



**HAL**  
open science

## Life history, lived temporal facts and adult education

Hervé Breton

► **To cite this version:**

Hervé Breton. Life history, lived temporal facts and adult education. *Linhas Críticas*, 2023, 29, pp.e47892. hal-04151414

**HAL Id: hal-04151414**

**<https://hal.science/hal-04151414>**

Submitted on 11 Jul 2023

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial 4.0 International License

-----

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7

**Hervé BRETON**  
**Professeur des universités**

Université de Tours, EA7505, France  
[herve.breton@univ-tours.fr](mailto:herve.breton@univ-tours.fr)  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3536-566X>

## 8 **Life history, lived temporal facts and adult education**

9 Issue 142 of the journal *Éducation Permanente*, published in 2000, contained a transcript of the  
10 discussions that took place at a round table entitled " What can be done with life stories? A look back at  
11 fifteen years of practice ", which brought together Pierre Dominicé, Vincent de Gaulejac, Guy Jobert and  
12 Gaston Pineau. It is on this occasion that Pineau proposes to define life stories in the following way:  
13 "For me, the best definition of life story is 'the search and the construction of meaning from experienced  
14 temporal facts'", integrating the idea of meaning to the sensitive, the direction and the significant  
15 (Dominicé et. al., 2000, p. 237). It is from this definition that the axes contained in this text may be  
16 unfolded. It is from this definition that the axes contained in this text may be unfolded. In fact, it is a  
17 matter of thinking about the links between the narrative processes activated by adults in the context of  
18 life history sessions in training and the formative dimensions of this inquiry on the facts lived which is  
19 conducted in the first person perspective by the narrator. The reflection formalised in this article intends,  
20 therefore, to structure a theoretical framework whose challenge is to characterise the formative dimensions  
21 of the self-writing, from two aspects: the notion of what are "lived temporal facts"; the narrative  
22 composition of the autobiographical text. There are several stages to the discussion presented in this text:  
23 the first section is devoted to formalising the current trend of life stories in training, the aim being to  
24 specify the singularity of the approach, and to specify the place taken by research on 'lived facts' in this  
25 context of adult training. The second part of the text aims to characterise the notion of facts, then that of  
26 temporal facts, then that of lived temporal facts. In the third part, we will use the notions of narrative  
27 regimes and narrative kinetics to specify the effects on comprehension and self-education processes. The  
28 fourth and final section brings together and integrate the theories of narrative that have been invoked,  
29 examining them from a phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective.

## 30 **The life story paradigm in adult education**

31 "Training through self-narration" may be one way of characterising the singularity of life stories  
32 in training, both theoretically and methodologically. The point is to consider that narrative work,  
33 whether oral or written, generates formative effects for the subject who engages in it. However, in  
34 order to examine this proposition, we need to characterise what is meant by the term 'narrative',  
35 and then specify the processes associated with the training development of the narrator.

36  
37 In the context of life stories, different types of narratives are activated, in succession:  
38 self-writing, expression of the narrative within groups, circulation of narratives and experience  
39 of reception, collective thematisation, etc. This succession of times is not produced at

40 random in the devices. It is part of a strategy aimed at gradually immersing adults in  
41 training in the work of storytelling. Immersing oneself in the work of recounting one's  
42 experience requires the narrator to give himself time to access the memories, to allow himself to  
43 be impregnated by the retentions that become present again as a result of the exploration of the  
44 lived experience during the evocation. These operations cannot be produced simply by  
45 volunteering (Ricœur, 1949). In order to be achieved, they presuppose that learning takes place,  
46 so that gestures such as disengagement, the ability to remain  
47 available, the possibility of allowing oneself to be impregnated by the memory, can take place  
48 upstream of putting things into words and putting them into narrative. This narrative activity  
49 has been theorised as a test by Baudouin (2010), which is defined, in relation to the work of  
50 Bakhtin (2017), on the basis of three fields of strength: putting experience into words (1), putting  
51 lived experience into narrative (2), and accessing the narrative to the community (3).

52  
53 Taking these three dimensions into account in thinking about the narrative work carried out in  
54 adult education training enables us to sort and classify the operations and sub-operations  
55 included in the life history approach.

