly positive). Thus we deduce a second lemma.

Lemma 2 (Product Differentiation) *Under the market coverage assumption, F_1 always chooses its differentiation level at $l_1 = 0$ and F_2 at $l_2 = 1$, regardless of the candidate price equilibrium retained.*

PROOF See Appendix B.

As in the certain case, firms choose a maximum degree of differentiation to weaken price competition. Indeed, by exacerbating the difference between their products to the maximum, consumers are left with the choice between a low-quality or a very high-quality product. Firms can therefore take advantage of this to increase the price charged. This result holds under the assumption that the market is covered, i.e. that all consumers buy one of the two goods. This explains why even if F_1 sells a good with a very low quality, a part of the demand is still directed to it.

⁷The indifference points could be replaced by their expression. But since they are independent of l_1 and l_2 , we keep the notation x^* for simplicity.

3.3. Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria

A Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium $\{l_1, l_2, p_1, p_2\}$ associated with a particular case is called a Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibrium (CE). A CE is obtained by first solving a PCE and then the level of differentiation associated with this case. First, we give a result on the number and the forms of the CE.

Proposition 1 (Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria) *There exist at most three pure strategy Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria simultaneously.*

$$\begin{aligned}
 CE_1 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{2}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]}, \right. \\
 &\quad \left. p_2 = \frac{2}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]} \right), \\
 CE_2 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha_2}, p_2 = \frac{2}{3\Psi\alpha_2} \right), \\
 CE_3 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3} \left[-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha_1\chi} \right], p_2 = \frac{1}{3} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\alpha_1\chi} \right] \right).
 \end{aligned}$$

PROOF This proposition simply stems from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Note that it is necessary to replace l_1 and l_2 by their value to rewrite the PCE in their normal form.

The number of CE existing simultaneously depends on the existence conditions associated with each of them. The existence conditions are given by the following result.

Proposition 2 (Existence Conditions)

$$CE_1 \text{ exists iff } \xi \leq x_1^* < 1, 0 < x_1^* \leq \epsilon, p_1 \text{ and } p_2 > 0.$$

$$CE_2 \text{ exists iff } 0 < x_2^* < \xi, 0 < x_2^* \leq \epsilon, p_1 \text{ and } p_2 > 0.$$

$$CE_3 \text{ exists iff } \xi \leq x_3^* < 1, \epsilon < x_3^* < 1, p_1 \text{ and } p_2 > 0.$$

PROOF This proposition simply stems from the conditions associated with each case, from the $0 < x^* < 1$ condition and from the necessity of having positive prices for both firms to make a positive profit.

To check if a CE exists, we have to compute *a posteriori* the quantities x^*, p_1, p_2 associated with this CE and compare with the conditions stated above. We give an example in the subsection 3.6.

3.4. Effects of ambiguity aversion on the CE

In this subsection, we discuss the effects of ambiguity aversion on the prices, the differentiation level and the associated indifference point.

Proposition 3 (Impacts of Ambiguity Aversion on the CE) *The prices of candidate equilibria are decreasing with ambiguity aversion whereas the differentiation level is constant under the market coverage assumption.*

PROOF

CE_1 :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{2\Psi(1-\chi)}{3[\alpha_1\chi + (1-\alpha_1)\Psi]^2} < 0 & \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{\chi(1-\Psi)}{3[\alpha_2\Psi + (1-\alpha_2)\chi]^2} < 0 \\ \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{\Psi(1-\chi)}{3[\alpha_1\chi + (1-\alpha_1)\Psi]^2} < 0 & \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{2\chi(1-\Psi)}{3[\alpha_2\Psi + (1-\alpha_2)\chi]^2} < 0\end{aligned}$$

CE_2 :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_1} &= 0 & \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{-1}{3\Psi(\alpha_2)^2} < 0 \\ \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_1} &= 0 & \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{-2}{3\Psi(\alpha_2)^2} < 0\end{aligned}$$

CE_3 :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{-2}{3(\alpha_1)^2\chi} < 0 & \frac{\partial p_1}{\partial \alpha_2} &= 0 \\ \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{-1}{3(\alpha_1)^2\chi} < 0 & \frac{\partial p_2}{\partial \alpha_2} &= 0\end{aligned}$$

The decrease in equilibrium prices with respect to ambiguity aversion can be easily interpreted. Indeed, the greater a firm's ambiguity aversion, the greater the weight given to the worst-case scenario. Thus, in order to maintain expected demand at a sufficiently sustained level, the firm reduces its price. For the differentiation level result, it is highly likely that if we release the market coverage hypothesis, firms differentiate less (as in the certain case) and ambiguity aversion accentuates this result. However, we do not study this conjecture because our specification leads to an overly large number of CE. A specification with regular functions seems more appropriate to explore this question.

