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Designing acceptable anti-COVID-19 policies by taking into account individuals' preferences: evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment

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Abstract

In the need to assess anti-COVID-19 policies in terms of public acceptability, we report the key results of a Discrete Choice Experiment based on a representative sample of the French population. Preference-ranking analysis is performed for the whole population and by subgroups. Results show that wearing masks, transport limitations, and digital-tracking are well accepted. However, restaurant closures and excessive leisure travel restrictions are not. The acceptability depends on personal characteristics: political orientation, health vulnerability, or age. The young population differs from others, in terms of policies preferences and in their claim for monetary compensation, suggesting a tailored policy for them.

Résumé

Nous rapportons les principaux résultats d'une expérience de choix discret basée sur un échantillon représentatif de la population française pour évaluer les politiques anti-COVID-19 en termes d'acceptabilité publique. Le classement des préférences est effectué pour l'ensemble de la population et par des sous-groupes. Les résultats montrent que le port de masques, les limitations de transport et le suivi numérique sont bien acceptés. En revanche, les fermetures de restaurants et les restrictions excessives des voyages de loisirs ne le sont pas. L'acceptabilité dépend des caractéristiques personnelles : orientation politique, vulnérabilité sanitaire ou âge. Les jeunes diffèrent des autres, en termes de préférences politiques et de demande de compensation monétaire, ce qui suggère une politique adaptée à leur cas.

Keywords: COVID-19, policy design, discrete choice experiment, individual preferences, acceptability

JEL codes: C90; D90; I18

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1. Introduction

One of the most famous cited papers in the recent years in public health is “the silent misdiagnosis: patients’ preferences matter” by Mulley et al. (2012). The idea is that the omission of patients’ preferences among treatments (including the option of no-treatment) is at the origin of considerable welfare losses, as much as errors of diagnosis would be. In the domain of epidemic control policies, lots of “treatments” are competing against each other: confinement, travel restrictions, sectoral lockdowns (bars, restaurants, spectacles) or cuts in the public transportation system. They are all causing inconvenience (disutility), although they are certainly useful in terms of epidemic control. The paramount discussion is, of course, about the epidemiological benefits of each (Haug et al., 2020). However, the issue of the preference orderings among these policies, for the local populations, is also of primary importance. Neglecting the respective degrees of acceptance -or rejection- associated with each control policy, would be a form of social misdiagnosis and, more importantly, could lead to distrust and non-compliance. The recent data show that it is likely that the non-compliance of the young people with the prophylactic barrier-gestures, partly drove the ‘second wave’ of the epidemics in France.

While the vaccines just begin to be administered to the populations, the social and behavioural sciences can provide valuable insights for managing the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts (e.g., Van Bavel et al., 2020). Economics is well equipped to measure and discuss social choices and welfare. Several methods, already applied to inform policy-making on the welfare consequences of public decisions, are available, e.g. surplus analysis, revealed preferences, stated preferences or discrete choice experiments (DCE, see e.g. Louviere et al. (2020)). The present paper reports the findings of the DCE method, which we implemented to assess respondents’ preference for alternative ‘menus’ of COVID-19 control policies. A major issue is the welfare assessment of the confinement device with respect to alternative restriction strategies. For instance, do people prefer a radical lockdown for an additional 6 weeks, or do they prefer a longer freedom restriction, in some other domain of their daily life, for a whole year? Another issue is the likelihood of adherence of specific strata of the population, e.g. the youngest or the most vulnerable, with respect to anti-COVID-19 strategies. Lockdown measures, social distancing, leisure-places closures have suddenly changed social life and daily routines of the populations, with a particularly high cost and no direct benefit for the youngest. The question of (financial) compensation is therefore raised.

Our main findings are the following. The French population is willing to accept most restrictions and constraints imposed by the anti-COVID-19 policies: wearing a mask, mobility restrictions and digital-tracking are well accepted. In contrast, our data reveals a strong rejection of additional weeks of confinement, and increasing aversion to confinement with its duration. We also observe a massive rejection of the closure of bars, restaurants and festive venues. Most people do not require monetary compensation for accepting restrictions, except the young. Finally, we provide a preference ranking of some emblematic anti-COVID-19 policies, which shows that the government strategy is well accepted by all strata of the population.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 offers a discussion and a conclusion.

2. Empirical strategy

We managed a web-based survey among a representative sample of the French population (see Appendix 1). Online questionnaires were available for 2 weeks, from 4 May 2020 to 16 May 2020, during which 1154 respondents participated (questionnaire completed). The online application was developed using the oTree platform (Chen et al., 2016). The questionnaire was broken into several blocks, including the DCE block which offered a large set of anti-COVID-19 policies. In this paper we report our key findings from the DCE block. We also rely on a few demographic variables (e.g., gender and age) from another block.

