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Solipsistic and inter-subjective attitude reports.
From representational to volitionals

Enzo Laurenti, Alda Mari
Institut Jean Nicod CNRS/ENS/EHESS/PSL
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Abstract

The utterability of bouletic attitude reports is understood as sensitive to semantic features of their prejacent. Since Heim’s seminal work, much has been said on the constraints relative to beliefs and plausibility. Recently, the debate has focused on the distinction between action-oriented desire reports, in contrast to mere desire reports (Condoravdi & Lauer, 2016). Describing the first use, theoreticians have encoded in the semantics of want the requirement for structures of desire compatible with planning and action. These, in addition to ingredients referring to responsibility, have shown the proximity of some desire reports with intention reports. Here we understand these two interpretations as following from a fundamental difference between solipsistic and inter-subjective profiles of the attitudes across the epistemic (representational) and the bouletic domain (preferential attitudes). Revisiting the classical Hamblinian view, we propose that attitudes feature speech-act like content, which present p for uptake in the common ground. We argue that the uptake with representational is ‘confirmation’ and that with bouletics it is ‘realization’. In our analysis, actionability follows as a felicity condition on the inter-subjective use of bouletics and want in particular. Focusing on a variety of bouletic expressions in Italian, we also derive their temporal constraints from this more general distinction between private and public attitudes.

1 Introduction

At a very first approximation, attitude reports describe manners whereby individuals apprehend the world: epistemic attitudes (1-a) describe belief or knowledge about the world, and bouletic attitudes (1-b) describe ways in which the individuals would like the world to be.1

(1) a. I believe that it is raining.
   b. I want that he finishes his homework before he goes out.

Epistemic attitudes have been dubbed representational (Bolinger, 1974), they picture the world as it is represented in the mental state of the individual; bouletics are dubbed preferential (Anand & Hacquard, 2013), as they set a preference scale in which their prejacent2 is ranked higher as it negation or possibly an available alternative.

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1In this paper we use the terms bouletic, volitional and desiderative attitudes interchangeably.

2Prejacent refers to the proposition embedded under the attitude.
This twofold distinction between two types of attitudes has been recently refined in several ways (see (Giannakidou & Mari, 2021b; Portner, 2018) for recent overviews) and in particular revisited in the light of a prominent difference between two interpretations the attitudes. Specifically for epistemic attitudes and belief, it has been shown that they come in two sorts: solipsistic and non-solipsistic (Giannakidou & Mari, 2021a, 2021b; Giorgi & Pianesi, 1997; Mari, 2016; Mari & Portner, 2021). This very same description had been put forward by Nuysts (2014) who distinguishes subjective and non subjective attitudes. Here we use the labels solipsistic and inter-subjective to highlight the private-public dimension of this distinction.

(2) a. I believe that this is a good plan. (Solipsistic)
b. I believe that the keys are in the drawer. (Inter-subjective)

At a first approximation, on the solipsistic interpretation the belief statement describes a credence of the attitude holder (here, the speaker); on the inter-subjective interpretation, the belief statements proposes $p$ for uptake in the common ground.

This paper extends this view to bouletics and argues that bouletics also divide between solipsistic (or pure desiderative) interpretations and inter-subjective interpretations thus revisiting a distinction stated by Hare, and very much discussed in the recent literature, between bouletics as expressing mere desires and bouletics as conveying an action-oriented goal.

(3) After Hare (1971): If you want sugar in your soup,
   a. You must ask the waiter. ACTION-ORIENTED interpretation of want.
b. You must have diabetes. MERE DESIRE interpretation of want.

We will show that, in Italian, this distinction is lexically encoded and surfaces as a set of constraints on the semantic profile of the prejacent. One prominent constraints pertains to actionability, that it is to say whether the action that the prejacent describes can be successfully carried out in order to comply with the desire.

This paper has three goals: (i) set a cross-categorical distinction between subjective and inter-subjective uses for the representational and preferential attitudes; (ii) describe the constraints on the semantic profile of the prejacent for a set of preferential expressions (Italian will be a case in point to illustrate our purpose), (iii) propose an analysis that derives actionability not as as a lexically encoded feature, but as the result of an inter-subjective interpretation for volitionals.

Section 2 is dedicated to the first goal of setting the distinction between two uses of the attitudes. Section 3 describes the solipsistic and inter-subjective uses of bouletic attitudes in French and Italian. Section 4 proposes an analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2 Solipsistic and inter-subjective interpretations of the representational attitudes

In a series of recent studies, Mari (2016), Giannakidou and Mari (2021a, 2021b) and Mari and Portner (2021) have noted that representational predicates (including credere (‘believe’) and immaginare (‘imagine’) feature two interpretations. On one interpretation the representational attitude describes an internal mental state. This interpretation is called ‘expressive’ in Mari (2016) and ‘solipsistic’ in (Giannakidou & Mari, 2021b; Giorgi & Pianesi, 1997). We maintain here the term solipsistic.

(4) a. John believes that God exists.
b. John imagines that his car is a plane.

Under a second interpretation, the attitude does not only describe an internal mental state, but it also proposes to add $p$ to the common ground, it conveys a conjecture that is deemed to become common ground. Mari (2016) calls this use ‘inquisitive’, Giannakidou and Mari (2021b) ‘suppositional’ Here we will use the label inter-subjective to high-lighten the fact that $p$ becomes public, that it is to say, it is available for uptake.

(5) a. John believes that Mary is late
b. I imagine that you were late today at school

In languages like Italian, this distinction between the two interpretations is instantiated by mood; other languages may resort to other grammatical or pragmatic devices. Mari and Portner (2021) provide an extensive account on the idea that the inter-subjective interpretation is enhanced by raisability of a question under discussion for which $p$ provides an answer.

We focus here on fictional predicates to illustrate the purpose. Under the solipsistic interpretation fictional verbs select indicative (e.g. Giorgi and Pianesi (1997); Giannakidou (1999); Farkas (2003)). They are claimed to trigger a homogeneous modal space, consisting of $p$-dreaming/imaging worlds. The semantics mimics the semantics for Hintikka (1969) belief, and most if not all the theoreticians of mood would agree on the following analysis in (6).

(6) Fictional attitudes.
All worlds in the fictional modal base of the attitude holder are $p$ worlds.

Fictional predicates also feature an inter-subjective interpretation, which is manifested by the use of the subjunctive in the embedded clause in Italian (7).