56  
57 **Putting experience into words** involves various gestures that must be performed and learnt:  
58 disengagement, evocation, awakening of the memory, presentification, semantic filling, lexical  
59 retrieval, etc. The transition from experience to language involves accessing memories  
60 (Vermersch, 1994), remaining attentive to the lived effects associated with the microprocessual  
61 awakening of retentions (Depraz,  
62 2014), finding the way to name (Cance and Dubois, 2015), structuring statements, etc. (Depraz,  
63 2014). making it possible to contain the experience in stabilised, meaningful terms... The  
64 performance of each of these operations mobilises gestures that need to be practised,  
65 accomplished, their mastery having the effect, no less, of generating an ability to transform the  
66 connection with the embodied experience which, from being passively sedimented, becomes  
67 graspable, expressive, thematisable.

68  
69 This first field comprises dimensions concerning narrative research and is situated at the  
70 crossroads of experiential phenomenology and the language sciences. The second field concerns  
71 more specifically contemporary narratology and hermeneutic phenomenology.

72  
73 **Storytelling involves** processes that are both compositional (Ricœur, 1983) and narrative  
74 tension (Baroni, 2007). Composition, because, as Ricœur points out, in order to appear  
75 complete, the narrative must integrate the major events and lived facts in the life story unit.  
76 Tense, because the narrative's diegesis includes a tonal and sensitive substance that must  
77 correspond to the experience of the lived experience that has been transferred to language  
78 and narrated as a story. Producing a first-person narrative therefore means, as far as  
79 the work of composition is concerned, accessing the facts of the experience, grasping them in  
80 their singularity, ordering them in time, then associating them logically so that, as Ricœur puts it,  
81 a transition can take place: from the episodic to the logical. This process, which Ricœur  
82 associates with plotting, combines temporalisation and configuration: the ordering of lived facts  
83 and the configuration of events in relation to each other. These processes remain dependent  
84 on wording the experience, which makes it possible to preserve the vital charge of the  
85 experience in the narrative text, which gives it its tension. We need to examine, however, what  
86 the facts experienced are, insofar as they are the objects of the work of temporalisation and

-----

87 configuration. From it, the narrator is expressing point of view, and therefore the modes of  
88 interpretation, on his existence and his way of living.

89 The third field described below has a social and political dimension. Indeed, it questions the  
90 places and spaces that open up the right to self-expression and, more broadly, the conditions  
91 of circulation of first-person narratives in the social world.

92  
93 **The story's access to the community.** The third component of the test lies in the format granted  
94 for the socialisation of the story. The term format can refer to a material medium (the print  
95 medium, paper or digital), but also to the time available to the narrator(s). It also, and perhaps  
96 above all, refers to the attentional resource of the person or community providing the  
97 attentional experience, this resource being a factor in the capacity to take into account and  
98 understand the singularity of the narrative. This format can also be apprehended insofar as it  
99 is governed by what Foucault (1972) identifies as the taboo of the object, the rituals of the  
100 circumstance, and the rights conferred (or denied) to the subject who speaks. Access to the  
101 narrative thus seems uncertain, because of the elements that can potentially stand in the way:  
102 distraction, temporal urgency, prescription on what is to be said, etc. The possibility of a "true  
103 parole", from the subject's point of view, may be hindered or blocked as the composition asserts  
104 itself. However, the strength of the narrative depends on it, as the ethopoetic capacity (as a mode  
105 of transformation of the subject's modes of existence) is dependent on the expression of truth,  
106 from the narrator's point of view.

107  
108 Examining the processes generated by narrative work, seen as a test, makes it possible to  
109 characterise the formative dimensions of storytelling, without, however, attributing mechanistic  
110 relationships to them that make it possible to predict the concretisation of effects over time.  
111 Indeed, although learning can be identified when an adult engages in a process of expression,  
112 description, oral or written narration of the story, the origin of this learning cannot be directly or  
113 strictly associated with the operations of composing or reviewing the self-narrative. What is  
114 generated by the narrative is not the acquisition of knowledge, but the ability to understand. From  
115 a hermeneutical perspective (Finger, 1984), this involves learning to question the narrative  
116 structures and habits of interpretation that organise the self-narrative, in order to open up the  
117 scope for interpreting lived experience, and thus gain access to understandings that have  
118 remained unnoticed, ungrasped, or obstructed by the forms of evidence that seem to have been  
119 imposed. This questioning can also lead to freedom from inherited discourses, as the subject  
120 emancipates themselves from the identities assigned to them by their history, background or  
121 social class (de Gaulejac, 2012).