The DCE methodology was implemented for eliciting individuals' preferences for various attributes (Hensher et al., 2015) of prophylactic strategies. This method has been frequently applied in the health domain, in particular for the adoption of alternative medical treatments with various side-effects as attributes (de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012, Ostermann et al., 2020). In our study, choice options were framed as “menus” of anti-COVID-19 policies. Two options were presented at a time representing a scenario, and individuals were asked to select one of these two options. Each participant participated in three different scenarios, which varied across individuals. The attributes of the choice options were the different prophylactic measures possibly applied, sometimes at various levels (e.g.: *No-Mask* (level 0); *Mask in public places* (level 1); *Mask in all circumstances* (level 2)). Each option was made of an integrated set of prophylactic measures. Some of them corresponded to an emblematic anti-

COVID-19 national strategy, such as the one of the French government or of the US administration.

2.1 Attributes

The list of attributes was determined in April 2020 after an attentive consideration of the debates in the press and following a discussion with public-health experts, in particular at the *Observatoire Régional de la Santé*¹. These attributes did not lose their relevance so far: mask (3 levels), restrictions in bars, restaurants and festive venues (2 levels), restrictions on leisure travel (3 levels), adaptation in the public transportation system (2 levels), digital tracking (2 levels), monetary compensation (4 levels), and additional weeks of confinement (3 levels). A detailed description of the attributes and their levels is provided in Table 1. From all the possible combinations of the levels of these 7 attributes (i.e. a full factorial design consisting of 864 possible combinations), we selected 84 options (with a D-efficiency of 83% for main effects and first order interactions), which we divided randomly into 42 scenarios (hence, each scenario included 2 options, named Option A and Option B). Each respondent chose three consecutive options from three randomly selected scenarios. Figure 1 provides a screenshot of a typical decision screen (translated from French).













¹ ORSPACA (Marseille).

Part 2

Situation 1 over 3

Read again the explanations

Please choose the option that you prefer among the two given in the table below (Option A or Option B).

	Option A	Option B
Lockdown extension	No extension	Three weeks extension
Wearing mask	 Mandatory, but only in public gathering places (shops, transport ...)	 Non mandatory
Closing of cafés, restaurants and festive places	 Closing until mid June	 Closing all summer
Functioning of daily public transport (urban and regional)	 Reduced but adapted to working hours	 Normal
Vacation and leisure travels	 Restriction to metropolitan France	 No restrictions
Stop Covid tracking device	 Implementation with free participation	 Implementation with free participation
Financial compensation per household	 500€	 1500€
Your choice	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Next

Figure 1: Screenshot illustrating a typical scenario involving two choice options: option A and option B.

Based on the random utility theory of Luce (1959), we studied the determinants of our 3462 binary choices (3 scenarios \times 1154 respondents) using the conditional logit model (see Appendix 2). Our target variables are: (i) *Extended lockdown*, (ii) *Masks*, (iii) *Bars, restaurants and festive venues closed*, (iv) *Public transportation adapted to work-hours*, (v) *Travel restrictions*, (vi) *Tracking system*, and (vii) *Monetary compensation*. These variables, and their corresponding labels, are summarized in Table 1. After testing for various specifications, we estimated our model using the functional form of equation (1):

$$X'\beta = \beta_1(EXTD_LOCKDOWN)^2 + \beta_2MASK_PUBLIC + \beta_3MASK_EVERYTIME + \beta_4RESTO_SUMMER + \beta_5TRANSP_ADAPTED + \beta_6TRAVEL_FR + \beta_7TRAVEL_100KM + \beta_8TRACKING + \beta_9BONUS. \quad (1)$$

We estimated the conditional logit model of equation (1) by maximum likelihood. In our initial estimations of the model, for the general population, we controlled for some characteristics of the respondents, e.g. age, gender, and date of the survey. None of these variables affected the signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients β .

Table 1: Variables and corresponding labels used in equation (1).

Variable	Label	Type	Levels/ Values	Reference level
(i) <i>Extended lockdown</i>	EXTD-LOCKDOWN	Quantitative	0, 1 or 3 weeks	/
(ii) <i>Mask</i>	NO MASK MASK-PUBLIC MASK-EVERYTIME	Qualitative	3 levels	NO MASK
(iii) <i>Bar, restaurants and festive venues closed</i>	UNTIL MID-JUNE RESTO-SUMMER	Qualitative	2 levels	UNTIL MID-JUNE

(iv) <i>Public transportation adapted to work-hours</i>	NORMAL_TRANSP TRANSP_ADAPTED	Qualitative	2 levels	NORMAL_TRANSP
(v) <i>Travel restriction</i>	NO RESTRICTION TRAVEL_FR (restricted to France) TRAVEL_100KM (restricted to 100 km)	Qualitative	3 levels	NO RESTRICTION
(vi) <i>Tracking system</i>	NO_DIGITAL_TRACKING TRACKING	Qualitative	2 levels	NO_DIGITAL_TRACKING
(vii) <i>Monetary compensation</i>	BONUS	Quantitative	0 €, 500 €, 1500 €, 2200 €	/