Corollary 1 (Impacts of Ambiguity Aversion on the Indifference Points) *The three indifference points x^* are increasing in α_1 and decreasing in α_2 .*

PROOF

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{-\Psi(1-\chi)}{3[\alpha_1\chi + (1-\alpha_1)\Psi]^2} > 0 & \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{\chi(1-\Psi)}{3[\alpha_2\Psi + (1-\alpha_2)\chi]^2} < 0 \\ \frac{\partial x_2^*}{\partial \alpha_1} &= 0 & \frac{\partial x_1^*}{\partial \alpha_2} &= \frac{-1}{3\Psi(\alpha_2)^2} < 0 \\ \frac{\partial x_3^*}{\partial \alpha_1} &= \frac{1}{3(\alpha_1)^2\chi} > 0 & \frac{\partial x_3^*}{\partial \alpha_2} &= 0\end{aligned}$$

According to the previous proposition, prices are decreasing with ambiguity aversion and differentiation level is constant. Thus a positive change in α_1 leads to a decrease in the equilibrium price p_1 and thus mechanically to a shift to the right of the location of the indifference point since $x^* = \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}$. Similarly, a positive change in α_2 leads to a decrease in the equilibrium price p_2 and thus a shift to the left of the location of

the indifference point. Another way to interpret this result is to say that the demand functions for F_1 (F_2) are increasing (decreasing) in x^* . An increase in ambiguity aversion, and thus in the weight of the worst demand function, is then compensated by an increase of the expected quantity demanded through x^* .

3.5. Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium

In the subsection 3.1, since x^* is endogenous and depends on the levels of differentiation and prices, it is not possible to indicate *a priori* which case (and which associated equilibrium) each firm would like to obtain. Let us now study this question. If the choices of the case for F_1 and F_2 are the same, the associated CE is the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the game. Thus to determine the SPNE, it is necessary to determine the set of the CE, then to determine for each firm which CE offers the greatest profit and finally study the compatibility between the CE choices of the firms.

In this subsection, we analyse the pure strategy SPNE of the game and the effects of ambiguity aversion. We consider that firms have the same degree of ambiguity aversion, $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha$. Indeed, if there are several decision makers at the head of the firms, on average the ambiguity aversion of the decision maker group in F_1 could be equal to the one in F_2 . We also consider that the step lengths of the two Heaviside functions are equal in the market, $\epsilon = 1 - \xi$. Indeed firms could expect a width of the consumer taste spectrum determined through a nearby characteristic or through a complementary common market study. Under these assumptions, we obtain (see Appendix C) the following CE existence diagram where only CE_1 and CE_2 can exist:




Figure 8: Existence diagram of the CE depending on the parameter values α and ϵ

In the domains of the diagram (figure 8) where only one CE exists, the SPNE is immediate. In the domain where CE_1 and CE_2 coexist, it is necessary to determine for each firm which CE offers the greatest profit and finally study the compatibility between the CE choices of the firms. This allows us to obtain the next result:

Proposition 4 (Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium) *If $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha$ and $\epsilon = 1 - \xi$, then there is a well-defined pure strategy Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium.*

This Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium is CE_1 iff $(\alpha, \epsilon) \in D_1$ and CE_2 iff $(\alpha, \epsilon) \in D_2 \cup D_3$

where $D_1 = \{(\alpha, \epsilon) / \epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ and } \epsilon > \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha+1}\}$,

$D_2 = \{(\alpha, \epsilon) / \alpha \geq \frac{1}{3} \text{ and } \epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha+1} \text{ and } \epsilon < \frac{2}{3}\}$,

$D_3 = \{(\alpha, \epsilon) / \frac{(1-\alpha)\epsilon}{9\alpha^2} \geq \frac{\alpha^2}{\epsilon} - 2\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon - \frac{2\alpha}{3\epsilon} + \frac{2\alpha}{3} + \frac{1}{9\epsilon} \text{ and } \epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ and } \epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha+1}\}$.