(7) Immagino che Maria sia incinta.
Imagine.1SG.IND that Mary be.SUBJ.3SG pregnant
I imagine that Mary is pregnant.

The sentence states that, the speaker does not know whether $p$ is true, but she is reporting that in worlds that are compatible with what she knows and which comply with her imagination, her interlocutor has arrived late at school.

(8) Immagino che tu sia arrivato in ritardo questa mattina a scuola.
Imagine.IND.1SG that you arrive.SUBJ.3SG in late this morning at school
I imagine that you were late this morning at school.

There is empirical evidence indicating that mood shift might play a role in other Romance languages, including French, in spite of being a lot more constraint that Italian with respect to mood licensing. In French indicative seems to be mandatory (or, at least, largely favored) with fictional attitudes (9-a). However, if imaginer (‘imagine’) is in the imperative mood (9-b), the subjunctive is preferred.

We will not analyze these data in details, but they seem consistent with our observations on Italian: the use of imperative for the matrix verb might be viewed as way to coerce an inter-subjective reading – that may be otherwise conveyed by other means – here marked by mandatory mood shift.

(9) a. Tu imagines que Paul sera / *soit là
You imagine.IND.PRES.2SG that Paul be.IND.FUT.3SG / SUBJ.PRES.3SG here
avant toi.
before you
You imagine Paul will be there before you.

b. Imagine que Paul soit / *sera / là avant toi
imagine.IMP.2SG that Paul SUBJ.PRES.3SG / be.IND.FUT.3SG here before you
Imagine Paul is there before you.

Indicative-*immaginare* and subjunctive-*immaginare* trigger two different interpretations: Indicative-*immaginare* describes a solipsistic space of imagination; subjunctive-*immaginare* can be used to convey conjecture that is submitted to the common ground.3

To capture the solipsistic and the inter-subjective interpretation, we enrich the meaning of the attitude with speech-act-like content. We propose that the semantic content of the verb is added with speech-act type content, contrary to the performative hypothesis (Sadock (1974); Kaufmann (2012)) whereby speech acts are reduced to attitudes. We advance that the attitudes do not merely describe a mental state, but can be used to propose a conjecture (with representational, see Mari (2021)) or to make a desire public (with bouletics).

On this assumption disentangle the at-issue contribution from the speech-act-like layer. At the at-issue level, our definitions for solipsistic-*IMAGINE* are as follows (10).4,5

(10) Solipsistic-*IMAGINE* (at issue).
The mental state of the attitude holder is a $p$ state.

Inter-subjective-*IMAGINE* features speech-act-like content, that induces to add $p$ to a public space.

To make precise what this public space can be, we will rely on recent work on speech acts that has proposed fruitful revisitations of the notion of common ground, and, more broadly, of doxastic spaces (see e.g. C. L. Hamblin (1971); Clark and Schaefer (1989); Farkas and Bruce (2010); Krifka, 2015). Theoreticians have indeed conceived the common ground as a space where issues or questions are solved (Roberts, 1996) and proposals are made. With Farkas and Bruce (ibid.) we assume that for any given conversation, three spaces must be distinguished: a private space $s$, keeping track of the private beliefs, a space which we relabel ‘negotiation spaces’ $\mathfrak{N}$ which is a public space where proposals are made or questions are asked, and finally the common ground $C$, where ratified and mutually accepted propositions are stacked.

Negotiation spaces are supersets of common grounds (see also Portner (2007)). According to (Farkas & Bruce, 2010, p. 88)), assertions (by adding $p \in \mathfrak{N}$) project a future$C$ that includes the asserted proposition. This is a feature that we will maintain in our account, where negotiation spaces rather than the common grounds will play a role (in order to be added to the common ground dialogical moves are needed. For assertion, this dialogical move is confirmation (which can amount to lack of objection).

Importantly, we consider private and public space as independent from each other. Overall, different interpretations of IMAGINE statements reveal different articulations between $s$ and $\mathfrak{N}$. With Mari (2021), we propose that attitudes divide in two classes according to whether they are public or private. With public attitudes, $p$ is presented for uptake. With private attitudes, it

3Note that this is a simplification, as subjunctive can also be used under ‘pretend’ interpretations, which we do not discuss here, see Mari and Portner (2021).

4Giannakidou and Mari (2021b) distinguish between two layers: imagination and knowledge. Here we simplify the entry to focus on the distinction between the solipsistic and the inter-subjective interpretation. On how knowledge is related to the PUBLIC interpretation, see Mari (2021) and Giannakidou and Mari (2021a).

5We use italics to refer to specific expressions in a given language; small capitals to refer to a cross-linguistic entry, and use simple quotes for translations.
is not. More generally for attitudes the following distinction is proposed:

(11) Private and Public attitudes.
   a. PRIVATE attitudes: \( p \) is not for uptake
   b. PUBLIC attitudes: \( p \) is for uptake

On the inter-subjective (public) interpretation, a speech act like content is added to the semantic meaning of the attitude, specifying what follows:

(12) Speech-act layer of inter-subjective-IMAGINE
    PRESENT: update the negotiation space \( N \).

BELIEVE predicates illustrate the same distinction, (see for extended discussion Mari (2021)). The picture obtained is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>s</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Uptake</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMAGINE / other representational (Solipsistic)</td>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAGINE / other representational (Inter-subjective)</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that, if the distinction between two types of belief statements is marked by mood in Italian this does not need to be the case (see extended discussion in Mari and Portner (2021)). Languages resorts to a variety of grammatical and pragmatic features to convey these two interpretations. French, for instance uses prosody (Beyssade & Marandin, 2007).

We now newly argue that bouletic verbs also come in two varieties, solipsistic and inter-subjective and that these two uses emerge from a series of constraints on the semantic profiles of a variety of desire expressions.

### 3 Desiderative reports and ascriptions

The class of predicates that have a lexically hardwired bouletic meaning is very wide, and difficult to treat integrally. Here, we will focus on sperare (‘hope’), volere (‘want’) and avere voglia (lit. ‘have desire’) in Italian.

#### 3.1 Data

In Romance, attitude reports and ascriptions are prototypically constructed with a matrix verb complemented by a subordinate clause: the former describes the attitude, the second the prejacent proposition it applies to. The subordinates of Romance attitude verbs are finite, and thus subject to mood constraint, except when there is coreference between the grammatical subjects of the matrix clause (the attitude holder) and its subordinate (subject of the prejacent). In this case, non-finite clauses are licensed if the finite counterpart is at the indicative, or mandatory if its subjunctive.