2.2 Emblematic prophylactic strategies.

The DCE-model can be used to rank the acceptability, which we define as the probability of selection, of given packages of policies. We identified 6 integrated programmes based on some “emblematic” public-health strategies. First, we considered the actual set of measures that was deployed by the French government which we call “*Government strategy*”. An alternative to the former strategy is provided by an extension of confinement for three more weeks, for which we consider two variants: without compensation (“*Lockdown*”) and with a compensation of 500€ (“*Lockdown with bonus*”). We compare these strategies to more extreme policies. On one end, we defined the “*Laissez-faire*” strategy, which imposes no constraint and foresees no prophylactic measures. On the other end, we defined the “*Maximalist*” scenario, where all prophylactic measures are at their maximum (except the lockdown). Finally, we also considered the most-preferred public health policy, named *Max-U* hereafter, which is defined by the set of attribute levels giving the maximum utility to the whole sample, i.e. to the “average representative French population”.

Note that the programmes based on lockdown extension present a radical alternative to the other prophylactic measures that would combat the virus replication with effectiveness. The *Laissez-faire* programme, which is akin to the US Trump government policy is the exact opposite of the *Maximalist* policy, the most restrictive (i.e. liberticide) policy. We take the *Maximalist* policy as a benchmark for estimating the likelihood of choosing each other alternate policy. The *Max-U* policy was identified thanks to the estimated coefficients of our regression model, as explained in the result section.

3. Results

3.1 Representativeness

As a preliminary step, we check whether our survey sample (named CONFINOBS) reproduces the composition of the French population. Figure 2 compares the data obtained with our sample, to the data obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).




Figure 2: Sample characteristics (gender, age and location) compared to the national population

Statistical tests demonstrate that our sample is representative in terms of regions but weakly unbalanced in terms of gender and age composition (see Appendix 1, Table A, for detailed tests and Figure A for additional comparisons).

3.2 DCE estimates

We report in Table 2 our DCE estimates for the whole population and for several subsamples: vulnerable, young, poor, elderly, women and politically right.² Clinical vulnerability was defined by two conditions: vulnerable oneself or living with a vulnerable person. These conditions were elicited through self-reported questions.³

Among the general population, the attribute "Extension of lockdown" is generally poorly accepted: the scenarios that include it are associated with a reduction in their probability of selection. We also note that the best statistical fit for this variable is a quadratic form: the negative effect increases more than proportionally with the number of additional weeks of confinement -for example- 0.024 for one week, -0.216 for 3 weeks and -1.54 for 8 weeks.⁴ This is not the case for people who are in a COVID-19 vulnerable situation (column 2-4): the coefficient is much lower and non significant, both for own vulnerability and for living with a vulnerable person. Wearing a mask in public locations is very well accepted. But when it is extended everywhere and every time, it is less unanimously chosen. The same stands for leisure travels: restrictions are accepted, but not when they are strong (less than 100 km from home). The closure of bars, restaurants and festive venues is universally rejected, at a greater magnitude when the population is young. The population as a whole is in favour of public transportation adapted to working hours. Digital-tracking is accepted, but in a very different way depending on the category of the population: young people are clearly hostile to it (-0.537 which is a strong disagreement, of the same magnitude as "Bar, restaurant and festive venues closed"). Finally, the proposal of a monetary compensation does not attract choices; it would even tend to push people to refuse the options that include it (coefficients negative and significant for women and the elderly). We note, however, that the scenarios with financial transfer seem to appeal to the youngest (+0.25).

² As our DCE is unlabeled, marginal effects are not relevant to present here.

³ The exact wording of the two questions (translated from French) were:

(a): « Do you have a chronic illness or a health problem that could make you fear developing a severe form of Covid-19? » (Yes/No/I do not know).

(b): « Do you live with an elderly person or with someone who has a health problem that might cause them to fear developing a severe form of Covid-19? » (Yes/No).

⁴ Using the whole population, the model with the quadratic term for additional weeks of lockdown is preferred to the model with the linear counterpart (both of them has the same number of degrees of freedom, or number of parameters, i.e. 10) following several criteria: higher log-likelihood value (-2200 vs -2210), higher R^2 (0.079 vs 0.078), lower Akaike information criterion (4429 vs 4431), and lower Bayesian information criterion (4490 vs 4492). We also run a model with 2 dummies for additional weeks of lockdown (1 and 3 weeks). This model, with higher degrees of freedom (11), does not however give a better performance than the presented model: it delivers equal values for log-likelihood, R^2 , and AIC, but higher BIC (4497 vs 4490).

Table 2: Estimation results of the DCE model.

