



HAL
open science

A Mean Field Game Model for Renewable Investment under Long-Term Uncertainty and Risk Aversion

Célia Escribe, Josselin Garnier, Emmanuel Gobet

► **To cite this version:**

Célia Escribe, Josselin Garnier, Emmanuel Gobet. A Mean Field Game Model for Renewable Investment under Long-Term Uncertainty and Risk Aversion. *Dynamic Games and Applications*, 2024, 10.1007/s13235-024-00554-x . hal-04055421

HAL Id: hal-04055421

<https://hal.science/hal-04055421v1>

Submitted on 2 Apr 2023

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

A Mean Field Game Model for Renewable Investment under Long-Term Uncertainty and Risk Aversion

Célia Escribe^{1,2,*}, Josselin Garnier², and Emmanuel Gobet²

¹CIREN-CNRS, 45 bis, Avenue de La Belle Gabrielle, 94736, Nogent sur Marne, France

²CMAP, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Route de Saclay, Palaiseau, France

*Corresponding author: Célia Escribe, celia.escribe@polytechnique.edu

Abstract

We consider a stylized model for investment into renewable power plants under long-term uncertainty. We model risk-averse agents facing heterogeneous weather conditions and a common noise including uncertainty on demand trends, future fuel prices and the average national weather conditions. The objective of each agent is to maximize multistage profit by controlling investment in discrete time steps. We analyze this model in a noncooperative game setting with N players, where the interaction among agents occurs through the spot price mechanism. Our model extends to a mean field game with common noise when the number of agents is infinite. We prove that the N -player game admits a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we prove that under proper assumptions, any sequence of Nash equilibria to the N -player game converges to the unique solution of the MFG game. Finally, our numerical experiments highlight the impact of the risk aversion parameter and emphasize the difference between our model which captures heterogeneity and representative agent models.

Keywords: Stochastic control, Mean field games, Nash equilibrium, Renewable energy, Electricity markets

AMS subject classifications: 91A50, 49N80, 91A16, 91A80, 91A07

1 Introduction

1.1 Context and objectives

The achievement of carbon neutrality by 2050 requires significant and prompt reductions of emissions in the energy sector (Pörtner et al., 2022). Energy-related emissions contribute to nearly 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions (Friedlingstein et al., 2022). Decarbonization of the electricity sector offers a promising solution, given the considerable cost reductions of variable renewable energy (VRE) sources over the last decade, which have rendered them a competitive alternative to fossil fuel power plants. Furthermore, the electrification of heating and transportation sectors could further reduce greenhouse gas emissions related to energy by replacing the use of fossil fuels with electricity. Consequently, most energy transition scenarios rely on heavy investments in low-carbon assets, including renewable power plants, such as onshore and offshore wind turbines, solar panels, and biomass, to attain the necessary emissions reductions (IEA, 2022). Understanding whether market rules and regulatory arrangements in the energy sector allow to follow such

scaling up of renewable investments is therefore a key issue for policy makers today (Fabra, 2021).

Prospective models investigating investment in the energy sector – and more specifically in renewable power plants – should strive to include some essential features. Since the liberalization of the electricity sector, investment decisions are made by private risk-averse players, and are subject to a significant amount of uncertainty (Ostrovnaya et al., 2020). Future evolution of electricity markets is uncertain, regarding in particular future levels of electricity demand, evolution of power mix and market design, technology costs, fuel costs, or public policy. With increasing renewable penetration and subsequent decline in VRE unit revenues due to the cannibalization effect (López Prol and Schill, 2021), the impact of uncertainties related to weather and demand variability is also becoming increasingly important to understand and to account for (Staffell and Pfenninger, 2018). Such variability includes different time scales, going from very short-term volatility (hourly scale) to inter-annual variability (López Prol and Schill, 2021). All uncertainties translate into electricity price risk, and variable and uncertain profits, thus impacting the decisions of risk-averse investors.

Moreover, such investors are numerous and may have different characteristics, such as their geographical location, their level of risk aversion or their technology preferences. It is therefore important to allow for the representation of many competing heterogeneous agents who may share common features (such as national weather conditions) (Anwar et al., 2022). In particular, the question of whether renewable support systems such as feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums should be geographically differentiated in order to avoid a higher concentration of renewable energy technologies in most productive areas (such as sunny or windy areas) has been raised (Butler and Neuhoff, 2008). Indeed, such geographical concentration could lead to congestion, increased costs in the longer term and decreased energy supply security.

Long investment horizons (several decades) require consideration of multiple investment decision periods to account for transformation pathways (Fraunholz et al., 2023). It is also essential to develop tractable models with effective numerical tools to analyze and use the results.

Finally, one could expect to have theoretical guarantees on the properties of the model output, such as whether the trajectory conforms to a Nash equilibrium, although it may be not required by some authors interested in studying systems out of equilibrium. This last feature distinguishes simulation models from optimization models. Our goal in this work is to incorporate many of these desirable features into a new model investigating investment in renewable power plants.

Three main approaches have been used to develop prospective models for the evolution of the energy sector.

First, equilibrium models are optimization models where the individual profit maximization problems of the different market players are solved simultaneously to obtain a Nash equilibrium (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2011). Equilibrium models generally allow to represent different categories of uncertainties through a scenario-based approach. While such models can theoretically include various agents with heterogeneous characteristics and multistage investment decisions, their numerical complexity strongly limits the actual number of agents which can be considered (Mays et al., 2019). Equilibrium models are also mostly two-stage, thus not representing transformation pathways.

Second, agent-based modeling (ABMs) represent a new and widely used approach in the energy sector. ABMs provide a bottom-up description of a complex, evolving system

in which agents interact through a prescribed set of rules (Farmer and Foley, 2009). They allow the representation of heterogeneous agents and a very high degree of realism in describing market structure and real-world aspects such as asymmetric information, collective learning, or market power (Weidlich and Veit, 2008; Tesfatsion, 2018). However, mimicking real-world behavior and realistic markets with a high level of detail quickly leads to numerically intensive simulations and less transparent modeling. Moreover, ABMs are simulation models, not optimization models. Therefore, they do not provide theoretical guarantees for characterizing the model output, for example proving that it is a Nash equilibrium from which no agent has an interest to deviate.

Lastly, a more recent approach coming from the applied mathematics community is mean field games (MFGs), which were introduced in Lasry and Lions (2007). They are stochastic games where an infinite number of agents interact symmetrically through the average density of the players. MFG models therefore include by design a continuum of agents, and the mathematical framework also allows to derive strong theoretical guarantees, such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium. However, such complex mathematical framework may require sacrificing model realism or interpretability, and the MFG literature lacks effective numerical tools to analyze the model outputs in more complex settings than the linear quadratic setting.

Our goal is to provide a middle way approach trying to include as many of previously listed features as possible to model investment into renewable power plants by heterogeneous agents under long-term uncertainty and risk aversion. Our approach relies on the MFG framework, thus allowing by essence the representation of numerous heterogeneous agents and deriving theoretical guarantees regarding existence of a Nash equilibrium and convergence of the N -player game towards the limiting MFG. On the other hand, we strive to provide a realistic and interpretable model, where many sources of uncertainties are included, where the specificity of renewables variability is captured, and which is numerically tractable. Before explaining in detail our original contributions to the topic, we shall first give the state of the art with the previously introduced three approaches, both on the modeling viewpoint and the mathematical analysis viewpoint.

1.2 State of the art in energy economics and MFGs

Equilibrium models were firstly developed in response to the need to adapt traditional cost minimization problems taking the perspective of a social planner to the new competitive investment environment, with rising uncertainties and overwhelming risk (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2011). While the theoretical framework for such models is introduced with an arbitrary number of agents, numerical experiments are often made with very few players, for example two players in Mays et al. (2019) and Abada et al. (2017) and three players in Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011). All such papers also consider a two-stage setting, and while Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) highlights that extending this to a multistage setting is not conceptually difficult, this would result in an exponential increase (in the number of stages) of computational effort. Ambrosius et al. (2020) explore the interaction between different electricity market designs and risk aversion in a stochastic multi-level equilibrium model. To circumvent the problem mentioned above of computational complexity of representing multiple agents, the authors make the quite demanding assumption that financial markets are complete, thus simplifying the equilibrium decisions into welfare-maximizing decisions. The same hypothesis is made in Munoz et al. (2017) and Möbius et al. (2021). However, this assumption does not hold in real electricity markets, where there are for example no long-term contracts to cope with risk management over several years (Abada et al., 2017;

de Maere d’Aertrycke et al., 2017).

As mentioned above, ABMs allow for greater level of detail in the modeling of wholesale electricity markets than equilibrium models, and can include heterogeneous agents (Tessfatsion, 2018). Such models have been used to investigate the interdependencies between risk aversion and market design. They studied more specifically the effects of uncoordinated changes in market design in a multi-country model (Fraunholz et al., 2023), the impact of imperfect information and firms’ heterogeneous attributes (Anwar et al., 2022), and the effect of investors’ risk aversion on the performance of support schemes (Fagiani et al., 2013). Many sources of uncertainty can be included in such models, such as load growth (Botterud et al., 2007; Kell et al., 2019; Anwar et al., 2022), inter-annual weather variability (Petitet et al., 2017; Fraunholz et al., 2023), fuel prices (Fagiani et al., 2013; Kell et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018) and carbon prices (Kell et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2018). Uncertainties are usually represented through scenario trees or Monte-Carlo simulations. However, as stated previously, ABMs are not optimization models and therefore do not provide any theoretical insights on the simulated trajectory.

MFG models have been developed and applied to the energy sector. Alasseur et al. (2020) explored how to optimally control a storage device in a noncooperative game setting where nodes compete through the electricity price. The trade-offs between higher and more stable revenues from fossil fuel thermal power plants and the negative externalities of a carbon tax for electricity producers were studied in Carmona et al. (2021). Two papers should be emphasized as they consider settings close to the one developed in this paper. Bonnans et al. (2021a) analyze a model with risk-averse agents optimizing a linear discrete-time dynamical system and interacting through a price which depends on the aggregate demand and through a congestion function. This paper mostly focuses on proving existence of a solution in a general theoretical setting. Aid et al. (2020) introduce a game where renewable and conventional producers compete through optimal entry and exit times. Their optimal stopping MFG setting allows to understand the dynamics of investment and divestment in an uncertain context, where conventional producers face uncertain costs represented through a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process and renewable producers face intermittent output characterized by a slow climatic variation through a Jacobi process.

MFG also provides a theoretical framework for deriving existence and convergence results. Many results regarding existence of solutions to mean field games have been developed over the last decade. Carmona and Delarue (2013) develop a probabilistic approach to the MFG problem. They derive a specific form of the stochastic maximum principle, and use fixed point arguments in the space of flows of probability to conclude to the existence of the value function. Their result is improved in Carmona et al. (2016) to further include common noise. The other main approach to constructing equilibria in MFG recasts the fixed point problem in terms of a forward-backward stochastic partial differential equation or a forward-backward conditional McKean-Vlasov equation, and relies on a monotonicity condition to prove existence (Cardaliaguet et al., 2019).

The convergence problem is one of the current research questions in MFG. It asks whether the N -player equilibria converge to a solution of the MFG. While it has been shown in various settings that MFG solutions provide approximate Nash equilibria to the N -player game (Carmona and Delarue, 2013), the convergence problem is significantly harder. Convergence has been known in some very specific settings, for example in the linear-quadratic setting (Bardi, 2012), or for ergodic MFG (Bardi and Feleqi, 2016). Convergence results depend on the type of controls considered for the N -player game, whether we consider open-loop or closed-loop controls. With open-loop controls, players choose

their control as an adapted process on some given filtered probability space. The convergence for open-loop MFG has been extensively studied in [Lacker \(2016\)](#). In closed-loop controls, players choose control as a feedback function of the state of the system. The convergence problem was solved in this setting relying on the master equation framework. However, this requires a sufficiently smooth solution to the value function ([Cardaliaguet et al., 2019](#)). These shortcomings were addressed in [Lacker and Flem \(2021\)](#), which relies on the probabilistic approach developed in [Lacker \(2016\)](#) and on the notion of weak MFG solutions to prove that all closed-loop approximative equilibria converge to a weak mean field equilibrium.

1.3 Contributions of this work

We develop a stylized MFG model to study and understand investment in renewable energy under long-term uncertainty regarding evolution of wholesale electricity markets. We consider heterogeneous risk-averse agents investing in renewable capacity in discrete time steps (corresponding to 5-year time steps), while being exposed to a common long-term uncertainty and to the variability of renewable production at the hourly scale. The rest of the power mix is assumed to evolve exogeneously, as we expect that more stringent climate regulations will dictate evolution in fossil-fuel capacities (such as gas), rather than market-based interactions. A representative agent indexed by i controls her investment strategy $(q_t^i)_{1 \leq t \leq T-1}$, and minimizes the following objective, knowing other agents' strategy \mathbf{q}^{-i} :

$$\mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} L^\beta(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_T^i e^{-rT} g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right],$$

where the running cost L^β has the following general form

$$L^\beta(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) = e^{-rt} \left(Q_t^i f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + c_t q_t^i + \tilde{c}(q_t^i)^2 \right).$$

Running cost L^β captures the (negative) agent's profit $Q_t^i f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t)$, and the convex investment costs $c_t q_t^i + \tilde{c}(q_t^i)^2$, see [Section 2.3](#) for details. Q_t^i represents agent i 's total invested capacity weighted by the agent's average capacity factor Γ^i . Γ^i represents whether agent i faces on average better or worse weather conditions than the national average, and allows to capture heterogeneity among agents. Profit at time t depends on agent i 's total invested capacity Q_t^i , and on the electricity spot price, which itself depends on aggregate renewable production $m_t^{N,i}$. This is where interaction with the other agents takes place. Profit is specified as the sum of hourly profits and relies on historical weather and demand data, thus capturing the daily and seasonal patterns characterizing weather and demand variability and impacting electricity prices. The model allows to capture many types of uncertainties through the presence of common noise. The first kind of uncertainty D_t corresponds to evolution of market trends. It includes uncertainty on future levels of demand and the correlated uncertain evolution of power mix (e.g., evolution in gas capacity), as well as uncertainty on fuel prices. Our model also includes uncertainty on annual weather scenario \mathbf{Y}_t , as we emphasized previously the essential role inter-annual variability plays in power systems with a large renewable share. Running cost L^β includes in mapping f^β a convex combination between the random profit at time t and the conditional expected shortfall for the same profit, determined by uncertain market trends D_t and uncertain weather scenario \mathbf{Y}_t , thus capturing agents' risk aversion. Finally, the objective is multi-stage, allowing to explore the impact of transformation pathways.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide a modeling framework trying to reconcile the different advantages of the previously mentioned approaches (ABM, equilibrium models, MFG). Our model, while stylized, includes many essential features for a realistic description of electricity markets. Long-term uncertainties, inter-annual weather variability and agents' risk aversion are represented, while the multi-stage objective captures transformation pathways. The MFG framework allows to model explicitly a large number of agents while avoiding any numerical complexity. In particular, the MFG framework allows to capture heterogeneity among agents. The specific though sufficiently general formulation of the representative agent's problem avoids usual shortfalls of MFG models by offering interpretability of the model output, and effective numerical implementation. On the other hand, the MFG framework allows the derivation of strong theoretical guarantees in our specific setting characterizing the output of the model. In particular, we prove that the N -player game admits at least one equilibrium solution, which we characterize through a closed-form solution. We then introduce the corresponding MFG game and prove that under proper assumptions, this limiting game admits a unique solution, also characterized by a closed-form expression. Finally, we prove that any sequence of Nash equilibria to the N -player game converges to the unique solution of the MFG game. A second contribution consists in using our model to derive practical insights. In particular, we show that our results derived in the MFG framework with heterogeneity regarding geographical localization cannot be reproduced with a representative agent's model. This highlights the importance of explicitly modeling heterogeneity in energy prospective models. We develop a toy model applied to the specific case of France electricity market. Our numerical experiments highlight the importance of the risk aversion parameter and the analysis of the spread of invested capacity across agents, allowed by the explicit modeling of heterogeneity.