PROOF See Appendix C

The diagram in figure 9 illustrates this proposition and allows to conclude that an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to more price competition between firms! Indeed, in the subdomain where there is no pure strategy SPNE, F_1 wants to play CE_1 while F_2 wants to play CE_2 . So the choices are not compatible. In the rest of the candidate coexistence subdomain, both F_1 and F_2 want to play CE_2 and thus their choices are compatible. When we stand around $\epsilon = 2/3$, an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to a shift from CE_1 to CE_2 even though both firms can play CE_2 . In other words, an increase in ambiguity aversion leads to a change in equilibrium choice! This result is very intuitive. Remembering that the prices of candidate equilibria are decreasing in ambiguity aversion (Proposition 3). In particular F_2 decreases its price in order to increase its expected demand. But p_2 gets so close to p_1 that F_1 has no choice than to change equilibrium. Indeed vertical differentiation imposes that if $p_2 = p_1$, all the demand is directed to F_2 which produces a good with a better quality. The choice of F_1 is thus constrained by the behavior of F_2 . Thus, it is easy to understand why there is a subdomain in which there is no pure strategy SPNE. The width ϵ of taste distributions is simply good enough for F_1 to cope with F_2 's dominance and refuse to play CE_1 despite itself. This is consistent with the fact that the larger ϵ is, the higher the degree of ambiguity aversion must be for there to be no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategy.




Figure 9: Diagram of the pure strategy SPNE of the game depending on the parameter values α and ϵ

3.6. Numerical example

In this subsection, we give an example of numerical application. It helps to understand how to determine in general the SPNE when several CE exist simultaneously. The values of the parameters are $\alpha_1 = 0.7$, $\alpha_2 = 0.58$, $\epsilon = 0.25$, $\xi = 0.3$ ($\Rightarrow \Psi = 4$ and $\chi = \frac{1}{0.7}$).

We first compute the three indifference points (with their formula obtained in the subsection 3.1) and then check the existence conditions of the associated CE (see proposition 2). We obtain:

$$x_1^* \approx 0.180, \quad x_2^* \approx 0.144, \quad x_3^* = \frac{1}{3}.$$

And

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^* &< \xi, \\ 0 &< x_2^* < \xi \text{ and } 0 < x_2^* \leq \epsilon, \\ \xi &\leq x_3^* < 1 \text{ and } \epsilon < x_3^* < 1. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover,

$$\begin{aligned} CE_2 &= (l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 \approx 0.144 > 0, p_2 \approx 0.287 > 0), \\ CE_3 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3} > 0, p_2 = \frac{2}{3} > 0 \right), \end{aligned}$$

so all the existence conditions of CE_2 and CE_3 are verified but not those of CE_1 .

We see that the assumptions $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha$ and $\epsilon = 1 - \xi$ are important since the existence results of CE are no longer the same. Only CE_1 and CE_2 can exist in the figure 8 whereas in this example CE_2 and CE_3 can coexist simultaneously. Thus it is not guaranteed that the effects of ambiguity aversion on the SPNE are always the same. Prices could be decreasing up to a certain threshold and then increase brutally (due to a change in CE as the SPNE) before decreasing again. Kauffeldt & Wiesenfarth (2018) face a similar difficulty and explain that if they do not make the assumption of firms exhibiting the same attitude towards ambiguity the analysis is intractable. They add that *the attitude towards ambiguity becomes a global characteristic of the market and could be interpreted as "market sentiment"*.

All that remains is to determine for each firm which of these two CE offers the greatest expected profit and study the compatibility of these choices. We obtain that

$$\Pi_{CE_2} = \{\Pi_{1,CE_2} \approx 0.045, \Pi_{2,CE_2} \approx 0.423\}, \quad \Pi_{CE_3} = \{\Pi_{1,CE_3} = 0.015, \Pi_{2,CE_3} \approx 0.282\}.$$

We have $\Pi_{1,CE_2} > \Pi_{1,CE_1}$ and $\Pi_{2,CE_2} > \Pi_{2,CE_1}$.