Attributes	DCE estimated coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)								
	Whole sample	Vulnerable	Vulnerable oneself	Living with a vulnerable person	Young (18 to 25 years old)	Elderly (65 and over)	Women	Politically right	Poor
Extension of lockdown (quadratic shape for 1 unit of additional week)	-0.024 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.019 (0.025)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.018 (0.016)	-0.055 (0.025)	0.026 (0.041)
Masks (ref. = no mask)									
- in public locations	0.860 (0.078)	0.978 (0.129)	0.943 (0.161)	0.975 (0.174)	1.045 (0.250)	1.038 (0.159)	0.911 (0.113)	0.657 (0.176)	1.285 (0.299)
- every time	0.351 (0.105)	0.574 (0.177)	0.587 (0.218)	0.503 (0.246)	0.776 (0.334)	0.190 (0.212)	0.673 (0.153)	0.502 (0.249)	-0.126 (0.367)

Bar, restaurant and festive venues closed	-0.495 (0.062)	-0.356 (0.103)	-0.289 (0.127)	-0.374 (0.143)	-0.605 (0.196)	-0.455 (0.127)	-0.505 (0.090)	-0.569 (0.149)	-0.377 (0.235)
Public transportation limited to working hours	0.127 (0.058)	<i>0.191</i> (0.098)	<i>0.229</i> (0.121)	<i>0.254</i> (0.133)	-0.059 (0.183)	-0.069 (0.123)	0.265 (0.084)	0.273 (0.136)	0.023 (0.212)
Leisure travels (ref.=no restriction)									
- limited to France	0.289 (0.066)	0.261 (0.109)	0.327 (0.133)	0.327 (0.150)	0.163 (0.221)	<i>0.255</i> (0.137)	0.282 (0.096)	0.533 (0.159)	-0.278 (0.239)
- limited to 100 km around	-0.176 (0.070)	-0.124 (0.117)	0.089 (0.144)	-0.316 (0.159)	-0.120 (0.224)	-0.235 (0.143)	-0.229 (0.102)	0.047 (0.162)	-0.215 (0.257)
Digital tracking	0.240 (0.067)	0.222 (0.111)	<i>0.254</i> (0.139)	<i>0.255</i> (0.147)	-0.430 (0.223)	0.385 (0.136)	0.110 (0.097)	0.235 (0.153)	0.059 (0.249)

Monetary bonus (1000 euros)	-0.054 (0.028)	-0.150 (0.047)	-0.093 (0.058)	-0.241 (0.062)	+0.252 (0.094)	-0.279 (0.059)	-0.071 (0.041)	-0.122 (0.065)	0.135 (0.113)
ASC	0.041 (0.072)	0.031 (0.119)	-0.053 (0.146)	0.225 (0.166)	-0.248 (0.237)	0.115 (0.147)	0.083 (0.105)	0.067 (0.166)	-0.019 (0.276)
Number of obs.	3462	1266	828	720	330	882	1677	663	252
Log likelihood	-2200	-803	-529	-445	-208	-537	-1060	-414	-156
McFadden R ²	0.079	0.085	0.078	0.108	0.090	0.115	0.085	0.084	0.106
Likelihood ratio test (p-value)	378 (<0.0001)	149 (<0.0001)	90 (<0.0001)	108 (<0.0001)	41.2 (<0.0002)	139 (<0.0001)	197 (<0.0001)	75.8 (<0.0001)	37 (<0.0001)
Proportion predicted with succes	63,8%	64.10%	63.4%	65.3%	67.00%	67.3%	64.00%	64.00%	63.5%

Notes: ASC: alternative-specific constant. Significance at the 5% level in bold, 10% level in italics. Reading indication: (line Bar, Restaurant and Festive Venues closed), the estimated coefficient of -0.495 for the whole population means that the options that include the attribute “Bar, Restaurant and Festive Venues closed” generate a disutility of -0.495 magnitude (the coefficient measures how much the options with this prophylactic constraint were less frequently selected). This magnitude value can be compared, across subpopulation, and across attributes (when comparable). Two variables were introduced as continuous variables: additional weeks of lockdown (quadratic shape) and bonus (linear shape).

3.3 Preferences ranking of policies for various stratum

Based on the regression-model, we were able to determine the “most preferred scenario” by the general population, i.e. the *Max-U* scenario: no more lockdown, mask every-time, bar and restaurant opened, public transportation adapted to working hours, leisure travels restrained to France only, and access to digital tracking. We compare the *Max-U* scenario to four other emblematic public health policies that we discussed in Section 2: the *Government strategy*, *Lockdown*, *Lockdown with bonus (500€)* and the *Laissez-faire* policy. These programmes and their characteristics (e.g., lockdown extension, masks or travel restrictions, etc.) are summarized in Table 3. We take the *Maximalist* strategy as a benchmark, i.e. the policy for which all prophylactic measures are activated at their maximum level (except the lockdown).

Table 3: Characteristics of the target policy programmes for the general population.