(13) a. \( pro \) Credo che \( pro \) sia il più grande.
    \( proi \) believe.IND.1SG that \( proj \) be.SUBJ the more big
    I believe he is the biggest.

b. \( pro \) Credo che \( pro \) sono il più grande.
    \( proi \) believe.1SG that \( proi \) be.1SG.IND the more big
    I believe that I am the biggest.
Subject obviation, the semantics of non-finite clauses and *de se* interpretations are topics still under discussion, that are not totally stranger to our subject: recent work on these phenomena highlight the role played by actions and agency in their manifestation in language (Costantini, 2006; Farkas, 1992; Szabócs, 2021). We will try to ignore them in this paper, to focus on finite clauses.

In Italian, like in many languages, the notional category of desire is firmly associated with subjunctive. Most, if not all, Italian desire predicates are subjunctive selectors, and this selection is far more strict that with other type of attitudes (Giannakidou & Mari, 2021b; Portner & Rubinstein, 2020). *volere* (‘want’) can go with indicative prejacent only in very specific context, as *avere voglia* (‘want’ or ‘would like’, literally ‘have desire’).

(14) a. Voglio che Paul sia nel mio ufficio domani alla prima ora.
*Want.IND.1SG that Paul be.SUBJ.3SG in my office tomorrow at.the first hour*
I want Paul to be early in my office.

b. *Voglio che Paul è / sarà nel mio ufficio*
Want.IND.1SG that Paul be.IND.PRES.3SG / be.IND.FUT.3SG in my office
tomorrow at-the first hour
I want Paul to be early in my office.

(15) a. Ho voglia che Paul sia nel mio ufficio domani alla prima ora.
*Have.IND.1SG desire that Paul be.SUBJ.3SG in my office tomorrow at.the*
first hour
I have the desire for Paul to be early in my office.

b. *Ho voglia che Paul è / sarà nel mio ufficio domani alla prima ora.*
*Have.IND.1SG desire that Paul be.IND.PRES.3SG / be.IND.FUT.3SG in my*
office tomorrow at-the first hour
I have the desire for Paul to be early in my office.

*Sperare* (‘hope’), however, can much more easily accept indicative prejacent, in a way that is not without reminding epistemic reports to

(16) a. Spero che Paul sia qui domani alla prima ora.
*Hope.IND.1SG that Paul be.CONJ.3SG here tomorrow at.the first hour*
I hope that Paul will be here early tomorrow.

b. Spero che Paul *è / sarà qua domani*
Hope.IND.1SG that Paul be.IND.PRES.3SG / be.IND.FUT.3SG here tomorrow
at.the first hour
I hope that Paul will be here early tomorrow.

This relative homogeneity hides profound contrasts which seem to be linked to commitment to

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6Note that is not true for all equivalent of *HOPE* in Romance: if many tend to select subjunctive complements, French *espérer* (‘hope’) is a regular indicative selector. See again Portner and Rubinstein (2020) and Silk (2018)
act. As a first approximation, we can observe that the utterance of (17), with volere (‘want’), conveys the idea that the attitude holder will act to bring about the prejacent; this inference is absent, or at least not systematic, in (18) with sperare (‘hope’) or avere voglia (‘have desire’).

(17) Voglio che Maria sia orgogliosa di me.
Want.IND.1SG that Maria be.SUBJ.3SG proud of me
I want Maria to be proud of me.

I will act in order to bring about the fact that Maria is proud of me.

(18) a. Spero che Maria sia orgogliosa di me.
Hope.IND.1SG that Maria be.SUBJ.3SG proud of me
* I will act in order to bring about the fact that Maria is proud of me.
b. Ho voglia che Maria sia orgogliosa di me.
Have.IND.1SG desire that Maria be.SUBJ.3SG proud of me
* I will act in order to bring about the fact that Maria is proud of me.
c. Credo che Maria sia orgogliosa di me.
Believe.IND.1SG that Maria be.SUBJ.3SG proud of me
* I will act in order to bring about the fact that Maria is proud of me.

We will try spell out the ingredients underlying this contrast by considering a range of properties that distinguish volere (‘want’), from avere voglia (‘have desire’) and sperare (‘hope’).7

Rationality The compatibility of attitude verbs with prejacents perceived as impossible by the attitude holders is a long-standing topic in the semantics literature (see most prominently Heim (1982) and subsequent work). Very naturally, doxastic verbs like BELIEVE do not support such propositions: their association with the recognition of the impossibility of the prejacent is infelicitous, and a contradictory prejacent makes the attitude holder seem obviously irrational.

(19) a. #I know it is impossible, but I believe I’ll live on Mars.
b. Paul believes this circle is also a square.

The compatibility of desiderative attitudes with impossible prejacents is debated since the introduction on the matter in the linguistic literature. Heim (1992) famously proposed the following example, and remarked that want seems at ease with highly implausible (at least) situations, like never-ending weekends.

(20) Even if, of course, I know it will be over in a few hours,
a. I want this weekend to last forever.
b. #I hope this weekend will last forever.

Turning to Italian, we observe, without surprise, that credere (‘believe’) is incompatible with impossible prejacent. Sperare also patterns like a doxastic predicates, displaying the same rationality constraint.

(21) a. So che è impossibile, ma credo di andare
know.IND.1SG that be.IND.3SG impossible but believe.IND.1SG to go

7See Condoravdi and Lauer (2016); Grano (2017); Levinson (2003) for discussions of these properties in English.
sulla luna.
on the moon
I know it is impossible, but I believe to go on the moon.

b. #So che è impossibile, ma spero di andare sulla
   know IND.1SG that be IND.3SG impossible but hope IND.1SG to go on the moon.
   I know it is impossible, but I believe to go on the moon.

Turning to the other desire predicates, we observe that volere (‘want’) is not very felicitous in such a setting, especially when we compare it with an alternative using its conditional flexion vorrei (‘would want’). Here, volere seems to be subject to the same constraint as sperare (‘hope’) and the doxastics.

(22) a. #So che è impossibile, ma voglio andare sulla
   know IND.1SG that be IND.3SG impossible but want IND.1SG go INF on the moon.
   I know it is impossible, but I want to go on the moon.

b. So che è impossibile, ma vorrei andare sulla
   know IND.1SG that be IND.3SG impossible but wantCOND IND.1SG go INF on the moon.
   I know it is impossible, but I want to go on the moon.

