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# Vector space multiset-sharing scheme based on Blakley's method

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**Abstract**—Secret sharing schemes were introduced by Adi Shamir and George Blakley, independently, in 1979. In a  $(k, n)$ -threshold secret sharing scheme, any set of at least  $k$  out of  $n$  participants can retrieve the secret but no set of  $(k - 1)$  or less can. Shamir's secret sharing scheme is more popular than Blakley's, even though the former is more complex than the latter. The practical reason is that Blakley's scheme lacks determined, general and suitable matrices. In this paper, we present a multiset-sharing scheme based on vector spaces over  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . We use Blakley's method. This scheme is ideal in the sense that the size of each secret equals the size of any share.

**Index Terms:** Secret sharing, multiset-sharing scheme, vector space.

**2010 AMS Mathematics Subject Classifications:** 94A62, 15A03, 15A18.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The secure storage of the private keys of a cryptosystem is an important problem in cryptography and security. The possession of a highly sensitive key by an individual may not be desirable as the key can easily be lost or as the individual may not be fully trusted. Giving copies of the key to more than one individual increases the risk of compromise. A solution to this problem is to give shares of the key to several individuals, forcing them to cooperate to find the secret key. This not only reduces the risk of losing the key but also makes compromising the key more difficult. In threshold cryptography, secret sharing deals with this problem. The secret is shared among a group of  $n$  users so that only when a sufficient number  $k$  of them come together can the secret be reconstructed. In the literature well-known secret sharing schemes include Shamir [16] based on polynomial interpolation, Blakley [3] based on hyperplane geometry, and Asmuth-Bloom [2] based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. These schemes are called  $(k, n)$ -threshold secret sharing.

In this paper we use Blakley's scheme. Blakley's method [3] uses principles of geometry to share the secret. In [4], Blakley et al. only provided a guideline on how to design a matrix of linear systems for perfect secrecy, and no actual matrix was given. Recently, researchers began to use Blakley's geometry-based secret sharing approach in the area of secret image sharing [6], [17]. Chen et al. [6] and Tso [17] independently applied Blakley's scheme for secret image sharing.

Ulutaş et al. [18] proposed an enhanced scheme for secret image sharing, which adopts Blakley's secret sharing method and Steganography together to share the secret and create meaningful shares. As for threshold cryptography, Bozkurt et al. [5] proposed the first threshold RSA signature scheme as the underlying secret sharing scheme. Hei, Du and Song [10] present two matrices that can be used for Blakley's secret sharing scheme.

Multiset-sharing schemes form another family of secret sharing schemes. This scheme was proposed [11], [9], [13], [15], [19], [7].

Karnin et al. [12] examined the following situation. There are  $k$  secrets  $s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k$  to be shared. Such systems are called  $[k, m, n]$  (multiset-sharing) threshold schemes. Each  $[k, m, n]$ -threshold scheme for multiset-sharing gives  $k$  single-secret  $(m, n)$ -threshold schemes [8].

In this work we propose a new multiset-sharing scheme based on vector spaces over  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . We consider any basis elements of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . The proposed scheme is ideal and secure by means of the information rate. We use Blakley's method to share and recover the secret. We determine the access structure of this scheme. We analyse its security.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we introduce Blakley's secret sharing scheme. In Section III we present a new multiset-sharing scheme using Blakley's method and analyse its security. Section IV collects concluding remarks.

## II. BLAKLEY'S SECRET SHARING SCHEME

Blakley's secret sharing scheme uses hyperplane geometry to solve the secret sharing problem. The secret is a point in a  $t$ -dimensional space and  $n$  shares are affine hyperplanes that pass through this point. An affine hyperplane in a  $t$ -dimensional space with coordinates in a commutative field  $F$  can be described by a linear equation of the following form.

$$a_1x_1 + a_2x_2 + \dots + a_t x_t = b.$$

The intersection point is obtained by finding the intersection of any  $t$  of these hyperplanes. The secret can be any of the coordinates of the intersection point or any function of the coordinates. We take the secret to be the first coordinate of the point of intersection.

### A. Dealing Phase

Let  $F$  be the field we are working on. The dealer generates a secret point  $x$  in  $F$ , where the first coordinate  $x[1]$  is set to the secret value and sets the values of the other coordinates randomly from the field  $F$ . The  $i$ th user will get a hyperplane equation over  $F$ ,

$$a_{i1}x_1 + a_{i2}x_2 + \dots + a_{it}x_t = y_i \quad (1)$$

For a  $(t, n)$ -threshold scheme there will be  $n$  such hyperplane equations, and hence we will have an  $n \times t$  linear system,

$$AX = Y \quad (2)$$

The dealer then sends the secret value of  $y_i$  along with  $a_{i1}, \dots, a_{it}$  to user  $i$ . The coefficients  $a_{ij}$  are not sensitive and can be made public if needed.