Scenario	ASC	Ext_ lockdown	Mask public	Mask everytime	Restaurants closed	Transport adapted	Travel FR	Travel 100km	Tracking	Bonus
Lockdown	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lockdown, bonus =500€	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5
Max U	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
Government strate	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
Laissez-faire	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maximalist	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0

Note: ASC = alternative-specific constant.

Table 4: Preferences for emblematic health policies with respect to the *Maximalist* benchmark, for the whole population and targeted stratum.

	Lockdown Vs Maximalist	Lockdown with bonus Vs Maximalist	Max U Vs Maximalist	Government strategy Vs Maximalist	Laissez-Faire Vs Maximalist
General population	0.434 [0.320;0.561]	0.427 [0.308;0.549]	0.813 [0.750;0.859]	0.732 [0.665;0.789]	0.488 [0.392;0.577]
Female	0.449 [0.281;0.629]	0.44 [0.268;0.616]	0.778 [0.668;0.857]	0.677 [0.574;0.765]	0.449 [0.322;0.576]
Poor	0.5 [0.138;0.850]	0.5 [0.123;0.857]	0.783 [0.503;0.938]	0.783 [0.537;0.914]	0.5 [0.206;0.792]
Young 18-25	0.564 [0.211;0.868]	0.595 [0.242;0.880]	0.705 [0.429;0.885]	0.705 [0.489;0.865]	0.564 [0.285;0.829]
Elderly 65+	0.576 [0.326;0.787]	0.541 [0.285;0.769]	0.879 [0.778;0.938]	0.816 [0.699;0.895]	0.576 [0.385;0.747]
Politically right	0.331 [0.128;0.614]	0.317 [0.118;0.590]	0.778 [0.604;0.890]	0.673 [0.503;0.809]	0.449 [0.253;0.653]
Clinically vulnerable	0.347 [0.188;0.548]	0.33 [0.175;0.589]	0.735 [0.602;0.837]	0.681 [0.567;0.779]	<u>0.347</u> [0.221;0.491]
Oneself vulnerable	0.314 [0.140;0.575]	0.314 [0.139;0.557]	0.725 [0.562;0.857]	0.656 [0.504;0.777]	<u>0.314</u> [0.179;0.488]
Vulnerable regarding others	0.42 [0.184;0.695]	0.391 [0.168;0.666]	0.816 [0.663;0.910]	0.7 [0.536;0.826]	0.42 [0.237;0.639]

Notes: Monte Carlo 95% confidence intervals (with 2000 draws) are reported in brackets (These draws were obtained from a multivariate normal distribution with mean and variance given by the vector of DCE coefficients and the corresponding variance-covariance matrix).

Table 4 provides a quantitative assessment of the preferences of the survey sample concerning the emblematic public health policies defined in Section 2, each one compared to the *Maximalist* scenario. A probability above 0.5 means that the alternate policy is more likely to be chosen, i.e. is preferred, compared to the *Maximalist* policy. For instance, the likelihood that the *Government strategy* is chosen against the *Maximalist* scenario is 0.732.

In the general population, the extension of confinement (with and without bonus) is never chosen. Besides the *Max-U* policy (which has the highest probability to be selected by definition), the *Government strategy* ranks first in the general population, before the *Laissez-faire* policy. Looking at the strata, the young (18-25) and the elderly (over 65) seem to exhibit similar patterns. The elderly are almost indifferent (in probability terms) between the *Government strategy* and the *Max-U*. Overall, the choice probabilities of the various policies for the young and the elderly are very close.

3.4 A monetary compensation for the young

The young (18-25) is the only category, given our strata, that favours scenarios offering a monetary compensation. The DCE coefficient of the monetary bonus for the young is +.24 and significant. In comparison, the same coefficient takes the significant value -.28 for the elderly who are clearly against a monetary incentive to accept constraining measures. Overall, for the general population, this coefficient is also negative. The singularity of the young with respect to monetary compensations raises the issue of their acceptability of the government policy, which seems widely acclaimed by the general population. It is therefore interesting to raise the question about what level of monetary compensation would be required for the young that would maximize their compliance with the government policy.

In the remainder of this subsection, we propose a calculation of the corresponding level of compensation, targeted towards the young. More precisely, what is the level of monetary compensation for the young that would make them indifferent between the government strategy and the strategy that maximizes their utility?