On the opposite, avere voglia (‘have desire’) seems perfectly fine in such a context: its conditional counterpart avrei voglia (‘would have desire’) naturally exists but is not required nor favored over the simple present form.

(23) So che è impossibile, ma ho voglia di andare sulla
    know IND.1SG that be IND.3SG impossible but have IND.1SG desire to go INF on the moon.
    I know it is impossible, but I want to go on the moon.

Going back to the infinite weekend case, we hence have a pattern that distinguish volere at the simple present tense and sperare on one side, and volere with conditional morphology plus avere voglia on the other.

(24) Anche se so che sarà finito in poche ore,
    Even if I know it will be over in a few hours,
    a. #Voglio che questo weekend duri per sempre.
       want IND.1SG that this weekend last SUBJ IND.3SG for ever
       I would like this weekend to last forever.
    b. Vorrei che questo weekend duri per sempre.
       wantCOND IND.1SG that this weekend last SUBJ IND.3SG for ever
       I want this weekend to last forever.
    c. #Spero che questo weekend duri per sempre.
       hope IND.1SG that this weekend last SUBJ IND.3SG for ever

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The sentence improves with a concessive ‘nonetheless’ comunque.
I hope that this weekend will last forever.

d. Ho voglia che questo weekend duri per sempre. haveIND.1SG desire that this weekend lastSUBJ.3SG for ever I would like this weekend to last forever.

Rationality constraints thus seem to affect both an arguably action-oriented predicate (*volere*) and another who doesn’t have nothing to do with plans and bringing about (*sperare*) but for different reasons. This is also the case with inferential schemes, like the introduction of the conjunction, which is verified if and only if the fact that an agent is independently in relation with two distinct propositions $p, q$ entails that she is in relation with the conjunction $p \& q$ of those same propositions. (We omit the glosses here for readability).

\[(25)\]

a. Quest’estate, credo di andare a Roma e credo di andare a Dublino. #Ma non credo di andare e a Roma e a Dublino. This summer, I believe I’ll go to Dublin and I believe I’ll go to Rome. But I do not believe I’ll go both to Dublin and to Rome.

b. Quest’estate, voglio andare a Roma e voglio andare a Dublino. #Ma non voglio andare e a Roma e a Dublino. This summer, I want to go to Dublin and I want to go to Rome. But I do not want to go both to Dublin and to Rome.

c. Quest’estate, spero di andare a Roma e spero di andare a Dublino. #Ma non spero di andare e a Roma e a Dublino. This summer, I hope I’ll go to Dublin and I hope I’ll go to Rome. But I do not hope I’ll go both to Dublin and to Rome.

d. Quest’estate, ho voglia di andare a Roma e ho voglia di andare a Dublino. Ma non ho voglia di andare e a Roma e a Dublino. This summer, I hope I’ll go to Dublin and I hope I’ll go to Rome. But I do not hope I’ll go both to Dublin and to Rome.

*Credere* (‘believe), *sperare* (‘hope’) and *volere* (‘want’) – which are all rational in the sense defined above – instantiate this inferential schema, even if only the only one has this orientation toward action. Note that these properties are also observable in other action-oriented predicates, like intention reports (Grano, 2017), directives, and, arguably, some but not interpretations of *want*-sentences in English (see Condoravdi and Lauer (2016); Crnic (2011); Levinson (2003), a.o).

Rationality (and inferential schemes like conjunction introduction) are thus properties that allow to distinguish predicates like *volere* (‘want’) at the present tense from some other desire predicates – its conditional counterpart and *avere voglia* (‘have desire’), for example – but is not a sufficient criterion to identify link to action, because attitudes that are obviously lacking this semantic feature (*HOPE*, doxastic reports, . . . ) have the same behavior with respect to these properties. The temporal patterns discussed in the next section will allow us to sharpen the distinction.

**Temporal orientation** Temporal constraints on the prejacent of attitude verbs are an important feature which is ground in their semantics (Laca, 2010, 2012; Portner & Rubinstein, 2020)\(^{10}\): the notional categories of will and desire are tightly linked to future orientation, which the

\(^8\)See Grano (2017) for a discussion on the proximity of intention reports and doxastic attitudes on the basis of the same properties discussed here.

\(^{10}\)See also Condoravdi (2002) for a detailed analysis on the temporal orientation of modals.
space where desire are more naturally accomplished.

However, it is known that **Hope** is quite flexible with its prejacent: it supports present, past and future orientation. Such configurations are possible both in Italian (26) and in French (27).

(26) *Sperare* present perspective and past, present, future orientation:

a. Spero che ieri abbia dormito da Hope.IND.PRES.1SG that yesterday have.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PAST at sua madre.
   her mother
   I hope she slept at her mother’s place yesterday.

b. Spero che ora stia dormendo /
   Hope.IND.PRES.1SG that now be.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PRES /
   dorma da sua madre.
   sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother
   I hope she is sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

c. Spero che domani dormirà / dorma da sua
   Hope.IND.PRES.1SG that tomorrow sleep.IND.FUT.3SG / sleep.SUBJ.3SG at her
   madre.
   mother
   I hope she will sleep / sleeps at her mother’s place tomorrow.

(27) *Espérer* present perspective and past, present, future orientation:

a. J’espère qu’elle a dormi chez sa
   hope.IND.PRES.3SG that.she have.IND.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PAST at her
   mère hier.
   mother yesterday
   I hope she slept at her mother’s place yesterday

b. J’espère qu’elle est en train de dormir /
   I-hope.IND.PRES.1SG that.she be.IND.PRES.3SG in course of sleep.INF /
   dort chez sa mère maintenant.
   course of sleep.INF at her mother now
   I hope she is sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

c. J’espère qu’elle dormira chez sa mère demain.
   I-hope.IND.PRES.3SG that.she sleep.IND.FUT.3SG at her mother tomorrow
   I hope she will sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

**WANT** is stricter. It is not compatible with past prejacent, neither Italian nor in French (Giannakidou & Mari, 2021b).

(28) *Volere* present perspective and future orientation only:

a. #Voglio che ieri abbia dormito da
   Want.IND.PRES.1SG that yesterday have.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PAST at sua madre.
   her mother
   I want here to have slept at her mother’s place yesterday.