122  
123 Numerous parameters therefore deserve precise examination in order to characterise what  
124 contributes to the emergence of new understandings, the transformation of interpretation habits,  
125 and the evolution of the subject's modes of existence. For this article, the focus is on the  
126 subject's activity of composition, based on the identification of lived events, their temporal  
127 ordering and their logical configurations. This line of research, which focuses on the modes of

128 composition of the self-narrative, is not conducted independently of the processes of putting  
129 the lived experience into words, or of the formats that make it possible to express the narrative  
130 to the community. The main aim of this study is to focus on these processes, insofar as they form  
131 part of the current of life stories in training.

## 132 **Temporal facts and narrative composition**

133 As was said at the start of this text, Pineau's proposal for defining life histories in training is:  
134 "the search for and construction of meaning on the basis of lived temporal events". Three  
135 blocks can be distinguished: "the search", "the construction of meaning" and "based on lived  
136 temporal facts". These three blocks can be associated with the dynamics of narrative  
137 composition, especially in relation to Ricœur's theory of plot (1983). This involves a tension  
138 between two operations: the temporal ordering of lived facts (i.e. the operation of  
139 temporalisation); and the association of facts with each other according to a set of inferences  
140 whose logical connections can oscillate between the possible, the probable or the certain (i.e. the  
141 operation of configuration). In Ricœur's theory, then, there is a focus on lived facts insofar as facts  
142 are the organisers of the chronology of the subject's history. In other words, the facts of life  
143 constitute the temporal milestones that stand out within experiential continuity, and these  
144 moments of salience are constituted as elements that can be grasped in order to make sense of  
145 them.

146  
147 However, several points need to be made clear. Firstly, the content taken into account by the  
148 subject in the life history work is lived experience. The addition of the term "lived" appears  
149 decisive here. Without it, the story could end up in literary studies, fictionalised biography or  
150 historiography. In life history work, the subject is led to remember and then to grasp the facts that  
151 he has experienced himself. So it's not a question of documenting the facts of the period using a  
152 historiographical approach, or inventing facts to augment history or imagine alternative  
153 scenarios. Rather, it is a matter of becoming aware of what is given in the form of significant  
154 facts and which, precisely because of this gift, influences and generates the work of interpretation  
155 that is part of the configuration and is accomplished in the constitution of the history from which  
156 the subject thinks of itself in time. As Ferrarotti (2013) points out, this logic of enquiry does  
157 not preclude, at a later stage, the crossover between lived experience and social facts.

158  
159 However, several points need to be made clear. Firstly, the content taken into account by the  
160 narrator in the life history approach is the lived experience. The addition of the term "lived"  
161 appears decisive here. Without it, the story could end up in literary studies, fictionalised  
162 biography or historiography. In the life history field, the adult is led to remember and then to  
163 grasp the facts that he or she has experienced. So it's not a question of documenting the facts of  
164 the period using a historiographical approach, or inventing facts to augment history or imagine  
165 alternative scenarios. Rather, it is a matter of becoming aware of what is given in the form of  
166 significant facts and which, precisely because of this donation, influences and generates the  
167 work of interpretation that participates in the configuration and is accomplished in the  
168 constitution of the history from which the subject thinks of itself in time. As Ferrarotti (2013)  
169 points out, this logic of inquiry does not preclude, at a later stage, the crossover between lived  
170 experience and social facts.  
171

-----

172 This differentiation between facts and lived facts clarifies the notion of research mentioned by  
173 Pineau. The search for meaning involved in grasping lived experienced facts can be thought of in  
174 relation to the dynamics of configuration as presented by Ricœur (1983). According to this  
175 perspective, the person involved in the work proposed in the life story sessions is led to  
176 become aware of the geography of the personal facts which form the ground for interpretation  
177 and which participate in the hermeneutics of the self. To be meaningful, this proposition needs to  
178 be examined from two angles: that of the notion of fact itself (1); and that of the ways in which  
179 facts are grasped (or selected) by the narrator (2).

180  
181 As Françoise Lavocat shows in her book (2016), the precise definition of what constitutes a fact  
182 in narratology, psychoanalysis, cognitive science or literature is problematic. The same applies  
183 to the field of experiential hermeneutics from which life stories in adult education originate  
184 (Fabre, 1994). When the adults take attention to their lived experience, they get in contact  
185 with moments that appear with random precision and clarity. The exploration of lived  
186 experience, which can be thought of as a mode of first-person inquiry in which the subject  
187 engages in order to understand himself, and which takes place through the conversion of the view,  
188 is governed by a microdynamic process of awakening memory. This means that the narrator who  
189 turns to his or her experience is led to realise that he or she comes into contact with past  
190 moments of life when he or she makes himself or herself available, without to be able to lead  
191 these lived donation memory. In short, the facts of life that enter into the story are given with the  
192 force of evidence to the narrator who works with them during the process of interpretation  
193 and configuration. Similarly, the perimeter of the fact, and the boundary that separates it  
194 from the realm of fiction, to use Lavocat's terms (2016), appear to be neither clear nor definitive.  
195 The observation of these dynamics makes the firm characterisation of lived events problematic.  
196 Or, more precisely, it makes the boundary between the operation of temporalisation and that of  
197 configuration porous. In short, we can say that the work of wording lived experienced facts into  
198 temporal order, even if it respects the principle of succession (Brémond, 1963; 1966), which  
199 includes an historical dimension, is partly part of a logic of interpretation, since to select an  
200 event is to bring out a salience within the continuity of the experience.

