This article seeks to broaden the scope of discussions pertaining to land-value capture (LVC). Scholars have now accumulated considerable documentation and analyses on how public authorities can (and whether they should) capture land-value increases that stem from actions other than the landowner’s. Little attention has been paid, however, to how public actors might compete for, and share the fruit of LVC. Using the case study of Nanterre-la- Folie, a district located in the vicinity of a new train station within the Grand Paris metropolitan area, we draw attention to the interplay of a variety of public actors (transit operators, local governments, national government) as they negotiate their share of transit-related LVC. In doing so, we show that the largely agreed-upon narrative of LVC as public actors versus private ones leaves important aspects of planning in a blind spot. By drawing attention to public actors’ competition for transit-related LVC, we inform academic debates on metropolitan governance and highlight implications for the unfolding and outcomes of real-estate projects.