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11We use ‘temporal perspective’ to refer to the time at which the attitude holds and ‘temporal orientation’ to refer to the time at which the prejacent is evaluated with respect to the temporal perspective.
b. #Voglio che ora stia dormendo /
Want.IND.PRES.1SG that now be.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PRES /
dorma da sua madre.
sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother
I want her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

c. Voglio che dorma da sua madre domani.
want.IND.PRES.1SG that sleep.SUBJ.3SG at her mother tomorrow
I want her to sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

(29) Vouloir present perspective and future orientation only:

a. #Je veux qu’elle ait dormi chez sa
I want.IND.PRES.1SG that she have.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PAST at her
mère hier.
mother yesterday
I want her to have slept at her mother’s place yesterday
b. #Je veux qu’elle soit en train de dormir /
I want.IND.PRES.1SG that she be.IND.PRES.3SG in course of sleep.INF /
dorme chez sa mère maintenant.
sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother now
I want her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

c. Je veux qu’elle dorme chez sa mère demain.
I want.IND.PRES.3SG that she sleep..pres.3sg at her mother tomorrow
I want her to sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

The most litigious point pertains to simultaneity: it is frequently argued that WANT in Romance has a non-past orientation (e.g. Portner and Rubinstein (2020), a.o.). However, (30-a) and (31-a) are impossible in Italian and French, respectively, most notably in comparison with their conditional version, which is much more acceptable.

(30) a. #Voglio che ora stia dormendo /
Want.IND.PRES.1SG that now be.SUBJ.PRES.3SG sleep.PART.PRES /
dorma da sua madre.
sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother
I want her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

b. Vorrei che ora stesse dormendo da sua madre.
Want.COND.1SG that now be.SUBJ.IMPERF.3SG sleep.GER at her mother
I want her to be sleeping at her mother’s place right now.

(31) a. #Je veux qu’elle soit en train de dormir /
I want.SUBJ.PRES.1SG that she be.IND.PRES.3SG in course of sleep.INF /
dorme chez sa mère maintenant.
sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother now
I want her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

b. Je voudrais qu’elle soit en train de dormir /
I want.COND.1SG that she be.IND.PRES.3SG in course of sleep.INF /
dorme chez sa mère maintenant.
sleep.SUBJ.PRES.3SG at her mother now
I would like for her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

We thereby argue that the prejacent have a strict future interpretation, that is non simultaneous to the time of evaluation of the attitude.
In contrast, *avoir envie* and *avere voglia* (‘have desire’) seem to be much more at ease with present temporal orientation\(^\text{12}\), but are still incompatible with past prejacents. Future prejacent, on the other hand, are easily interpreted.

(32) *Avere voglia:* present perspective and present and future orientation:

a. #Ho voglia che ieri abbia dormito da sua madre.
   I would like her to have slept at her mother’s place yesterday.

b. Ho voglia che ora ??stia dormendo / dorma da sua madre.
   I would like her to be sleeping at her mother’s place right now.

c. Ho voglia che dorma da sua madre domani.
   I would like her to sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

(33) *Avoir envie* present tense : present perspective and present and future orientation:

a. #J’ai envie qu’elle ait dormi chez sa mère hier.
   I want her to have slept at her mother’s place yesterday.

b. J’ai envie qu’elle soit en train de dormir / dorme chez sa mère maintenant.
   I want her to be sleeping / sleeps at her mother’s place right now.

c. J’ai envie qu’elle dorme chez sa mère demain.
   I would like her to sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

The difficulty to go along simultaneous prejacent distinguish further *volere* and *avere voglia*. But it also draws a line between *sperare* and *volere*, which regularly pattern together with respect to other properties.

We can make sense of this contrast by going back to our original observation: it is expected that a predicate which semantically refers to action cannot go along a situation which is already true or false at the time at which the intention/request is evaluated.

(34) a. #I intend for this grade to be good.

b. #I request / demand this grade to be good.

**Actions** The temporal features of desire verbs in Romance echo another distinction, which relates to the possibility to act. We mentioned earlier that *sperare* and *volere* are not felicitous

\(^{12}\)Some speakers are reluctant with the association of *avere voglia* and a simultaneously interpreted prejacent with the gerunds, but with the present subjunctive any unacceptability is far less strong as with *volere*. The same holds for *avoir envie*.\]
in contexts where the prejacent is presented as impossible (the conditional would be needed). We argue that plausibility follows from the more fundamental property of actionability: a prejacent is actionable if and only if a relevant individual picked in the context of utterance can do something in order to bring it about.

Certain situations are possible, satisfying an hypothetical rationality constraint, but not actionable: no action accessible to a salient individual in the context of utterance can bring them about. With such prejacent, sperare and espérer are perfectly licit, but not volere and vouloir; here again, there conditional flexion is favored.

(35) Maria must go to the beach with her family this weekend. She wants everything to be perfect, and says:
   a. #Voglio che il tempo sia bello.  
      Want.IND.1SG that the weather be.SUBJ.3SG beautiful
      I want the weather to be beautiful.
   b. Vorrei che il tempo sia bello.  
      Want.COND.1SG that the weather be.SUBJ.3SG beautiful
      I would like the weather to be beautiful.
   c. Spero che il tempo sia bello.  
      Hope.IND.1SG that the weather be.SUBJ.3SG beautiful
      I hope the weather will be beautiful.
   d. Ho voglia che il tempo sia bello.  
      Have.IND.1SG desire that the weather be.SUBJ.3SG beautiful
      I would like the weather to be beautiful.

Symmetrically, if the realization of the prejacent seems to depend solely on the attitude holder actions, sperare (‘hope’) is not felicitous, while volere (‘want’) and avere voglia (‘have desire’) are.

(36) Samia just checked the fridge, and saw that everything is there to do here favorite breakfast (scrambled eggs and orange juice). She says:
   a. #Spero di avere un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate.  
      hope.IND.1SG of have a glass of juice of-orange with eggs scrambled.
      I hope to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.
   b. Voglio / vorrei un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate.  
      want.IND.1SG / want.COND.1SG a glass of juice of-orange with eggs scrambled.
      I want / would like to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.
   c. Ho voglia di un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate.  
      have.IND.1SG desire of a glass of juice of-orange with eggs scrambled.
      I would like to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.

It is important to note that this notion of actionability is purely subjective: it is not evaluated given any kind of metaphysical ability, but a subjective one. Indicating that the attitude holder is under the misconception that she has a grasp on outcomes that are, in fact, independent of her action is sufficient to have non-conditional morphology in the matrix clause.