Let V_{MaxU}^{18-25} designate the level of utility corresponding to the *Max U* policy specific to the young. That is, V_{MaxU}^{18-25} is the utility maximizing policy for the young, without monetary compensation. Similarly, let $V_{Gvt_Strategy}^{18-25}$ stands for the utility of the government strategy for the young. According to our estimates reported in Table 2, we have:

$$V_{MaxU}^{18-25} = \beta_2^{18-25} \times MASK_PUBLIC + \beta_9^{18-25} \times BONUS,$$

and

$$V_{Gvt_Strategy}^{18-25} = \beta_2^{18-25} \times MASK_PUBLIC + \beta_8^{18-25} \times TRACKING ,$$

where the superscript 18-25 indicates the young. Note that we only rely on significant coefficients.⁵

By definition, $V_{MaxU}^{18-25} \geq V_{Govt-Strategy}^{18-25}$, we can therefore identify the monetary compensation to be paid to the young that makes them indifferent between the *Max-U* policy and the government strategy. Let us call this compensation $\Delta BONUS$. We can now redefine the utility of the young by taking into account the $\Delta BONUS$, as follows:

$$V_{Govt-Strategy}^{18-25}(\Delta BONUS) = \beta_2^{18-25} \times MASK_PUBLIC + \beta_8^{18-25} \times TRACKING + \beta_9^{18-25} \times \Delta BONUS$$

Equalizing $V_{Govt-Strategy}^{18-25}(\Delta BONUS)$ to V_{MaxU}^{18-25} and solving for $\Delta BONUS$, leads to:

$$\Delta BONUS = -\beta_8^{18-25} \times TRACKING / \beta_9^{18-25} = -\beta_8^{18-25} / \beta_9^{18-25} = 0.430 / 0.252 = 1.706$$

By paying monetary compensation to young people, in the amount of 1706€⁶, they would achieve the same level of utility with the actual *Government strategy* than with the strategy that maximizes the utility of their strata.

4. Discussion

We assess the reception by the general population of 6 preventive measures against the COVID-19 pandemic. Our study informs about individuals' preferences about various prophylactic measures. We do this for each measure one by one, as well as for packages of measures, some of which correspond to actual policies. Our main purpose was to help defining public-health prophylactic strategies against COVID-19 that take into account their acceptability by citizens. After weeks of total lockdown, which were perceived as painful by most people, and which were economically costly, studying the level of acceptability of more subtle prophylactic measures had become a necessity after May 2020, when the “de-lockdown” strategy was discussed. In more recent times, the second (and sometimes third) waves raging in Europe (e.g., France, Spain, United Kingdom or Germany) have reinforced the need for public policies to select a package of prophylactic measures that can be adopted and followed by the people for long-lasting periods. This is a condition for their repeated use by governments over time, depending on the epidemiological data (for example on increases in incidence rates or the saturation of intensive care units), while awaiting the widespread

⁵ Note that tracking does not enter into the calculation of the *Max-U* utility for the young because its coefficient is negative.

⁶ This level of monetary compensation can be interpreted as the young's WTA (compensating surplus) digital tracking, since it is the only attribute that enters into the calculation of the bonus.

vaccination of populations to achieve sufficient herd immunity. This study is therefore a first step that can contribute to the definition of public policies that are socially sustainable over time in the face of the COVID-19.

We obtained some results that, first, could inform the policymaker about the acceptability of anti-COVID-19 policies taken separately. Extra weeks of lockdown are associated with marked disutility in the general population, but the magnitude of that disutility can change from one population-group to another: for instance, vulnerable people are less hostile to the extension of lockdown, as well as women, and the elderly population to a lesser extent. The media controversy about the mask seems irrelevant⁷. In our representative sample, the mask is very well accepted by all populations, even considering the non-vulnerable. This undoubtedly reflects a good “understanding” of this measure by the general population. In detail, the mask seems to be associated with greater utility when worn only in public places, but not everywhere and every time. Measures that restrict mobility (transport network, and travel) are also fairly well accepted; and it does not appear that the subgroups accept them any differently. Travel limited to the country is well accepted too, while a public device of travels limited to 100 km around, tends to be associated with a disutility, for the whole population, and particularly for female respondents. The closure of bars, restaurants and other places of leisure is the only measure to fight against the epidemic which seems to arouse obvious reluctance in the French population as a whole. This particular feature could be justified by the attachment of the population to the French gastronomic culture and traditions. We note that this result holds even for the vulnerable populations.

Digital tracking is not seen as a constraint; quite the contrary, as the options which integrate this characteristic are seen as more attractive, with the same magnitude as for example leisure travel restrictions limited to France. However, the young are strongly hostile to it, a result that was largely unexpected. Although perceived personal threats could play a role (Wnuk et al., 2020), this result could be explained by a particular need of this population for data protection. As this population has a high intensity of smart phones use, digital tracking can be experienced as a continuous violation of privacy. In the same way, the young population is the only category that is significantly in favour of receiving a bonus in the packages of proposed measures, i.e. a monetary compensation.

⁷ In France, according to the media, there is an anti-mask lobby. This lobby is probably the result of minority groups but undoubtedly very active in terms of communication. It is not found among our participants.