We want to emphasize the specificity of our contributions in comparison to the two papers [Aïd et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Bonnans et al. \(2021a\)](#) mentioned in Section 1.2 as having settings close to the one considered in this paper. While [Aïd et al. \(2020\)](#) also consider long-term evolution of electricity markets under uncertainty and large renewable penetration, they differ in many aspects from our setting. First, from a modeling perspective, they only consider renewable uncertain output through a slow climate variability, but they fail to consider the weather variability (especially inter-annual). They do not include risk aversion, and they do not account for common noise, while many sources of uncertainty are shared across agents (for example, evolution of demand). From a numerical perspective, their choice of a continuous setting with relaxed solutions of optimal stopping MFG makes numerical implementation harder, and the model less interpretable for practitioners. While [Bonnans et al. \(2021a\)](#) consider a similar discrete time setting with risk averse agents interacting through a price function depending on their average density, their setting differs fundamentally from our work in different ways. First, they focus on generic risk measures, and include an additional congestion term, preventing them from finding a closed form solution for the optimal control. They focus on idiosyncratic noise and do not include common noise. Finally, their generic theoretical setting only allows them to derive an existence result, and no result on uniqueness or convergence.

1.4 Notations

We set the investment time grid $\mathcal{T} := \{1, \dots, T - 1\}$. In practice, T corresponds to the usual prospective time horizon of 2050. The interval $[t; t + 1]$ corresponds to 5 years in the model. We set H the number of hours in a unit time interval $[t; t + 1)$. We denote $\mathcal{H} = \{0, \dots, H - 1\}$ the set of hours included in time interval $[t; t + 1)$. We write $T' > T$ for

the time after which all invested capacities at time T are decommissioned, and we denote $\tilde{\mathcal{T}} := \{1, \dots, T\}$. For any $t \in \mathcal{T}$ and any vector (x_0, \dots, x_t) we denote

$$x_{[t]} = (x_0, \dots, x_t).$$

Let $\mathcal{N} := \{1, \dots, N\}$ the set of agents and we denote $\mathcal{N}^{-i} := \mathcal{N} \setminus \{i\}$, for $i \in \mathcal{N}$. For any vector $\mathbf{x} := (x^1, \dots, x^N)$, we denote

$$\mathbf{x}^{-i} = (x^1, \dots, x^{i-1}, x^{i+1}, \dots, x^N).$$

We define the positive part function as $(x)_+ = x$ for non-negative x and zero otherwise.

Control Consider a given filtration \mathbb{F} and let \mathbf{A} be a set of \mathbb{F} -progressively adapted controls (q_t) . We define the ℓ_2 norm as

$$\|q\|_2 := \left(\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} q_t^2 \right] \right)^{1/2}.$$

and the ℓ_∞ norm as

$$\|q\|_\infty := \operatorname{ess\,sup}_{t,\omega} q_t(\omega).$$

We denote \mathbf{A}_C the set of controls $q \in \mathbf{A}$ such that

$$\|q\|_2^2 < C.$$

Probability measures Let \mathcal{X} be a subset of \mathbb{R}^d and $\mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{X})$ denote the set of probability measures on \mathcal{X} . Given $p \in [1, \infty)$, we define the set of finite p -th order moment measures

$$\mathcal{M}_p(\mathcal{X}) := \left\{ m \in \mathcal{M}_0(\mathcal{X}), \int_{\mathcal{X}} |x|^p dm(x) < +\infty \right\},$$

that we endow with the Kantorovitch-Rubinstein distance (Villani, 2009, p.94), defined by

$$d_1(\mu, \nu) := \sup_{\psi \in 1\text{-Lip}} \int_{\mathcal{X}} \psi(x) d(\mu - \nu)(x), \quad (1)$$

for any μ and $\nu \in \mathcal{M}_1(\mathcal{X})$. As usually, a function φ is C -Lip if φ is Lipschitz with a Lipschitz constant smaller than C .

Remark 1.1. Note that if X_1 and X_2 are random variables on the probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ such that the law of X_i is m_i , then

$$d_1(m_1, m_2) \leq \mathbb{E} [|X_1 - X_2|],$$

because, for any 1-Lipschitz map $\psi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$,

$$\int_{\mathcal{X}} \psi(x) d(m_1 - m_2)(x) = \mathbb{E} [\psi(X_1) - \psi(X_2)] \leq \mathbb{E} [|X_1 - X_2|].$$

Remark 1.2. Consider E a compact subspace of a metric space, where we denote $K = \sup_{x \in E} \|x\|$. For all $N \geq 1$, $\alpha \in E$ and $\mu \in \mathcal{M}_0(E)$, the metric d_1 satisfies

$$d_1 \left(\mu, \frac{N-1}{N} \mu + \frac{1}{N} \delta_\alpha \right) \leq \frac{2K}{N}.$$

2 The investment model

We consider a stylized model for investment. In this section, we introduce exhaustively the different modeling assumptions related to agents' dynamics and to electricity markets. The cost minimization problem solved by each agent is introduced in Section 2.4.

2.1 Agent's dynamics

In order to model the state dynamics, we consider a complete probability space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$ on which we define a common noise B^0 . We define

$$B_t^0 = (D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t), \quad \mathbf{Y}_t = \left(\Gamma_{t,h}, \tilde{D}_{t,h} \right)_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \in [0, 1]^H \times \mathbb{R}^H :$$

For the sake of simplicity, we will assume in this section that D_t corresponds to average demand during time interval $[t; t + 1)$. More uncertainties are included in D_t in the numerical experiments in Section 3.5, allowing for greater realism without modifying the theoretical results obtained in Section 3. \mathbf{Y}_t corresponds to the random variable representing the weather and centered demand scenario during time interval $[t; t + 1)$. It includes information on average national hourly capacity factor $\Gamma_{t,h}$, and centered demand $\tilde{D}_{t,h}$ around the average value D_t , for all hours $h \in \mathcal{H}$. Capacity factor corresponds to the dimensionless ratio of actual electrical energy output over a given period of time to the theoretical maximum electrical energy output over that period. Variable \mathbf{Y}_t therefore captures interannual weather variability.

We also consider N independent identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables Γ^i which are independent of B^0 and which follow law λ_Γ . Γ^i corresponds to the typical capacity factor for agent i , so that for a given hour h , agent i faces a final capacity factor of $\Gamma^i \times \Gamma_{t,h}$. $\Gamma^i > 1$ (resp. $\Gamma^i < 1$) implies that agent i faces better (resp. worse) weather conditions than the national average.

We denote $\mathbb{F}^N = (\mathcal{F}_t^N)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ the filtration defined by $\mathcal{F}_t^N := \sigma((\Gamma^i), D_{[t-1]}, \mathbf{Y}_{[t-1]}, i \in \mathcal{N})$. Because D_{t-1} and \mathbf{Y}_{t-1} depend on average and hourly data on the interval $[t-1, t)$, observe that \mathcal{F}_t^N represents indeed the information available at time t for decisions. We make the reasonable assumption that all agents are aware of the geographical conditions of other agents (the variables Γ^i), and that such conditions do not evolve over time.

We make some assumptions on the common noise.

Assumption 2.1. *The stochastic process $(D_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ is a Markov process, with law λ_D .*

Assumption 2.2. *The random variables $(\mathbf{Y}_t)_{t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}}$ are independent and identically distributed with common distribution λ_Y , and $(\mathbf{Y}_t)_{t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}}$ is independent from $(D_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$.*

Assumption 2.3. *We assume that all stochastic processes are defined on a discrete support. We denote $\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{Y}, \mathcal{G}$ discrete sets such that, p.s., $D_t \in \mathcal{D}$ for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $Y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$ for all $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, and $\Gamma^i \in \mathcal{G}$ for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, and assume that $\mathcal{G} \subset [\Gamma^{\min}; \Gamma^{\max}]$ with $\Gamma^{\min} > 0$.*

Assumption 2.3 is a technical assumption for the proofs; note that in applied settings, it is not really a restriction.

Each agent $i \in \mathcal{N}$ chooses strategy $q^i = (q_t^i)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$, where q_t^i corresponds to invested capacity at time t . A random variable \mathcal{F}_0^N -adapted Γ^i defines agent i 's capacity factor, as

described above. Agent i 's state $Q^i := (Q_t^i)_{t \in \bar{\mathcal{T}}}$ verifies the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_0^i &= 0, \\ Q_t^i &= (1 - \nu)Q_{t-1}^i + \Gamma^i q_t^i, \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T}, \\ Q_t^i &= (1 - \nu)Q_{t-1}^i, \quad \forall T \leq t \leq T', \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $\nu > 0$ represents the depreciation of the installed capacities with time. Q_t^i corresponds to installed capacity, weighted by the agent's capacity factor. We note that after time $T - 1$, state dynamics are uncontrolled: agents do not plan investments after time $T - 1$, but due to installations' long lifetime, it is necessary to account for profits stemming from the installed capacities after time $T - 1$ in order to avoid boundary effects.

A strategy q^i is deemed admissible if it belongs to the set \mathbf{A}^N which consists of the \mathbb{F}^N -progressively adapted non-negative real-valued processes $(q_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ satisfying $\|q\|_2^2 < \infty$.

Lemma 2.4. *For any control $q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N$, the state dynamics (2) are well-posed, and $Q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N$. Moreover, if there exists $C > 0$ such that $q^i \in \mathbf{A}_C^N$, then there exists $C' > 0$ such that $Q^i \in \mathbf{A}_{C'}^N$.*

Proof. See Section 5.1. □

An admissible strategy for all players $\mathbf{q} = (q^i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}$ is such that $q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N$ for all $i \in \mathcal{N}$. For an admissible strategy \mathbf{q} , the coupled state processes $\mathbf{Q} := (Q^i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}$ are governed by the equations (2). We introduce the random empirical measure of the positions of all agents by

$$m_t^N = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{N}} \delta_{Q_t^{i'}}. \tag{3}$$

For all $i \in \mathcal{N}$, we denote similarly the random empirical measure of the positions of all agents excluding agent i by

$$m_t^{N,i} = \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{N}^i} \delta_{Q_t^{i'}}, \tag{4}$$

and

$$m^{N,i} = \left(m_1^{N,i}, \dots, m_{T-1}^{N,i} \right).$$

2.2 Market mechanisms

In this section, we detail some modeling assumptions regarding the electricity market from which agents' profits are stemming.

Assumption 2.5. *We make a price-taking assumption, according to which the i^{th} agent does not consider her impact on market price. This assumption is justified in a setting where the number of agents N is large. It is often made in a context of perfect competition, when each agent's influence on the price is negligible. Moreover, in our setting, the impact of this assumption is very limited. This will be justified in more detail in Section 3.1, in particular Proposition 3.4.*

Residual demand. The hourly residual demand corresponds to the demand left to satisfy after accounting for renewable production, and it is defined by the following mapping $R : \mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+) \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ by

$$R(h, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) = \left(D_t + \tilde{D}_{t,h} - \Gamma_{t,h} \int x dm_t(x) \right)_+ . \quad (5)$$

The hourly residual demand considered by agent i in her optimization problem reads as $R(h, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t)$ by the price-taking assumption. Note that average installed capacity is considered in the definition of residual demand instead of absolute installed capacity. Justification of this modeling assumption is given in Remark 2.8 in Section 2.3.

Electricity price. We define an aggregate supply function for conventional producers (coal, gas, nuclear, hydroelectricity) $F(t, P) : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ corresponding to the offered capacity for a given price P at time t . It is obtained by summing all available capacities by increasing marginal cost. Dependence in t indicates that the supply function evolves over time, as the rest of the electricity mix is assumed to change exogeneously.

Assumption 2.6. For all $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, we define an aggregate supply function $P \in [0; \infty] \rightarrow F(t, P) \in [0; \infty]$ which is smooth and strictly increasing in P . We assume that there exists $L_F > 0$ such that for all $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, $F(t, \cdot)$ is L_F -Lipschitz. This implies that $F(t, \cdot)$ admits an inverse function which is smooth and strictly increasing. Moreover, we assume that $F^{-1}(t, \cdot)$ is also L_F -Lipschitz for all $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$.

In a simplified representation of electricity markets, the electricity price on the spot market is obtained by a cost minimization problem where the solution is provided by the merit-order dispatching rule (see (Cretì and Fontini, 2019, Chapter 8)). According to this rule, the dispatching of power is ordered from the least variable cost power plant to those with higher variable costs. Therefore, the electricity price corresponds to the intersection between the residual demand and the supply function.

Definition 2.7. The price mapping is defined following the merit-order rule, by the following mapping: $\phi : \tilde{\mathcal{T}} \times \mathcal{H} \times \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+) \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that :

$$\phi(t, h, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) := F^{-1}(t, R(h, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t)) \wedge \bar{P} \geq 0. \quad (6)$$

where \bar{P} is the price cap.

Note that the price mapping is defined at the hourly scale and is bounded.

A regulator impacts agents' profit through a deterministic process $(\alpha_t)_{t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}} \in \mathbb{R}$. This corresponds for example to feed-in premium or feed-in tariffs (Ambec and Crampes, 2019). We assume that α_t is bounded.

2.3 Costs and objective function

Investment costs. They are defined as a convex function of the invested capacity q :

$$C_t(q) = c_t q + \tilde{c} q^2. \quad (7)$$

The quadratic component $\tilde{c} q^2$ captures the fact that marginal investment costs for a given agent are increasing. We assume that the parameters c_t and \tilde{c} are positive.

Producer profit. We define the negative unit profit over time interval $[t, t + 1)$ by

$$f(t, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) = - \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} (\phi(t, h, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) + \alpha_t) \Gamma_{t,h}. \quad (8)$$

Therefore, agent i earns $-Q_t^i f(t, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t)$ total 5-year profits.

Producer's cost function. Each producer has the same discount rate $r \geq 0$ capturing the value of time. The running cost of the producer $L : \mathcal{T} \times \mathbb{R}^+ \times \mathbb{R}^+ \times \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+) \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is then defined by

$$L(t, Q_t, q_t, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) = e^{-rt} (Q_t f(t, m_t, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) + c_t q_t + \tilde{c} q_t^2). \quad (9)$$

The first part of the running cost corresponds to the negative producer profit. The second part of the running cost corresponds to the investment costs.

The terminal cost of the producer is defined by the mapping $g : \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+) \times \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{Y}^{T'-T+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

$$g(m_T, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) = \sum_{t=T}^{T'} e^{-r(t-T)} (1 - \nu)^{t-T} f \left(t, m_T \left(\frac{\cdot}{(1 - \nu)^{t-T}} \right), D_{T-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t \right). \quad (10)$$

This terminal cost corresponds to the sum of negative discounted unit profits over time interval $[T; T']$, and allows to avoid a discontinuity at the terminal date $T - 1$. We make the assumption that average demand after time T stays equal to its value over interval $[T; T']$. This assumption can be justified as there are very few forecasts for the evolution of electricity demand after 2050.