201  
202 Consideration of this issue, combined with the very definition of what constitutes an experience,  
203 raises questions about the processes involved in selecting lived experienced facts. This is  
204 relatively easy to improve it.

205  
206 If I make myself available for recollection by thinking, for example, of a learning  
207 moment that occurred in the course of my life, several of these moments come to  
208 mind, in an apparently spontaneous way. From a certain point of view, I am led to  
209 consider that these moments appear to compete with each other. How, then, do I go  
210 about sorting out the facts, selecting those that seem to me to stand out the most?  
211 Should I capture them all? But where do I draw the line? What would be, to use a  
212 classic notion of forms of enquiry in the social sciences, the line at which the  
213 data begins to saturate?  
214

215 The above passage aims to give an account of the complexity of the operation enabling access to  
216 the facts during the awakening of the memory, recollection and differentiation of the moment  
217 within experiential continuity. At this scale, that of the recalled moment, other factors need to  
218 be deliberated: what is the relevant time span for apprehending the experienced event? What  
219 level of detail should be used when putting it into words? At the level of the story, it is  
220 the criterion of completeness (Ricœur, 1983) that is interrogated: in order for the narrative  
221 to appear complete from the narrator's point of view, there are facts that cannot remain on  
222 the margins of the story, as forbidden from the narrative. From this perspective, an unspeakable  
223 fact that cannot be put into words or made to make sense (Pollak, 1990) weakens the structure of  
224 the self-narrative, making it appear irremediably incomplete from the narrator's point of view.  
225 This criterion of completeness may therefore be constrained by the non dicible dimension of the  
226 events experienced. It may also be constrained by the format imposed on the narrative, the  
227 temporal compression associated with the biographical narrative regime (Breton, 2022) having  
228 the effect of limiting the number of facts that can be included in the story. What criteria should be  
229 used to decide whether a succession can take place, when all the facts cannot find the place they  
230 need, from the narrator's point of view, because of the necessarily constrained format in which  
231 the narrative is expressed? The format also has a constraining effect on the level of detail  
232 associated with the description of the facts, which may require, again from the narrator's point of  
233 view, detailed wording that is both aspectual (Adam, 2015) and profound (Petitmengin, 2010).  
234

235 Making sense of the temporal events we have experienced therefore requires us to engage in a  
236 process of composition, which entails its share of trials and tribulations: grasping the key events,  
237 arranging them according to a principle of succession, integrating moments left out of the story,  
238 producing inferences, manifesting a logic. This dynamic of composition cannot be dissociated  
239 from the organic dimension of self-narratives, which must be thought of as living matter, or even  
240 as an entity with a vitality of its own. Baroni (2007), in examining the aggregating and tensional  
241 processes of expectation, curiosity and surprise, emphasises the strength of the sensitive insofar as  
242 these dimensions form the tonal and ambient foundation (Bégout, 2020) of the narrative, through  
243 which the composition produces an intrigue that inscribes the narrative as a human  
244 understanding (Delory-Momberger, 2009) integrating the logical and the sensitive.  
245

## 246 **Experiential phenomenology and the kinetic regime of texts**

247 As already mentioned, in the context of life stories in training (Breton, 2019), support is  
248 offered to a group of adults in training so that they can experience self- narration on a  
249 biographical scale. To achieve this, the program is structured in phases, alternating between  
250 periods of theoretical and methodological input, periods of immersion in the narrative, and  
251 periods of expression and circulation of narratives within the group. A second sequence is also  
252 organised. Its purpose is to generate variations in temporal scales for the capture of experiences  
253 brought to language and integrated into the narrative.  
254