All this draws a picture of the French population that perceives the prophylactic measures relatively well, not only as constraints, but also as a necessary evil. Wearing a mask, restrictions on mobility and digital-tracking are prophylactic policies that people adhere to, except when they are designed with (too much) intensity. In the same vein, the quadratic nature of the aversion to additional weeks of confinement shows that confinement is rejected even more widely when its duration is long. On this last point, we learned that vulnerable people exhibit a better tolerance to confinement and other expected differences in preferences: a little more acceptance of the mask, a little less disutility when restaurants are closed. However, these differences between sub-populations remain modest. This reveals either a strong concern of the non-vulnerable towards the vulnerable (the former closely incorporate the welfare of the latter into their preferences), or a weak singularity of the vulnerable in terms of preferences.

Young people are arguably the most dissonant segment of the population, in terms of preferences. Interestingly, they are clearly in favour of the financial compensation. We calculated the required level of monetary compensation that would achieve for them the same level of utility with the actual *Government strategy* than with the strategy that maximizes their utility, to be equal to 1706€. As said, this attitude is specific to the young. All other segments of the population reject such compensation, meaning that, except for the young, the acceptability of prophylactic constraints does not require any kind of material compensation. Acting responsibly resembles more a categorical imperative than a commodity that could be traded-off. This implies that financial incentives are not the appropriate tool for the general population to trigger compliance with the restrictions. Worse it could crowd out their moral motivation to act in this way. However, a monetary incentive could be an efficient instrument if targeted towards the young who could be more likely to adhere to the restrictions if compensated. Their willingness to trade off compliance for money, could be explained by several factors. First, the health consequences in case of infection are more benign than for older generations. Second, they have lower revenues and lower revenue expectations (Aucejo et al., 2020), which both imply a higher marginal utility for current money. Third, they might feel excluded from the job market and might have developed a syndrome of “sacrificed generation”. Fourth, they may have different other-regarding preferences than other sub-populations.

In any case, policy-makers should consider this segment of the population to be targeted for a special treatment, as they face many costs in this period, without a clear (medical) benefit for

themselves. Since the young population appears to have played a major role in the emergence of the second wave in France, taking their preferences into account is a priority.

Conversely, those over 65 are strongly averse to the idea of a monetary compensation. They seem to have difficulty associating financial rewards with behaviours that protect the health of the population in general, and themselves in particular. For this segment of the population, intrinsic motivations and extrinsic incentives might stand in conflict, a situation that could potentially lead to partial crowding out of intrinsic motivations (Frey, 1997, Kreps, 1997, Benabou & Tirole, 2003). For the most vulnerable, the rejection of any trade-offs between health-protective measures and material compensation, is probably the strongest. Worse, financial incentives could lead to total crowding out of moral motivations (Bowles, 2008) to adhere to constraining pro-social public health measures.

One of the advantages of this exercise is that it makes it possible to quantitatively assess the collective welfare attached to various packages of policies to fight the COVID-19 (some national emblematic strategies), and even, to determine the strategy that would receive the most support. The preferred strategy by the French population, which we named *Max-U*, would be the following: no more lockdown, mask in public places, restaurant opened, public transportation adapted, leisure travels restrained to France only, and access to digital tracking. In april 2020, this set of measures was consistent; it was a logical alternative to a complete lockdown device, although surely less efficient for the control of the epidemic (Ferraresi et al., 2020). The issue of the restaurants and other festive venues closure is the problematic point, through which the population's preferred package of prophylactic policies was different from the "wise one". But data on the propagative effect of restaurants were not yet available in April 2020, so these preferences could have changed since the survey date. Note that, in April, the government strategy was neither including the closure of restaurants for the summer period but was effectively restored in France and in many other countries a few months later.

In the general population, acceptance of the governmental strategy was almost the same as the *Max-U*, which means that the Macron government was remaining not far from the preferences of the French people -but also means that the authorities were not willing to take unpopular measures, in April 2020 after 8 weeks of lockdown...If we consider stratified "voting", poor and elderly 65+ people were giving the largest support to the governmental package (with voting probabilities around 0.8, compared to the Maximalist benchmark); this could reveal the implicit target followed by the French executive authority. We may add that clinically vulnerable individuals are also somehow in line with the government strategy, as

they anyway reject all the other strategies: laissez-faire or lockdown (and this, with very low acceptance rates: 0.35).

Last, lockdown associated with a monetary compensation (bonus) is badly rated, whatever the strata, except by the young who have a voting probability above 0.5 (but insignificant) and the Elderly-65+, but the latter do not require a bonus for giving their consent. In principle, lockdown is in itself a complete prophylactic strategy, which should be assessed in relation with the various substitutive measures that can be implemented to fight the epidemics. In the general population, the scenario with 3 additional weeks of confinement is never “elected” when compared to all other alternatives (results not shown). This is probably of interest for the government who currently faces the dilemma between re-confinement or a package of daily-life prophylactic limitations. Lockdown appears to be really unpopular for almost all segments of the population; and all other options are preferred, even those very restrictive as in the maximalist strategy.