Consequently F_1 prefers to play CE_2 and so does F_2 . Since the choices of the two firms are compatible, the SPNE is CE_2 .

4. Conclusion

This paper investigates the effects of ambiguity aversion on vertical differentiation and product pricing choices when firms face ambiguity about consumer tastes. By considering that firms have several distributions of consumer tastes and by specifying them with Heaviside functions, we obtain results on the existence of several Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria. For each of these candidate equilibria, and under the assumption of market coverage, firms choose to differentiate themselves as much as possible from their rivals to weaken price competition. Moreover, the equilibrium price associated with each candidate decreases with ambiguity aversion. Indeed, the greater a firm's ambiguity aversion, the greater the weight given to the worst-case scenario. Thus, in order to maintain expected demand at a sufficiently sustained level, the firm reduces its price. The study of the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium indicates that ambiguity aversion can lead to a transition in the candidate equilibrium as a solution of the game. Indeed, the firm that produces the highest quality can force the other firm to play a more advantageous candidate equilibrium by reducing its price if the width of taste distributions is not large enough.

Despite these results, there are still several points to explore in order to improve the understanding of firms' decisions in situations of ambiguity about consumers' tastes. Focused on the vertical framework, releasing the market coverage assumption seems to be the next step. The use of more regular functions than Heaviside functions can help to do it but can also lead to have the existence of an equilibrium for each point of the domain. We conjecture that relaxing this assumption leads firms to differentiate less (as in the certain case) and ambiguity aversion accentuates this result. From a broader perspective, there is also the question of how the different possible taste distributions are obtained from the aggregate demand curve. The question is particularly complex for several characteristics since several combinations of distributions can lead to the same aggregate demand curve. However, answering this question also appears necessary to explore the multidimensional case.

Although this model is only a case of a single-product duopoly with vertical differentiation, it may provide some clues to better understand Apple's strategy regarding its iPhone 14 range. A low level of ambiguity aversion could have led the firm to charge a price that was too high for the real distribution of consumer tastes. A higher level of ambiguity aversion for Samsung could explain the lower price of the successful S22 Ultra competitor to the 14ProMax.

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Appendix A. Proof Lemma 1

Note that $-\alpha_1\chi\xi = \alpha_1(1-\chi)$ and $\chi\xi + 1 = \chi$. These two expressions are useful to rewrite the maximization programs as easily resolvable second degree polynomials.

$$\begin{aligned}
Max_{p_1} \Pi_1 &= \alpha_1 p_1 q_1^2(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 q_1^1(x^*) \\
&= \alpha_1 p_1 \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \\ \chi[x^* - \xi] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \end{cases} + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \begin{cases} \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ 1 & \text{if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} \alpha_1 p_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_1 p_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} \alpha_1 p_1 \chi \left[\frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1} - \xi \right] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1} & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1} & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_1 p_1 \chi \left[\frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1} - \xi \right] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} - \frac{(1 - \alpha_1) \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) \\ + p_1 \left(\frac{\alpha_1 p_2 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} + \frac{(1 - \alpha_1) p_2 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} + \alpha_1 (1 - \chi) \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{(1 - \alpha_1) \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_1 \left(\frac{(1 - \alpha_1) p_2 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_1)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_1 \left(-\alpha_1 \chi + 1 + \frac{\alpha_1 \chi p_2}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
Max_{p_2} \Pi_2 &= \alpha_2 p_2 q_2^1(x^*) + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 q_2^2(x^*) \\
&= \alpha_2 p_2 \begin{cases} 1 - \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ 0 & \text{if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \\ \chi[1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi x^*] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi x^*] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - \frac{p_2 - p_1}{l_2 - l_1}] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_2 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} - \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) \\ \quad + p_2 \left(\frac{\alpha_2 p_1 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} + \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) p_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} + \alpha_2 (1 - \chi) + \chi \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{\alpha_2 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_2 \left(\frac{\alpha_2 p_1 \Psi}{l_2 - l_1} + 1 \right) & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (p_2)^2 \left(-\frac{(1 - \alpha_2) \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) + p_2 \left((1 - \alpha_2) \chi + \frac{(1 - \alpha_2) p_1 \chi}{l_2 - l_1} \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

