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Is Quantitative Easing Productive?

The Role of Bank Lending in the Monetary Transmission Process

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Abstract

The European Central Bank's (ECB) quantitative easing (QE) program was supposed to stimulate the real economy and be able to control inflation rates. Nevertheless, primarily the financial sector has benefited from the asset purchase program. Transmission was not taking place as desired, with commercial banks as money creators and thus liquidity distributors at the center of its inefficiency. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the transmission of central bank money to the euro area economy via the banking system and the corresponding bank lending channel (BLC). To bring clarity to the economic debate about the effectiveness of the BLC, bank lending and additional macroeconomic variables are divided into productive and unproductive. We analyze how these areas react to an exogenous monetary policy shock in excess reserves, which is identified using different identification schemes before deploying least-square and penalized local projection (LP) methods. Following the estimation results, it can be concluded that a liquidity increase via quantitative easing cannot stimulate economic activity-enhancing lending in the euro area but, on the contrary, tends to disincentivize it. On the other hand, it drives lending to an unproductive sector. Additionally, this is confirmed by the fact that prices, especially in the housing sector, react significantly positively to a QE shock, whereas, on the contrary, producer prices in the industrial sector and inflation are not affected by unconventional monetary policy.

Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, bank lending, local projection, identification, zero- and sign restrictions

JEL Classification: C32, E44, E51, E52, E85

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1 Introduction

Over the past three decades, monetary policy analysis has been characterized by a number of studies that have attempted to explain how monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy. A central assumption underlying this research is that the use of monetary policy instruments can directly impact bank deposits. Transmission can accordingly run through the banking sector via a *bank lending channel* (BLC).

The origins of this discussion include S. R. King (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), and Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) who show that monetary policy shocks can lead to shifts in bank lending schedules. According to Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), the traditional theory of monetary policy transmission through the banking system holds that the policy can affect real economic activity mainly by influencing the supply of credit by depository institutions. Thus, much of the driving force behind bank lending is thought to be due to central bank-induced quantitative changes in the liability structure of bank balance sheets (Disyatat, 2011). Building on the theory of Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) argue that expansionary monetary policy through BLC could increase commercial banks' reserves and transaction deposits. Assuming that transaction deposits are a relatively cheap source of funding, banks are willing to lend more money than before at constant interest rates. Monetary policy is assumed to significantly impact productive investment and aggregate economic activity. In sum, the traditional conceptualization of the transmission efficiency of the bank lending channel assumes the ability of central banks to directly influence the level of deposits in order to increase lending.

That this assumption can only partially represent the processes of contemporaneous monetary policy transmission in the euro area will be the main focus of the following article. Triggered by the onset of the *global financial crisis* (GFC) in 2008, followed by the European sovereign debt crisis and the resulting inability to lower short-term interest rates further to boost stagnant credit and real economic activity, the *European Central Bank* (ECB) has introduced a wide range of unconventional measures to expand its monetary policy toolkit.
To address the risks to macroeconomic and financial stability, the ECB expanded its balance sheet and, thus, the supply of liquidity to commercial banks at a specified interest rate and subject to certain collateral provisions. Over time, the pool of eligible collateral accepted for refinancing operations has been expanded, and liquidity with longer maturities than in pre-crisis times has been made available to banks. In particular, the three-year LTROs (*longer-term refinancing operations*) conducted in December 2011 and March 2012 marked the ECB's turn toward *quantitative easing* (QE) measures and large-scale expansions of money supply. The

introduction of the *Asset Purchase Programme* (APP) in 2015 represents thereby the flagship of these unconventional instruments. Under this program, mainly medium- and long-term government and corporate bonds are purchased almost exclusively by commercial banks. In return, banks receive new central bank liquidity in the form of reserves. The withdrawal of long-term securities from the market is expected to increase demand for corresponding bonds, with a simultaneous expansion of the money supply. Premiums for government bonds are reduced, while at the same time, the market suffers from shortages of long-term securities. Demand exceeds supply, leading to a corresponding price rise and a decline in long-term interest rates or yields (see, Tobin, 1958, 1969; Tobin et al., 1961). If fewer long-term securities are held by market participants and yields are low, investors seek to modify their investment portfolios in a profit-maximizing manner so they can continue to earn high returns. The idea is that they reallocate their capital accordingly into new projects and corporate bonds, and in addition to searching for yield, simultaneously boost economic activity. This *portfolio rebalancing effect* is an important channel of monetary policy transmission and is intended to provide investors with the incentive to engage in new real economic activity-boosting projects.[1] The analysis of Andrade et al. (2016) and Altavilla et al. (2021), among others, show that rebalancing effects have indeed taken place in the European context[2]. However, it is worth mentioning that the reallocation of portfolio did not exclusively take place toward real economic projections. New profitability, after the withdrawal of long-term bonds from the market, was more likely to be found in financial assets than in corporate funding. Emphasizing that point, Haldane et al. (2016) show for the United Kingdom that portfolio allocation decisions by financial intermediaries favor security purchases by non-bank financial sectors, such as life insurance companies or pension funds. Moreover, the ECB's purchase of long-bonds raises prices of these assets, making those households that hold them relatively richer. Again, this does not necessarily lead to an increase in productivity. Kumhof and Rancière (2010) show that wealthier households are less likely to spend additional income on consumption and prefer to save or to invest in financial markets. An interesting paper by Boddin et al. (2022) shows that, in particular, QE has led households with larger initial bond holdings to shift their portfolios towards the investment into second homes, which in turn has led to price increases in the housing market.

[1]In addition, it should be mentioned that QE was introduced as a bailout tool after the GFC, so that most of the euro area member states benefited from the reduction in borrowing costs, as the ECB's bond purchases were able to lower yields. This made it cheaper for governments to obtain liquidity and helped to stabilize public finances.

[2]Further empirical applications investigating the portfolio effect, including Lenza et al. (2010), Peersman (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Ciccarelli et al. (2015), consistently find a negative relationship between long-term asset purchases and corresponding returns. Further examples supporting this hypothesis are presented by Gagnon et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for the US in their analysis of the Fed's first asset purchase program after 2008. These results are confirmed by Williams (2014) and others. Similar results have been found for the Bank of England (BoE) (see, Joyce et al., 2011; Meaning & Warren, 2015) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) (see, Ito, 2014).

Despite the admittedly adverse effects of the portfolio channel, the main task of QE remains to boost real economic activity in a situation of impotent conventional monetary policy by influencing commercial bank lending through the additional provision of central bank liquidity, lower market yields, and cheapening of corresponding refinancing. Thereby bringing inflation rates to a target level of 2% in the medium term, increasing real economic activity, and preventing price volatility in financial markets.

Given that bank loans are an important source of external financing for non-financial companies and thus for the real economy in the euro area (Trichet, 2010), a functioning bank lending channel, in addition to the *portfolio rebalancing channel*, is essential for achieving the just-mentioned ECB's objectives. As described above, according to the theory of a traditional BLC, commercial banks would have to increase their lending significantly due to an expanded supply of central bank liquidity triggered by the ECB's massive bond purchases. It is hypothesized that, concerning unconventional measures such as QE, commercial banks, which are required to hold a certain reserve ratio proportional to their transaction deposits, will be supplied by the ECB with more reserves than necessary. In order to somehow deploy the excess reserves, it is assumed that financial intermediaries will lend them excessively as loans. The process would continue until banks have created enough deposits through lending to ensure that the new reserve level is not excessive anymore (Butt et al., 2014).

The question of whether this mechanism actually operates to this extent should be critically examined when looking at the movements in *excess reserves* held by commercial banks over the past few years, as shown in figure 1.[3] It can be observed that especially with the introduction of QE measures in 2012 and 2015 (LTROs and APP, respectively) and thus with the sharp increase in asset purchases, banks hold more reserves than they need for their reserve requirements or interbank market exchanges.

As the European economy found itself until mid-2022 in a situation of very low interest rates and inflated central bank balance sheets[4], economic research found commercial banks behaving as risk-averse in such economic environments. The reserves provided by the ECB linger on commercial bank balance sheets instead of being transferred as credit to the economy (see, e.g., Kydland & Prescott, 1990; Borio & Disyatat, 2009; Disyatat, 2011). A shift of high-powered ECB liquidity (or *base money*) to circulating *broad money*, as postulated by the outdated concept of a static *money multiplier*, has hardly been seen in the last years.[5] The high stock of excess

[3]Excess reserves subject to minimum reserve requirements refer to the funds that credit institutions hold in their accounts with the central bank, over and above the minimum reserve requirements set by the central bank.

[4]This is still the case. Just because the ECB's net purchases have ceased does not mean that the bonds purchased simply disappear.

[5]Inferring the concept of a money multiplier, an over-allocation of reserves by the central bank should lead to higher bank lending and, consequently, to a higher price level. This line of reasoning is still used in macroeconomic textbooks and contemporary literature (see, e.g., Mankiw et al., 2008; Champ et al., 2016). Nevertheless, it should

Figure 1: *Excess reserves subject to minimum reserve requirements*



Note: Authors' own illustration; data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse

reserves could be a good indicator that the ECB is supplying more liquidity than is needed in the money market. The money multiplier should therefore be seen as ineffective and purposeless as a concept of describing contemporary monetary policy.