### B. Share Combining Phase

Share combining step is simply finding the solution of a linear system of equations. Suppose that a coalition  $S = \{i_1, \dots, i_t\}$  of users come together. They form a matrix  $A_s$  using their hyperplane equations and solve

$$A_s X = Y_s, \quad (3)$$

where  $Y_s$  is the vector of the secret shares of the users. The secret is found as the first coordinate of the solution [13].

## III. MULTISECRET-SHARING SCHEMES BASED ON VECTOR SPACES

Consider a finite-dimensional vector space. We construct a multisecret-sharing scheme based on this space.

- Let the vector space  $F^n$  be the secret space.
- Let any vector of  $F^n$  be the secret.

We know that if vector addition is defined to be matrix addition and vector scalar multiplication is defined to be matrix scalar multiplication, then the set  $W$  of all  $n \times n$  matrices with real entries is a vector space.

**Definition:** If  $W$  is any vector space and

$$V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$$

is a set of vectors in  $W$ , then  $V$  is called a basis for  $W$  if the following two conditions hold:

- $V$  is linearly independent,
- $V$  spans  $W$  [1].

**Theorem 1.** ([1]) *If  $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$  is a basis for a vector space  $W$ , then every vector  $v$  in  $W$  can be expressed in the form*

$$v = c_1v_1 + c_2v_2 + \dots + c_nv_n$$

*in exactly one way, where  $c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n \in \mathbb{R}$ .*

### A. Proposed Method

Now we construct a multisecret-sharing scheme based on the vector space  $F^n$ . Let any vector of  $F^n$  be the secret  $S = (s_1, s_2, \dots, s_n)$ . First we find any basis of  $F^n$  is called  $V = \{v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n\}$  and calculate the shares  $y_i, i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ .

$$V \cdot S^T = Y^T,$$

where  $V$  is an element of  $W$ . We write the following linear equation system for each participant.

$$\begin{pmatrix} v_1 \\ v_2 \\ \vdots \\ v_n \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} s_1 \\ s_2 \\ \vdots \\ s_n \end{pmatrix}^T = \begin{pmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \\ \vdots \\ y_n \end{pmatrix}$$

It can reach by solving this equation system.

The dimension of matrix  $V$  is  $n \times n$  and the elements are the basis elements of  $F^n$ . The transpose of  $S$  is denoted by  $S^T$ . The dimension of  $S$  is  $n \times 1$ .  $Y$  is a sharing vector.

**Theorem 2.** *If the matrix  $V$  is non-singular, then the secret can be recovered. Otherwise it cannot be reached.*

*Proof.* If the matrix  $V$  is singular, then the vectors of  $V$  will be linearly dependent. In this case these vectors do not consist of a basis of  $F^n$ . □

**Theorem 3.** *In this multisecret-sharing scheme we have the following facts.*

- 1) *The qualified set in the access structure is the set of all  $n$  participants.*
- 2) *No subset of less than  $n$  participants can recover the secret.*

*Proof.* 1) The secret is recovered thanks to the basis elements of  $F^n$  and their number is  $n$ .

- 2) The number of basis elements cannot be less than  $n$ . Only  $n$  elements can be used to recover the secret but  $(n - 1)$  cannot. □

**Corollary 1.** *The multisecret-sharing scheme satisfying the hypothesis of the above theorem is also a  $(n, n)$ -threshold secret sharing scheme.*

*Proof.* It is clear that the participants are the basis elements of  $F^n$  and their number is  $n$ . These  $n$  participants can be reached the secret by combining their shares. □

**Example 1.** Consider the vectors

$$v_1 = (1, 2, 1), v_2 = (2, 9, 0), v_3 = (3, 3, 4).$$

The set  $V = \{v_1, v_2, v_3\}$  is a basis for  $F^3$ .