Our research has several limitations. The first refers to the time of the survey. May 2020 was the end of the first lockdown period in France. The preferences of the population were probably -for a part- influenced by the context: e.g. shortages in masks, without real experimentation of them in real setting, could be at the origin of the particularly high acceptance we have in our data for wearing a mask. The subjective assessment of the attribute “additional weeks of lockdown” was necessarily biased by the 8 weeks of lockdown that had preceded. Another limitation is the size of the sample, which is an issue when we need to undertake subpopulation studies. Some coefficients are not significant. Indeed, when the sample size is reduced, we cannot have a clear view whether this result of insignificance comes from the lack of power of the statistical analysis, or, is due to a “true” non-difference with the null hypothesis. This is why we did not go deeper in multiple sub-stratifications, for example, by regions and age-groups, which could be of interest for local policy-makers. Another important limitation is that we only elicited respondents preferences, but not their beliefs about others’ compliance. According to psychological game theory, beliefs about others could affect one’s own utility, and therefore the likelihood of taking various actions. However, going into this direction would require not only first-order beliefs (my beliefs about others’ actions) but also second-order beliefs (my beliefs about others beliefs about my actions) and maybe higher order beliefs. Since the questionnaire was already relatively long, we decided to avoid an additional module about beliefs elicitation. However, this could be an interesting future extension by targeting the questionnaire on this issue. .Despite these limitations, our study is the first to give a complete investigation into the preferences of a

national population among various sets of COVID-19 policy responses. Knowing how people rank the various COVID-19 prophylactic measures is a logical condition for designing sets of suitable epidemic-control programmes that could be observed with the highest degree of compliance. The revealed major dissonances of the young people suggest the need for a specific menu of anti-COVID-19 policies. The policy-maker should clearly consider this segment of the population to be targeted for a special treatment, maybe using monetary compensations. This could be a way to improve compliance and avoid repeated new waves that may be vectorized through this sub-group.

Appendix 1: Survey methodology

The survey institute, *Viavoice*, recruited respondents by telephone for the online questionnaire. The survey institute had to target a representative sample of the French population (gender, age, and regional characteristics). In total, over the 7500 persons that were contacted by Viavoice by telephone, 5331 accepted and received a web link. 1154 responded to the on-line survey, which represents a response rate of 21.6 %.

Table A gives descriptive information about the survey sample, in comparison with the national population (target).

Table A: Sample characteristics

Characteristics	Sample (1154)	France (adults>18 yo) <i>Source: INSEE</i> https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/fichier/1892086/pop-totale-france.xls	p-value of tests H0 = equality of distribution
Male	51.09%	48.05%	$\chi^2(1)=4.110$, p-value=0.043
Female	48.91%	51.95%	
18-25	8.25%	10.58%	$\chi^2(2) = 6.751$, p-value=0.034
26-64	66.47%	65.30%	
65 and more	25.28%	24.12%	
AUVERGNE RHONE ALPES	12.32%	12.31%	
BOURGOGNE FRANCHE COMTE	5.46%	4.26%	

BRETAGNE	5.02%	5.12%	$\chi^2(13)=15.24$ p-value=0.293
CENTRE VAL DE LOIRE	3.70%	3.92%	
CORSE	0.62%	0.53%	
GRAND EST	10.12%	8.45%	
HAUTS DE FRANCE	7.92%	9.14%	
ILE DE FRANCE	17.78%	18.82%	
MARTINIQUE	0.62%	0.55%	
NORMANDIE	4.58%	5.06%	
NOUVELLE AQUITAINE	8.45%	9.19%	
OCCITANIE	10.56%	9.08%	
PAYS DE LA LOIRE	5.19%	5.83%	
PROVENCE ALPES COTE D AZUR	7.66%	7.75%	




Figure A: Political distribution: comparison with the European Values Survey.

The political positions of our sample can also be compared to the answers of a question extracted from the European Values Study in 2017. *In political matters, people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?*

Appendix 2: Theoretical background on choice modelling

To estimate the effects of the attributes on individual choices in a DCE, we start by assuming that individuals maximize their utility (or their satisfaction) based on the following random utility function: $U_{ijk} = \alpha_j + X'_{jk}\beta + \varepsilon_{ijk}$ where U_{ijk} is the observed utility level of individual i related to scenario j ($j = 1, 2, \dots, J$) presented among the choice set k ($k = 1, \dots, K$), X_{jk} is the set of attributes' levels displayed in scenario j at the choice set k , α_j is the alternative-specific intercept, and ε_{ijk} is the regression error. As the latter is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with an extreme value, the probability for choosing option j has the familiar logit form:

$$Pr(Y_{ik} = j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + X'_{jk}\beta)}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(\alpha_j + X'_{jk}\beta)}.$$

In our experiment, we have $K= 3$ choice sets and $J= 2$ choice options (or equivalently, $j = A, B$). As there are two options A and B, only one alternative-specific intercept is identified (here we assume that it corresponds to option A, i.e. α_A).

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