From a methodological perspective, we will investigate this issue in this paper by first identifying exogenous innovations to excess reserves (*QE-shock*) building on different identification schemes[6], before incorporating them as external series in a least-square *local projection* (LP) methodology. We complement with several robustness checks, including the estimation of an impulse response analysis of *penalized or smooth local projection* (SLP) models, as well as further LP estimations with base money and total central bank assets as QE proxies.

As we will show below, there are disagreements in the literature on the effects of QE via the banking sector. Some research shows a positive effect of bond purchases on lending in aggregate, whereas the studies that focus on the analysis of non-financial bank loans cannot confirm these effects. Hence, we will include both financial and non-financial loans in the analysis, define them according to their contribution to the economy, and show to what extent the ECB misses its objective to stimulate liquidity in real sectors of the economy. By using least-square LP and SLP estimation methods, the paper highlights several important findings. First, an increase in money supply via quantitative easing cannot stimulate activity-enhancing lending in the euro area but, on the contrary, tends to discourage it. On the other hand, it drives lending into the financial sector, where the liquidity gets stuck without benefiting a real productive purpose of the economy. This is further confirmed by the fact that prices, especially in the housing sector, react significantly positively to a QE shock. On the contrary, producer prices and core infla-

be noted that the aforementioned concept has long been scientifically outdated and cannot optimally represent the current monetary process.

[6]To identify the exogenous shocks, we use (i) Cholesky Decomposition and (ii) sign- and zero restriction identification schemes. We then employ identification schemes following (iii) Peersman (2011) and (iv) Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016) to compare our estimated shocks with those of "more traditional" identification methods.

tion are not affected by unconventional measures. The estimates of LP models using different QE-proxies, as well as the SLP modeling, confirm our main results and show similar impulse response patterns. In this context, the use of LP, in particular, penalized (smooth) local projection methods, is a novelty in monetary policy research in the euro area.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on monetary policy transmission and the impact of different lines of bank lending on the economy. In section 3, we attempt to find a proxy for productive and unproductive credit, with section 4 presenting the methodology of VARs and LP estimates. The identification of exogenous shocks to excess reserves by Cholesky decomposition and various sign- and zero restriction schemes, as well as the impulse response analysis estimated by local projections, constitutes the content of section 5. Section 6 contains several robustness checks, including the estimation of smooth local projection and LP estimates using different QE-proxies besides excess reserves. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Literature review

Looking at empirical research with a focus on the efficiency of the transmission mechanisms of unconventional monetary policy, there is a growing literature examining the bank lending channel and the accumulation of reserves through QE on commercial banks' balance sheets (see, e.g., Peersman, 2011; Joyce et al., 2014; Butt et al., 2014; Rodnyansky & Darmouni, 2017). Despite the increasing interest in economic research, evidence of a well-functioning BLC in a QE regime is mixed.

For instance, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) find that banks that benefited from asset purchases lent more than banks that were not directly affected by the program. Similar results can be found in Peersman (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2014), and Hachula et al. (2020) for the euro area. For the United Kingdom, Joyce et al. (2014) show that the *Bank of England's* (BoE) first bond purchase program led to a small but statistically significant increase in bank credit growth. This was particularly the case for small and medium-sized commercial banks. For the US, Luck and Zimmermann (2020) found that banks increased overall lending after the first and third rounds of quantitative easing. Kandrac and Schlusche (2021) confirm these findings by demonstrating that the reserves created under QE1 and QE3 led to higher overall credit growth. Bowman et al. (2015) find a robust positive response of banks' liquidity provision to credit growth over 2000 till 2009 in the case of Japan, suggesting that QE boosted lending by increasing reserves.

Despite these existing positive results of what appears to be a functioning BLC in the context of unconventional monetary policy, many dissenting voices criticize the actual efficiency of the

bank lending channel, stating that commercial banks do not require external financing, like central bank reserves, to grant credit. For instance, Disyatat (2011) of the *Bank for International Settlements* (BIS) asserts that under a fiat money standard and a liberalized financial system, central banks have no exogenous constraints on lending except through regulatory capital requirements. He argues that the money multiplier concept, as explained above, is flawed and uninformative in analyzing the dynamics of bank lending since a sufficiently capitalized banking system can always meet the demand for credit if it chooses to do so. Romer et al. (1990) confirm that banks can fund themselves through means other than deposits if necessary. Thus, even if a restrictive central bank's policy would reduce the deposit funds available to the banking sector, banks can easily make up the shortfall.[7]

In consequence, this would imply that the ECB does not have the sole monopoly of money creation but shares it to a large extent with private banks. Literature even states that commercial banks have the ability to individually create money "out of nothing" (see McLeay et al., 2014b, 2014a). In this context, the Bundesbank (2017) notes that most of the circulating money supply in the Eurosystem is created by bank loans rather than provided externally by central banks. A study by the Bank of England (2014) supports this statement, noting that commercial banks effectively create 97% of the money supply in circulation (McLeay et al., 2014b). The explanation is that when a bank extends credit, it simultaneously creates both an asset, the actual loan, and a liability. Therefore, when a loan is agreed upon, the commercial bank makes two balanced entries. On the one hand, it creates a new loan asset in the amount of the loan, and on the other hand, it credits the borrower's demand deposit account with this same amount of the loan. The two entries are made out of "thin air", so no money is transferred from other accounts.
Consequently, the bank finances its loan through the independent creation of this type of liability but not through external financing via central bank reserves or transaction deposits. Since banks create deposits when they lend, credit creation automatically leads to an expansion of the broad money supply. Accordingly, following R. G. King and Levine (1993), central banks provide base money, but the banking sector actually creates broad money.[8]

Thus, assuming that commercial banks are able to create liquidity in the economic system independently of the central bank, the BLC's hypotheses related to unconventional monetary policy and QE, in particular, need to be fundamentally reconsidered. For example, economists

[7] As has been shown, banks do not need central bank liquidity or deposits to lend. Instead, banks' demand for ECB liquidity is due to the reduction of bank run risks and hedging in times of crisis (Reichlin et al., 2021). Banks use reserve balances to meet the payment requirements of their customers. Liquidity is also needed to meet short-term obligations: Individual banks occasionally need reserves or foreign exchange to meet regulatory requirements or make sudden withdrawals of deposits by the end of the day. In addition, reserves may be used to settle payments in the interbank market.

[8] Numerous policymakers, economists, and central bankers confirm this process of independent credit or money creation by banks. They recognize that banks do not simply distribute existing funds but create credit, money, and thus purchasing power *ex nihilo* (see, e.g. Turner, 2011, 2013; Jakab & Kumhof, 2015; Schnabel, 2022).

such as Goodhart and Ashworth (2012); Butt et al. (2014) or Giansante et al. (2022) find no evidence of positive effects of QE on credit supply and broader macroeconomic variables in the case of the United Kingdom. Hereby, Butt et al. (2014) analyze the efficiency of the BLC by modeling bank lending according to the methodology of Kashyap and Stein (1995). They consider a partial 3-period equilibrium analysis of the impact of monetary shocks on lending decisions of a single commercial bank. To consider changes in the supply of credit as opposed to changes in deposits, they underpin the theoretical modeling with an empirical *difference-in-difference* approach. In doing so, they find no statistical evidence that banks that received more deposits due to QE lent more, other things equal. QE may have been associated with an increase in the variance of bank reserves and hence deposits, but this did not necessarily lead to increased bank lending to the real economic sector.

Ryan and Whelan (2021) provide similar evidence for the euro area. They show that banks used the reserves created by the ECB's QE programs mainly to purchase debt instruments rather than to increase lending. These results are confirmed by Kabundi and De Simone (2022), who, analyzing the impact of monetary policy shocks on the European macroeconomy and the banking sector in the euro area after the global financial crisis, find that the desired stimulus to bank lending was muted. A particularly interesting paper by Behrendt (2017) analyzes the impact of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy since the financial crisis, especially regarding its effectiveness for bank lending under an SVAR with sign restrictions. In doing so, he comes to the interesting observation that during the financial crisis, unconventional and conventional monetary policy measures failed to stimulate bank lending in the euro area. After the financial crisis, no positive response to credit supply was identified either.[9]

While these findings can certainly be explained by a particular risk aversion among banks after the financial crisis, as mentioned above, the economy was moreover still in a situation of low interest rates until mid-2022, which made the traditional banking business of lending to the economy less lucrative. Borio et al. (2017) argue that very low interest rates can affect the profitability of the lending business by eroding persistently low interest margins. If banks do not raise lending rates to compensate, the return from lending falls, which could reduce banks' willingness to lend. Low interest rates would constrain lending by narrowing net interest margins. At the same time, they would be less likely to constrain, and possibly even increase, the profitability of activities more akin to investment banking, such as securities underwriting, securities trading, or mergers and acquisitions. Commercial banks tend to favor the financial sector in lending because they expect to profit more from it than from lending to *small and*

[9]Similar results are found in the case of the Bank of Japan's QE (see Ugai, 2007; Kimura et al., 2009). Meanwhile, in the US, voices are being raised (see J. B. Taylor, 2013) that QE can lead to uncertainty because an increase in central bank reserves does not immediately imply an increase in the money supply, especially if banks hold excess reserves and do not lend money.

medium-sized enterprises (SME) (Werner, 2005). Falling interest rates in developed countries over a long period have a hemlock effect on the banking sector, i.e., they rely on cheaper financing or speculative profits in financial markets instead of seeking efficiency. Bittner et al. (2021) confirm this finding by observing that when monetary policy rates are negative, and the lower bound on deposit rates is zero, those banks that are more affected by the ECB's bond-buying programs reduce their lending to the real economy more than their competitors.