Remark 2.8. In an initial game where *total* installed capacity is considered instead of *average* installed capacity in the definition of residual demand (5), the quadratic component in investment costs in (7) initially scales as N such as investment costs write as $C_t(q) = c_t q + N \tilde{c} q^2$. In this initial game, the running cost then writes as

$$L^{real}(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, (N - 1)m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) = e^{-rt} \left(Q_t^i f(t, (N - 1)m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) + c_t q_t^i + \tilde{c} N (q_t^i)^2 \right).$$

A change of variable $q_t^i \leftarrow \frac{q_t^i}{N}$ in the above yields

$$\begin{aligned} L^{real}(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, (N - 1)m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) &= e^{-rt} \left(\frac{Q_t^i}{N} f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) + c_t \frac{q_t^i}{N} + N \tilde{c} \left(\frac{q_t^i}{N} \right)^2 \right) \\ &= \frac{1}{N} L(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t). \end{aligned}$$

We obtain an equivalence up to a scaling factor between the original running cost, and the new running cost defined in (9), with investment costs as introduced in (7). The same holds for the terminal cost (10). This justifies the assumption of considering average installed capacity instead of aggregated installed capacity: as it will be seen in Section 3.2, modeling with average capacity allows for MFG arguments.

2.4 Agent minimization problem

Following Rockafellar and Uryasev (1999), we use the following definition of the expected shortfall \mathbf{ES}^α of a random variable X :

$$\mathbf{ES}^\alpha(X) = \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} \left[x + \frac{(X - x)^+}{\alpha} \right]. \quad (11)$$

Note that expected shortfall was initially named as the conditional value-at-risk in the literature (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 1999). However, this definition made it confusing to consider additional conditioning, leading to the less ambiguous denomination of expected shortfall.

In our case, X corresponds to negative profits (ie, $X \leq 0$). Therefore, the \mathbf{ES}^α corresponds to the conditional expectation of negative profits below the amount \mathbf{VaR}^α , where \mathbf{VaR}^α is the lowest amount such that, with probability $1 - \alpha$, the negative profits will not exceed this amount. The \mathbf{ES}^α therefore identifies the worst (100α) percent of profit outcomes for an agent. Typical values for α are 0.05. The choice of \mathbf{ES}^α instead of \mathbf{VaR}^α allows to use a coherent risk measure.

For any admissible strategy $\mathbf{q}^{-i} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^i} \mathbf{A}^N$, and for a control $q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N$ the multistage cost of agent i is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) := & \mathbb{E} \left[\beta \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} L(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right] \\ & + \mathbb{E} \left[(1 - \beta) \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \mathbf{ES}^\alpha \left(L(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N, q_t^i, Q_t^i \right) \right] \\ & + \mathbb{E} \left[Q_T^i e^{-rT} g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

for $\beta \in (0, 1)$. The first part of the objective corresponds to a risk-neutral assessment of expected cost. The second part of the objective corresponds to a sum of conditional \mathbf{ES}^α . This part of the objective corresponds to a time-consistent risk measure. Using a convex combination of expectation and of \mathbf{ES}^α is a common modeling assumption when evaluating the feasibility of an investment (see Munoz et al. (2017); Mays et al. (2019); Möbius et al. (2021); Fraunholz et al. (2023))

Deriving the expected shortfall. We derive in the following preliminary discussion a new form for the objective (12). We have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{ES}^\alpha \left(L(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N, q_t^i, Q_t^i \right) = & e^{-rt} Q_t^i \mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}_t^N}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right) \\ & + e^{-rt} (c_t q_t^i + \tilde{c}(q_t^i)^2), \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

where we denote $\mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}_t^N}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right) = \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} \left[x + \frac{(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) - x)^+}{\alpha} \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N \right]$. Note that since D is Markovian, and since Y_t is independent from $Y_{[t-1]}$ and from D_{t-1} , we have

$$\mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}_t^N}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right) = \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} \left[x + \frac{(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) - x)^+}{\alpha} \mid D_{t-1} \right].$$

One should note that the expectation in the expected shortfall does not include the random variable $m_t^{N,i}$, which is fixed given Q_t^{-i} . Consequently, we will write

$$\mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}_t^N}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right) = \mathbf{ES}_{D_{t-1}}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, \dots) \right).$$

where we used the notation \dots to avoid confusions.

We define the following mapping:

$$f^\beta(t, m, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) = \beta f(t, m, D, \mathbf{Y}) + (1 - \beta) \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha (f(t, m, \cdot, \cdot)), \quad (14)$$

and corresponding running cost

$$L^\beta(t, Q, q, m, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) = e^{-rt} \left(Q f^\beta(t, m, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) + c_t q + \tilde{c} q^2 \right). \quad (15)$$

With (12) and (13), we finally obtain the following simplified multistage cost:

$$\mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} L^\beta(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_T^i e^{-rT} g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right]. \quad (16)$$

3 Theoretical results

3.1 N -player game

This section focuses on the N -player game. We consider that players have access to open-loop controls. This implies that their controls are only specified as \mathcal{F}_t -adapted processes, and do not depend on the state of the system. A detailed discussion on the difference between closed-loop and open-loop controls can be found in [Carmona and Delarue \(2018\)](#).

In the following, we will consider Nash equilibriums, with the following definition.

Definition 3.1. *We say that $\mathbf{q}^* = (q^{1,*}, \dots, q^{N,*})$ is a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if for any $i \in \mathcal{N}$, for any $q \in \mathbf{A}^N$:*

$$\mathcal{J}^i(q, \mathbf{q}^{-i,*}) \geq \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i,*}).$$

Existence of optimum for the producer problem We consider a given strategy $\mathbf{q}^{-i} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^i} \mathbf{A}^N$ with associated state dynamics \mathbf{Q}^{-i} given by the equations (2) for $i \in \mathcal{N}^{-i}$.

The control problem of agent i is obtained by solving

$$\inf_{q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N} \mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}), \quad (\mathcal{P}^N)$$

where \mathcal{J}^i was defined in (16). We will prove that Problem (\mathcal{P}^N) admits a unique minimizer, and that this unique minimizer can be characterized through a closed-form expression.

Proposition 3.2. *Let $\mathbf{q}^{-i} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^i} \mathbf{A}^N$ and $m^{N,i}$ the associated empirical measure defined in (4). The function $\mathcal{J}^i(\cdot, \mathbf{q}^{-i})$ admits a unique minimizer denoted by $q^{i,*} \in \mathbf{A}^N$ given by:*

$$q_t^{i,*} = \frac{1}{2\tilde{c}} (H_t)_+, \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T}, \quad (17)$$

with

$$H_t = -\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} x^{t'-t} \Gamma^i f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{N,i}, D_{t'}, D_{t'-1}, \mathbf{Y}_{t'}) + x^{T-t} \Gamma^i g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N \right] - c_t,$$

and $x = e^{-r}(1 - \nu)$.

Proof. See Section 5.2. \square

Corollary 3.3. *Let $q^* \in \mathbf{A}^N$ the unique minimizer of Problem (\mathcal{P}^N) . There exist constants $C, C' > 0$ independent of N such that $q^* \in \mathbf{A}_C^N$, and $Q^* \in \mathbf{A}_{C'}^N$.*

Proof. The proof directly stems from the boundedness of mapping f^β in Lemma A.2, and from the closed-form expression of q^* in (17). It is clear that the constant C does not depend on N . Lemma 2.4 proves that there exists $C' > 0$ such that $Q^* \in \mathbf{A}_{C'}^N$. \square

We will now justify in more detail why the price-taking Assumption 2.5. Consider the alternative optimization problem

$$\inf_{q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N} \bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}), \quad (\mathcal{Q}^N)$$

where

$$\bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} L^\beta(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m_t^N, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_T^i e^{-rT} g(m_T^N, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right].$$

This optimization problem depends on the empirical measure (3) of the positions of all agents, without excluding agent i . Therefore, the price-taking assumption for the N -player game is removed. It cannot be solved through a closed-form solution as was done in Proposition 3.2. However, Proposition 3.4 shows that any ϵ -solution to Problem (\mathcal{Q}^N) can be approximated by the optimal solution of Problem (\mathcal{P}^N) with a rate $\frac{1}{N}$. This further justifies Assumption 2.5 for large number N of players.

Proposition 3.4. *Let $\mathbf{q}^{-i} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^i} \mathbf{A}_C^N$. Let $q^{i,*}$ be the unique optimal solution of Problem (\mathcal{P}^N) . Let $\epsilon > 0$, and \bar{q}^i be an ϵ -solution of Problem (\mathcal{Q}^N) . Then, the following holds:*

- *There exists a constant C independent from N such that $\bar{q}^i \in \mathbf{A}_C$ and $q^{i,*} \in \mathbf{A}_C$.*
- *There exists a constant $\kappa > 0$ (independent on N and ϵ) such that*

$$\|\bar{q}^i - q^{i,*}\|_2 \leq \frac{1}{N} (e^{-rT} \tilde{c})^{-1} \kappa + (e^{-rT} \tilde{c})^{-\frac{1}{2}} \epsilon^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

Proof. See Section 5.3. \square

Existence of Nash equilibrium for the N -player game We state a result for which the proof is similar to the one in Theorem 3.8 introduced later in Section 3.2.

Proposition 3.5. *There exists at least one Nash equilibrium for the N -player game.*

Proof. The proof is completely similar to the proof of Theorem 3.8. Details are left to the reader. \square

3.2 Limiting game

In this section, we introduce a limiting mean field game. We introduce another random variable Γ , independent of $(B_t^0)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$. Similarly as for the N -player game, this variable represents the typical capacity factor, and its distribution represents the distribution of the capacity factor over the distribution of agents.

We denote $\mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ the filtration defined by $\mathcal{F}_t := \sigma(\Gamma, D_{[t-1]}, \mathbf{Y}_{[t-1]})$ and $\mathcal{F}_t^B := \sigma(D_{[t-1]}, \mathbf{Y}_{[t-1]})$ the filtration associated to the common noise.

As in [Lacker and Zariphopoulou \(2019\)](#), there are two separate sources of randomness in this limiting model. The first is due to the random processes D_t and \mathbf{Y}_t , while the second source is static and comes from the random variable Γ , which represents the distribution of the capacity factor across the continuum of agents. The agents can be thought of as a continuum, each assigned an independently and identically distributed capacity factor vector at the outset, and they interact after these assignments are made. Note that this is the extension of the N -player game, where parameter Γ^i was fixed for each player and known by all agents, and the equilibrium strategy of player i depended on the distribution $m^{N,i}$ of the finite set of other players.

For any control q , we denote $Q^q := (Q_t^q)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ the state process corresponding to q , driven by the following dynamics:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_0^q &= 0, \\ Q_t^q &= (1 - \nu)Q_{t-1}^q + \Gamma q_t, \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T}, \\ Q_t^q &= (1 - \nu)Q_{t-1}^q, \quad \forall T \leq t \leq T', \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

and

$$m_t^q = \mathcal{L}(Q_t^q \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B), \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T}, \tag{19}$$

where $\mathcal{L}(\cdot \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B)$ denotes the conditional law given \mathcal{F}_t^B .

In this newly introduced limiting game, the probability measure $\mathcal{L}(Q_t^q \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B)$ can be seen as representing the distribution of the states, depending on the distribution of parameter Γ . This explains why random parameter Γ is not part of the conditioning. We adopt the MFG approach of depicting a single representative agent as a random sample from the population, instead of explicitly modeling the continuum of agents.

A strategy q is deemed admissible if it belongs to the set \mathbf{A} which consists of the \mathbb{F} -progressively adapted non-negative real-valued processes $(q_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ satisfying $\|q\|_2 < \infty$. It is easy to see that when $q \in \mathbf{A}$, m_t^q has finite second moment a.s., ie $m_t^q \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$ a.s.. Therefore, $m_t^q \in \mathcal{L}(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_t, \mathbb{P}, \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+))$, i.e., m_t^q is an \mathcal{F}_t -adapted random variable taking values in $\mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$.

Problem definition. The limiting game with common noise (*MFG*) is defined as follows. Find a control $\hat{q} \in \mathbf{A}$ such that, given $m^{\hat{q}} := (m_t^{\hat{q}})_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$, \hat{q} is an optimal control for the stochastic control problem with state process (18) and cost

$$\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q, m^{\hat{q}}) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} L^\beta(t, Q_t^q, q_t, m_t^{\hat{q}}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_T^q e^{-rT} g(m_T^{\hat{q}}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right].$$

We write

$$\inf_{q \in \mathbf{A}} \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q, m^{\hat{q}}). \tag{P}$$

Alternatively, we can view Problem (*MFG*) as a fixed point problem as follows: given a strategy $\hat{q} \in \mathbf{A}$, find an optimal control q for the stochastic control problem with state process (18) and cost (P) where $m^{\hat{q}}$ is defined as in Equation (19). Then \hat{q} is a solution of Problem (*MFG*) if and only if it is a fixed point of the following map:

$$\hat{q} := (\hat{q}_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \rightarrow Q^{\hat{q}} = Q^q(\hat{q}) \rightarrow m^{\hat{q}} := (m_t^{\hat{q}})_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \rightarrow q := \operatorname{argmin}_{q \in \mathbf{A}} \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q, m^{\hat{q}}) \tag{20}$$

We will define the map (20) formally later in (22). Our main result in this section is to show existence and uniqueness of a solution to Problem (MFG).

We first suppose we are given a vector of random probability measures. We prove in the following proposition that the standard control problem admits a unique minimizer, and we give a closed form expression for this minimizer.

Proposition 3.6. *Let $m^q := (m_t^q)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ with $m_t^q \in \mathcal{L}(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_t, \mathbb{P}, \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+))$ be a vector of random probability measures taking values in $\mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$. The function $\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(\cdot, m^q)$ admits a unique minimizer denoted by $q^* \in \mathbf{A}$ given by:*

$$q_t^* = \frac{1}{2\bar{c}} (H_t)_+, \quad \forall t \in \mathcal{T} \quad (21)$$

with

$$H_t = -\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} \Gamma x^{t'-t} f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^q, D_{t'}, D_{t'-1}, \mathbf{Y}_{t'}) + x^{T-t} \Gamma g(m_T^q, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] - c_t,$$

and $x = e^{-r} (1 - \nu)$.

Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the one for the N -player Nash game, see Section 5.2. \square

Corollary 3.7. *Let $q^* \in \mathbf{A}$ the unique minimizer of Problem (P). There exists $C > 0$ such that $q^* \in \mathbf{A}_C$, and $C' > 0$ such that $Q^* \in \mathbf{A}_{C'}$.*

Proof. The proof is the same as the proof for Corollary 3.3. \square

3.2.1 Existence of a MFG solution

We begin by proving existence of a solution. We adopt an approach relying on Schauder's fixed point theorem. It should be emphasized that our proof is allowed by the fact that we consider a discrete-time problem, and Proposition 3.6 gives a closed-form solution of the optimization problem. We also strongly rely on the fact that the price process is bounded and the support of all random variables is discrete, therefore working on compact convex sets. This allows simpler proofs than in classical continuous-time setting with common noise like in Carmona et al. (2016).

We define the map $\Psi : \mathbf{A} \rightarrow \mathbf{A}$ as follows; given $\hat{q} \in \mathbf{A}$, we define $Q^{\hat{q}}$ to be the state process corresponding to \hat{q} as defined by (18), and $m^{\hat{q}}$ the (random) conditional probability measure given by (19). We then solve Problem (P), and we set

$$\Psi(\hat{q}) = q. \quad (22)$$

By Proposition 3.6, Problem (P) admits a unique minimizer, so the map Ψ is well-defined. Furthermore, a fixed point of Ψ clearly gives a solution of Problem (MFG).