- To show that the set  $V$  spans  $F^3$ , we must show that an arbitrary vector  $b = (b_1, b_2, b_3)$  can be expressed as a linear combination

$$b = c_1v_1 + c_2v_2 + c_3v_3$$

of the vectors in  $V$ . Expressing this equation in terms of component gives

$$(b_1, b_2, b_3) = c_1 \cdot (1, 2, 1) + c_2 \cdot (2, 9, 0) + c_3 \cdot (3, 3, 4),$$

where  $c_1, c_2, c_3 \in F$  or

$$(b_1, b_2, b_3) = (c_1 + 2c_2 + 3c_3, 2c_1 + 9c_2 + 3c_3, c_1 + 4c_3)$$

on equating corresponding components

$$c_1 + 2c_2 + 3c_3 = b_1, 2c_1 + 9c_2 + 3c_3 = b_2, c_1 + 4c_3 = b_3. \quad (4)$$

Thus, to show that  $V$  spans  $F^3$ , we must demonstrate that the system (4) has a solution for all choices of  $b = (b_1, b_2, b_3)$ .

- To prove that  $V$  is linearly independent, we must show that the only solution of

$$c_1v_1 + c_2v_2 + c_3v_3 = 0 \quad (5)$$

is  $c_1 = c_2 = c_3 = 0$ . As above, if (5) is expressed in terms of components, the verification of independence reduces to showing that the homogeneous system

$$c_1 + 2c_2 + 3c_3 = 0, 2c_1 + 9c_2 + 3c_3 = 0, c_1 + 4c_3 = 0 \quad (6)$$

has only the trivial solution. Observe that systems (4) and (6) have the same coefficient matrix. Thus we can prove that in systems (4) and (6) the matrix of coefficients

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 3 \\ 2 & 9 & 3 \\ 1 & 0 & 4 \end{pmatrix}.$$

has a nonzero determinant, that is  $|A| = -1$ . So  $V$  is a basis for  $F^3$ .

Now we try to construct a multisecret-sharing scheme based on  $F^3$ .

Let the secret vector be  $S = (s_1, s_2, s_3) = (-3, 1, -1) \in F^3$ . We calculate the shares as follows.

$$y_1^T = v_1 S^T = (1, 2, 1) \cdot (-3, 1, -1)^T = -2$$

$$y_2^T = v_2 S^T = (2, 9, 0) \cdot (-3, 1, -1)^T = 3$$

$$y_3^T = v_3 S^T = (3, 3, 4) \cdot (-3, 1, -1)^T = -10$$

The participants (the basis elements) can reach the secret by combining their shares as follows.

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & 1 \\ 2 & 9 & 0 \\ 3 & 3 & 4 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} s_1 \\ s_2 \\ s_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} -2 \\ 3 \\ -10 \end{pmatrix}.$$

It is seen that the secret  $S = (s_1, s_2, s_3) = (-3, 1, -1)$  by solving the above linear system.

This multisecret-sharing scheme is also a (3, 3)- threshold scheme.

## B. Information throughput

Since the security of a system depends on the amount of information that must be kept secret, the size of the shares given to the participants is an important point in the design of secret sharing schemes. Besides, if the shares are too large, the memory requirements for the participants will be too strong, and the algorithms used to compute the shares will become inefficient. So one of the basic parameters in secret sharing is the **information rate**  $\rho$  of the scheme, which is defined in [14] to be the ratio between the length (in symbols) of the secret and the maximum length of the shares given to the participants.

A secret sharing scheme is said to be **ideal** if its information rate is equal to one, which is the maximum possible value. So our scheme is ideal since the secret  $S[1]$  is one element of  $F$ , like the share  $Y_i$  of the generic user  $i$ .

## C. Security Analysis

In a secret sharing scheme, there exists the possibility that some participants lie about the value of their shares in order to obtain some illicit benefit. Therefore, the security against cheating is a key point in the implementation of secret sharing schemes. If  $F = \mathbb{F}_q$  a finite field of order  $q$ , one possible attack would be for  $s$  participants to collude together, and to guess the shares of the remaining  $n - s$  users. It is readily seen that the probability of success of such an attack is  $\frac{1}{q^{n-s}}$ . Thus a safe system would require  $q$  to be large.

## IV. CONCLUSION

In the present article we have introduced a new multisecret-sharing scheme based on vector spaces over the  $F$  vector space  $F^n$  for some field  $F$ . The reconstruction algorithm is based on Blakley's method. We determine the access structure, and calculate the information rate of this scheme. We have analysed its information flow. The new system is ideal in a precise sense in terms of information throughput. It is reasonably secure if a sufficiently large field is used.

The choice of a field depends on the practical application and machine implementation. Using a finite field  $F = \mathbb{F}_q$  might require a large size  $q$  in view of probabilistic attacks. Using an infinite field like the reals removes this security problem at the price of a possible computational burden and precision issues. So we have preferred to expose our system for a general computation field  $F$ .

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