In particular, house and asset prices are put under pressure by one-sided liquidity provisions. In contrast to non-financial credits, bank lending for real estate has increased exponentially since the 1980s (Bezemer & Hudson, 2016). The danger of this trend is that the rapid expansion of domestic mortgage lending is more closely related to crises than lending to non-financial firms (see, e.g., Büyükkarabacak & Valev, 2010; Mian & Sufi, 2010; Beck et al., 2012; A. Taylor et al., 2014). The underlying concern is that the banking system's traditional primary role of providing credit to finance physical capital investment in new productive assets is being marginalized. Banks principally finance the purchase and transfer of existing real estate and financial assets (Bezemer, 2014). Accordingly, the result of lending is not an expansion in housing supply, especially since the housing market is inherently sticky, but rather an increase in housing prices. Meanwhile, this does not directly lead to economic growth but rather to market participants creating an enormous amount of unproductive wealth, being inconducive to the ECB's actual objectives, namely real economic growth and financial and price stability.

In summary, there is a lot of inconsistency in the research concerning the bank lending channel and its efficiency. On the one hand, a positive impact of QE on commercial bank lending behavior can be found, whereas, on the other hand, there is literature that does not seem to observe any significant effects. In this article, we therefore attempt to detect a definitive accord within this literature. As such, we observe that those papers focusing on the impact of QE on *total aggregate lending* mostly find a positive relationship (see Bowman et al., 2015), whereby those who concentrate only on lending with respect to *non-financial firms* cannot identify a significant positive effect on credit supply expansion via QE (see Butt et al., 2014).
However, studies on the QE's impact on bank lending in financial markets are rather rare. Yet, it could well be assumed that the positive effects found on the aggregate credit supply are caused by increased lending in the financial sector, which would also explain why no significant effects are found in the literature concentrating on non-financial loans. We take these weaknesses of existing literature into account and include them in our model.
Therefore, we will examine the ECB's asset purchases in terms of the extent to which the central bank's liquidity is transmitted to the real economy or to financial markets and, in the worst case, driving the formation of bubbles. More precisely, we want to analyze if the transmission of

European monetary policy has taken place via the banking system and its corresponding lending. We assume that it is not necessarily the ECB that determines the efficiency of monetary policy transmission but rather its counterpart, the commercial banks. They are the ones who can create money supply in circulation and thus have the power to allocate liquidity in the economy according to their preferences. The result is speculation to maximize profits instead of investing in the real economy. This uneven distribution of liquidity is exacerbated by portfolio effects in a low interest rate environment, in addition to the bank lending channel. In order to be able to examine precisely those distributions of liquidity to different sectors of the market and to bring clarity to the existing literature, we will divide lending and economic activity in section 3, following Schumpeter (2005 [1939]), Marx (2016 [1867]), Werner (1997), and Bezemer (2014), into productive, conducive to real economic activity, and unproductive, not conducive to real economic activity, in order to then examine the two sectors concerning an increase in liquidity supplied by the ECB. This is a methodology that, to our knowledge, is without precedent in the literature analyzing the ECB's QE mechanism.

To be able to analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks, *vector autoregressive* (VAR) models, as defined by Sims (1980), have traditionally been used to construct *impulse responses* (IR). The earliest applications of structural VAR models to analyze the efficiency of monetary policy instruments originate in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano et al. (1999), and Peersman and Smets (2003), among others. Recent applications of VAR or SVAR models to monetary policy can be found in Peersman (2011), Gambacorta et al. (2014), Haldane et al. (2016), Weale and Wieladek (2016), and Boeckx et al. (2017), among others. One of the most influential SVAR analyses of monetary transmission in the euro area relates to Peersman (2011), who examines the macroeconomic effects of traditional interest rate innovations and unconventional monetary policy measures. Using base money as a proxy for the unconventional monetary policy instrument, he finds that the Eurosystem can stimulate the economy by expanding its balance sheet. Kabundi and De Simone (2022) also assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on the macroeconomy and the banking sector in the euro area after the global financial crisis. They use a two-stage strategy that links policy shocks to the endogenous buildup of bank and macrofinancial sector vulnerabilities. First, they use a structural credit risk model, which is based on combined options and estimates the time structure of bank group default probabilities, expected returns, financial leverage, bank asset performance, and implied volatility. Second, the estimates of these indicators are incorporated into a database from which the shocks are identified, and their effects are assessed using a *Structural Factor-augmented Vector Autoregression* (SFAVAR) model. They conclude that unconventional monetary policy, particularly the ECB's asset purchase program, appears to have been more successful in raising output and inflation than conventional monetary

policy. However, the desired boost to bank lending has not materialized.

Two articles similar to our thinking on the transmission of monetary policy through the banking sector come from Jawadi et al. (2017) and Behrendt (2017). Behrendt (2017) estimates the impact of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy since the global financial crisis, particularly in terms of its effectiveness in lending to banks. Methodologically, he applies a SVAR with sign and zero restrictions. Unlike most empirical studies dealing with bank credit, Behrendt does not use the stock of outstanding loans as an indicator of bank lending but focuses on the volume of new bank loans issued. Thereby, he found no positive response of lending to unconventional monetary policy shocks during the financial crisis and only a short-term positive response after the financial crisis. Similarly, Jawadi et al. (2017) focus on the macroeconomic and wealth effects of unconventional monetary policy in the United States. They analyze the unanticipated component of the growth rate of central bank reserves using a Bayesian SVAR model and examine its impact on real output and inflation after the GFC. Investigating the impact of unconventional monetary policy on asset prices, they implicitly find that there is a favoring of the financial sector due to unconventional monetary policy. While a QE shock stimulates the economy only marginally, and the consumer price index is not affected, real estate and stock prices rise in response.

However, Jordà (2005) points out that the VAR methods used in the presented literature are not necessarily optimal if the VAR does not match the underlying *data generating process* (DGP). Therefore, he developed an alternative to impulse responses for VAR, namely the *local projection* (LP) method. This method is intended to allow *impulse response functions* (IRFs) to be computed without specifying and estimating the underlying multivariate dynamic system, unlike VARs. LPs have the advantage over VARs in that they do not impose specific dynamics on the system's variables, do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality inherent in VARs, and can more easily account for nonlinearities.

Thus, in order to ensure orthogonality of unconventional monetary policy shocks and, at the same time, overcome the weaknesses of the conventional VAR analysis just mentioned, this article will resort to a least-square LP estimation (and penalized LP estimates checking for robustness), based on exogenous innovations identified with (i) a Cholseky decomposition- and (ii) a zero- and sign restrictions identification scheme. To prove the validity of our identification, we confirm it by relying on "more traditional" identification schemes of Peersman (2011) (iii) and Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016) (iv). It is this two-step analysis that strongly distinguishes our research from the aforementioned literature, which has mostly resorted to a simple VAR methodology to study unconventional monetary policy. The choice of such methodology is a novelty in European monetary analysis and, to our knowledge, has never been used in this

context before. Another novelty by which we contribute to existing literature is the study of the impact of a QE shock on an economy divided into productive and non-productive sectors. Thus, instead of examining credit movements in aggregate or only credit flows to *non-financial corporations* (NFCs) as done in current research, we also include credit to the financial sectors in the set of variables used for the LP analysis. The disaggregation of economy and credit, combined with the assumption of commercial banks' money creation and distribution capabilities, suggests new results that can complement existing research and bring clarity to the work on unconventional monetary policy by resolving inconsistencies found in the literature.

3 Disaggregation of the bank credit supply

While, as shown, several studies have found opposing effects of bank lending to unconventional monetary policy shocks, the following empirical modeling tries to shed light on economic research by analyzing the supply of credit not in its aggregate but by dividing it into productive and unproductive. In this context, what do we mean when talking about productive and unproductive loans in the further course of the paper, and how can they best be approximated with suitable variables?

Hereby, Schumpeter (2005 [1939]) and his credit theory of money will serve as an initial theoretical approach to finding a suitable definition of credit disaggregation. Schumpeter categorizes debt according to its intended use, distinguishing the primary innovation process from a secondary credit process for speculative investment. He states that bank credit for innovation can stimulate new economic activity and ultimately enable economic growth. Loans for purposes other than financing innovation lead, at best, to speculation rather than productivity increases, which, at worst, could trigger an artificially created boom. The sole purpose of this type of credit is to finance transactions of already existing goods and assets, leaving actual production untouched.

Following Schumpeter, Bezemer (2014) defines two approximations of the concepts of primary (productive) and secondary (unproductive) credit. Thereby, he characterizes productive credit as bank credit to non-financial firms plus consumption credit to households. Here, using credit to the non-financial private sector seems a perfectly reasonable proxy for productive credit. For instance, an analysis by the Fed (2013) shows a close relationship between the growth of non-financial sector debt and aggregate economic activity over long periods in the United States. Supporting this observation, Bezemer and Hudson (2016) use a disaggregated dataset to show that bank credit growth to the real sector and nominal GDP move in parallel. Also, Calza et al. (2006) can confirm a long-run relationship between credit to non-financial firms and real GDP using cointegration analysis. For Japan, Werner (1997, 2005) provides empirical evidence

that disaggregated lending to private non-financial firms strongly predicts nominal GDP. Similar evidence can be found for the United Kingdom (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012) and Spain (Werner, 2014). For the euro area, Ciccarelli et al. (2015) show that a decline in lending to firms can significantly lead to a decline in GDP growth.