Theorem 3.8. *There exists a solution to Problem (MFG).*

Proof. See Section 5.4. \square

We now state a Lemma necessary for Theorem 3.13.

Lemma 3.9. We denote

$$C_e = \max \left[\sup_{q \text{ s.t. } \Psi(q)=q} \|q\|_\infty, \sup_N \sup_{q \text{ s.t. } \Psi^N(q)=q} \|q\|_\infty \right],$$

and

$$C'_e = \max \left[\sup_{q \text{ s.t. } \Psi(q)=q} \|Q(q)\|_\infty, \sup_N \sup_{q \text{ s.t. } \Psi^N(q)=q} \|Q(q)\|_\infty \right].$$

Then C_e and C'_e are finite.

Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Corollary 3.7 (the bound does not only hold in ℓ_2 norm but also in ℓ_∞ norm). The bound is independent of N . \square

Remark 3.10. Our MFG problem is not equivalent to a game with a representative player with fixed parameter $\bar{\Gamma}$ and corresponding equilibrium state $Q^{\bar{\Gamma}}$. Indeed, one can note that the optimal control defined in (21) depends linearly in parameter Γ , therefore writing in a simplified form $q_t = \Gamma q_t^1 + q_t^0$. Similarly, by the state equation, we can write $Q_t = \Gamma^2 Q_t^1 + \Gamma Q_t^0$. If problem (MFG) was equivalent to a representative agent game, the equivalence of the optimal controls would require that $\mathbb{E}[Q] = Q^{\bar{\Gamma}}$. This would yield that $\mathbb{E}[\Gamma^2] Q_1 + \mathbb{E}[\Gamma] Q_0 = \bar{\Gamma}^2 Q_1 + \bar{\Gamma} Q_0$. In full generality on Q_0 and Q_1 , such an equality can hold only when $\mathbb{E}[\Gamma^2] = \bar{\Gamma}^2 = \mathbb{E}[\Gamma]^2$, i.e. Γ is constant, discarding interesting settings with heterogeneous players. This will be further discussed in the numerical experiments in Section 3.5.

3.2.2 Uniqueness

To prove uniqueness, previous papers often use a monotonicity condition. See Cardaliaguet et al. (2019); Ahuja (2016). We introduce the following assumptions needed in this section. The first assumption denotes the fact that the function $F^{-1}(t, \cdot)$ is strictly increasing and bounded from below by a linear function. This is a very reasonable assumption based on the fact that $F^{-1}(t, \cdot)$ is increasing smoothly.

Assumption 3.11. Let $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, and $C'_e > 0$ as defined in Lemma 3.9. Let $0 < \bar{Q}_1 < \bar{Q}_2 \leq C'_e$. There exists $C_{(23)} > 0$ such that

$$F^{-1}(t, \bar{Q}_2) - F^{-1}(t, \bar{Q}_1) \geq C_{(23)}(\bar{Q}_2 - \bar{Q}_1). \quad (23)$$

The next assumption is needed to obtain a strict lower bound in the proof of Theorem 3.13.

Assumption 3.12. Let $C'_e > 0$ as defined in Lemma 3.9. There exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that, for all $t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, for all $\mathbf{Y}_t \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon = \left\{ h \in \mathcal{H} \mid \forall D \in \mathcal{D}, \Gamma_{t,h} C'_e \leq D + \tilde{D}_{t,h} \leq F(t, \bar{P}) - \epsilon, \quad \Gamma_{t,h} > \epsilon \right\}$$

satisfies $\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon \neq \emptyset$.

Assumption 3.12 justifies that for all possible weather annual scenarios, there exists a subset of hours where average national renewable production is nonzero, renewables are not sufficient to cover all demand, and demand does not reach market price cap. This assumption is very realistic based on historical data and projections.

We can now state the following.

Theorem 3.13. *Under Assumptions 3.11 and 3.12, the solution to Problem (MFG) is unique.*

Proof. See Section 5.5. □

3.3 Algorithm to find the MFG equilibrium

Common algorithms to derive an MFG equilibrium include Fictitious play (Cardaliaguet and Hadikhanloo, 2017). Algorithm 1 describes the process. Following Bonnans et al. (2021b), we use the Frank-Wolfe learning rate of $\frac{2}{k+2}$ which demonstrates sharper convergence results. Note that in Algorithm 1, notations m_t^k no longer refer to the solution to the Nash equilibrium, but to the consecutive iterations of the algorithm.

Algorithm 1 Fictitious play

Input: number of time steps $T - 1$, initial policy m^0
for $k = 0, \dots, K$ **do**
 Compute $q^{k+1} \in \arg \max_q \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q, m^k)$
 Compute $m_t^{q^{k+1}} = \mathcal{L}(Q_t^{q^{k+1}} | \mathcal{F}_t), \quad \forall t = 1, \dots, T - 1$
 Update $m_t^{k+1} = \frac{1}{k+2} m_t^{q^{k+1}} + \frac{k+1}{k+2} m_t^k$
end for
Return: m^K, q^K

Remark 3.14. *Proposition 3.6 gives a recursive form for the solution of the control problem, which facilitates the calculus in the algorithm.*

3.4 Convergence of the N -player game

This section focuses on proving that when N tends to infinity, any sequence of Nash equilibria to the N -player game converges to the unique solution of the MFG problem. The following section is greatly inspired from Lacker (2016), where the author studies convergence of open-loop N -player game to the corresponding MFG.

Definition 3.15. *We will now write an MFG solution as a tuple $(\Omega, \mathbb{F}, \mathbb{P}, D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)$, where $(\Omega, (\mathcal{F}_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}, \mathbb{P})$ is a complete filtered probability space supporting $(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)$. This MFG solution satisfies:*

- $D := (D_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ and $\mathbf{Y} := (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{t \in \tilde{\mathcal{T}}}$ are \mathcal{F}_t -adapted processes following respectively the laws λ_D and $\lambda_Y^{\otimes T'}$.
- Γ is a random variable with law λ_Γ .
- Γ and D, \mathbf{Y} are independent.
- q_t is an \mathcal{F}_t -adapted process such that $q \in \mathbf{A}$.
- (q, Γ, Q) satisfy the state equation (18).
- m is the conditional law of Q given \mathbb{F}^B : $m_t = \mathcal{L}(Q_t | \mathcal{F}_t^B)$.
- For all $q' \in \mathbf{A}$, we have

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathcal{J}(q', m)] \geq \mathbb{E} [\mathcal{J}(q, m)].$$

From Lemma 3.9, we know that if q is an MFG solution, $\|q\|_\infty \leq C_e$ and $\|Q\|_\infty \leq C'_e$. From now on, we will denote $E = [0, \max[C_e, C'_e]]$ the compact convex subspace of \mathbb{R} .

Given an MFG solution $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}, D, \mathbf{Y}, m, \Gamma, q, Q)$, we may view $D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q$ as a random element of the canonical space

$$\Omega := (\mathcal{D})^{T-1} \times (\mathcal{Y})^{T'} \times \mathcal{G} \times (\mathcal{M}_2(E))^{T-1} \times E^{T-1} \times E^{T-1}.$$

Note that Ω is a metric space, as product of metric spaces.

An MFG solution thus induces a probability measure on Ω , which itself we would like to call a MFG solution. Following Lacker (2016), we give the following equivalent definition for an MFG solution.

Definition 3.16. *If $P \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ satisfies $P = \mathbb{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)^{-1}$ for some MFG solution $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}, D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)$, then we refer to P as the MFG solution.*

From now on, we let $D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q$ denote the identity maps on $(\mathcal{D})^{T-1}, (\mathcal{Y})^{T'}, \mathcal{G}, (\mathcal{M}_2(E))^{T-1}, E^{T-1}$, and E^{T-1} respectively. We define the objective functional

$$\Lambda(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q) := \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} L^\beta(t, Q_t^q, q_t, m_t, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_T^q e^{-rT} g(m_T, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}),$$

and we define the reward associated to an element $P \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ by

$$J(P) := \mathbb{E}^P [\Lambda(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)].$$

We will now define some subsets of $\mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$. Let $\mathcal{M}_0(\Omega')$ denote the set of $\rho \in \Omega' := (\mathcal{D})^{T-1} \times (\mathcal{Y})^{T'} \times \mathcal{G} \times (\mathcal{M}_2(E))^{T-1}$ satisfying $\rho \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma)^{-1} = \lambda_D \otimes \lambda_{\mathbf{Y}}^{\otimes T'} \otimes \lambda_\Gamma$.

For any $\rho \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega')$, the class $\mathcal{RA}(\rho)$ is the set of admissible joint laws for the optimal control problem associated to ρ . Specifically, it is the set of probability measures P on Ω satisfying:

1. $P \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m)^{-1} = \rho$,
2. $\mathbb{E}^P \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} q_t^2 \right] < \infty$,
3. $P \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)^{-1} \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ denotes the joint law of the solution and the inputs to (18) (ie, the canonical processes Γ, q, Q satisfy the state equation (18)).

Define the set of optimal controls corresponding to ρ by

$$\mathcal{RA}^*(\rho) := \arg \min_{P \in \mathcal{RA}(\rho)} J(P).$$

By Proposition 3.6, we know that $\mathcal{RA}^*(\rho)$ is reduced to a singleton (we are simply changing the probability space that we consider).

The first lemma gives a characterization of an MFG solution.

Lemma 3.17. *Let $P \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$, and define $\rho := P \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m)^{-1}$. If P satisfies the following conditions:*

1. ρ is in $\mathcal{M}_0(\Omega')$,
2. $P \in \mathcal{RA}(\rho)$,

3. $m = P(Q \in \cdot \mid D, \mathbf{Y})$. That is, m is a version of the conditional law of Q given D, \mathbf{Y} ,
4. $P \in \mathcal{RA}^*(\rho)$,

then P is an MFG solution.

Proof. It is obvious and simply follows from Definitions 3.15 and 3.16. \square

We now state some useful results following Lacker (2016).

Lemma 3.18. *The map $J : \mathcal{M}(\Omega) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous.*

Proof. The map Λ is bounded and continuous on Ω . This directly yields the continuity of J on $\mathcal{M}(\Omega)$ (for the topology defined by the weak convergence). \square

We will define the N -player environment:

$$\mathcal{E}_N := (\Omega, (\mathcal{F}_t^N)_t, \mathbb{P}, D, \mathbf{Y}, (\Gamma^i)_{i \in 1, \dots, N}).$$

We will now consider a sequence of Nash equilibria. By Proposition 3.5, we know that there exists at least one Nash equilibrium for the N -player game. For each N , let $q^{1,N}, \dots, q^{N,N} \in \mathbf{A}_C^N$ denote such a Nash equilibrium. We let

$$P_N := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^i, m^{N,i}, q^{i,N}, Q^{i,N} [q^{i,N}])^{-1}. \quad (24)$$

Remark 3.19. *Averaging over $i = 1, \dots, N$ gets round the problem that the strategies $q^{1,N}, \dots, q^{N,N}$ are not necessarily exchangeable. To interpret the definition of P_N , note (as suggested in Lacker (2016)) that we may write*

$$P_N = \mathbb{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^{U_N, N}, m^{U_N, N}, q^{U_N, N}, Q^{U_N, N})^{-1},$$

where U_N is a random variable independent of the rest, uniformly distributed among $\{1, \dots, N\}$.

We can now prove the following lemma.

Lemma 3.20. *The sequence $(P_N)_{N \in \mathbb{N}} \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ is relatively compact.*

Proof. Ω is a compact metric space, since the random variables D, Y and Γ have respective finite support \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{Y} and \mathcal{G} . It follows from (Parthasarathy, 1967, Theorem 6.4) that $\mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ is also a compact metric space. Therefore, the sequence $(P_N)_{N \in \mathbb{N}} \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$ is relatively compact. \square

By Lemma 3.20, we have that every subsequence P_{N_k} contains a further subsequence such that this subsequence converges weakly to a limit point $P \in \mathcal{M}_0(\Omega)$.

Lemma 3.21. *Each limit point P of any converging subsequence of $(P_N)_{N \in \mathbb{N}}$ is an MFG solution.*

Proof. See Section 5.6. \square

Proposition 3.22. *The sequence $(P_N)_{N \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges to a unique limit solution which is the solution to the (MFG) problem.*

Proof. Lemma 3.21 and Lemma 3.17 prove that the limit point P is an MFG solution. Therefore, we have proven that each subsequence of P_N contains a further subsequence converging weakly to P where P is an MFG solution. By Proposition 3.6, we know that Problem (MFG) admits a unique solution. Therefore, we conclude that $(P_N)_{N \in \mathbb{N}}$ converges weakly to P where P is the unique MFG solution. \square

3.5 Extension to the case of multiple clusters

While the results derived in the previous subsections hold for the case where a single type of producers is considered, an interesting application of the model includes the representation of multiple clusters (e.g., producers of wind and solar). Our results of the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game and for the MFG game can easily be extended to the case of multiple clusters. The extension of the uniqueness result is left for future research. However, we observed empirically in our simulations that uniqueness seems to hold in the case of multiple clusters.

4 Numerical simulations

The objective of this section is to provide a toy example inspired by the French electricity sector to illustrate our model, rather than utilizing it for generating practical predictions. These predictions will instead be the focus of forthcoming research.

The main energy sources that we consider are gas, coal, nuclear and intermittent renewables, consisting of solar, onshore and offshore wind, and run-of-river. Initial capacities of renewables are taken to be equal to 10GW, 18GW, 0 GW and 10 GW respectively. We therefore consider an economy consisting of only these sources of electricity, without considering other sources of flexibility such batteries, electrolysers or imports. This allows us to derive a practical toy model.

In our model, investment decisions in solar and onshore wind are taken endogenously, while the rest of the power mix is assumed to evolve following exogenous trends. This will be further described in Section 4.1.

4.1 Setting and data gathering

Electricity and mix projections. We use RTE's (French transmission network operator) latest study "Futurs Energétiques" (RTE, 2022) to obtain forecasts of evolution of electricity demand. Three main scenarios are considered: a "Sobriety" scenario, a "Reference" scenario, and a "Reindustrialization" scenario. Final electricity demand in 2050 amounts to a range between 555 TWh and 750 TWh according to the scenarios. This takes into account foreseeable change in the demand profile up to 2050, including an increased demand for electric vehicles and for heating.

All capacities but onshore wind and solar capacities are assumed to evolve exogenously, following scenario N1 of the "Futurs Energétiques"'s study. This study provides a variation around the central N1 scenario to consider adjustment of the mix to the demand scenario (e.g., offshore capacities are considered lower in the "Sobriety" scenario than in the "Reference" scenario, as demand is lower).

We rely on such assumptions to create the aggregate supply function $F(t, \cdot)$. Note that as exogenous power mix is taken to evolve over time following RTE's given scenario, the corresponding supply function also evolves in a deterministic manner over time. We build this supply function as a piecewise affine function, according to the merit-order rule. Cutoff points follow available capacity, while the slope of the function is determined by each technology's variable cost. We consider a variable cost for gas of 23.2 €/MWh, following IEA's projections for 2040 (IEA, 2022). We model different gas power plants with varying efficiency between 0.4 (for open-cycle gas turbines) and 0.58 (for combined-cycle gas turbines), to capture the heterogeneity of gas supply across France.

Because of maintenance constraints, nuclear capacity is not available for all hours. We consider a corresponding capacity factor of 0.9.