(37) Teresa is under the misconception that she can control the weather / knows someone

\[13\] See Mandelkern, Schultheis, and Boylan (2017) for a recent analysis on the matter.
who can control the weather, and says:

a. **Voglio che il tempo sia bello.**
   *Want.IND.1SG.PRES that the weather be.SBJ.3SG beautiful.*
   I want the weather to be beautiful.

b. **Je veux qu’il fasse beau.**
   *Want.IND.1SG.PRES that the weather be.SBJ.3SG beautiful.*
   I want the weather to be beautiful.

The following table summarizes the main observations pertaining to temporal orientation and actionability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Temporal constraint</th>
<th>Actionnability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sperare</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Independent of the attitude holder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>volere</td>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Dependent of somebody’s action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avere voglia</td>
<td>Non-Past</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 Previous analysis

**Are desire reports like all attitude reports?** In his pioneering work, Hintikka (1969) develops a very simple semantics for attitude reports. Focusing on “epistemic” attitudes, he considers that an individual’s beliefs might be described as a set of worlds compatible with the individual’s beliefs. Informally, Hintikka states that a sentence which has the form of (38-a) is true if and only if, in the context of utterance, the prejacent $p$ – is true in every world of the doxastic mental space.

(38) a. $S$ believes that $p$
   b. Maria believes that the Colonel Mustard is the murderer.

If Hintikka is primarily concerned with the semantics of epistemics, he explicitly states that he doesn’t see reasons for not extending his analysis to other kind of attitudes, including desires.

(39) a. $S$ wants that $p$
   b. Maria wants the Colonel Mustard to face a tribunal.

Commenting the hintikkian perspective, Stalnaker (1984) identifies serious flaws with this approach for desire reports: it overgenerates too many true desire.

> Suppose I am sick. I want to get well. But getting well entails having been sick, and I do not want to have been sick. Suppose there was a murder. I want to know who committed the murder. But my knowing who committed the murder entails that the murder was committed, and I never wanted the murder to have been committed.

There are in fact many propositions that are not desired but are homogeneously present in the doxastic space – among them, the necessary conditions for effectively desired propositions.

(40) a. Maria wants to find the murderer.
   b. Maria wants the murder to have happen.

(41) a. Sam wants to be cured.
   b. Sam wants to have been sick.
The problem is that the domain of quantification cannot be solely bouletic, because all the situations that are homogeneously present in the mental space of desire are not effectively desired.

**Double material** Heim is primarily concerned with the behavior of presuppositions with attitude verbs. She observes that the presuppositions of the prejacent (here, ‘*Paul has a violin*”) are projected on beliefs when embedded by a desire predicate.

(42) After Heim (1992):

a. (Paul is under the misconception that he has a violin, and) Paul wants to sell his violin.

The mental space of desire reports thus appears doxastic : it corresponds to the beliefs of the attitude holder, not solely her desire.

Heim’s analysis is essentially the formalization of an idea originally formulated by Stalnaker (1984, p.89), who states that

> wanting something is preferring it to certain relevant alternatives, the relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the agent believes will be realized if he does not get what he wants.

To adopt this view invites to consider desire reports as a kind of hidden counterfactual conditionals, somehow relativized to the beliefs of the attitude holder : to say that Hercule Poireau wants to catch the murderer is, to a certain degree, similar to say that Hercule Poireau thinks that if he catches the murderer, he would be in a more desirable state than if he didn’t.

Heim’s comprehension of desire reports is thus based on a comparison operator<> that will oppose the prejacent and its negation : the former will be favored in comparison to the other in the doxastic space.

This now classical analysis has been amended, by Villalta (2008) who considers that the preference is not only between a proposition and its negation, but a class of relevant alternatives; Rubinstein (2017) also proposes to extend the mental space to include situation that are known to be impossible.14 None of these proposals is primarily concerned with actions.

**(At least) Two types of desire** A conceptual distinction between two types of desires reports is often made in the analytic literature. Numerous labels have been proposed in order to name this distinction : on the philosophical side, Davis (1984) opposes *volitive* and *appetitive* desires, and (Locke, 1982) use the term *formal* and *genuine* ; in the linguistic literature, Levinson (2003) use the terms *motivational* and *partial*, Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) mere *desire* and *effective preference*.

Levinson (2003), elaborating on an example from Davis (1984), insists that a semantics for *want* must be able to account for cases like (43), where two opposite answers to the same question do not seem to contradict each other. Choosing to assert one answer or the other does not imply any changes toward the way I’m considering the fact to share a drink with my classmates : it’s appealing, but I can’t.

(43) Adaptation from Davis (1984):

Q : Do you want to grab a beer after class ?

a. Oh yes, I really want to, but I have to finish a paper.

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14A kratzerian semantics for desire reports has been spelled out by von Fintel (1999). Under many circumstances, these analysis make similar predictions. See Crnic (2011) for a detailed comparison.
b. No (I don’t want to), I have to finish a paper.

We will not develop Levinson’s analysis here, which is probabilistic and utility-driven. It’s sufficient to note that the contrast its based on seem to be the exact same we try to capture – except it’s focus on the semantics of a particular verb, *want*, when we are interested in how its lexically encoded in different predicates.

On the same line, Condoravdi and Lauer (2016) argues that *want* is underspecified between two readings, which correspond to the two possible answers to (43), but also to the two different interpretations of the conditionals in (3), repeated below in (44).

(44) After Hare (1971): If you *want* sugar in your soup,

a. You must ask the waiter. ACTION-ORIENTED interpretation of *want*.

b. You must have diabetes. MERE DESIRE interpretation of *want*.

The conditional in (44-a) has a very special interpretation, dubbed anankastic in the literature, which present the consequent as a mean to (optimally) obtain the antecedent – note that the desire reports is not present in the paraphrase. (44-b), on the other hand, does not have this teleological interpretation. It might be paraphrased as “Because you feel like having sugar in your soup, you must have diabetes”, with an explicit reference to the desire expressed in the antecedent.

Here again, anankastic conditionals are a long-standing puzzle in the semantics literature that we will not develop here. Interesting for us is the answer Condoravdi and Lauer implement, which relies on the observation that anankastic reading emerges in some structure with a particular reading of *want*, that is action-oriented.

They formalize their analysis by injecting preference structures in the model. In every situation of utterance, agents are associated with a set of such structures, each corresponding to her divers engagements, defined by pairs $P \preceq$ where the set of propositions $P$ and a strict partial order on $P$ – as they write, “a preference structure can be thought of as an ordering source [from kratzerian semantics] plus an ‘importance’ ranking” (Condoravdi & Lauer, 2016). The truth of a desire reports depends here solely on the top-ranking of the proposition denoted by the prejacent in such a preference structure.