In contrast, when speaking of unproductive credit, the literature often defines it as mortgage lending by banks and lending to non-bank financial firms, such as insurance companies, pension funds, and other investors that favor asset price appreciation. In particular, housing and mortgage loans are characterized by their unproductiveness. Thus, several empirical studies can show that while there is generally a strong link between bank credit in aggregate and financial crises (Zhu, 2011; Borio, 2012; Schularick & Taylor, 2012), the rapid expansion of mortgage credit, in particular, is more closely associated with crises than lending to non-financial firms (see, e.g., Jordà et al., 2014; Bezemer, 2014). For instance, Bezemer (2014) shows for 37 economies that the interaction of mortgage credit vigilance and rising house prices is a good predictor of a credit boom and represents a high probability of going "bad", which in turn leads to a decline in overall credit growth. This can be confirmed by the research of Jordà et al. (2014). In their data analysis of 14 countries and a period of more than 100 years, they conclude that financial crises result from precisely such credit booms gone wrong. Mortgage booms and the housing bubbles they finance, are associated with a high probability of financial crises.
However, although these types of loans may well be detrimental to economic efficiency, they are precisely what commercial banks favor in their lending behavior. This fact can be demonstrated in figure 2 below. Even though unproductive loans in the euro area declined in relation to total credit issuance during the period of the GFC and the European sovereign debt crisis, the issuance of such loans has picked up again since 2012 and, thus, since the ECB's first asset purchases. Opposite dynamics can be seen for productive loans, which have experienced a sharp drop, especially since 2015, and hence since the introduction of QE in the euro area.

Figure 2: *Unproductive and Productive Bank Loans*



Note: Authors' own illustration; data from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse

In the following empirical analysis (see section 5), productive credit will be approximated by MFI loans, i.e., loans from the banking sector to non-financial corporations. In contrast to Bezemer (2014) consumer loans are not included in the proxy of productive loans.

Instead, loans that are destined for consumption are part of the definition of our variable of unproductive loans. Although seemingly counterintuitive at first, the reader should be aware of the distinction between the financing of consumption goods and capital goods. Financing the former results in products simply disappearing from the market as they are merely consumed - the second results in productivity. Ideally, banks lend to firms on the assumption that they will revolve the debt they take on, i.e., borrow to pay suppliers and employees, to then repay the debt when their customers pay them for the product they produce. Thus, the debt is directly tied to the production of the business and, ideally, helps the entrepreneur generate profits and drive economic expansion. In contrast, consumer loans are not self-liquidating. Banks are faced with the fact that this type of loan will remain on their books for a long time, with payments being made only to service the interest and pay down marginal portions of the principal loan balance. Lending to businesses adds value to the economy, while consumer loans do not and are therefore classified in the following as unproductive.
Ultimately, in addition to consumer credit, following, among others, Bezemer and Werner (2009) and Bezemer (2014), unproductive loans are defined in the remainder of this article as credits to financial institutions outside the banking sector, such as pension funds, insurance companies, and as well as credits for real estate purposes.

4 Methodology

4.1 Review of VARs

To investigate the dynamics between unconventional QE policy and the economy, *vector autoregressive models* (VAR) developed by Sims (1980) have been traditionally used in the empirical monetary literature to construct impulse responses.[10] A linear vector autoregressive DGP of finite order p can be expressed as,

$$y_t = \Pi_1 y_{t-1} + ... + \Pi_p y_{t-p} + u_t, \tag{1}$$

where simply out of convenience, the intercept is suppressed and $y_t = (y_{1t}, ..., y_{Kt})'$ is a $(K \times 1)$ random vector for $t = p+1, ..., T$. $\Pi_i, i = 1, ..., p$, are $(K \times K)$ coefficient matrices, and $u_t = (u_{1t}, ..., u_{Kt})'$ is a $(K \times 1)$ vector of independent and identically distributed white noise residuals,

[10] Although in section 5 we rely on a local projection method to estimate impulse responses, understanding VAR models is essential for identifying monetary policy shocks.

being the unpredictable component of y_t. All values of z satisfying $det(I_K - \Pi_1 z - ... - \Pi_p z^p) = 0$ should lie outside the unit circle.[11]

The VAR process can be written in his *structural form*[12] as,

$$A_0 y_t = \Gamma_1 y_{t-1} + ... + \Gamma_p y_{t-p} + \varepsilon_t. \tag{2}$$

Here, the $(K \times 1)$ vector of mean zero structural shocks ε_t is serially uncorrelated with a diagonal variance covariance matrix $\Sigma_\varepsilon = E(\varepsilon\varepsilon')$ of full rank such that the number of shocks coincides with the number of variables (Kilian & Lütkepohl, 2017). Thereby, ε_t is assumed to be white noise and to follow interpretations in terms of underlying economic hypotheses. The coefficients A_0 and Γ are the parameters of interest. Whereby Γ is a $(K \times K)$ matrix of autoregressive slope coefficients and the $(K \times K)$ matrix A_0^{-1} reflects the structural impact matrix, which contains the contemporaneous effects of the increase of each endogenous variable on the other. It captures the impact effects of each of the structural shocks on each of the model variables. Eq. (2) is structural in that the shocks are postulated to be mutually uncorrelated with each element of ε_t having a distinct economic interpretation. This fact allows one to interpret movements in the data caused by any one element of ε_t as being caused by a shock (Kilian & Lütkepohl, 2017).

The relationship between structural shocks, ε_t, and reduced form shocks, u_t, is given by,

$$A_0 u_t = \varepsilon_t. \tag{3}$$

Normalizing the covariance matrix of the structural errors $E(\varepsilon\varepsilon') \equiv \Sigma_\varepsilon = I$, the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form is $\Sigma_u = A^{-1}\Sigma_\varepsilon A^{-1'} = E(uu')$. Given an estimate of this very reduced form, all required for recovering the structural model of Eq. (3) is knowledge of the structural impact multiplier matrix A_0 (or, equivalently, of its inverse A_0^{-1}). Given that $u_t = A_0^{-1}\varepsilon_t$, the matrix A_0 allows us to express the typically mutually correlated reduced-form innovations (u_t) as weighted averages of the mutually uncorrelated structural innovations (ε_t), with the elements A_0^{-1} serving as the weights (Kilian & Lütkepohl, 2017).

If the matrix A_0 can be solved for, given these restrictions and the data itself, the structural VAR model parameters, A_0, Γ, Σ_ε, or, equivalently, the structural shocks $\varepsilon_t = Au_t$ are identified

[11] This is equivalent to the condition that all eigenvalues of the companion matrix have a modulus less than 1, lying therefore inside the unit circle, being the reciprocals of the roots of the VAR polynomial (Pfaff & Stigler, 2021).

[12] While the reduced form helps summarize data, we cannot interpret how the endogenous variables affect each other because the residuals of the reduced form are not orthogonal. Accordingly, we must resort to a structural form, since the recovery of structural parameters and shocks requires identification restrictions that reduce the number of unknown parameters.

(Kilian & Lütkepohl, 2017). Given that Σ_u is *Hermation*, A_0^{-1} can be retrieved by *Cholesky factorization*, as explained in further detail in appendix A. Further identification methods of matrix A_0^{-1} are possible and will be presented in section 5.1.

Following Kilian and Kim (2011), impulse responses to VAR reduced-form disturbances can be obtained recursively as,

$$\Phi_h^{VAR} = \sum_{l=1}^{h} \Phi_{h-l}^{VAR} \Pi_l, \qquad h = 1, 2, ..., H, \tag{4}$$

where $\Phi_0^{VAR} = I$ and $\Pi_l = 0$ for $l > p$. The corresponding responses to structural shocks are given by,

$$\Theta_h^{VAR} = \Phi_h^{VAR} A_0^{-1}, \qquad h = 1, 2, ..., H, \tag{5}$$

where A_0^{-1} satisfies $A_0^{-1}(A_0^{-1})' = \Sigma_u$. Here we postulate that A_0^{-1} is a lower triangular matrix. Element (j, k) of Θ_h^{VAR} is $\theta_{jk,h}^{VAR}$ and represents the response of the variable j to a one-time structural shock k, h periods ago. Estimates $\hat{\Theta}_h^{VAR}$ are constructed by substituting the least-squares estimates of A_0 and Σ_u.

4.2 Local projection (LP) methodology

As can be seen, VARs are intended to be a linear global approximation to the ideal data generating process. Thus, this kind of modeling is optimally suited for forecasts with one period ahead. However, if we are interested in estimating impulse responses, then these response functions of forecasts are normally specified for increasingly distant horizons. This means that the use of VAR cannot necessarily be longer ideal, with misspecification errors increasing as the forecast horizon increases.