Finally, we assume a market price cap of 10000 €/MWh.

Demand and fuel prices uncertainty. We use a Markovian model for demand uncertainty, with a transition matrix between the different demand scenarios introduced beforehand. Specifically, we consider that when on the "Reference" scenario, there is a $\frac{1}{2}$ probability of staying on that trajectory, and a $\frac{1}{4}$ trajectory of shifting trajectory to either the lower or higher demand scenario. When on an extreme scenario (either "Sobriety" or "Reindustrialization"), there is a $\frac{3}{4}$ of staying on that trajectory, and a $\frac{1}{4}$ probability of shifting to the "Reference" scenario trajectory. We do not consider transition from the "Sobriety" to the "Reindustrialization" scenario, as such transitions would be very unrealistic. While a very simplistic modeling of uncertainty, this model allows to explore the impact of demand uncertainty on investment decisions. Moreover, the jump from one trajectory to another may represent either political decisions (e.g., rapid reindustrialization), or society shifts (e.g., decrease of consumption). Moreover, parametrizing such an uncertainty is a difficult task.

We model fuel prices uncertainties by considering that variable gas price is a random uniform variable with mean of 23.2 €/MWh (as stated before) and spread of 10€/MWh.

Inter-annual variability of hourly profiles. As emphasized, our model relies on an hourly time scale to calculate profits for producers, in order to capture the variability of demand and intermittent renewables. This is captured in the random variable \mathbf{Y}_t . Hourly capacity for offshore wind, onshore wind and solar PV were prepared using the renewables.ninja website¹, which provides the hourly capacity factor profiles of solar and wind power from 1990 to 2019 at the geographical scale of French counties, following the methods elaborated by Pfenninger and Staffell (2016). The hourly electricity demand profile was provided by RTE.

Estimating demand heat sensitivity is a very challenging task. Therefore, we choose not to capture this in the model, and we focus on the inter-annual variability of renewable capacity factors. The average correlation between demand and weather is still captured through the average electricity profile.

Variability of capacity factor. We test different distributions for the capacity factor, with a range of [0.5; 1.5]. In particular, we consider a distribution made of two Diracs at 0.7 and 1.3, with equal ($p = \frac{1}{2}$) or asymmetric probability ($p = \frac{1}{4}$ and $p = \frac{3}{4}$, and $p = \frac{3}{4}$ and $p = \frac{1}{4}$). We also consider Beta Binomial distributions with law

$$f(x + (y - x)\frac{k}{n} \mid a, b) := \binom{n}{k} \frac{B(k + a, n - k + b)}{B(a, b)}, \quad \forall 0 \leq k \leq n,$$

with $x = 0.5$, $y = 1.5$ and $n = 12$. We explore different combinations of parameters a and b (namely, $a = 0.5$ and $b = 0.5$, $a = 0.15$ and $b = 0.3$ and $a = 0.3$ and $b = 0.15$). In addition, we also model representative agent model by taking singletons as distributions. We consider different singletons distributions, spanning the whole range of the other distributions, with a step of 0.05 for the value of the capacity factor for different singleton distributions.

¹<https://www.renewables.ninja/>

Risk aversion parameter. Since there is no literature specifying realistic values for investors’ decisions, we considered in an ad hoc way risk aversion parameter β ranging from 0.5 to 1 in our experiments. We will focus on specific values of 0.5 and 0.9 in the coming analysis. The expected shortfall level is fixed at 0.05, following classical values found in literature (Mays et al., 2019; Ambrosius et al., 2020).

Costs, discount rate and depreciation rate. Cost evolution assumptions are taken from RTE (2022). Ground solar panels costs are assumed to fall from 750 €/MW in 2020 to 550€/MW in 2050. Onshore wind turbines costs are assumed to fall from 1300 €/MW in 2020 to 900 €/MW.

Parameter \tilde{c} is calibrated as follows. As stated in Remark 2.8, when total capacity is considered, the quadratic component in investment costs scales as N , so that $C_t(q) = c_t q + N\tilde{c}q^2$. For a classical power plant size, we assume that the two components are equivalent: $c_t q \sim N\tilde{c}q^2$. Assuming an average installation rate of 10 GW per time step of 5 years (RTE, 2022) and an average cost of $C = 12000$ €/GW, this yields

$$N\tilde{c} = \frac{C}{10/N}.$$

Therefore, $\tilde{c} \sim 12000$ for wind turbines. We obtain similarly that $\tilde{c} \sim 5500$ for solar panels.

Following RTE (2022), we consider that solar and wind power plants have an average lifetime of 30 years, corresponding to 6 time stamps of 5 years. We model lifetime as a geometric random variable, with average of 30 years. The devaluation rate ν is therefore taken equal to $\frac{1}{6} = 0.16$. Following Aïd et al. (2020), we take a yearly discount rate of $r = 8.6\%$. The RTE study also specifies such range of values when private investors’ decisions are considered (a normative approach would on the other hand rely on a lower discount rate).

4.2 Interpretation.

We perform 100 iterations of the algorithm as described in Section 3.3, and we monitor the gain increase from switching to the best response for renewable producers, by summing gain increase for solar producers and onshore wind producers. It can be seen in Figure 1 that this quantity converges to zero.




Figure 1: Evolution of gain increase over algorithm iterations.

In the following, the average installed capacity refers to the quantity $\frac{Q}{T}$ with notations from Section 2, while the average installed capacity with capacity factor refers to the

quantity Q . The former relates to actual investment decisions, while the latter relates to the average production (product of investment decision and capacity factor). It is the latter which impacts the electricity spot price.

When not specified, evolution of installed capacities in figures is taken by simulating the "Reference" demand scenario trajectory.

The impact of the choice of distribution for the capacity factor is illustrated in Figure 2. When an asymmetric distribution is considered, we obtain a larger average installed capacity when the asymmetry is biased towards lower capacity factors. Indeed, since a similar invested capacity leads to lower production because of smaller capacity factor, there is more room for investment. Figure ?? highlights the need to correctly specify the distribution of the heterogeneity among agents when using such a prospective model.




Figure 2: Impact of capacity factor distribution for three different distributions: a symmetric two Dirac distributions, and two asymmetric two Dirac distributions. Left: average installed capacity in solar panels. Right: average installed capacity in onshore wind turbines.

The impact of the risk aversion parameter is illustrated in Figure 3. A lower risk parameter β corresponds to higher risk aversion. When risk aversion increases, invested capacity decreases by up to 6 %. Such a result is aligned with the literature (Fraunholz et al., 2023; Möbius et al., 2021).




Figure 3: Impact of risk aversion parameter β for two different values of 0.5 and 0.9.

Figure 4 shows the impact of the heterogeneity in terms of distribution of the installed capacity. We observe that as time goes by and average installed renewable capacity increases, the spread of installed capacity increases across the continuum of agents with different capacity factors. This illustrates the cannibalization effect, and how such effect can impact differently heterogeneous producers (e.g., in terms of geographical localizations). This points out that a result of private risk-averse agents taking investment decisions may

be a higher concentration of renewable energy technologies in the most productive areas, which could lead to congestion, increased costs and decreased energy supply security, because of increased production correlation. Such an insight also highlights the interest for practitioners to work with models designed to handle heterogeneity, as a representative agent model would not allow to analyze such an impact.




Figure 4: Evolution of the distribution of installed capacity across the considered time range. The x-axis represents the value for the solar panel capacity, while the y-axis represents the probability with which this value is attained. The probability corresponds to the distribution for the capacity factor parameter.

Finally, we explore whether the results of the model with heterogeneity can be reproduced with a representative agent model. Remark 3.10 already highlighted that from a theoretical point of view, there exists many capacity factor distributions for which the output of the model cannot be reproduced with a representative agent model. In the following, we compare the average installed capacity and the average installed capacity with capacity factor for different distributions. Specifically, we consider a beta binomial distribution with parameter $a = 0.3$ and $b = 0.15$. We compare in Figure 5 the model results for this distribution with the results obtained for the two singleton distributions closest in terms of average installed capacity weighted by the capacity factor (this is this average statistics that determines the value of optimal control for the Nash equilibrium), and the ones obtained with the two singleton distributions closest in terms of average installed capacity. The relative difference with respect to the beta binomial distribution is represented. Singleton distributions with capacity factor of 1.3 and 1.25 are the closest to the solar panel capacity weighted by capacity factor, within a 2 % difference. However, the same singleton distributions yield a solar panel capacity which differs by almost 10 % from the capacity for the beta binomial distribution. The same can be said when we try to select the singleton distributions yielding the closest results to the beta binomial distribution in terms of capacity: in that case, the selected singleton distributions yield a capacity weighted by capacity factor which differs by almost 10% from the beta binomial distribution. This indicates that a singleton distribution cannot approximate similarly well both the average capacity and the average capacity weighted by the capacity factor. Therefore, the same Nash equilibrium cannot be reached by a singleton distribution. Once again, this prompts practitioners to use models handling explicitly heterogeneity, and to pay attention to the use of representative agent’s model in settings where the heterogenous

parameter may impact the results.




Figure 5: Comparison of model outcomes for different capacity factor distributions. Left: average capacity weighted by the capacity factor. This is the quantity that impacts the spot price and therefore agents' profits. Right: average capacity. This is the quantity actually invested by agents, and derived from the average capacity weighted by the capacity factor.

5 Proofs

5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4

From the initial condition $Q_0^i = 0$, we have by direct induction that $\mathbb{E}[(Q_t^i)^2] < \infty$ for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$, and that Q_t^i is \mathcal{F}_t -adapted.

Let $q^i \in \mathbf{A}_C^N$ and let $t \in \mathcal{T}$. We have $Q_t^i = \sum_{t'=0}^t (1-\nu)^{t-t'} q_{t'}^i$. Therefore, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,

$$\mathbb{E}[(Q_t^i)^2] \leq \frac{1}{\nu} \sum_{t'=0}^t \mathbb{E}[(q_{t'}^i)^2] \leq \frac{1}{\nu} C.$$

Therefore, there exists $C' > 0$ such that $Q^i \in \mathbf{A}_{C'}^N$. \square

5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2

We first prove that $\mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \cdot)$ is strongly convex. The linearity of the dynamics (2) and the quadratic/convex functions in the definition (15) of $L^\beta(t, Q, q, m, D, D', \mathbf{Y})$ give us that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^i(\lambda q^1 + (1-\lambda)q^2, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) &= \lambda \mathcal{J}^i(q^1, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) + (1-\lambda) \mathcal{J}^i(q^2, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \\ &+ \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \tilde{c} \left((\lambda q_t^1 + (1-\lambda)q_t^2)^2 - \lambda (q_t^1)^2 - (1-\lambda)(q_t^2)^2 \right) \right] \\ &\leq \lambda \mathcal{J}^i(q^1, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) + (1-\lambda) \mathcal{J}^i(q^2, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) - e^{-rT} \tilde{c} \lambda (1-\lambda) \|q^1 - q^2\|_2^2. \end{aligned}$$

We now define $q^{i,*}$ and H_t as given in Equation (17). Let $\Delta q \in \mathbf{A}$ such that for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$, Δq_t takes arbitrary values in $[-q_t^{i,*}, +\infty)$, and define an admissible control $\bar{q}^i \in \mathbf{A}$ such that

$$\bar{q}_t^i = q_t^{i,*} + \Delta q_t.$$

Let us compute $\Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) = \mathcal{J}^i(\bar{q}^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) - \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i})$. Denote

$$\Delta_{t'} = t' - t, \quad \text{and} \quad x = e^{-r}(1 - \nu).$$

We have that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t' \geq t} x^{\Delta_{t'}} \Gamma^i f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{N,i}, D_{t'}, D_{t'-1}, \mathbf{Y}_{t'}) \Delta q_t + \Delta q_t c_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right) \right] \\ &+ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \mathbb{E} \left[x^{\Delta_T} \Gamma^i \Delta q_t g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \mathbb{E} \left[\Delta q_t \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t' \geq t} x^{\Delta_{t'}} \Gamma^i f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{N,i}, D_{t'}, D_{t'-1}, \mathbf{Y}_{t'}) + c_t \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N \right] + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right) \right] \\ &+ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \mathbb{E} \left[\Delta q_t \mathbb{E} \left[x^{\Delta_T} \Gamma^i g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^N \right] \right] \\ &= \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \mathbb{E} \left[-\Delta q_t H_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right) \right], \end{aligned}$$

where the third equality comes from definition of H_t .

Let us analyse the sign of the quantity $-\Delta q_t H_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right)$ inside of the expectation. If $q_t^{i,*} = 0$, then $H_t \leq 0$ and $\Delta q_t \geq 0$: $-\Delta q_t H_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right) = -\Delta q_t H_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 \right) \geq 0$. Otherwise, $H_t = 2\tilde{c}q_t^{i,*}$ and then $-\Delta q_t H_t + \tilde{c} \left((\bar{q}_t^i)^2 - (q_t^{i,*})^2 \right) = \tilde{c}(\Delta q_t)^2 \geq 0$. Therefore, we obtain that for all admissible control $q^{i,*} + \Delta q$, we have

$$\Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \geq e^{-rT} \tilde{c} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (\Delta q_t)^2 \right] \geq 0. \quad (25)$$

This proves that $q^{i,*}$ is a global minimum.

Moreover, we proved previously that $\mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \cdot)$ is strongly convex. As \mathbf{A} is a convex set, we conclude that $q^{i,*}$ is actually the unique global minimum. \square

5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4

The proof of the first point directly follows from Lemma A.3. Indeed, since \bar{q} is an ϵ -solution, we have:

$$\bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(\bar{q}^i, \mathbf{q}) \leq \inf_{q^i \in \mathbf{A}} \bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}) + \epsilon.$$

Therefore, there exists a constant $C_1 > 0$ independent of N such that $\bar{q}^i \in \mathbf{A}_{C_1}$. We also have by Corollary 3.3 that $q^{i,*}$ belongs to \mathbf{A}_C . We obtain the result by taking $C = \max[C_1, C]$.

The proof of the second point relies on (Bonnans and Shapiro, 2013, Proposition 4.32). Let us introduce some notations.

We denote m_t^{N,q^i} the random empirical measures where player i uses control $q^{i,1}$. Note that this is different from notation $m_t^{N,i}$ which denotes the empirical measure where player i was omitted.

We also write

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q^i) &:= \mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) - \bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}) \\ &= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} Q_t^i \left(f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) - f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) \right) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + Q_T^i e^{-rT} \left(g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^{N,q^i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right) \right].\end{aligned}$$

Following the above reference, we will prove i) that the second order growth condition holds for function $q^i \rightarrow \mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i})$ on a given neighborhood S of the optimal solution q^* and ii) that the difference function $\Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q)$ is Lipschitz-continuous on $\mathbf{A}^N \cap S$.

We first prove i). Using (25) in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we obtain that for all $q^i \in \mathbf{A}^N$,

$$\mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) - \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,*}, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \geq e^{-rT} \tilde{c} \|q^i - q^{i,*}\|_2^2.$$

This proves that the second order growth condition holds.

