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# When in-core DIFT faces fault injection attacks

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## Information Flow Tracking in a RISC-V processor

Different types of IFT [1, 2]:



- Static or Dynamic
- Software, hardware (in-core, off-core [3] (dedicated CPU, co-processor)) or mixed

Three steps

- Tag initialization
- Tag propagation
- Tag verification

Levels of IFT

- OS level
- Application level
- Low level




D-RISCV [4] has been developed by researchers from Columbia University, New York, and University of Turin (Italy).


## Physical Attacks against DIFT

We consider an attacker able to:

- combine software and physical attacks to defeat the DIFT mechanism,
- inject faults in registers associated to the DIFT-related components: set to 0, set to 1, a bit-flip at a random position of the targeted register.



Tag propagation in a buffer overflow attack



Logic description of the exception driving in a buffer overflow attack

## Results

We used fault injection simulations to evaluate the sensitivity of DIFT at cycle-accurate and bit-accurate levels (CABA).

	Crash	NSTR	Delay	Success	Total
Buffer overflow	0	940	17	15 (1.54%)	972

Fault simulations end status

	137140 ns		137180 ns		137220 ns	137260 ns		137300 ns
	set to 0	set to 1	set to 0	set to 1	bitflip	set to 0	bitflip	set to 0
pc_if_o_tag					✓			✓
rf_reg[1]					✓	✓		✓
tcr_q	✓		✓		✓		✓	
tpr_q		✓		✓				✓

Buffer overflow: success per register, fault type and simulation time

## Perspectives

- Implement and evaluate countermeasures taking into account constraints (performance, area, consumption) to protect critical computation related to DIFT.
- Extend the study to the entire D-RISCV core and a more complex threat model.
- Perform a fault injection campaign targeting a FPGA implementation.

## Bibliography

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- [3] H. Kannan *et al.*, "Decoupling dynamic information flow tracking with a dedicated coprocessor," in *International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks*, IEEE, 2009. DOI: 10.1109/DSN.2009.5270347.
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