Accordingly, Jordà (2005) has pointed out that the just explained methodology of a VAR system is not optimal if the VAR does not coincide with the underlying DGP. Therefore, he has developed an alternative to impulse responses for VAR, namely the *local projection* (LP) method. The intent of this method is to allow IRFs to be computed without having to specify and estimate the underlying multivariate dynamical system - unlike for VARs. In its basic formulation, the LP approach consists in running a sequence of predictive regressions of a variable of interest on a structural shock for different prediction horizons. The IRF is then given by the sequence of regression coefficients of the structural shock (Barnichon & Brownlees, 2019). Because the LP method, in its theoretical interpretation, does not impose any underlying dynamics on the variables in the system, this leads to a number of advantages. For instance, LPs can

be estimated by one equation, they are more robust to misspecification of the DGP (see, e.g., Jordà, 2005; Ramey, 2016; Nakamura & Steinsson, 2018), do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality inherent to VARs, and can easily be adapted to a nonlinear framework (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2016). Furthermore, while the LP estimator makes flexible use of sample autocovariances by directly projecting an outcome at future horizon h onto the current covariates, a VAR estimator instead extrapolates longer-term impulse responses from the first p sample autocovariances. Accordingly, it could be conjectured that VAR, unlike LP, suffers from a larger bias. Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2021) and Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2021) show that LPs are more robust than SVAR approaches, especially when the dataset is highly persistent. Furthermore, they state that both methodologies lead to the same median impulse responses in the short and medium term, whereby they behave in opposite ways in longer horizons.

Due to their advantages over VARs, local projections are attracting more and more interest in macroeconomic research. For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2016), and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) use LPs to estimate state-dependent fiscal multipliers, while Hamilton (2011) and Cai et al. (2022) employ impulse responses from LPs to assess the dynamics of oil shocks. In the monetary policy context, Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2021), among others, use LP estimators to observe monetary transmission to the real economy.

Applying the local projections of Jordà (2005), one runs the following regressions,

$$y_{t+h} = \alpha^h + F_1^{h+1} y_t + F_2^{h+1} y_2 + ... + F_p^{h+1} y_{t-p} + u_{t+h}^h, \qquad for\, h = 1, ..., H, \tag{6}$$

where y_t is a vector of endogenous variables and the residuals u_{t+h}^h are a moving average of the forecast errors and may be serially uncorrelated with the regressors (Jordà, 2005). As seen, the LP estimator utilizes the sample autocovariances flexibly by directly projecting an outcome at the future horizon h on current covariates. The maximum lag, p, does not need to be common to each horizon, h.

By construction, the slope F_1^{h+1} can be interpreted as the response of y_{t+h} to a reduced-form disturbance in period t:

$$\Phi_h^{LP} = F_i^{h+1} = E(y_{t+h}|u_t = a_i; X_t) - E(y_{t+h}|u_t = 0_k; X_t), \tag{7}$$

with $\Phi_0^{LP} = I$, where 0_k is a $(K \times 1)$ zero column vector and the impulse response are a function of time t, horizons h and a $(K \times 1)$ column vector of the impact matrix A_0^{-1} (namely a_i). $E(.|.)$ denotes the best mean squared error predictor, y_t is a $(K \times 1)$ vector and X_t denotes the lags of y_t $(y_{t-1}, ..., y_{t-p})$.

The corresponding structural impulse responses of y_{t+h} are,

$$\hat{IR} = \Phi_h^{LP} a_i, \tag{8}$$

where $\hat{\Phi}_h^{LP}$ estimates are obtained from a sequence of least-square regressions (Eq. 8) and a_i corresponds to the i^{th} column of the matrix A_0^{-1} and the identified shock which will be obtained based on identification schemes as described in section 5.1. Although Jordà (2005) does not explicitly discuss the distinction between the structural and reduced-form impulse responses, Kilian and Kim (2011) show that the structural impulse responses are constructed using the VAR estimate of A_0^{-1}.

The goal of this paper is to identify first an unconventional monetary policy shock based on different identification schemes. Once this exogenous shock has been identified, we estimate impulse responses directly via LP methods, using OLS regressions:

$$x_{t+h} = a^h + b^h shock_t + \gamma w_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}, \tag{9}$$

where x_t represents the variable of interest, w_t a vector of control variables and $shock_t$ represents the identified exogenous shock. The impulse response of $shock_t$ on x_t corresponds to the series of coefficients b^h for each horizon h.

5 Identification of exogenous shocks and estimation of IRs with local projection models

In an attempt to examine the effects of QE policies on the economy, we first seek to identify exogenous innovations in *excess reserves* before including them in a LP methodology.
At this point, it is worth noting why the bank's excess reserves subject to minimum reserve requirements are used here to represent the QE process, rather than the monetary base (see, e.g. Peersman, 2011) or total central bank assets, as in VAR analyses by Gambacorta et al. (2014) or Boeckx et al. (2018). In this article, the use of an innovation in excess reserves as a QE shock is intended to examine the transmission of central bank money to the economy. In other words, the aim is to show the in-(efficiency) of the bank lending channel and to examine the extent to which the ECB's liquidity is passed on to households and firms in the form of loans. Hereby, the main difficulty in identifying monetary policies using monetary aggregates is that a significant portion of the variance in the reserves data is due to the central bank absorbing innovations in the demand for reserves rather than policy-induced supply shocks. This could lead to a mixing of supply and demand innovations.

However, using excess reserves, we believe to be able to show that monetary policy shifted from a demand-driven to a supply-driven reserve policy with the introduction of QE policies. As the expansion of reserves is largely taking place through the direct purchases of bonds from commercial banks, this injection of liquidity should lead to an increase in excess reserves. This increase is due to the fact that banks do not necessarily have to use all of the new reserves to meet their reserve requirements and have the possibility to keep some of them on their balance sheets. If the central bank's QE policy ought to be successful in increasing the supply of money and stimulating economic growth, asset purchases should lead to an increase in bank lending, which in turn should reduce the level of excess reserves in the system. Furthermore, if the interest rate on reserves is low or negative, banks should have been given an incentive to lend more, and through competition on the saving, to maintain their profit margin. However, the opposite is the case. After the introduction of unconventional monetary policy measures such as the LTROs in 2011 and 2012 and the outright securities and asset purchase programs at the beginning of 2015, commercial banks do not seem to pass on their reserves as credit to the economy. The demand for liquidity in the banking sector seems to be marginalized. To use an indicator that is able to represent the exogenous liquidity supply and thereby distinguish it from endogenous movements in liquidity provision, excess reserves seem to be the right choice. Following Avalos and Mamatzakis (2018) from the BIS and Jouvanceau (2019) from the *Bank of Lithuania*, we will frame QE programs therefore as an exogenous supply of excess reserves. This way of modeling QE programs is much closer to actual QE programs than any alternative in the literature, which ensures liquidity provision that is supply-induced rather than demand-induced. An indicator that mainly takes into account the ECB's QE episode of supply-driven liquidity may thus allow for a better understanding of the bank lending behavior than other QE proxies. However, appendix B shows that, when employing the base money supply or total central bank assets as alternative proxies for QE, little difference can be seen in the estimation results.

5.1 Identification strategies for exogenous shock in excess reserves

The baseline SVAR model that will be used for decomposing excess reserve supply innovations into mutually orthogonal components takes the same representation as the structural VAR model presented in Eq. (2):

$$A_0 y_t = \Gamma_1 y_{t-1} + ... + \Gamma_p y_{t-p} + \varepsilon_t. \tag{10}$$

Fluctuations in the ECB's supplied reserves are a combination of changes in monetary policy that can be both interpreted as exogenous and as an endogenous response to economic developments. To truly isolate only the exogenous innovations in excess reserves, we use four identification schemes to the matrix A_0, which can be found in figure 3.

Figure 3: *Identification Schemes*

(i)-(ii) Baseline Identification

	Core	IPI	Excess Reserves	Bank Credit	CISS	MRO
Identification Scheme I (Cholesky Decomposition)						
Core	1	0	0	0	0	0
IPI		1	0	0	0	0
Excess Reserves			1	0	0	0
Bank Credit				1	0	0
CISS					1	0
MRO						1
Identification Scheme II (Zero- and Sign Restrictions)						
UMP Shock	0	0	+	+	−	0

(iii) Identification Peersman (2011)

	Core	IPI	Bank Credit	Lending Rate	EONIA	Excess Reserves
UMP Shock	0	0	+	−	0	+
CMP Shock	0	0	+	−	−	

(iv) Identification Wieladek & Garcia Pascual (2016)

	Core	IPI	Excess Reserves	Long-Term Rate	Housing Price
Supply Shock	−	+		+	+
Demand Shock	+	+		+	+
UMP Shock			+	−	+

The most widely used method for identifying exogenous shocks is to produce a recursive ordering of the VAR, since this is easy to implement using a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals in reduced form. This strategy is used as a first way to identify an unconventional monetary policy shock.