We will now prove ii). We consider $q^{i,1}, q^{i,2} \in \mathbf{A}^N$. We introduce the following notations:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Q_t &= Q_t^{i,1} - Q_t^{i,2}, \\ \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,j}}) &= f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) - f^\beta(t, m_t^N, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t), \\ \Delta g(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,j}}) &= g(m_T^{N,i}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^{N,q^{i,j}}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}).\end{aligned}$$

Note that

$$\begin{aligned}(Q_t^{i,1} - Q_t^{i,2})f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) - Q_t^{i,1}f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) + Q_t^{i,2}f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) \\ = \Delta Q_t \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}) + Q_t^{i,2} \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}).\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,1}) - \Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,2}) &= \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} \Delta Q_t \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}) + e^{-rt} Q_t^{i,2} \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right] \\ &\quad + \mathbb{E} \left[e^{-rT} \Delta Q_T \Delta g(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}}) + e^{-rT} Q_T^{i,2} \Delta g(t, m_T^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right].\end{aligned}$$

We have

$$\begin{aligned}&|\Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,1}) - \Delta\mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,2})|^2 \\ &\leq 4 \left[(T-1) \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-2rt} \mathbb{E} \left[\left| \Delta Q_t \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right|^2 \right] + e^{-2rt} \mathbb{E} \left[\left| Q_t^{i,2} \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right|^2 \right] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + e^{-2rT} \mathbb{E} \left[\left| \Delta Q_T \Delta g(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right|^2 \right] + e^{-2rT} \mathbb{E} \left[\left| Q_T^{i,2} \Delta g(t, m_T^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}}) \right|^2 \right] \right] \\ &\leq 4 \left[(T-1) \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-2rt} \mathbb{E} [\Delta Q_t^2] \mathbb{E} [\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2] + e^{-2rt} \mathbb{E} [(Q_t^{i,2})^2] \mathbb{E} [\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2] \right. \\ &\quad \left. + e^{-2rT} \mathbb{E} [\Delta Q_T^2] \mathbb{E} [\Delta g(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}})^2] + e^{-2rT} \mathbb{E} [(Q_T^{i,2})^2] \mathbb{E} [\Delta g(t, m_T^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}})^2] \right]\end{aligned}$$

by applying Cauchy-Schwarz inequality successively.

Now, we have by Lemma A.5 that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq L_f^2 \mathbb{E} \left[d_1(m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

We also have that, since $\mathbf{Q}^{-i} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}^i} \mathbf{A}_C^N$, by using Jensen's inequality,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[d_1(m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq \frac{4C}{N^2}. \quad (26)$$

By combining the two previous inequalities, we obtain that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,i}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq \frac{4L_f^2 C}{N^2}.$$

We also have that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[d_1(m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq \frac{1}{N^2} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(Q_t^{i,1} - Q_t^{i,2} \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right],$$

and therefore

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_t^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq \frac{L_f^2}{N^2} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(Q_t^{i,1} - Q_t^{i,2} \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].$$

since the only difference between the two empirical measures is the value of the state of player i .

Similarly, by Lemma A.6, and by using the same bound (26),

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[\Delta g(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right] &\leq L_g^2 \mathbb{E} \left[d_1(m_T^{N,i}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right] \\ &\leq \frac{4L_g^2 C}{N^2}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta g(m_T^{N,q^{i,2}}, m_T^{N,q^{i,1}})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right] \leq \frac{L_g^2}{N^2} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(Q_T^{i,1} - Q_T^{i,2} \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right].$$

With $L^2 = 20C(T-1) (L_f^2 + L_g^2)$, we finally obtain that

$$|\Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,1}) - \Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,2})|^2 \leq \frac{L^2}{N^2} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} [\Delta Q_t^2] \right).$$

Therefore,

$$|\Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,1}) - \Delta \mathcal{J}^i(q^{i,2})| \leq \frac{L}{N} \|\Delta Q\|_2.$$

Moreover, the state dynamics give that

$$\|\Delta Q\|_2 \leq \sqrt{\frac{T}{2}} \|\Delta q\|_2.$$

We finally conclude that the function $q \rightarrow \Delta \mathcal{J}(q)$ is Lipschitz-continuous on \mathbf{A}_C , with constant $\frac{\kappa}{N}$ where

$$\kappa = \frac{LT}{\sqrt{2}}.$$

Proposition 4.32 of [Bonnans and Shapiro \(2013\)](#) therefore gives us that if \bar{q} is an ϵ -solution of Problem (\mathcal{Q}^N) , then we have that

$$\|\bar{q} - q^{i,*}\|_2 \leq \frac{1}{N} (e^{-rT}\hat{c})^{-1} \kappa + (e^{-rT}\hat{c})^{-\frac{1}{2}} \epsilon^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

□

5.4 Proof of Theorem 3.8

Step 1. By Proposition 3.6, there exists $C > 0$ such that the minimizer of (\mathcal{P}) belongs to \mathbf{A}_C . Therefore, the map Ψ maps \mathbf{A}_C into itself. Moreover, by Assumption 2.3, the support of filtration \mathbb{F} is discrete. Therefore, \mathbf{A} is of finite dimension, and by Riesz theorem, \mathbf{A}_C is compact. Moreover, it is also convex.

Step 2. We now check that Ψ is continuous on \mathbf{A}_C . Let $\hat{q}^1, \hat{q}^2 \in \mathbf{A}_C$. Denote Q^1 and Q^2 the associated installed capacities, m^{q^1} and m^{q^2} the associated random vectors of probability measures, and $q^1 = \Psi(\hat{q}^1)$ and $q^2 = \Psi(\hat{q}^2)$. We also denote

$$\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{\hat{q}^1}, m_t^{\hat{q}^2}) = f^\beta(t, m_t^{\hat{q}^1}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) - f^\beta(t, m_t^{\hat{q}^2}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t),$$

and

$$\Delta g(m_T^{q^1}, m_T^{q^2}) = g(m_T^{q^1}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^{q^2}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}).$$

We write $x = e^{-r}(1 - \nu)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} & \|q^1 - q^2\|_2^2 \\ & \leq \frac{1}{(2\hat{c})^2} \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} [|H_t^1 - H_t^2|^2] \\ & \leq \frac{1}{(2\hat{c})^2} \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} x^{t'-t} \Gamma \Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2}) + x^{T-t} \Gamma \Delta g(m_T^{\hat{q}^1}, m_T^{\hat{q}^2}) \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \right] \\ & \leq \frac{1}{2\hat{c}^2} \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[(T-t) \sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} x^{2(t'-t)} \Gamma^2 \Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2})^2 + x^{2(T-t)} \Gamma^2 \Delta g(m_T^{\hat{q}^1}, m_T^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \right] \end{aligned}$$

where we used the definition of q in (21), Jensen's inequality on line 2, and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on line 3. We note that after conditioning on $\mathcal{F}_{t'}$, $m_{t'}^{q^1}$ and $m_{t'}^{q^2}$ are deterministic probability measures. Therefore, by Lemma A.5,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'} \right] \leq L_f^2 \mathbb{E} \left[d_1 \left(m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2} \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'} \right].$$

From Remark 1.1, it readily follows that

$$d_1 \left(m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2} \right) = \sup_{\psi \text{ 1-Lip}} \mathbb{E} \left[\psi(\hat{Q}_{t'}^1) - \psi(\hat{Q}_{t'}^2) \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'}^B \right] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[\left| \hat{Q}_{t'}^1 - \hat{Q}_{t'}^2 \right| \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'}^B \right].$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'} \right] &\leq L_f^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{t'}^1 - \hat{Q}_{t'}^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'}^B \right]^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'} \right] \\ &\leq L_f^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{t'}^1 - \hat{Q}_{t'}^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'}^B \right],\end{aligned}$$

where we used Jensen inequality. Thus, for $t' \geq t$,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E} \left[\Gamma^2 \Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] &= \mathbb{E} \left[\Gamma^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t', m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}, m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'} \right] \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \\ &\leq L_{\Delta_f}^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{t'}^1 - \hat{Q}_{t'}^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{t'}^B \right] \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right],\end{aligned}\tag{27}$$

with $L_{\Delta_f}^2 := (\Gamma^{max})^2 L_f^2$. Similarly, with Lemma A.6 and Remark 1.1, we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E} \left[\Gamma^2 \Delta g(m_T^{\hat{q}^1}, m_T^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right] &\leq (\Gamma^{max})^2 L_g^2 \mathbb{E} \left[d_1 \left(m_T^{\hat{q}^1}, m_T^{\hat{q}^2} \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1} \right] \\ &\leq (\Gamma^{max})^2 L_g^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_T^1 - \hat{Q}_T^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1}^B \right] \\ &\leq L_{\Delta_g}^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{T-1}^1 - \hat{Q}_{T-1}^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1}^B \right],\end{aligned}$$

with $L_{\Delta_g}^2 = (\Gamma^{max})^2 L_g^2 (1 - \nu)^2$. We used similarly Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that since the state dynamics are uncontrolled after time T , $m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^1}$ and $m_{t'}^{\hat{q}^2}$ are deterministic probability measures for all $t' \geq T$ after conditioning on \mathcal{F}_{T-1} . Therefore,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\Gamma^2 \Delta g(m_T^{\hat{q}^1}, m_T^{\hat{q}^2})^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right] \leq L_{\Delta_g}^2 \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{T-1}^1 - \hat{Q}_{T-1}^2 \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_{T-1}^B \right] \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right].\tag{28}$$

The combination of (27) and (28) gives the existence of constant $L = \frac{1}{2\bar{c}^2} \left((T-1)L_{\Delta_f}^2 + L_{\Delta_g}^2 \right)$ such that

$$\begin{aligned}\|q^1 - q^2\|_2^2 &\leq L \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \sum_{t'=t}^{T-1} \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\hat{Q}_{t'}^1 - \hat{Q}_{t'}^2 \right)^2 \right] \\ &\leq L(T-1) \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \left(\hat{Q}_t^1 - \hat{Q}_t^2 \right)^2 \right].\end{aligned}$$

With the state dynamics, we finally have obtain that there exists a constant $L > 0$ such that

$$\|q^1 - q^2\|_2^2 \leq L \|\hat{q}^1 - \hat{q}^2\|_2^2.$$

We conclude that the map Ψ is continuous in q .

Step 3. We finally conclude by using Schauder's fixed point theorem on the map Ψ which is continuous on the compact convex set \mathbf{A}_C . \square

5.5 Proof of Theorem 3.13

Let $q^1, q^2 \in \mathbf{A}^C$ two fixed points of the map Ψ . By Lemma 3.9, we have that almost surely, for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$, $\int x dm_t^{q^1}(x) \leq C'_e$, where $m_t^{q^1}$ and $m_t^{q^2}$ are the associated random vectors of probability measures. The same holds for $m_t^{q^2}$. As previously, we denote

$$\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, m_t^{q^2}) = f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) - f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^2}, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t),$$

and

$$\Delta g(m_T^{q^1}, m_T^{q^2}) = g(m_T^{q^1}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^{q^2}, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}).$$

As stated previously, fixed points of Ψ are minimizers of (??), therefore

$$\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^1, m^{q^1}) \leq \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^2, m^{q^1}),$$

and

$$\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^2, m^{q^2}) \leq \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^1, m^{q^2}).$$

By summing the two previous inequalities, we get

$$\left(\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^1, m^{q^1}) - \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^1, m^{q^2}) \right) - \left(\mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^2, m^{q^1}) - \mathcal{J}^{mfg}(q^2, m^{q^2}) \right) \leq 0.$$

This implies

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} e^{-rt} (Q_t^1 - Q_t^2) \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, m_t^{q^2}) + (Q_T^1 - Q_T^2) e^{-rT} \Delta g(m_T^{q^1}, m_T^{q^2}) \right] \leq 0. \quad (29)$$

Conditioned on \mathcal{F}_t^B , $m_t^{q^1}$ and $m_t^{q^2}$ are deterministic probability measures. By Lemma A.7,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} \left[(Q_t^1 - Q_t^2) \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, m_t^{q^2}) \right] &= \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[(Q_t^1 - Q_t^2) \Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, m_t^{q^2}) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbb{E} \left[\Delta f^\beta(t, m_t^{q^1}, m_t^{q^2}) \mathbb{E} \left[(Q_t^1 - Q_t^2) \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] \right] \\ &\geq K_{(40)}^\epsilon \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^1 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] \right)^2 \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

By Lemma A.8, we obtain similarly that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[(Q_T^1 - Q_T^2) \Delta g(m_T^{q^1}, m_T^{q^2}) \mid \mathcal{F}_T \right] \geq K_{(43)}^\epsilon \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\mathbb{E} \left[Q_T^1 \mid \mathcal{F}_T^B \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[Q_T^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_T^B \right] \right)^2 \right]. \quad (31)$$

Therefore, we obtain by combining (29), (30) and (31)

$$0 \geq K \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T e^{-rt} \left(\mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^1 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] \right)^2 \right]$$

where $K = \min \left[K_{(40)}^\epsilon, K_{(43)}^\epsilon \right]$. This implies that for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^1 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[Q_t^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_t^B \right].$$

We will now prove that the equality actually holds for the probability measure in addition to the expectation. By Proposition 3.6, for a given vector of random probability measures

m , there exists a unique minimizer $q^* \in \mathbf{A}$. We have shown that if q^1, q^2 are two fixed points of the mapping Ψ , we have that for all $t \in \mathcal{T}$

$$\int x dm_t^{q^1}(x) = \int x dm_t^{q^2}(x).$$

Therefore, since the mapping $\mathcal{J}^{mfq}(\cdot, m^q)$ only depends on the quantity $\int x dm_t^q(x)$, we can conclude that the minimizers $q^{1,*}$ and $q^{2,*}$ are also equal. This concludes that if q^1, q^2 are two Nash equilibria, we have that

$$q^1 = q^2.$$

□

5.6 Proof of Lemma 3.21

Proof. We abuse notation somewhat by assuming that $P_N \rightarrow P$, with the understanding that this is along a subsequence. We now check that P satisfies the four conditions of Lemma 3.17. Define $\rho := P \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m)^{-1}$. By definition of P_N in (24), we have that

$$P_N \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma)^{-1} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^i)^{-1} = \lambda_D \otimes \lambda_Y^{\otimes T'} \otimes \lambda_\Gamma.$$

Therefore, $P_N \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma)^{-1}$ satisfies the required law. Since P_N converges in distribution to P , we directly obtain that $\rho \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma)$ also satisfies the required law. Therefore, $\rho \in \mathcal{M}$. Since Γ^i and D, \mathbf{Y} are independent under \mathbb{P} for each i , it follows that Γ and D, \mathbf{Y} are independent under P_N for each N . Thus Γ, D and \mathbf{Y} are independent under P .

We know that since $(q^{1,N}, \dots, q^{N,N})$ is a Nash equilibrium, we have by Corollary 3.3 that

$$\sup_N \frac{1}{N} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (q_t^{i,N})^2 \right] \leq C.$$

Moreover, all processes $q^{i,N}$ are uniformly bounded in N . Therefore, by taking the limit in the previous equation, we get that

$$\mathbb{E}^P \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (q_t)^2 \right] \leq C.$$

Moreover, since (Γ^i, q^i, Q^i) verifies the state equation under \mathbb{P} , the canonical processes $(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, D)$ also verify the state equation under each P_N . Since all processes are uniformly bounded in N , we directly obtain that the state equation also holds under the limit P .