If it is said effective, a preference structure has to be structured in order to be consistent and realistic with regards to an information state, that is the mental space of the relevant individual. These features are designed as minimal requirements to describe action-relative preference structures: consistency ensures that an agent ranks conflicting proposition, which expresses the intuitive idea that if she has to effectively act, she will choose one over the other; realism just rules out propositions that are believed to be impossible as non-determinant lead to action.

According to them, the anankastic reading emerges if and only if the predicate in the antecedent targets an effective preference structure. They argue that *want* is underspecified with respect to the quality of it’s preference structures: if the context feeds it with a structure that has the qualities to be effective, it will have some special properties, including anankastic readings

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15See Iatridou and von Fintel (2005); Sābō (2001), a.o.

16See Phillips-Brown (2020) for a critique.

17Which comes from a framework introduced in Condoravdi and Lauer (2011).

18Condoravdi and Lauer insist on the fact that realism and consistence are necessary conditions for a preference structure to be effective, but that these properties are maybe not sufficient to characterize one.
with conditionals and conjunction introduction.

The advantage of their analysis is that it seems it might be expanded to other neighbor predicates: Grano (2017) spells out a semantics for intention reports that relies on hardwired requirement for effective preference structures and RESP-onisibility relation\textsuperscript{19} between the pre-jacent and the attitude holder. Moreover, it echoes other observation on distinct structures, like the imperative discussed by Roberts (2015).

Our analysis is distinct from these other approaches in that it derives action as one of the moves in the common ground that desire attitudes enhance in their inter-subjective interpretation.

4 Analysis

4.1 Inter-subjective WANT

We will understand the phenomenology of bouletics along the lines of the distinction between solipsistic and inter-subjective uses of representational predicates. In order to achieve this, we will once again here distinguish between their at-issue and speech-act-like content.

As far the semantics is concerned, we will follow the tradition going back to Heim (1992) and von Fintel (1999) according to whom bouletics (and \textit{want} in particular) features two modal spaces. One of them represents what the attitude holder believes to be possible (DOX) and the second one features what s/he prefers (BUL). The attitudes states that in all worlds that comply with what the attitude holder believes to be possible and that best comply with the attitude holder’s preferences, \( p \) is true. As for now, we remain silent about which of the bouletic expressions feature what type of modal space, and work on the assumption that both are involved in the interpretation.

\begin{equation}
\text{(45)} \quad \text{Solipsistic-BOULETIC.}
\end{equation}

In all worlds compatible with what the attitude holder believes to be possible and that best comply with his preferences \( p \) is true.

Some of the bouletic expressions are solely solipsistic, or PRIVATE. Other, and in particular \textit{volere} are by default inter-subjective or PUBLIC. The inter-subjective interpretation adds a speech-act-like component to the solipsistic interpretation, whereby \( p \) is presented in \( \mathbf{N} \).

\begin{equation}
\text{(46)} \quad \text{Inter-subjective-BOULETIC.}
\end{equation}

(Solipsistic content) in all worlds compatible with what the attitude holder believes to be possible and that best comply with his preferences \( p \) is true. & & \begin{equation}
\text{(Speech-act-like content) PRESENT: } p \text{ is added to } \mathbf{N} \text{ (speech-act-like content)}
\end{equation}

Crucial for our account is the type of uptake that is expected on the part of the addressee or a third party once \( p \) had been posed in the public space. Our claim is that, with bouletics, the uptake is `realization’.

\[
\text{Attitude} \quad \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{S} & \text{N} & \text{Uptake} & \mathbb{C}
\end{array}
\]

\begin{tabular}{l}
\text{bouletic (Solipsistic)} \\
\text{bouletic (Inter-subjective)}
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ccc}
\text{p} & \text{p} & \text{Realization}
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{19}This relation is originally found in Farkas (1988) and might be understood as some kind of (very) special thematic role.
We see that the inter-subjective interpretation subsumes the solipsistic interpretation. The desire exists in the mental state of the attitude holder, and also becomes public.

What does it mean for a desire to become public? Let us comment on ‘realization’. \( p \) as a wish or desire can only become PUBLIC if it is ‘endorsed’ by the community of speakers, and thus realized. Sharing the same desire in not sufficient to be ‘public’. Consider the case in which I desire to buy myself an ice-cream. If my interlocutors also desire to buy themselves an ice-cream, we just share the same desire, but my desire is not for uptake in the common ground.

With bouletics, going PUBLIC means that the addressee (or a third party) is involved in the realization of the attitude holder desire and that their action is interpreted and understood by the attitude holder as satisfying their desire. Unlike the belief (and in general with attitudes of acceptance (Stalnaker, 1978), the desire is not true or false and the time when it is conceived or express. It becomes true or false via realization. Realization by the addressee (or a third party) is the move in the common ground that correspond to confirmation with bouletics.

We claim that volere (‘want’) has an inter-subjective interpretation by default (that can be manipulated, see infra).

(47) Inter-subjective-volare.
(Solipsistic content) in all worlds compatible with what the attitude holder believes to be possible and that best comply with his preferences \( p \) is true. &
(Speech-act-like content) present: \( p \) is added to \( \Pi \) (speech-act-like content)

This is immediately clear in the imperative interpretation.

(48) Voglio che (tu) metti/metta a posto la camera.
\[ \text{want.1SG that (you) make.2SG.IND/SUBJ at order the room} \]
I want you to clean your room.

Here the desire is public and the addressee is asked to realize the desire. Our account straightforwardly capture these cases, without needing the addition of any lexical enrichment like plans, intentions etc. Here the addressee ‘acts to satisfy the desire’.

In several other cases, the addressee or a third party does not act to satisfy the desire (49), but the attitude holder considers the realization of the action as ‘related’ to their own desire and as satisfying it.

(49) Voglio che Macron anunci le restrizioni solo per quelli che non sono vaccinati.
\[ \text{want.1SG that Macron announce.SBJ.3SG the restrictions only for those that non} \]
I want Macron to announce restrictions only for those who have not been vaccinated.

‘Actionability’ with volere (‘want’) is thus a felicity condition on their inter-subjective profile (see also Roberts (2015)) that is tightly related to ‘realization’. Likewise, rationality follows from ‘realization’ as \( p \) must not be impossible. Furthermore, our account also explains the default future orientation of volere (‘want’), as a consequence of the realization of the action that will make \( p \) true.