The baseline model associated with identification schemes (i) and (ii) contains six variables: the core inflation (Core), the industrial production index (IPI), excess reserves subject to bank's minimum reserve requirements (Excess Reserves), the amount of total bank credits (Bank Credit), the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS), and the main refinancing rate (MRO). Data were taken from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and OECD database. Following Boeckx et al. (2017), all selected time series, except core inflation and MRO, are included as log in our modeling, as this allows for an implicit cointegration relationship in the data. This fact seems to be an essential assumption, especially concerning our relatively short sample. Moreover, we

explicitly refrain from differentiating the data and contradict the requirement for stationarity of individual time series (as suggested by Sims et al., 1990). Differentiating the time series would result in losing important information about the data and their relationship. The preference for VARs in levels here can be explained, at least in part, by a reluctance to impose potentially spurious restrictions on the model (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1994). This is especially true for VAR estimates with macroeconomic series. Consider, for example, monetary aggregates, interest rates, inflation, or credit. For these variables, it can be assumed *a priori* that the correlation is not spurious. The omission of differentiation when working with macroeconomic variables is entirely justified.

The variables chosen in this article are quarterly time series for the euro area between 2000:Q1 and 2020:Q1. The period covers both the conventional and unconventional monetary policy phases and the European financial and sovereign debt crisis. In choosing this period, we are guided by the VAR studies analyzing unconventional monetary policy by Lenza et al. (2010), Peersman (2011), and Giannone et al. (2011), which also include a data period before the financial crisis. The results in figure 4 show that no unit root falls outside the unit root circle, indicating the stationarity of the VAR and the corresponding stability of the system. Following Lütkepohl (2007), who considers the lag determination as a filter that allows the transformation of the given data into a time series with white noise, a lag choice of $p = 2$ seems appropriate. With this number of lags, the residuals are uncorrelated, and the system is stable. The *likelihood ratio* test confirms this choice. Following the diagnostic, we assume a lag length of two throughout.

Figure 4: *Inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial*



Note: Authors' own calculations. VAR is specified with 2 lags.

Identification scheme (i) For identification scheme (i) prices are proxied by Core Inflation (Core) following Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016), and for the output variable, the industrial production index (IPI) is applied, as the focus is on lending activity to the non-financial corporate sector, following Peersman (2011) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013). Ordering Core and IPI first in the recursive identification scheme, we assume that there is only a lagged impact of an excess reserves shock on output and consumer prices. Conversely, innovations to output and prices are allowed to have an immediate effect on the reserve supply of the ECB. This is an assumption, which is made in most VAR studies analyzing the effects of monetary policy (see, e.g. Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; Peersman & Smets, 2003; Gambacorta et al., 2014; Boeckx et al., 2017), and allows us to disentangle monetary policy shocks from real economy disturbances such as aggregate supply and demand shocks. The stock of total loans reported by MFI is used to approximate Bank Credit, which is ordered after excess reserves, as, by definition, liquidity supply by the ECB should have a positive effect on lending. Furthermore, we include the *Composite Indicator of System Stress* (CISS) of Hollo et al. (2012) in the baseline VAR estimation in order to capture financial stress and economic risk, following Boeckx et al. (2017). Thereby, the CISS indicator summarizes information on financial stress in euro-area markets, bond markets, equity markets, foreign exchange markets, and financial intermediaries. Taking into account such an indicator is crucial to disentangle exogenous changes in the reserve supply from endogenous responses to financial stress and uncertainty. As the last ordered variable, we include the main refinancing rate or minimum bid rate (MRO), which banks have to pay when they borrow money from the ECB. Including the MRO as conventional monetary policy tool besides excess reserves as unconventional monetary policy tool is crucial to avoid confounding effects of the shocks of interest. Alternatively, the marginal lending facility, the deposit facility, or the EONIA rate could be used to account for conventional interest rate policy.

Identification scheme (ii) However, although taking into account conventional monetary policy by including the main refinancing rate and the CISS to capture financial stress, the ordering of those two as the last variable in the systems, and thereby assuming that they have no contemporaneous effect on the other variables, is tricky to justify. The difficulty of finding an economically coherent ordering between variables makes such temporal exclusion restrictions, as used in Cholesky decomposition, open to criticism. A recursive ordering is on the one hand only plausible when there is a clear causal chain, while on the other hand, these estimates often tend to be inaccurate for shorter time series.

To address this issue, Uhlig (2005), among others, propose to identify shocks based on the implied signs of the impulse responses they generate. The sign restriction approach presents an identification scheme in which it is not necessary to determine the order of the causation in

the model, as is the case in the Cholesky identification. In contrast, all variables are allowed to respond simultaneously to the identified shock. The intuition of an identification scheme with sign restrictions is to consider all possible permutations of SVAR models that match the reduced form but keep at the same time only those that yield "economically reasonable" impulse responses. Accordingly, we attempt to identify an exogenous shock in excess reserves[13] in identification scheme (ii) through zero- and sign restrictions.[14] Again, the contemporaneous impact on prices and output to the shock in excess reserves is restricted to be zero, therefore not allowing monetary policy to have a contemporaneous impact on those two variables, while innovations to output and consumer prices are allowed to have an immediate effect on the excess reserve supply. Furthermore, we employ a non-negative restriction on the sign for bank lending and excess reserves in response to a QE shock. Different from the Cholesky identification, we assume here that an unconventional monetary policy shock that increases the excess reserves on the market does not increase financial stress. This restriction, which embodies the notion that exogenous innovations to the stock of excess reserves have a mitigating effect on financial stress, is required to disentangle such innovations from the endogenous response of the ECB to financial turmoil and market disturbances. Gambacorta et al. (2014) follow a similar reasoning by assuming that an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock does not increase stock market volatility. This restriction arises from the assumption that the reserves offered by the ECB increase in response to volatilities in financial markets, reflecting the consideration that central banks often respond immediately to increasing uncertainty in financial markets with unconventional measures. A recursive structure in which excess reserves are ordered after stock market volatility is inappropriate and potentially distortive, given that monetary policy interventions should at the same time directly affect financial market sentiments. Likewise, with a zero and sign identification strategy, it is possible for us to more clearly distinguish between the effects of conventional and unconventional monetary policy. Given that we want to estimate the dynamic effects of innovations to the ECB's balance sheet that are orthogonal to shifts in the policy rate, the identified shocks have zero contemporaneous impact on the MRO rate.

[13]Note: here, the unconventional monetary shock is the only shock of interest in the model. No attempt is made to identify economically the other structural shocks.

[14]The model is estimated using a Bayesian approach with non-informative normal-Whishart prior for estimation and inference. For details, see Uhlig (2005). To draw the "candidate truths" from the posterior, we take a joint draw from the unconstrained Normal-Whishart posterior for the VAR parameters as well as a random possible decomposition of A_0 of the variance-covariance matrix, which allows the construction of momentum functions. If the impulse response functions of a given draw satisfy the imposed constraints, the draw is retained. Otherwise, the draw is discarded by giving it a zero prior weight. Each draw must satisfy the restrictions for all identified shocks simultaneously. Finally, a total of 1000 successful draws from the posterior are used to determine the numbers. The model was estimated with the ZeroSignVAR routine in MATLAB following Breitenlechner et al. (2019)

Identification scheme (iii) & (iv) To verify our strategies and compare them with "more traditional" identification schemes, we identify a shock to excess reserves similar to Peersman (2011) and Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016), whereby both articles are limited to the euro area, and each proposes different ways of identification. This should help us verify the baseline identification and serve as a robustness check with respect to the results of the subsequent local projection estimation. The identifications of Peersman (2011) can be found in **identification scheme (iii)** and those of Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016) in **identification scheme (iv)**. We apply the identification to a dataset with the same observation period as our baseline estimation (Q1:2000-Q1:2020), which allows for comparison with the baseline identification. In addition, the respective monetary policy variable used in the two articles has been replaced with the excess reserves variable to allow a comparison with our model here as well.

To identify structural innovations, Peersman (2011) concentrates ostensibly on bank lending. This focus facilitates the disentanglement of shocks, but has the drawback of not necessarily capturing conventional and unconventional monetary policy innovations that affect the economy beyond bank lending. Nonetheless, he argues that borrowing and lending in the euro area mainly occurs through the banking sector, and the unconventional measures taken by the Eurosystem in response to the crisis were primarily aimed at propping up the banking system. Therefore, most monetary policy measures should be captured in the analysis. Instead of the MRO rate as a conventional monetary proxy, Peersman (2011) includes the EONIA rate, which he restricts to zero in the event of an unconventional shock.
QE shocks are included in the model, assuming to have a non-positive impact on bank lending rates, as looser monetary policies should lead to lower lending rates, because of cheaper refinancing and lower financial risks.

In identification (iv), modeled upon the scheme of Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016), asset purchases are assumed to affect the real economy via portfolio shifts from long-term government bonds to equities, distinguishing them from shocks at the aggregate supply and demand level. Accordingly, long-term yields are included alongside prices and output. The variable that is supposed to represent the movements in the financial market is real equity prices.
The estimated shocks identified by the four schemes mentioned above can be found in appendix A.

5.2 Estimation of local projections with identified shocks

Having identified an exogenous unconventional monetary policy shock, impulse responses can be directly estimated via local projection methods using OLS regressions, as seen in Eq. (9),

$$x_{t+h} = a^h + b^h shock_t + \gamma w_t + \varepsilon_{t+h}, \tag{11}$$

where x_t represents the variable of interest. The impulse response of $shock_t$ on x_t corresponds to the series of coefficients b^h for each horizon h. Let us define x_t on the one hand with variables which we classify as productive, therein conducive to the real economy, and on the other hand with variables defined as unproductive. This gives us the possibility to explicitly show the transmission weaknesses of unconventional monetary policy and the resulting liquidity allocations to a productive and unproductive economy. In addition to the disaggregation of credit lines, as shown in section 3, we will analyze the responses of other macroeconomic variables that should be able to reveal aforementioned distributional effects.