The first three cases of each maximization program are negative in the highest order term whatever the values taken by the parameters α_1 , α_2 , χ , Ψ and d on their respective definition interval. Polynomials of the form $ax^2 + bx + c$ reaches their maximum in $x = \frac{-b}{2a}$. Therefore, for the first three cases, the PCE are determined as follows

Case 1 : if $x^* \geq \xi$ and if $x^* \leq \epsilon$

$$\begin{cases} p_1^{max} = \frac{p_2}{2} + \frac{\alpha_1(1-\chi)(l_2-l_1)}{2[\alpha_1\chi+(1-\alpha_1)\Psi]} \\ p_2^{max} = \frac{p_1}{2} + \frac{(l_2-l_1)}{2} \frac{[\alpha_2(1-\alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]} \end{cases} \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} p_1 = \frac{l_2-l_1}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{2(l_2-l_1)}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1-\chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi+(1-\alpha_1)\Psi]} \\ p_2 = \frac{2(l_2-l_1)}{3} \frac{[\alpha_2+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{(l_2-l_1)}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1-\chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi+(1-\alpha_1)\Psi]} \end{cases}$$

Case 2 : if $x^* < \xi$ and if $x^* \leq \epsilon$

$$\begin{cases} p_1^{max} = \frac{p_2}{2} \\ p_2^{max} = \frac{p_1}{2} + \frac{l_2-l_1}{2\Psi\alpha_2} \end{cases} \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} p_1 = \frac{(l_2-l_1)}{3\Psi\alpha_2} \\ p_2 = \frac{2(l_2-l_1)}{3\Psi\alpha_2} \end{cases}$$

Case 3 : if $x^* \geq \xi$ and if $x^* > \epsilon$

$$\begin{cases} p_1^{max} = \frac{p_2}{2} + \frac{l_2-l_1}{2\alpha_1\chi} - \frac{l_2-l_1}{2} \\ p_2^{max} = \frac{p_1}{2} + \frac{l_2-l_1}{2} \end{cases} \Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} p_1 = \frac{(l_2-l_1)}{3} [-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha_1\chi}] \\ p_2 = \frac{(l_2-l_1)}{3} [1 + \frac{1}{\alpha_1\chi}] \end{cases}.$$

The last case of each maximization program is a linear function. Moreover $(1 - \alpha_1)$ and $(1 - \alpha_2)$ are strictly positive. Under the market coverage hypothesis, we get $p_1 = p_2 = R$ and all the demand goes to F_2 . F_1 has no interest to play this PCE and so it is not a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium.

Appendix B. Proof Lemma 2

$$\begin{aligned} Max_{l_1} \Pi_1 &= \begin{cases} \alpha_1 p_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_1 p_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) p_1 & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} p_1 [\alpha_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) \Psi x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ p_1 (1 - \alpha_1) \Psi x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ p_1 [\alpha_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1)] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\ &= \begin{cases} (l_2 - l_1) \times \left(\frac{1}{3} \left[\frac{[\alpha_2+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2\Psi+(1-\alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{2}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1-\chi)}{[\alpha_1\chi+(1-\alpha_1)\Psi]} \right] \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \times (\alpha_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1) \Psi x^*) & \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{(1-\alpha_1)}{3\alpha_2} x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{1}{3} [-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha_1\chi}] \times (\alpha_1 \chi [x^* - \xi] + (1 - \alpha_1)) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
Max_{l_2} \Pi_2 &= \begin{cases} \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi x^*] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \alpha_2 p_2 [1 - \Psi x^*] + (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (1 - \alpha_2) p_2 \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} p_2 [\alpha_2 [1 - \Psi x^*] + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi [1 - x^*]] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ p_2 [1 - \alpha_2 \Psi x^*] & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ p_2 (1 - \alpha_2) \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases} \\
&= \begin{cases} (l_2 - l_1) \times \left(\frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{[\alpha_2 + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]}{[\alpha_2 \Psi + (1 - \alpha_2)\chi]} + \frac{1}{3} \frac{\alpha_1(1 - \chi)}{[\alpha_1 \chi + (1 - \alpha_1)\Psi]} \right] \right) & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ \times \left(\alpha_2 [1 - \frac{x^*}{\epsilon}] + (1 - \alpha_2) \chi [1 - x^*] \right) & \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{4}{3} x^* & \text{if } x^* < \xi \text{ and if } x^* \leq \epsilon \\ (l_2 - l_1) \times \frac{1}{3} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\alpha_1 \chi} \right] \times (1 - \alpha_2) \chi [1 - x^*] & \text{if } x^* \geq \xi \text{ and if } x^* > \epsilon \end{cases}
\end{aligned}$$