255 The expression "temporal fact experienced" contains the notion of duration. The narration of a  
256 period of life covers a longer period of existence than the narration of a moment or an instant.  
257 Given a constant format for expressing lived experience, the fact that the narrator is led to bring  
258 to language experiences of varying duration means that he has to adjust his compositional  
259 procedures, and to realise that this variation in procedures has effects on the manifestation of the

-----

260 experiential phenomena experienced in the narrative. It is this variation that generates the  
261 oscillations in the kinetic regime of the narrative, i.e. the phenomena of acceleration or slowing of  
262 the speed of the passage of time experienced during first-person narration. This variation in  
263 processes can result from a deliberate action on the part of the narrator, who decides to regulate  
264 the kinetics of the narrative according to criteria that are stabilised and explicit from his point of  
265 view, depending on what he considers relevant or decisive to convey in language.

266  
267 However, a concrete examination of the narrator's activity in the context of a life history training  
268 session shows that the kinetics of the narrative are given to the subject in the form of a force of  
269 evidence, without the elements governing this gift being made conscious or thematised. This  
270 donation must be seen here as a force that produces a constraining effect on the mobilisation  
271 of the processes on the basis of which the composition of the narrative is organised. In other  
272 words, in the context of first-person narration, the narrator is moved by a force which, from a  
273 hermeneutical perspective, is quasi-destinal:

274  
275 "Experience can be said, it asks to be said. To bring it into language is not to  
276 change it into something else, but, by articulating and developing it, to make it become  
277 itself" (Ricœur, 1985, p. 62).

278  
279 This destinal character can, however, be reflected upon from a hermeneutic point of view, based  
280 on the configured dimension of the narrative, the level of strength of the interpretative structures  
281 and the associated inferential dynamics. From this point of view, the narrator's involvement in the  
282 process of composition enables us to bring out, in a discourse or text, the version of the narrative  
283 that has been constituted with the "force of the evidence" from the narrator's point of view, a  
284 means in the course of experience, and which nevertheless generates modes of existence and ways  
285 of inhabiting the world of life. This process can be set in motion when writing or speaking, when  
286 rereading, or when receiving the life stories of others. It proceeds from a logic of rupture with  
287 the sedimented version, this rupture being made possible by the disengagement from the  
288 habits of interpretation that have generated a quasi-naturalised meaning that prefigures the modes  
289 of interpretation and participates in the structures of relevance of the world of life (Schütz, 1987).  
290 The emergence of a gap in meaning can therefore result, in the context of the "life stories in  
291 training" sessions, from the dialogical process associated with the experience of reception during  
292 the circulation of life stories. This breach can also be provoked by the variation of kinetic  
293 regimes, by the slowing down at certain moments, and by the entry into the regime of  
294 microphenomenological description during certain phases of the narrative.

295  
296 The entry into a microphenomenological regime corresponds to a phase of the narrative that  
297 proceeds from an extreme slowing down of the speed of kinetic speed of the narration. Examples  
298 of this can be found in literature, particularly in Proust's writings, where descriptive passages are  
299 characterised by a quasi-suspension of time (Esnault, 2019). In the case of autobiographical texts,  
300 i.e. those written in the first person, this process of slowing down has the effect of extending  
301 the space given to certain moments of the life course in the text, with the effect of generating a

302 detailed description of these moments. These phenomena of kinetic variation appear  
303 spontaneously to the narrator. They can, however, be induced and then produced methodically. In  
304 this case, the narrator, in the course of his narrative, proceeds in a regulated way, in the course  
305 of putting it into words, in order to transfer to language the microprocessual and sensitive  
306 dimensions of the lived experience. This activity of regulated description (Petitmengin et al,  
307 2015) has been documented in Vermersch's two main works (1994; 2011), and then in work on  
308 microphenomenological description (Depraz, 2020). It has been the subject of specific study, in  
309 relation to the 'strata' of lived experience (Petitmengin, 2010).

310  
311 This practice of description, conducted in a regulated manner during the course of the narrative  
312 activity, does not have the exclusive function of intensifying the depth of the diegesis. Its  
313 function is also, and above all, to elucidate the preconfigured dimensions of the narrative that  
314 result from the inferences that generate the interpretive processes that underpin the narrative  
315 structure of the self-narrative. In other words, slowing down and detailing engages the narrator in  
316 the work of elucidating the interpretive processes that generate the meaning conveyed by the  
317 experience, and these processes may occur without the narrator's knowledge, i.e. without him or  
318 her resorting to any voluntary work. Describing, in this case, means suspending the system of  
319 interpretation that takes place along the way, in order to question and widen the range of possible  
320 ways of signifying the experience:

