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Article Dans Une Revue Mathematical Social Sciences Année : 2021

Stable agreements through liability rules: A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem

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hal-04097841 , version 1 (15-05-2023)

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Kevin Techer. Stable agreements through liability rules: A multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, 111, pp.77-88. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.003⟩. ⟨hal-04097841⟩
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