Do followers really matter in Stackelberg competition? - Archive ouverte HAL
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2011

Do followers really matter in Stackelberg competition?

Ludovic A. Julien
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Olivier Musy
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Aurélien Saïdi

Résumé

In this note, we consider a generalized T−stage Stackelberg oligopoly. We provide a proof and an interpretation that under the two necessary and sufficient conditions of linear aggregate demand and identical constant marginal costs, followers do not matter for leaders. Leaders act as rational myopic agents, voluntarily ignoring the number of followers and remaining stages, thereby behaving as Cournotian oligopolists. Strategies of incumbent firms are invariant to entry of new cohorts. Their profits can be studied by the way of two discount factors: the first impacting markup and the second impacting output supply. Some implications in terms of welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium are derived.
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Dates et versions

hal-04141007 , version 1 (26-06-2023)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04141007 , version 1

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Ludovic A. Julien, Olivier Musy, Aurélien Saïdi. Do followers really matter in Stackelberg competition?. 2011. ⟨hal-04141007⟩
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