321  
322 To describe is to put aside the formulation of the causes of phenomena in favour of an  
323 account of what is noticed. Hence the preference given to the 'how' rather than the 'why'  
324 or the 'what', i.e. the ways of being, the modalities of presence, the qualities of lived  
325 experience and the processes by which phenomena emerge (Depraz, 2014, p. 136)

326  
327 For this description to appear in the narrative in a regulated way, it presupposes the development  
328 of narrative capacities (Breton, 2019). During self-writing, as Baudouin (2010) shows, the  
329 variation in kinetic regimes in autobiographical texts is spontaneously given to the narrator. It is  
330 therefore indicative of narrative tension: the testing of moments, the non-dicibility of  
331 experiences...). It is during the rereading period that the narrator can see whether he has  
332 decided to emphasise a quasi-unawareness of past experiences, by noting the ways in which he  
333 has been able to narrate, the space that has proved necessary for the narration, and the forms  
334 of organisation that have proved relevant to temporalisation. Conversely, to tell, to say and to  
335 describe in a regulated way is to establish, in the course of expression, whether written or  
336 oral, a dynamic of transformation of the rapport to experience. The ability to describe in fact  
337 generates this capacity for elucidation, not in the aftermath of the expression and socialisation  
338 of the narrative, but in the course of its refiguration during the constitution of the text.

## 339 **Expiential fermeneutics as a paradigm for adult education**

340 As it has been said said, the life stories in adult education uses the practice of storytelling as a  
341 means of self-formation. It is part of the philosophical tradition of hermeneutics, and finds its  
342 contemporary extensions in the fields of experiential training, self-formation and Bildung (Fabre,  
343 1994). The relationship between hermeneutic philosophy, narrative theories and self-formation  
344 has yet to be formally documented. Numerous works have been published on the place of  
345 narrative in the field of adult education (Dominicé, 2007; Pineau and Legrand, 2019; Josso, 1991;  
346 Villers, 2002), as well as in the field of biographical research in education (Deloy- Momberger,

-----

2005) and the clinical narratives (Niewiadomski, 2012). These works are the result of real-life experience for the researchers, observations made during life story sessions with groups of adults in training. They make it possible to establish a paradigm in education, training and research (Delory-Momberger, 2019). Studies are still needed, however, to characterise the processes involved in understanding, broadening the scope of meaning, and overcoming the habits of interpretation that preconfigure the narrative without the subject's knowledge.

"I will understand hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation, concerned with the operations necessary for understanding a text. Also, it is always good to warn anyone who resit a little lost here since the summary, and references to authors studied, I deal here with textual hermeneutics...." (Souza, 2022, p. 29)

This then leads him to specify the singularity of the hermeneutic of the self in the field of adult education and training:

Interpretation is, in the end, for Ricœur (2011), an act of self-understanding. The appropriation in the sense proposed by the author leads the reader to a hermeneutics of himself, a form of analysis by the subject of his existence, by inserting in the way he sees himself other concepts and other possible worlds as a horizon of possibility for existing. (Matos-de-Souza, 2022, p. 36)

Training from a hermeneutical point of view is part of a tradition that seems to run counter to conceptions of adult education that focus on the logic of skills, the acquisition of know-how and the stock of technical and procedural knowledge. The effects generated by the narrative are in fact to be located on the scale of understanding, i.e. the way in which the person makes sense of the experience over time, according to a longitudinal perspective, this making sense participating in a process of forming which takes place in one or more modes of existence. From this perspective, the reflexive grasp and elucidation of the processes involved in interpreting lived experience and prefiguring connections with experience have both a hermeneutic and an ethical dimension: hermeneutic, because self-understanding cannot be separated from the dynamics of inter-understanding with others, but also with the living world, or even the ecological environment as a whole (Pineau, 1989); ethical, because the training processes generated move away from the processes of adapting to the workstation, of acquiring knowledge alienated from a singular technique, to resituate the processes of making sense on the scale of existence. Experiential hermeneutics leads to a training process that lasts: the time it takes to acquire knowledge, the time it takes to integrate a practice, the time it takes to form a subject, the time it takes to affiliate and belong to one or more collective(s) or community(ies). The ethical dimension is also embodied in facts, lived temporal facts. From this point of view, despite the sometimes arduous vocabulary used, hermeneutics and experiential phenomenology have a concrete, embodied, incorporated dimension. This concrete dimension of hermeneutics is evident in the work of Ricœur (1986). It can also be grasped in phenomenology, notably in the work of Depraz (2012) and Varela and Shear (1999).