Accordingly, besides our definition of productive credit, core inflation is another of the variables assigned to the productive sector. This is the Consumer Price Index excluding food and energy (Core). By excluding these two areas, we can control for price volatilities that are not necessarily due to monetary policy and, accordingly, are difficult to manage by monetary policy instruments. Including the core CPI in our sample shows that while the ECB's money supply is increasing, this should not necessarily impact inflation as most of this liquidity goes into financial product's funding, where, as a consequence, a hidden price increase can be observed. Moreover, the Producer Price Index (PPI) for industrial activity may be an ideal representation of a productive sector. The PPI excludes most financial transactions and can well reflect a primary production process in the sense of Schumpeter (2005 [1939]).

As a counterpart to productive credit, unproductive credit is assigned to an unproductive sector. These kinds of credits include consumer and housing loans, as well as loans to pension and insurance funds. The inclusion of this breakdown of loans may reflect two facts. First, banks allocate credit according to their preferences, and second, the ECB provides incentives for commercial banks to do so. The result is an increase in asset prices instead of an increase in inflation. To further illustrate this fact, a price indicator for these financial assets is included in the set of variables in addition to loans. This is the housing price index calculated by the *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD). It includes house prices, rental price indices, real and nominal house price indices, and price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios. Since the housing market was at the center of the pre-2008 US price bubble, it is useful to focus on an

empirical examination of housing prices as a proxy for financial price movements.[15] Looking at price appreciation in the housing market, we can identify interesting movements. After rising until 2008, some stagnation was observed in the euro area until around 2015. However, since the low interest rate policy and the introduction of unconventional monetary policy instruments, a similar price increase as before 2008 can be observed.

Let us now examine the impulse responses of our disaggregated variables to the exogenous innovations in excess reserves, as determined via the four identification schemes described in section 5.1, and estimated with a least-square local projection method. The results of the impulse response analysis can be seen in the figure 5 below, showing least-square LP IRs with a 90% confidence interval.

Recall, column (i) corresponds to the IRs of the variables induced by exogenous shocks identified via Cholesky decomposition. The shock in column (ii) corresponds to our identification with zero and sign restrictions. In the analysis of the results, the main focus will be on those two baseline estimations. Finally, the figures in column (iii) and (iv) show the IRs caused by the identified shocks according to Peersman (2011) and Wieladek and Garcia Pascual (2016), respectively. These two schemes shall be used to verify the baseline identification. Looking at the estimation results in figure 5, it is worth mentioning that an overall similarity can be seen among the impulse responses of all four identified shocks. In consequence, the validity of our Cholesky, as well as zero and sign restrictions, can be confirmed. Furthermore, the robustness of the models is again pointed out by the estimation of *Smooth-Local Projections* (SLP) in section 6.1.
However, it must be noted that especially the results of the local projection estimation following the identification of Peersman (2011) deviate from the others. Although the effects from a QE shock in the individual models move in the same direction, the significance of the results is nevertheless different. This may be due to the fact that the identification scheme in Peersman (2011) only considers central bank monetary behavior prior to 2009, when, first, the economy was not yet at a zero-lower bound and, second, quantitative supply-side unconventional measures of massive bond purchases were not seen as an alternative to conventional monetary policy. Furthermore, he also refrains from identifying interest rate innovations, in contrast to traditional identification schemes.

[15] For instance, Boddin et al. (2022) states that real estate represents the lion's share of households' total assets in Germany.

Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Exogenous Excess Reserve Shock



Note: Authors' own calculations.[a]

[a]The *lpirfs* package in R from Adämmer (2019) was used to calculate the IRFs.

Either way, analyzing the impulse responses of the four schemes, concentrating especially on the first two[16], we are able to confirm the hypotheses about possible transmission weaknesses, especially those of the bank credit channel, and the resulting consequences for the liquidity allocation of European monetary policy. Considering the impulse responses estimated by LP, it can be seen that the real sector of the economy is mostly negatively affected by QE shocks, while the financial sector seems to be favored. Consistent with the existing literature, real estate prices show a significantly positive response to a monetary policy shock. Only in the case of (iii) a mere short-run response of house prices is evident. These observed responses thus confirm the hypothesis that financial sector prices are driven upward by unconventional monetary policy in combination with the adversarial behavior of commercial banks and reallocation effects induced by portfolio effects. Unproductive bank credit should therefore be seen as the driving force behind asset price movements.

Given the response of housing prices, unproductive loans, defined as loans to housing, consumer, pension, and insurance funds, respond also significantly positively to a QE shock. The only exception, where slightly different movements can be detected, is again the identification of Peersman (2011). Still, the general observations of the baseline estimation confirm the assumption that commercial banks can and do lend according to their profit-maximizing preferences in an environment of low interest rates and ECB money flooding. Put differently, favoritism of liquidity for the unproductive sector can be validated.

In contrast to unproductive credit, productive credit responds in every identification scheme significantly negatively to an increase in the money supply. This negative response of productive credit can be again confirmed by the robustness checks in section 6. The rise in lending to productive sectors targeted by the ECB does not occur.

As advocated throughout the paper, these observations may expose the disagreements about the efficiency of the bank lending channel found in economic literature. Looking at unproductive and productive credit, a strong discrepancy can be discovered. While productive bank loans react strongly negatively to a shock in excess reserves, unproductive ones have a positive bias. This underscores the hypothesis that credit in aggregate being found to react positively to QE policies, is driven primarily by financial credit, given that the counterpart of non-financial credit reacts strongly negatively.

These movements are confirmed by the reactions of industrial production. Although positive effects can be seen in some identification schemes (again, Peersman, 2011), in the aggregate there can hardly be said to be a significant impact of a QE shock on industrial output prices, while asset price movements react strongly positively.

[16] as the other two are estimated for pure validation of the results.

A final interesting observation is the response of core inflation. It can be seen, following identification (i), (ii), and (iv), that inflation is hardly affected by QE, implying that the transmission of central bank money to the real economy is nonexistent. Monetary policy has only little impact on inflation. This is consistent with the assumption that central bank money is not transmitted to the economy. Thus, a multiplier effect of monetary policy could be refuted and is shown to be invalid to represent monetary policy transmission mechanisms. Moreover, it should be outlined that just because asset prices are rising (i.e. "hidden" inflation is observed in areas such as real estate), this does not mean that they have spillover effects on consumer prices.
Overall, the effectiveness of a quantitative easing program that has set itself the task of both controlling inflation and stimulating the real economy can certainly be doubted. Transmission via bank credit does not achieve the desired goals. A supply shock to reserves does not lead to significant movements in the real sector, but rather to price inflation and bubble formation in the financial sector. Bank loans are indeed being extended, just not where they are supposed to end up. With the monetary policy pursued by the ECB and given the current banking system in the euro area, no added value for a productive economy can be seen, as QE favors an unproductive liquidity distribution in the euro area.

6 Robustness

6.1 Smooth local projection

As was seen, least-square local projections do have a lot of advantages over VARs. They do not impose specific dynamics on the variables in the system, they do not suffer from the curse of dimensionality inherent to VARs, and they can more easily accommodate nonlinearities.

However, when comparing LP and VAR estimations, one could find a non-trivial bias/variance trade-off between least-squares LP and VAR estimators. For instance, Li et al. (2022) conduct a simulation study of LP and VAR estimators of structural impulse responses across thousands of DGPs. The analysis considers various identification schemes and several variants of LP and VAR estimators. Thereby they found that LP estimators have lower bias than VAR estimators but do have a substantially higher variance.

To lower the variance of least-square LP, Barnichon and Brownlees (2019) propose a penalized regression of LP, thereby introducing an IR estimation methodology called *smooth local projection* (SLP) that builds upon *penalized B-splines*. While sharing the advantages of least square LPs, SLPs could overcome its major drawback, that is, a large variability of the impulse response (IR) estimator (Stolbov & Shchepeleva, 2021).

The logic behind this method consists in modeling the sequence of IR coefficients as a linear combination of B-splines basis functions, and estimating the coefficients of this linear combination using a shrinkage estimator that shrinks the IR towards a smooth quadratic function of the horizon. More simple, the estimator minimizes the sum of squared forecast residuals (across both horizons and time) plus includes a penalty term that encourages the estimation of smooth impulse responses. Li et al. (2022) argue that this kind of penalized LP is especially attractive at short horizons, as it is the case in this article.

According to Barnichon and Brownlees (2019), such a SLP method could have a number of advantages. First, the methodology can substantially increase the estimation accuracy of LP while preserving flexibility. Second, SLP estimation is executed by *standard ridge regressions*, which are simple and straightforward to implement. Third, SLP, like standard LP, can be used to recover structural IRs in conjunction with a number of identification schemes.

Although still very recent and therefore not frequently applied, SLP is gaining attention in macroeconomic research. In the context of monetary policy literature, Funashima (2022) applies SLP to US data from 1985 to 2007 and attempts to estimate the effects of loose and restrictive monetary policy shocks on monetary policy uncertainty. It can be found that a shock of restrictive monetary policy has no significant impact on monetary policy uncertainty, while the shock of loose monetary policy reduces monetary policy uncertainty. Further applications of SLP can be found in Franta and Gambacorta (2020) or Stolbov and Shchepeleva (2021).

