Article Dans Une Revue Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy Année : 2023

Prudential Parity Objection to the Moral Error Theory

Résumé

According to the moral error theory, all moral judgments are false. Until lately, most error theorists were local error theorists; they targeted moral judgments specifically and were less skeptical of other normative areas. These error theorists now face so-called “prudential parity objections”, according to which whatever evidence there is in favor of the moral error theory is also evidence for a prudential error theory. The present paper rejects three prudential parity objections: one based on the alleged irreducible normativity of prudential reasons; another on the lack of a story about the normativity of hypothetical reasons; yet another on the very nature of reasons generally. I argue that these objections leave an important variant of a local moral error theory intact.

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Dates et versions

hal-04010698 , version 1 (01-03-2023)

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Francois Jaquet. Prudential Parity Objection to the Moral Error Theory. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2023, 24 (1), pp.102-118. ⟨10.26556/jesp.v24i1.1922⟩. ⟨hal-04010698⟩
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