## To conclude

390 The aim of this study was to clarify the place of 'lived temporal facts' within life history training  
391 systems and practices. To do this, it drew on theories of narrative rooted in hermeneutics,  
392 phenomenology and narratology. Engaged in sometimes heated debates with sociology for whom,  
393 notably according to Bourdieu (1986), biographies could neither constitute robust and valid  
394 research approaches nor means of emancipation from cultural and social determinants, the  
395 consideration given to contemporary work from experiential phenomenology and contemporary  
396 narratology appears to be little visible. Research that mobilises life stories as a means of  
397 qualitative research in the domain of the humanities and social sciences (Breton, 2023), or those  
398 that aim to characterise the forms of stories and accounts as a means of examining their effects  
399 from both scientific and formative perspectives, must necessarily be open to disciplines situated  
400 at the intersection of narratology, hermeneutics, phenomenology and even the cognitive sciences.  
401 There are still many areas to be studied, including the narrative unconscious activity, the rhythmic  
402 unconscious (Alhadeff-Jones, 2020), forms of description in the self- narrative, and the  
403 circulation of first-, second- and third-person narratives (Depraz,  
404 2014b).

406 These disciplinary and interdisciplinary horizons can be mobilised in the context of narrative  
407 research, as in the field of adult education and training. In the context of narrative research, the  
408 crossover between training and research appears to be maximal. In the course of this article, it  
409 was pointed out that narrative constitutes a practice of the self, in other words a practice of self-  
410 formation mobilising narrative practices. It has also been said that narrative is a means of  
411 qualitative inquiry in the human and social sciences. However, it would be more accurate to  
412 say that narrative research makes the research and training processes inseparable. In fact,  
413 initiating research using narrative practices presupposes experiential knowledge of its effects, for  
414 ethical reasons, but also for reasons of relevance and effectiveness. Having an experiential  
415 knowledge of storytelling, of the processes involved and of the effects generated over time,  
416 means that it is getting possible to structure systems and to support others in their narrative  
417 work by adjusting to the flow of expression, of putting words into words and of narrative  
418 composition. Conversely, learning through storytelling means developing a familiarity with a  
419 mode of knowledge, including its logical and narrative structure, which has the ability to  
420 make manifest phenomena that are otherwise blind.

## 421 **References**

- 422 Breton, H. (2019). Vitalité des formations par les histoires de vie. Dans M.-C. Bernard,  
423 G. Tschopp et A. Slowik (dir.), *Les voies du récit : pratiques biographiques en formation,*  
424 *intervention et recherche* (p. 13-27). Québec, Canada : Éditions Science et bien commun.
- 425 Breton, H. (2022). *L'enquête narrative en sciences humaines et sociales*. Armand Colin.
- 426 BRETON, H. (2023). *Investigação narrativa em ciências humanas e sociais*. Tradução : Camila  
427 Aloisio Alves. São Paulo, Brasil : Fundação Carlos Chagas. DOI 10.18222/fcc-60876-16-7
- 428 Adam, M. (2015). *Les textes: types et prototypes*. Armand Colin.
- 429 Alhadeff-Jones, M. (2020). Explorer l'inconscient rythmique dans les pratiques d'histoires de vie  
430 en formation. *Éducation Permanente*, 222, 43-51. <https://doi.org/10.3917/edpe.222.0043>
- 431 Bakhtine, M. (2017). *Esthétique de la création verbale*. Gallimard.
- 432 Baroni, R. (2007). *La tension narrative. Suspense, curiosité et surprise*. Seuil.
- 433 Baudouin, J.-M. (2010). *De l'épreuve autobiographique*. Peter Lang.
- 434 Bégout, B. (2020). *Le concept d'ambiance*. Seuil.

[PREPRINT] **Breton, H.** (2023). Life history, lived temporal facts and adult education. *Linhas Críticas*, 29, e47892. <https://doi.org/10.26512/lc29202347892>