All these maximization programs are linear in l_1 and l_2 . Moreover, taking into account the conditions associated with each case and assuming that prices are strictly positive (which is checked *a posteriori* when we give existence conditions for the Subgame-Perfect Nash Candidate Equilibria in the subsection 3.3), the slope associated to l_1 (l_2) is always strictly negative (strictly positive). Thus, we have $l_1 = 0$ and $l_2 = 1$.

Appendix C. Proof Proposition 4

Note that two numerical comparisons are used in this appendix to compare the profit functions associated with the existing candidate equilibria.

Under the assumptions $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \alpha$ and $\epsilon = 1 - \xi$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
CE_1 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{\alpha}{\Psi} + \frac{1}{3} - \alpha, p_2 = \frac{\alpha}{\Psi} + \frac{2}{3} - \alpha \right) & \text{and } x_1^* &= \frac{1}{3} \\
CE_2 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha}, p_2 = \frac{2}{3\Psi\alpha} \right) & \text{and } x_2^* &= \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha} \\
CE_3 &= \left(l_1 = 0, l_2 = 1, p_1 = \frac{1}{3} \left[-1 + \frac{2}{\alpha\Psi} \right], p_2 = \frac{1}{3} \left[1 + \frac{1}{\alpha\Psi} \right] \right) & \text{and } x_3^* &= \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{1}{\alpha\Psi} \right].
\end{aligned}$$

CE_1 exists iff $\xi \leq x_1^* < 1, 0 < x_1^* \leq \epsilon, p_1 > 0$ and $p_2 > 0$.

$$\text{Condition A : } \xi \leq x_1^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \xi \leq \frac{1}{3} < 1 \Leftrightarrow 1 - \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{3} < 1 \Leftrightarrow \frac{2}{3} \leq \epsilon$$

$$\text{Condition B : } 0 < x_1^* \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{1}{3} \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{3} \leq \epsilon$$

$$\text{Condition C : } p_1 > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha}{\Psi} + \frac{1}{3} - \alpha > 0 \Leftrightarrow \alpha\epsilon + \frac{1}{3} > \alpha \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{3(1 - \epsilon)} > \alpha$$

$$\text{Condition D : } p_2 > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha}{\Psi} + \frac{2}{3} - \alpha > 0 \Leftrightarrow \alpha\epsilon + \frac{2}{3} > \alpha \Leftrightarrow \frac{2}{3(1 - \epsilon)} > \alpha$$

Conditions A and B imply that $\epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3}$. Conditions C and D are always satisfied for $\epsilon \in [\frac{2}{3}, 1)$. So under the previous assumptions, CE_1 exists iff $\epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3}$.

CE_2 exists iff $0 < x_2^* < \xi$, $0 < x_2^* \leq \epsilon$, $p_1 > 0$ and $p_2 > 0$.

$$\text{Condition } \alpha : 0 < x_2^* < \xi \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha} < \xi \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{\epsilon}{3\alpha} < 1 - \epsilon \Leftrightarrow \epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha + 1}$$

$$\text{Condition } \beta : 0 < x_2^* \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha} \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow 0 < \frac{\epsilon}{3\alpha} \leq \epsilon \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{3} \leq \alpha$$

$$\text{Condition } \gamma : p_1 > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{1}{3\Psi\alpha} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{\epsilon}{3\alpha} > 0$$

$$\text{Condition } \delta : p_2 > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{2}{3\Psi\alpha} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \frac{2\epsilon}{3\alpha} > 0$$

Conditions γ and δ are always satisfied for the definition intervals of ϵ and α which are $(0, 1)$. So under the previous assumptions, CE_2 exists iff $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{3}$ and $\epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha + 1}$.