However, applying a SLP approach, we consider the following predictive equation, for each horizon h,

$$y_{t+h} = \alpha^h + \varphi^h x_t + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \gamma_i^h w_{it} + \varepsilon_{t+h}^h, \tag{12}$$

where x_t is the unconventional monetary policy shock at time t, and ε_{t+h}^h is a prediction error term with $Var(u_{t+h}^h) = \sigma^2$. We are interested in the dynamic multiplier φ^h, which denotes the causal effect of a monetary policy shock at horizon h.

As mentioned before, to overcome the issue of LP estimation via least-squares and its suffering from excessive variability, Barnichon and Brownlees (2019) apply a SLP estimation based on B-splines. B-splines are an often used possibility to approach so-called *splines*, a function which is composed piecewise of polynomials with maximum degree n. This method of convergence is conducted by approximating given points with the help of weight functions, where the first and last point can be the start and end point of the curve. Given are the $q + 1$ points chosen by the researcher, the so-called control points. Then, a smooth curve is sought, which runs in

the vicinity of these control points and can be changed locally by shifting them. Barnichon and Brownlees (2019) show that B-splines are a basis of hump-shaped functions indexed by a set of knots and composed of $q+1$ polynomial pieces of order q. All B-spline basis functions of order q can be obtained recursively from basis functions of order $q-1$. As an approach of approximating the φ^h coefficient, we are using a linear B-spline basis function expansion in the forecast horizon h, so that the curve representation is,

$$\varphi^h \approx \sum_{k=1}^{K} f_k B_k(h), \tag{13}$$

where $B_k : R \to R$ for $k = 1, ..., K$ is a set of B-spline basis functions and f_k is a set of scalar parameters for $k = 1, ..., K$. For each horizon, h, φ^h is the weighted sum of the control points. Analogously is proceeded with the α^h and γ_i^h terms, so that Eq. (9) can be approximated as,

$$y_{t+h} \approx \sum_{k=1}^{K} a_k B_k(h) + \sum_{k=1}^{K} f_k B_k(h) x_t + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \sum_{k=1}^{K} c_k B_k(h) w_{it} + \varepsilon_{t+h}^h. \tag{14}$$

An appealing feature of the model in Eq. (12) is that it retains linearity with respect to the parameters, which is further object to a generalized ridge estimation to obtain the values of the dynamic multiplier φ^h.[17] For a more detailed explanation of Smooth Local Projection, see Barnichon and Brownlees (2019).

In the case of SLP, if the shock is identified as the residual of the regression of an endogenous variable on a set of control variables, then the IR can be estimated by running multiple Eq. (12) setting y_t equal to the corresponding endogenous variables, divided into a productive and an unproductive sector (see, Section 5.2) and w_t equal to the set of controls, as identified in **identification scheme (i)** and **(ii)**. The coefficient φ^h captures the causal effect of the structural shock and the IR is given by $\varphi^h a_i$, which can be estimated as $\hat{IR}(h, a) = \hat{\varphi^h} a_i$. Also here, standard recursive timing restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous impact of the shocks in the system, to identify the full set of structural IRs. The impact of shocks can differ with the ordering of the used variables.

The results of the impulse response analysis can be seen in the figure 6 below, showing least-square LP IRs (dotted blue line) and smooth LP IRs (solid black line). The dotted red lines denote the 90% confidence interval for the IRFs of the SLP.[18] The impulse responses confirm the results shown above.

[17] We exploit an R code provided by Barnichon and Brownlees (2019) to derive the impulse response functions, previously adjusting it for our six-variable setting. See https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10. 7910/DVN/8KQJBJ.

[18] For the sake of clarity, we have chosen to show only the confidence bands of the SLP.

Figure 6: *Penalized LP (SLP) vs. Least-Square LP*



Note: Authors' own calculations.

6.2 LP estimation with base money and total central bank assets as QE Proxy

In addition to excess reserves, the literature often uses total central bank assets (see, among others, Boeckx et al., 2017) or the monetary base (see, among others, Peersman, 2011) as proxies for unconventional monetary policy. To account for this, least square local projection models were estimated, preceded by identifying an exogenous shock to the monetary base or total central bank assets according to the identification scheme **(ii)**. The impulse responses confirm the results found in section 5.2.

Figure 7: Impulse Responses to Exogenous Base Money & ECB's asset shock



Note: Authors' own calculations.

7 Conclusion

Quantitative easing, as the main instrument of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy, aims to influence both market prices and economic conditions by purchasing medium- and long-term bonds while simultaneously increasing liquidity and targeting the inflation rate. While it helped in lowering the borrowing costs for governments and businesses, we argue that instead of encouraging investors to commit to economically enhancing projects, the transmission of monetary policy is not working as intended. Financial prices and thus "hidden inflation" are pushed up while the real economic price level remains unaffected. The troublemaker in the process can be found in the banking system. Thus, it is explained that banks are not pure intermediaries transmitting central bank money to the economy according to the ECB's directives but are capable of creating money through loans. In addition, we show to what extent the preferences of banks

diverge from those of the central bank and lead to a distinct creation and distribution of credit. Hence, we argue that the interplay between the profit maximization prospects of money-creating banks and liquidity gluts in a low interest rate environment results in favoring an unproductive financial sector over a productive, real sector. A particular focus on the disaggregation of bank loans has been included in the analysis to illustrate their institutional role in the QE mechanism and to demystify the inconsistency in the QE effects found in the literature regarding bank lending. Unproductive loans are considered bank loans to real estate, consumption, pension, and insurance funds. Productive loans are defined as loans to non-financial corporations. With this disaggregation, we show that banks prefer financial speculation over investments in SMEs. Consequences are possible price bubbles and unstable economic developments.

After identifying exogenous monetary shocks to excess reserves with different identification schemes, we are using data for the euro area with quarterly frequency and are dividing these time series simultaneously into productive and unproductive ones, before estimating the impulse responses via least square and penalized smooth local projections.

In the analysis of impulse response functions, we find that a positive QE shock has a negative macroeconomic impact on the real economy. In contrast, its positive impact on the unproductive sector is not negligible. In fact, an unexpected increase in the growth of reserves does not lead to significant positive responses of industrial production prices and does further not affect consumer prices. Productive credit shows a significant negative response. However, the same shock leads to a significant increase in house prices and unproductive credit. The use of different QE-proxies in the robustness checks confirms the found results. Consequently, our paper confirms that commercial banks distribute credit unequally into speculation instead of real economic activity in interaction with QE processes. Transmission via a bank lending channel hardly seems to work as desired. The real economy finds itself in a situation where they do not benefit from European monetary policy. Indeed, the empirical evidence that emerges from the model estimation is consistent with the theoretical predictions. An exit from QE, as executed by the ECB in the summer of 2022, seems to be justified, at least with respect to transmission efficiency and the position of the current banking system within this regime.

A Theory behind Cholesky decomposition

As was seen in section 4.1, when describing the VAR methodology, knowledge of A_0 is giving us the possibility to reconstruct the structural shock ε_t from $\varepsilon_t = A_0 u_t$. Thus, the elements of A_0 (or its reverse) must be deduced from consistent estimates of the reduced form, whereby by construction, $u_t = A_0^{-1}\varepsilon_t$ and the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form can be written as

$$\Sigma_u = E(uu') = A_0^{-1}E(\varepsilon\varepsilon')A_0^{-1} = A_0^{-1}\Sigma_\varepsilon A_0^{-1'} = A_0^{-1}A_0^{-1'}, \tag{15}$$

supposing $\Sigma_\varepsilon = I$, as stated before. This leads to the observation of $\Sigma_u = A_0^{-1}A_0^{-1'}$ being a system of equations in the unknown parameters of A_0^{-1}. This system of equations can be solved for the unknown parameters in A_0^{-1} using numerical methods, which involves imposing additional, in our case exclusional, restrictions on selected elements of A_0^{-1}, forcing these elements to be zero.

One popular way of disentangling the structural innovations ε_t from the reduced-form innovation u_t is to orthogonalize the reduced-form errors. Orthogonalization here means making the errors mutually uncorrelated. Let L be a lower-triangular $(K \times K)$ matrix with a positive main diagonal such that $LL' = \Sigma_u$. Considering Eq. (12), it is evident, that $LL' = A^{-1}A^{-1}$, and therefore, $L = A^{-1}$ is one possible solution to the problem of how to recover ε_t (Kilian & Lütkepohl, 2017). The orthogonalized shocks are given by $\varepsilon_t = L^{-1}u_t$, which have unit covariance matrix, that is, $E(\varepsilon\varepsilon')$. This recursively identified matrix L is known as the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition of Σ_u, reproducing the variance-covariance structure of the reduced form. The orthogonalized impulse responses are the elements of the $\Theta_i = \Phi_i L$ $(i = 0, 1, 2, ..., p)$.

B Exogenous identified shocks according to four identification schemes

Figure 8: *Exogenous Identified Shocks*

(a) Identification (i)



(b) Identification (ii)



(c) Identification (iii)



(d) Identification (iv)



Note: Authors' own calculations.

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