-----

- 435 Bourdieu, P. (1986). L'illusion biographique. *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, 62-63,  
436 69-72. <https://doi.org/10.3406/arss.1986.2317>
- 437 Bremond, C. (1966). La logique des possibles narratifs. *Communications*, 8, 60-76.  
438 <https://doi.org/10.3406/comm.1966.1115>
- 439 Bremond, C. (1973). *Logique du récit*. Seuil.
- 440 Cance, C., & Dubois, D. (2015). Dire notre expérience du sonore : nomination et  
441 référenciation. *Langue française*, 188, 15-32. <https://doi.org/10.3917/lf.188.0015>
- 442 Delory-Momberger, C. (2005). *Histoire de vie et Recherche biographique en éducation*.  
443 Economica.
- 444 Delory-Momberger, C. (2009). *La condition biographique : Essais sur le récit de soi dans la*  
445 *modernité avancée*. Téraèdre.
- 446 Delory-Momberger, C. (2019). *Vocabulaire des histoires de vie et de la recherche biographique*.  
447 Érès.
- 448 Depraz, N. (2012). *Comprendre la phénoménologie. Une pratique concrète*. Armand Colin.
- 449 Depraz, N. (2014a). *Attention et vigilance*. Presses universitaires de France.
- 450 Depraz, N. (2014b). *Première, deuxième, troisième personne*. Zeta Books.
- 451 Depraz, N. (2020). De la narration dans l'entretien micro-phénoménologique. *Éducation*  
452 *permanente*, 222, 23-30. <https://doi.org/10.3917/edpe.222.0023>
- 453 Dominicé, P. (2007). *La formation biographique*. L'Harmattan.
- 454 Dominicé, P., Gaulejac de, V., Jobert, G., & Pineau, G. (2000). Que faire des histoires de vie ?  
455 Retour sur quinze ans de pratiques. *Éducation permanente*, 142, 217-240.
- 456 Esnault, N. (2019). Narration et éducation thérapeutique. *Chemins de formation*, HS2019, 15-29.
- 457 Fabre, M. (1994). *Penser la formation*. Presses universitaires de France.
- 458 Ferrarotti, F. (2013). *Histoires et histoire de vie*. Téraèdre.
- 459 Finger, M. (1984). *Biographie et herméneutique. Les fondements épistémologiques et*  
460 *méthodologiques de la méthode biographique*. Presses de l'université de Montréal.
- 461 Foucault, M. (1972). *L'ordre du discours*. Gallimard.
- 462 Gaulejac, V. (2012). *L'histoire en héritage*. Payot.
- 463 Josso, C. (1991). *Cheminer vers soi. L'Âge d'Homme*.
- 464 Lavocat, F. (2016). *Fait et fiction*. Seuil.
- 465 Matos-de-Souza, R. (2022). Notas para o trabalho com a hermenêutica na pesquisa em  
466 educação. *Momento - Diálogos Em Educação*, 31(03), 26-40.  
467 <https://doi.org/10.14295/momento.v31i03.14038>
- 468 Niewiadomski, C. (2012). *Recherche biographique et clinique narrative*. Érès.
- 469 Petitmengin, C. (2010). La dynamique prérefléchie de l'expérience vécue. *Alter*, 18, 165-182.  
470 <https://doi.org/10.4000/alter.1668>
- 471 Petitmengin, C., Bitbol, M., & Ollagnier-Beldame, M. (2015). Vers une science de l'expérience  
472 vécue. *Intellectica*, 2015/2, 64, 53-76. <https://doi.org/10.3406/intel.2015.1012>
- 473 Pineau, G. (1989). La formation expérientielle en auto-, éco- et coformation. *Éducation*  
474 *permanente*, 100-101, 23-31.
- 475 Pineau, G., & Legrand, J.-L. (2019). *Les histoires de vie*. Presses universitaires de France.
- 476 Pollak, M. (1990). *L'expérience concentrationnaire. Essai sur le maintien de l'identité sociale*.  
477 Éditions Métailié.
- 478 Ricœur, P. (1949). *Philosophie de la volonté. Le volontaire et l'involontaire*. Aubier.

- 479 Ricœur, P. (1983). *Temps et récit. 1. L'intrigue et le récit historique*. Seuil.
- 480 Ricœur, P. (1986). *Du texte à l'action*. Seuil.
- 481 Ricœur, P. (1985). *Temps et récit. 3. Le temps raconté*. Seuil.
- 482 Schütz, A. (1987). *Le chercheur et le quotidien*. Klincksieck.
- 483 Varela, F. J., & Shear, J. (1999). *The view from within. First-person approaches to the study of*  
484 *consciousness*. Imprit Academic.
- 485 Vermersch, P. (1994). *L'entretien d'explicitation*. ESF.
- 486 Vermersch, P. (2011). *Explicitation et phénoménologie*. Presses universitaires de France ;
- 487 Villers, G. (2002). *Souci et soin de soi : Liens et frontières entre histoire de vie, psychothérapie*  
488 *et psychanalyse*. L'Harmattan.
- 489
- 490