CE_3 exists iff $\xi \leq x_3^* < 1$, $\epsilon < x_3^* < 1$, $p_1 > 0$ and $p_2 > 0$.

$$\text{Condition a : } \xi \leq x_3^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \xi \leq \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{1}{\alpha\Psi} \right] < 1 \Leftrightarrow 1 - \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{\epsilon}{\alpha} \right] < 1$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \begin{cases} \frac{\alpha}{3\alpha - 1} \geq \epsilon & \text{if } \alpha < \frac{1}{3} & \text{Condition } a_1 \\ \alpha \leq 0 & \text{if } \alpha = \frac{1}{3} & \text{Condition } a_2 \\ \frac{\alpha}{3\alpha - 1} \leq \epsilon & \text{if } \alpha > \frac{1}{3} & \text{Condition } a_3 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Condition b : } \epsilon < x_3^* < 1 \Leftrightarrow \epsilon < \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{1}{\alpha\Psi} \right] < 1 \Leftrightarrow \epsilon < \frac{1}{3} \left[2 - \frac{\epsilon}{\alpha} \right] < 1 \Leftrightarrow \epsilon < \frac{2\alpha}{3\alpha + 1}$$

Condition a_1 implies that $\epsilon < 0$ but the definition interval of this latter is $(0, 1)$ so it is impossible. Condition a_2 is a contradiction. To have simultaneously the conditions a_3 and b , it is necessary that $\alpha > 1$ but the definition interval of this latter is $(0, 1)$ so it is also impossible. Thus under the previous assumptions, CE_3 does not exist.

From these conditions we obtain the figure 8. In the domains where only one CE exists, the SPNE is immediate. In the coexistence domain, it is necessary to determine for each firm which CE offers the greatest profit and then study the compatibility between the CE choices. The (expected) profit functions of F_1 and F_2 for each CE can be rewritten as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_1 &= \left\{ \begin{aligned} \Pi_{1,CE_1} &= \frac{\alpha^2}{\epsilon} - 2\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon - \frac{2\alpha}{3\epsilon} + \frac{2\alpha}{3} + \frac{1}{9\epsilon}, & \Pi_{1,CE_2} &= \frac{(1-\alpha)\epsilon}{9\alpha^2} \end{aligned} \right\} \\ \Pi_2 &= \left\{ \begin{aligned} \Pi_{2,CE_1} &= -2\alpha^2 + \frac{\alpha^2}{\epsilon} + \alpha^2\epsilon + \frac{4}{3}\alpha + \frac{4}{9\epsilon} - \frac{4\alpha}{3\epsilon}, & \Pi_{2,CE_2} &= \frac{4\epsilon}{9\alpha} \end{aligned} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

A numerical comparison of the Π_1 's profit functions for the coexistence domain indicates

that F_1 makes more profit with CE_2 in the subdomain Λ and more profit with CE_1 in the subdomain Γ where

$$\Lambda = \left\{ (\alpha, \epsilon) / \frac{(1-\alpha)\epsilon}{9\alpha^2} \geq \frac{\alpha^2}{\epsilon} - 2\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon - \frac{2\alpha}{3\epsilon} + \frac{2\alpha}{3} + \frac{1}{9\epsilon} \text{ and } \epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ and } \epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha+1} \right\}$$

$$\Gamma = \left\{ (\alpha, \epsilon) / \frac{(1-\alpha)\epsilon}{9\alpha^2} < \frac{\alpha^2}{\epsilon} - 2\alpha^2 + \alpha^2\epsilon - \frac{2\alpha}{3\epsilon} + \frac{2\alpha}{3} + \frac{1}{9\epsilon} \text{ and } \epsilon \geq \frac{2}{3} \text{ and } \epsilon < \frac{3\alpha}{3\alpha+1} \right\}.$$

An other numerical comparison of the Π_2 's profit functions indicates that, regardless of the parameter values in the coexistence domain, F_2 always makes more profit with CE_2 . In the subdomain Λ , the choices of the CE are compatible, thus the SPNE is CE_2 . In the sub-domain Γ , the choices are not compatible, hence there is no pure SPNE strategy. From these results we obtain the proposition 4 and can trace the figure 9.