We now check the third condition: Consider $\Phi : E^{T-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\Psi : \mathcal{D}^{T-1} \times \mathcal{Y}^{T'} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ two bounded and Lipschitz continuous mappings with corresponding Lipschitz constants L_Φ and L_Ψ . Note that by Remark 1.2 and by definition of E , we have

$$d_1(m^N - m^{N,i}) \leq \frac{2C'_e}{N}, \quad \text{a.s..}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}
\left| \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \int_E \Phi d(m^N - m^{N,i}) \right] \right| &\leq \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[|\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y})| \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L_{\Phi} d_1(m^N, m^{N,i}) \right] \\
&\leq \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[|\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y})| \frac{L_{\Phi}}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \frac{2C'_e}{N} \right] \\
&\leq \frac{2C'_e L_{\Phi}}{N} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} [|\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y})|] \rightarrow 0.
\end{aligned}$$

We finally obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}^P [\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \Phi(Q)] &= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \Phi(Q^i) \right] \\
&= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \int_E \Phi dm^N \right] \\
&= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \int_E \Phi dm^{N,i} \right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}^P \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \int_K \Phi dm \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Finally, from the density of Lipschitz functions in the space of bounded uniformly continuous functions, we obtain that for all $\Phi : E^{T-1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $\Psi : \mathcal{D}^{T-1} \times \mathcal{Y}^{T'} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ bounded and uniformly continuous mappings,

$$\mathbb{E}^P [\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \Phi(Q)] = \mathbb{E}^P \left[\Psi(D, \mathbf{Y}) \int_K \Phi dm \right].$$

Therefore, we conclude that conditioned on the common noise, the law of Q under P is m .

We now check the final condition, which requires to prove that P is optimal, ie that $P \in \mathcal{RA}^*(\rho)$, and so that for all $\tilde{P} \in \mathcal{RA}(\rho)$, $J(\tilde{P}) \geq J(P)$. Let $\tilde{P} \in \mathcal{RA}(\rho)$. We have $\tilde{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m)^{-1} = \rho$. Moreover, there exists $\tilde{q} \in \mathbf{A}$ such that $\tilde{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma, m, q, Q)^{-1}$ denotes the joint law of the solution and the inputs to state equation (18) associated to control \tilde{q} . Denote $Q^{\tilde{q}}$ the associated state process.

For $1 \leq k \leq N$, let

$$\tilde{P}_{N,k} := \mathbb{P} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^k, m^{N,k}, \tilde{q}, Q^{\tilde{q}})^{-1}.$$

By definition of the P_N and their weak convergence towards P , and since

$$\tilde{P}_{N,k} \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^k)^{-1} = P \circ (D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^k)^{-1},$$

we obtain that

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{P}_{N,k} = \tilde{P}.$$

It is fairly straightforward to verify that J is linear. The continuity of J of Lemma 3.18 implies

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N J(\tilde{P}_{N,k}) = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} J\left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \tilde{P}_{N,k}\right) = J(\tilde{P}).$$

By Lemma 3.18, we have that

$$J(P) = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} J(P_N) = \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \mathcal{J}^k(q^k, \mathbf{q}^{-k}).$$

Moreover, by definition of $\tilde{P}_{N,k}$, we obtain that

$$\mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Lambda(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^k, m^{N,k}, \tilde{q}, Q^{\tilde{q}}) \right] = J(\tilde{P}_{N,k}).$$

Finally, since all P_N are Nash equilibria, we have

$$\begin{aligned} J(P) &= \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \mathcal{J}^k(q^k, \mathbf{q}^{-k}) \\ &\leq \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \mathcal{J}^k(\tilde{q}, \mathbf{q}^{-k}) \\ &\leq \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N \mathbb{E}^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\Gamma(D, \mathbf{Y}, \Gamma^k, m^{N,k}, \tilde{q}, Q^{\tilde{q}}) \right] \\ &\leq \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N J(\tilde{P}_{N,k}) = J(\tilde{P}). \end{aligned}$$

This finally proves that $P \in \mathcal{RA}^*(\rho)$. □

Conclusion

We developed in this paper a new modeling framework which allows to study the long-term evolution of investment into renewable resources under uncertainty and risk aversion. We contribute to bridging the gap between the equilibrium models and agent-based models, and the mathematical approach of mean field games, by using the MFG framework to derive strong theoretical guarantees for games with large number of players, while striving to introduce a simple and interpretable model with closed-form solutions. We prove that both the N -player game and the corresponding MFG game admit an equilibrium solution, which we characterize through a closed-form solution. We also prove that any sequence of Nash equilibria to the N -player game converges to the unique solution of the MFG game. We develop a toy model applied to the specific case of France electricity market. Our numerical experiments highlight the importance of the risk aversion parameter and the analysis of invested capacity spread, allowed by the explicit modeling of heterogeneity. We show that our results derived in the MFG framework with heterogeneity regarding geographical localization cannot be reproduced with a representative agent's model. This highlights the importance of explicitly modeling heterogeneity in energy prospective models. This paper paves the way for future research into the impact of agents' heterogeneity on the prospective evolution of energy markets.

This paper constitutes a first step and calls for future research and improvements. In particular, the representation of the price mechanism could be improved from the current static representation through the merit-order curve to a more evolved representation capturing dynamic effects caused by storage and demand flexibility. Another future line of

research could strive to include more long-term uncertainties in the macro scenarios. Finally, some work could be done to modify the scope of the model by adding other types of producers, such as storage producers, in order to come closer to partial equilibrium models of the whole electricity market.

Acknowledgments This work benefited from the support of ADEME and of the Chair Stress Test, Risk Management and Financial Steering, led by the French Ecole polytechnique and its foundation and sponsored by BNP Paribas.

References

- Ibrahim Abada, Gauthier de Maere d’Aertrycke, and Yves Smeers. On the multiplicity of solutions in generation capacity investment models with incomplete markets: a risk-averse stochastic equilibrium approach. *Mathematical Programming B*, 165:5, 2017. ISSN 0025-5610.
- A. Agarwal, S. De Marco, E. Gobet, J. G. López-Salas, F. Noubiagain, and A. Zhou. Numerical approximations of McKean anticipative backward stochastic differential equations arising in initial margin requirements. *ESAIM: Proceedings and Surveys*, 65:1–26, 2019. ISSN 2267-3059. doi: 10.1051/proc/201965001.
- Saran Ahuja. Wellposedness of Mean Field Games with Common Noise Under a Weak Monotonicity Condition. *SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization*, 54(1):30–48, January 2016. ISSN 0363-0129, 1095-7138. doi: 10.1137/140974730.
- René Aïd, Roxana Dumitrescu, and Peter Tankov. The entry and exit game in the electricity markets: A mean-field game approach. *arXiv:2004.14057 [math]*, April 2020.
- Clémence Alasseur, Imen Ben Taher, and Anis Matoussi. An Extended Mean Field Game for Storage in Smart Grids. *Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications*, 184(2): 644–670, February 2020. ISSN 1573-2878. doi: 10.1007/s10957-019-01619-3.
- Stefan Ambec and Claude Crampes. Decarbonizing Electricity Generation with Intermittent Sources of Energy. *Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists*, 6(6):1105–1134, November 2019. ISSN 2333-5955. doi: 10.1086/705536.
- Mirjam Ambrosius, Jonas Egerer, Veronika Grimm, and Adriaan H. van der Weijde. Risk Aversion in Multilevel Electricity Market Models With Different Congestion Pricing Regimes. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3541599, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, February 2020.
- Muhammad Bashir Anwar, Gord Stephen, Sourabh Dalvi, Bethany Frew, Sean Ericson, Maxwell Brown, and Mark O’Malley. Modeling investment decisions from heterogeneous firms under imperfect information and risk in wholesale electricity markets. *Applied Energy*, 306:117908, January 2022. ISSN 0306-2619. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2021.117908.
- Martino Bardi. Explicit solutions of some linear-quadratic mean field games. *Networks & Heterogeneous Media*, 7(2):243, 2012. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2012.7.243.
- Martino Bardi and Ermal Feleqi. Nonlinear elliptic systems and mean-field games. *Nonlinear Differential Equations and Applications NoDEA*, 23(4):44, July 2016. ISSN 1420-9004. doi: 10.1007/s00030-016-0397-7.

- Frédéric J. Bonnans, Pierre Lavigne, and Laurent Pfeiffer. Discrete-time mean field games with risk-averse agents. *ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations*, 27: 44, 2021a. ISSN 1292-8119, 1262-3377. doi: 10.1051/cocv/2021044.
- J. Frederic Bonnans and Alexander Shapiro. *Perturbation Analysis of Optimization Problems*. Springer Science & Business Media, November 2013. ISBN 978-1-4612-1394-9.
- J. Frédéric Bonnans, Pierre Lavigne, and Laurent Pfeiffer. Generalized conditional gradient and learning in potential mean field games. *Arxiv preprint*, <https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.05785>, sep 2021b.
- Audun Botterud, Matthew R. Mahalik, Thomas D. Veselka, Heon-Su Ryu, and Ki-Won Sohn. Multi-Agent Simulation of Generation Expansion in Electricity Markets. In *2007 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting*, pages 1–8, June 2007. doi: 10.1109/PES.2007.385566.
- Lucy Butler and Karsten Neuhoff. Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction mechanisms to support wind power development. *Renewable Energy*, 33(8):1854–1867, August 2008. ISSN 0960-1481. doi: 10.1016/j.renene.2007.10.008.
- Pierre Cardaliaguet and Saeed Hadikhanloo. Learning in mean field games: The fictitious play. *ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations*, 23(2):569–591, April 2017. ISSN 1292-8119, 1262-3377. doi: 10.1051/cocv/2016004.
- Pierre Cardaliaguet, François Delarue, Jean-Michel Lasry, and Pierre-Louis Lions. *The Master Equation and the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games: (AMS-201)*. Princeton University Press, August 2019. ISBN 978-0-691-19371-7. doi: 10.1515/9780691193717.
- René Carmona and François Delarue. Probabilistic Analysis of Mean-Field Games. *SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization*, 51(4):2705–2734, January 2013. ISSN 0363-0129. doi: 10.1137/120883499.
- René Carmona and François Delarue. Stochastic Differential Mean Field Games. In René Carmona and François Delarue, editors, *Probabilistic Theory of Mean Field Games with Applications I: Mean Field FBSDEs, Control, and Games*, pages 129–213. Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018. ISBN 978-3-319-58920-6. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-58920-6_3.
- René Carmona, François Delarue, and Daniel Lacker. Mean field games with common noise. *The Annals of Probability*, 44(6):3740–3803, November 2016. ISSN 0091-1798, 2168-894X. doi: 10.1214/15-AOP1060.
- Rene Carmona, Gokce Dayanikli, and Mathieu Lauriere. Mean Field Models to Regulate Carbon Emissions in Electricity Production. *arXiv:2102.09434 [math]*, July 2021.
- Huadong Chen, Can Wang, Wenjia Cai, and Jianhui Wang. Simulating the impact of investment preference on low-carbon transition in power sector. *Applied Energy*, 217: 440–455, May 2018. ISSN 0306-2619. doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.02.152.
- Anna Creti and Fulvio Fontini. *Economics of Electricity: Markets, Competition and Rules*. Cambridge University Press, May 2019. ISBN 978-1-107-18565-4.

- Gauthier de Maere d’Aertrycke, Andreas Ehrenmann, and Yves Smeers. Investment with incomplete markets for risk: The need for long-term contracts. *Energy Policy*, 105: 571–583, June 2017. ISSN 0301-4215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.029.
- Andreas Ehrenmann and Yves Smeers. Generation Capacity Expansion in a Risky Environment: A Stochastic Equilibrium Analysis. *Operations Research*, 59(6):1332–1346, 2011. ISSN 0030-364X.
- Natalia Fabra. The energy transition: An industrial economics perspective. *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 79:102734, December 2021. ISSN 0167-7187. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102734.
- Riccardo Fagiani, Julián Barquín, and Rudi Hakvoort. Risk-based assessment of the cost-efficiency and the effectivity of renewable energy support schemes: Certificate markets versus feed-in tariffs. *Energy Policy*, 55(C):648–661, 2013. ISSN 0301-4215.
- J. Doyne Farmer and Duncan Foley. The economy needs agent-based modelling. *Nature*, 460(7256):685–686, August 2009. ISSN 1476-4687. doi: 10.1038/460685a.
- Christoph Fraunholz, Kim K. Miskiw, Emil Kraft, Wolf Fichtner, and Christoph Weber. On the Role of Risk Aversion and Market Design in Capacity Expansion Planning. *The Energy Journal*, 44(3), July 2023. ISSN 01956574. doi: 10.5547/01956574.44.2.cfra.
- Pierre Friedlingstein, Matthew W Jones, Michael O’Sullivan, Robbie M Andrew, Dorothee CE Bakker, Judith Hauck, Corinne Le Quéré, Glen P Peters, Wouter Peters, Julia Pongratz, et al. Global carbon budget 2021. *Earth System Science Data*, 14(4):1917–2005, 2022.
- IEA. *World Energy Outlook 2022*. 2022.
- Alexander Kell, Matthew Forshaw, and A. Stephen McGough. ElecSim: Monte-Carlo Open-Source Agent-Based Model to Inform Policy for Long-Term Electricity Planning. In *Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems, E-Energy ’19*, pages 556–565, New York, NY, USA, June 2019. Association for Computing Machinery. ISBN 978-1-4503-6671-7. doi: 10.1145/3307772.3335321.
- Daniel Lacker. A general characterization of the mean field limit for stochastic differential games. *Probability Theory and Related Fields*, 165(3):581–648, August 2016. ISSN 1432-2064. doi: 10.1007/s00440-015-0641-9.
- Daniel Lacker and Luc Le Flem. Closed-loop convergence for mean field games with common noise. *arXiv:2107.03273 [math]*, July 2021.
- Daniel Lacker and Thaleia Zariphopoulou. Mean field and n -agent games for optimal investment under relative performance criteria. *Mathematical Finance*, 29(4):1003–1038, October 2019. ISSN 0960-1627, 1467-9965. doi: 10.1111/mafi.12206.
- Jean-Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions. Mean field games. *Japanese Journal of Mathematics*, 2(1):229–260, March 2007. ISSN 0289-2316, 1861-3624. doi: 10.1007/s11537-007-0657-8.
- Javier López Prol and Wolf-Peter Schill. The Economics of Variable Renewable Energy and Electricity Storage. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 13(1):443–467, 2021. doi: 10.1146/annurev-resource-101620-081246.

- Jacob Mays, David P. Morton, and Richard P. O’Neill. Asymmetric risk and fuel neutrality in electricity capacity markets. *Nature Energy*, 4(11):948–956, November 2019. ISSN 2058-7546. doi: 10.1038/s41560-019-0476-1.
- Thomas Möbius, Iegor Riepin, Felix Müsgens, and Adriaan H. van der Weijde. Risk aversion in flexible electricity markets. *arXiv:2110.04088 [econ, q-fin]*, October 2021.
- Francisco D. Munoz, Adriaan Hendrik van der Weijde, Benjamin F. Hobbs, and Jean-Paul Watson. Does risk aversion affect transmission and generation planning? A Western North America case study. *Energy Economics*, 64:213–225, May 2017. ISSN 0140-9883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.03.025.
- Anastasiya Ostrovnaya, Iain Staffell, Charles Donovan, and Robert Gross. The High Cost of Electricity Price Uncertainty. SSRN Scholarly Paper 3588288, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, February 2020.
- Kalyanapuram Parthasarathy. *Probability Measures on Metric Spaces*. Probability and Mathematical Statistics: A Series of Monographs and Textbooks. Academic Press, 1967. doi: 10.1016/C2013-0-08107-8.
- Marie Petitet, Dominique Finon, and Tanguy Janssen. Capacity adequacy in power markets facing energy transition: A comparison of scarcity pricing and capacity mechanism. *Energy Policy*, 103:30–46, April 2017. ISSN 0301-4215. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.032.
- Stefan Pfenninger and Iain Staffell. Long-term patterns of European PV output using 30 years of validated hourly reanalysis and satellite data. *Energy*, 114:1251–1265, November 2016. ISSN 0360-5442. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2016.08.060.
- Hans-O Pörtner, Debra C Roberts, Helen Adams, Carolina Adler, Paulina Aldunce, Elham Ali, Rawshan Ara Begum, Richard Betts, Rachel Bezner Kerr, Robbert Biesbroek, et al. *Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability*. IPCC Geneva, Switzerland:, 2022.
- R. Tyrrell Rockafellar and Stanislav Uryasev. Optimization of conditional value-at-risk, 1999.
- RTE. *Futurs Énergétiques 2050*. 2022.
- Iain Staffell and Stefan Pfenninger. The increasing impact of weather on electricity supply and demand. *Energy*, 145:65–78, February 2018. ISSN 0360-5442. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2017.12.051.
- Leigh Tesfatsion. Electric Power Markets in Transition: Agent-Based Modeling Tools for Transactive Energy Support. In *Handbook of Computational Economics*, volume 4, pages 715–766. Elsevier, 2018. ISBN 978-0-444-64131-1. doi: 10.1016/bs.hescom.2018.02.004.
- C. Villani. *Optimal transport*, volume 338 of *Grundlehren der Mathematischen Wissenschaften [Fundamental Principles of Mathematical Sciences]*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2009. Old and new.
- Anke Weidlich and Daniel Veit. A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models. *Energy Economics*, 30(4):1728–1759, July 2008. ISSN 0140-9883. doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2008.01.003.