Note that with the marginal cases of present orientation, volere (‘want’) assumes a plain imperative interpretation, whereby ‘realization’ is understood as ‘maintaining of the present state of affairs’ and avoiding cessation of this state. This however requires a reinterpretation of ‘realization’ into ‘maintenance’ that renders the use of volere with present orientation marginal.
This observation corresponds to what we might call the teleological view of desire, held, among other, by Augustine. Desire, for him, is strictly future-oriented: if its object is already present, like in our example, the desire is aimed toward its not absence in the future. Arendt (1996, p.9) on here doctoral dissertation on the subject, details it as follow:

Craving is determined by the definitely given thing it seeks, just as a movement is set by the goal toward which it moves. For, as Augustine writes, love is "a kind of motion, and all motion is toward something." [. . .] Once we have the object [it aimed for,] our desire ends, unless we are threatened with its loss. In that case the desire to have (appetitus habendi) turns into a fear of losing (metus amittendi).

Turning back to linguistics, it’s important to note this speech-act type content can be manipulated. The default inter-subjective interpretation of volere can be overwritten by subjective expressions such as così tanto (roughly ‘so (much)’). We argue that this is due to the exclamative nature of così tanto (see on the same line of analysis ‘tellement’ in French (52), Ozello (1978)) which modifies the speech-act content of the attitude into an exclamative.

We claim that it is a silent exclamative operator that allow using voglio (‘I want’) without conditional morphology in cases where $p$ is an irrational desire. This silent exclamative emerges, which we hope to be able to describe in future research.

Future research will also explore the hypothesis that the conditional levels the requirement of the realization by introducing counterfactual morphology and it modifies the default speech-act content.
4.2 Solipsistic bouletics

In Italian not all expressions of desire have an inter-subjective interpretation. *Sperare* and *avere voglia* lack it, and are merely solipsistic. This is typically reflected in their inability to give rise to an imperative interpretation.

(56) a. Voglio che tu metta in ordine la tua stanza. (imperative-like)
   want.1SG that you put.2SG.SUBJ in order the your room
   I want you to clean your room.

b. Ho voglia che tu metta in ordine la tua stanza.
   have.1SG desire that you put.2SG.SUBJ in order the your room
   I would like that you clean your room.

c. Spero che tu metta in ordine la tua stanza.
   hope.1SG that you put.2SG.SUBJ in order the your room
   I hope you will clean your room.

*Sperare* and *avere voglia* however, differ with respect to the plausibility component.

(57) a. So che è impossibile, ma ho voglia di andare sulla luna.
   Know.IND.1SG that be.3SG.IND impossible but have.IND.1SG desire to go.INF
   I know its impossible, but I want to go on the moon.

b. So che è impossibile, ma vorrei andare sulla luna.
   Know.IND.1SG that be.3SG.IND impossible but want.COND.1SG go.INF. on.the
   moon
   I know its impossible, but I want to go on the moon.

With *sperare*, as very often noted (see Anand and Hacquard (2013), Portner and Rubinstein (2013), Giannakidou and Mari (2021b) a.o.) there is a constraint on plausibility (the attitude holder believes that *p* is possible), that is absent with *avere voglia*. The solipsistic default interpretation of volitionals thus applies to *sperare* but requires some modifications for *avere voglia*.

(58) Solipsistic-avere voglia.
   The attitude holder has a preference for *p*.

*Sperare* is solipsistic, and it even has an anti-realization constraint when it comes to first person *Giannakidou and Mari (2021b)*. Being solipsistic means that the realization of the action is not seen as correlated to the desire. On the contrary, *sperare* is used whenever the attitude holder knows that the realization of the action is independent of his/her will. If the action is realized, its realization is seen as a fortunate coincidence with the desire. This emerges clearly with the first person.

(59) Samia just checked the fridge, and saw that everything is there to do here favorite breakfast (scrambled eggs and orange juice). She says:

a. #Spero di avere un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate.
   hope.IND.1SG of have a glass of juice of-orange with eggs scrambled.
   I hope to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.

20
b. Voglio / vorrei un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate. I want/ would like to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.

c. Ho voglia di un bicchiere di succo d’arancia con uova strapazzate. I would like to have a glass of orange juice with scrambled eggs.

Since preparing the breakfast, in absence of extraordinary conditions only depends on the speaker’s actions, sperare cannot be used. We can thus consider that sperare is averse to public uptake.

Avere voglia conveys pure preference, and it is underspecified in many respects, including the temporal orientation. We hold that present orientation, as in the marginal cases with volere, is due to the fact that the realization of the action is conceived as a ‘maintenance’ of the ongoing state.

(60) avere voglia present tense and ban against past orientation only

a. #Ho voglia che ieri abbia dormito da sua madre. I would like her to have slept at her mother’s place yesterday.

b. Ho voglia che ora stia dormendo / dorma da sua madre. I would like her to be sleeping at her mother’s place right now.

c. Ho voglia che dorma da sua madre domani. I would like her to sleep at her mother’s place tomorrow.

Sperare, instead, includes a rational component, and the default solipsitic interpretation applies as in (61).

(61) Solipsistic-sperare.

In all worlds compatible with what the attitude holder believes to be possible and that best comply with his preferences $p$ is true.

Sperare and avere voglia, in their solipsistic nature, thus differ with respect to the internal constitution of the mental state in which $p$ is true. They both differ from volere, which, unless coerced or modified.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we have established a distinction between PRIVATE and PUBLIC use of bouletic attitudes and derived the actionability constraint not from an ambiguity characterizing the volitional domain, but from a general distinction that cuts across representational and bouletics. This distinction relies on the revisitation of the Hamblinian distinction between private and
public commitments as associated with propositional attitudes and speech-act respectively. According to C. Hamblin (1970), attitudes provide subjective content, whereas speech-acts contribute to the common ground. We have proposed that bouletic attitudes can feature speech-act like content, besides the descriptive one. We have proposed that they come in two sorts, depending on whether $p$ becomes common ground or not.

Uptaking the content of a public attitude means to endorse and to be committed to its content to become true.

With representational the uptake expected in the public domain is ‘confirmation’; with bouletics it is ‘realization’. Actionability is thus a property rooted in the public use of the bouletics and the mandatory future temporal orientation of WANT also derives from its intersubjective nature.

We have also shown that this default speech-act like content of ‘realization’ can be manipulated by exclamative expressions and the conditional thus bringing new elements to understand the behavior of these modifiers in the context of volitional attitudes.
References