A Technical lemmas

This section is concerned with proving some technical lemmas on the structure of our problem.

A.1 Some properties of the Expected Shortfall

Lemma A.1. *Let A, B be two random variables on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P})$, and let \mathcal{F}' be a sub- σ -field of \mathcal{F} . Then*

$$|\mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(A) - \mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(B)| \leq \frac{\mathbb{E}[|A - B| | \mathcal{F}']}{\alpha}, \quad (32)$$

$$\mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(A) - \mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(B) \geq \frac{1}{\alpha} \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E}[(A - x)^+ - (B - x)^+ | \mathcal{F}']. \quad (33)$$

Proof. The sketch of proof of (32) follows (Agarwal et al., 2019, p.14). To prove (33) we use Definition (11) to write:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(A) - \mathbf{ES}_{\mathcal{F}'}^\alpha(B) &= \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} \left[x + \frac{(A - x)^+}{\alpha} | \mathcal{F}' \right] + \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} \left[-x - \frac{(B - x)^+}{\alpha} | \mathcal{F}' \right] \\ &\geq \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ \mathbb{E} \left[x + \frac{(A - x)^+}{\alpha} | \mathcal{F}' \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[-x - \frac{(B - x)^+}{\alpha} | \mathcal{F}' \right] \right\} \\ &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} [(A - x)^+ - (B - x)^+ | \mathcal{F}'], \end{aligned}$$

where we used the fact that $\inf_{x \in X} f(x) + \sup_{x \in X} g(x) \geq \inf_{x \in X} f(x) + g(x)$ on line 2. \square

A.2 Lemmas for the N -player game

The following lemma uses the fact that the market price is bounded to derive some bounds on the coefficients in the cost function.

Lemma A.2. *There exists $K > 0$ such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$, for all $D, D' \in \mathcal{D}$, and for all $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$,*

$$|f^\beta(t, m, D, D', \mathbf{Y})| \leq K. \quad (34)$$

Proof. Definition of function f in Equation (8) and the fact that the price mapping is bounded directly yields that function f is bounded. Moreover, definition of expected shortfall (11) gives that $\mathbf{ES}_{D_{t-1}}^\alpha \left(f(t, m_t^{N,i}, \dots) \right)$ is also bounded. Finally, by definition of function f^β in Equation (14), we obtain that there exists $K > 0$ satisfying (34). \square

The following lemma is an estimate of the second-order moment of all suboptimal controls.

Lemma A.3. *Let $\mathbf{q} \in \prod_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \mathbf{A}$ and $C_1 > 0$. There exists $C_2 > 0$ independent from N such that for any $i \in \mathcal{N}$,*

- if \hat{q}^i satisfies

$$\mathcal{J}^i(\hat{q}^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \leq \inf_{q^i \in \mathbf{A}} \mathcal{J}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) + C_1, \quad (35)$$

then $\hat{q}^i \in \mathbf{A}_{C_2}$.

- if \hat{q}^i satisfies

$$\bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(\hat{q}^i, \mathbf{q}) \leq \inf_{q^i \in \mathbf{A}} \bar{\mathcal{J}}^i(q^i, \mathbf{q}) + C_1,$$

then $\hat{q}^i \in \mathbf{A}_{C_2}$.

Proof. We will prove the first point, as the second point directly follows from the same proof. Let $i \in \mathcal{N}$ and let \hat{q}^i satisfy (35). Then

$$\mathcal{J}^i(\hat{q}^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) \leq \mathcal{J}^i(0, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) + C_1 = C_1. \quad (36)$$

We need now to bound $\mathcal{J}^i(\hat{q}^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i})$ from below. Lemma A.2 directly gives us that there exists a constant $K > 0$ such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}_+)$, for all $D_t, D_{t-1} \in \mathcal{D}$, for all $\mathbf{Y}_t \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$f^\beta(t, m, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) \geq -K.$$

Therefore, combining this previous result with the fact that $q_t^i \geq 0$ a.s., and that $c_t > 0$, we have that

$$L^\beta(t, Q_t^i, q_t^i, m, D_t, D_{t-1}, \mathbf{Y}_t) \geq e^{-rt} (-Q_t^i K + \tilde{c} q_t^i)^2 \quad \text{a.s.}$$

Therefore, we obtain by combining the definition of the state equation and Young's inequality that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{J}^i(\hat{q}^i, \mathbf{q}^{-i}) &\geq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (\tilde{c} |q_t^i|^2 - Q_t^i K) - Q_T^i K \right] \\ &\geq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \left(\tilde{c} |q_t^i|^2 - 2K \sum_{t' \leq t} q_{t'}^i \right) \right] \\ &\geq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \left(\tilde{c} |q_t^i|^2 - 2 \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \frac{KT}{\sqrt{\tilde{c}}} \sqrt{\tilde{c} q_t^i} \right) \right] \quad (37) \\ &\geq \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \tilde{c} |q_t^i|^2 - \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \frac{(2KT)^2}{2\tilde{c}} - \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} \frac{\tilde{c} |q_t^i|^2}{2} \right] \\ &\geq \frac{\tilde{c}}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} |q_t^i|^2 \right] - K'. \end{aligned}$$

By combining (36) and (37), we finally obtain that $\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} |q_t^i|^2 \right] \leq \frac{2}{\tilde{c}} (C_1 + K') =: C_2$ as announced. \square

We now move to some lemmas corresponding to the limiting game. We first prove that the different mappings are Lipschitz with respect to the Kantorovitch-Rubinstein distance.

Lemma A.4. *Let $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$, $D \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then*

$$|R(h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - R(h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \leq d_1(m_1, m_2),$$

and

$$|\phi(t, h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - \phi(t, h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \leq L_F d_1(m_1, m_2).$$

Proof. By definition (5) of R ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& |R(h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - R(h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \\
&= \left| \left(D + \tilde{D} - \Gamma_h \int x dm_1(x) \right)_+ - \left(D + \tilde{D} - \Gamma_h \int x dm_2(x) \right)_+ \right| \\
&\leq \left| \Gamma_h \int x d(m_1 - m_2)(x) \right| \\
&\leq d_1(m_1, m_2)
\end{aligned}$$

where we used the fact that $\Gamma_h \in [0, 1]$ and the definition of the distance d_1 in (1).

By definition (6) of ϕ ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& |\phi(t, h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - \phi(t, h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \\
&= |F^{-1}(t, R(h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y})) \wedge \bar{P} - F^{-1}(t, R(h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})) \wedge \bar{P}| \\
&\leq |F^{-1}(t, R(h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y})) - F^{-1}(t, R(h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}))| \\
&\leq L_F |R(h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - R(h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \\
&\leq L_F d_1(m_1, m_2),
\end{aligned}$$

where line 4 comes from Assumption 2.6. \square

Lemma A.5. *Let $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$, $D, D' \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$. Then there exists a constant $L_f > 0$ such that*

$$\left| f^\beta(t, m_1, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) - f^\beta(t, m_2, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) \right| \leq L_f d_1(m_1, m_2).$$

Proof. The proof directly follows from Lemma A.4. We write

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}) &:= f(t, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - f(t, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}), \\
\Delta \phi(h, m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}) &:= \phi(t, h, m_1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - \phi(t, h, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}), \\
\Delta \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(m_1, m_2) &:= \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m_1, \cdot, \cdot)) - \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m_2, \cdot, \cdot)).
\end{aligned}$$

Note that by definition of f in (8),

$$\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}) = - \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \Gamma_{t,h} \Delta \phi(h, m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y}),$$

Lemma A.4 gives:

$$\begin{aligned}
|\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| &\leq \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} |\Gamma_{t,h} \Delta \phi(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \\
&\leq L_F H d_1(m_1, m_2),
\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

using that $\Gamma_{t,h} \in [0, 1]$. Moreover, (32) from Lemma A.1 combined with Lemma A.4 gives that

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(m_1, m_2) &\leq \frac{1}{\alpha} \mathbb{E} [|\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| \mid D'] \\
&\leq \frac{1}{\alpha} L_F H d_1(m_1, m_2).
\end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

Combining (38) and (39), we get

$$\begin{aligned} \left| f^\beta(t, m_1, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) - f^\beta(t, m_2, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) \right| &= |\beta (\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})) + (1 - \beta) (\Delta \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(m_1, m_2))| \\ &\leq \beta |\Delta f(m_1, m_2, D, \mathbf{Y})| + (1 - \beta) |\Delta \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(m_1, m_2)| \\ &\leq \frac{1}{\alpha} L_F H d_1(m_1, m_2), \end{aligned}$$

where we used the fact that $\alpha \leq 1$. We then write $L_f = \frac{1}{\alpha} L_F H$. \square

Lemma A.6. *Let $m_T^1, m_T^2 \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}^+)$, $D_{T-1} \in \mathcal{D}$ and $(\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'} \in \mathcal{Y}^{T'-T+1}$. Then there exists a constant $L_g > 0$ such that*

$$\left| g(m_T^1, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^2, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right| \leq L_g d_1(m_T^1, m_T^2).$$

Proof. Lemma A.5 also holds for mapping f (this corresponds to the case where $\beta = 1$). Therefore, Definition (10) of mapping g combined with Lemma A.5 gives

$$\begin{aligned} &\left| g(m_T^1, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m_T^2, D_{T-1}, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \right| \\ &\leq L_f \sum_{t=T}^{T'} e^{-r(t-T)} (1 - \nu)^{t-T} d_1 \left(m_T^1 \left(\frac{\cdot}{(1 - \nu)^{t-T}} \right), m_T^2 \left(\frac{\cdot}{(1 - \nu)^{t-T}} \right) \right) \\ &\leq L_f \sum_{t=T}^{T'} e^{-r(t-T)} (1 - \nu)^{2(t-T)} d_1(m_T^1, m_T^2). \end{aligned}$$

The result follows by writing $L_g = L_f(T' - T + 1)$. \square

The next lemma introduces a monotonicity condition similar in spirit to the ones introduced in Cardaliaguet et al. (2019) or Ahuja (2016).

Lemma A.7. *Assume Assumption 3.12 and Assumption 3.11 hold, and fix $\epsilon > 0$ as defined in Assumption 3.12. Let $t \in \mathcal{T}$. There exists $K_{(40)}^\epsilon > 0$ such that for all $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$, for all $D, D' \in \mathcal{D}$, for all $m^1, m^2 \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}_+)$ such that $0 \leq \int x dm^1 < \int x dm^2 \leq C'_e$, we have*

$$f^\beta(t, m^1, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) - f^\beta(t, m^2, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) \leq K_{(40)}^\epsilon \int x d(m^1 - m^2) \leq 0. \quad (40)$$

Proof. Note that since $\int x dm^1 < \int x dm^2$,

$$F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y})) \geq F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y})),$$

for all $D \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$.

By Assumption 3.12, for all $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon \neq \emptyset.$$

Then, for all $D \in \mathcal{D}$ and $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\begin{aligned}
& f(t, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - f(t, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y}) \\
&= - \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}} \Gamma_{t,h} (F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y})) \wedge \bar{P} - F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y})) \wedge \bar{P}) \\
&\leq \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon} \Gamma_{t,h} (F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y})) - F^{-1}(t, R(h, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y}))) \\
&\leq \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon} \Gamma_{t,h} C_{(23)} (R(h, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y}) - R(h, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y})) \\
&\leq \sum_{h \in \mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon} \Gamma_{t,h}^2 C_{(23)} \int xd(m^1 - m^2) \\
&\leq |\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon| C_{(23)} \epsilon^2 \int xd(m^1 - m^2) \leq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

where third line comes from Assumption 3.11, and the rest follows from the definition of the subset \mathcal{H}_t^ϵ . Moreover, (33) from Lemma A.1 gives that

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m^2, \cdot, \cdot)) - \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m^1, \cdot, \cdot)) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{\alpha} \inf_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \mathbb{E} [(f(t, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y}) - x)^+ - (f(t, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - x)^+ | D'] \geq 0
\end{aligned} \tag{42}$$

using (41) for the last inequality. Combining (41) and (42), we get that for all $D, D' \in \mathcal{D}$ and for all $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\begin{aligned}
& f^\beta(t, m^1, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) - f^\beta(t, m^2, D, D', \mathbf{Y}) \\
&= \beta (f(t, m^1, D, \mathbf{Y}) - f(t, m^2, D, \mathbf{Y})) + (1 - \beta) (\mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m^1, \cdot, \cdot)) - \mathbf{ES}_{D'}^\alpha(f(t, m^2, \cdot, \cdot))) \\
&\leq \beta |\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon| C_{(23)} \epsilon^2 \int xd(m^1 - m^2).
\end{aligned}$$

We obtain the announced result with $K_{(40)}^\epsilon = \beta |\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon| C_{(23)} \epsilon^2$. \square

Lemma A.8. *Assume Assumption 3.12 and Assumption 3.11 hold, and fix $\epsilon > 0$ as defined in Assumption 3.12. Then there exists $K_{(43)}^\epsilon > 0$ such that for all $\mathbf{Y} \in \mathcal{Y}$, for all $D, D' \in \mathcal{D}$, for all $m^1, m^2 \in \mathcal{M}_2(\mathbb{R}_+)$ such that $0 \leq \int x dm^1 < \int x dm^2 \leq C'_e$,*

$$g(m^1, D, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m^2, D, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \leq K_{(43)}^\epsilon \int xd(m^1 - m^2). \tag{43}$$

Proof. We mimic the proof of Lemma A.7 with $\beta = 1$, which gives, in view of the definition (10) of g ,

$$\begin{aligned}
& g(m^1, D, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) - g(m^2, D, (\mathbf{Y}_t)_{T \leq t \leq T'}) \\
&\leq \sum_{t=T}^{T'} e^{-r(t-T)} (1 - \nu)^{t-T} |\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon| C_{(23)} \epsilon^2 \int (1 - \nu)^{t-T} xd(m^1 - m^2).
\end{aligned}$$

We conclude by defining $K_{(43)}^\epsilon = C_{(23)} \epsilon^2 \sum_{t=T}^{T'} |\mathcal{H}_t^\epsilon| > 0$. \square