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Résumé

L'expulsion des travailleurs éthiopiens d'Arabie Saoudite (2013-2014) : la gestion d'une crise humanitaire et politique.

Selon la déclaration de l'IOM, entre novembre 2013 et mars 2014, 163 018 Éthiopiens furent expulsés d'Arabie Saoudite. L'opération humanitaire à grande échelle mise en place pour soutenir les déportés appartient certainement au système de "gestion de crise". La création de camps autour d'Addis-Abeba est emblématique de l'intégration de la logistique humanitaire dans la gestion post-déportation. Mais l'opération doit aussi être comprise comme expérimentale, en servant de test pour de futures opérations d'accueil et de réinsertion des déportés. Étant donné que la légitimation des retours forcés par les mécanismes humanitaires et le financement des projets est au coeur de la politique préconisée par l'IOM pour promouvoir les "retours durables" et la "réintégration", ce dispositif post-déportation devrait être envisagé dans le cadre plus large de la gestion des migrations, qui implique l'IOM, les États, les ONG et les acteurs privés. Est-il alors encore pertinent de parler en terme de "gestion de crise" ou cette conjoncture a-t-elle permis de tester un modèle durable pour les programmes d'assistance et de réinsertion post-déportation pour les déportés ?

Abstract

Between November 2013 and March 2014, 163,018 Ethiopians were expelled from Saudi Arabia, according to the IOM registration. The high-scale humanitarian operation set up to support the deportees certainly belongs to the “crisis management” framework. The creation of camps around Addis Ababa is emblematic of the incorporation of humanitarian logistics into post-deportation management. But the operation is also to be apprehended as experimental, serving as a test for future operations of reception and reintegration of the deportees. Since the legitimization of forced returns through humanitarian devices and projects funding is central to the policy advocated by the IOM to promote “sustainable returns” and “reintegration”, this post-deportation device should be apprehended within a broader framework of migration management, which involves the IOM, states, NGOs, and private actors. Then, is it still relevant to speak in term of “crisis management”, or did this conjecture allow to test a sustainable model for post-deportation assistance and reintegration programs for deportees ?
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The management of a humanitarian and political crisis

Between November 2013 and March 2014, 163,018 Ethiopians (100,688 men, 53,732 women and 8,598 children) were expelled from Saudi Arabia, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) registration. A huge majority of them (153,173) received humanitarian support at their arrival (Source: IOM). It represents not only a major deportation campaign, motivated by foreign workers’ irregular status and national preference in employment, but also a high-scale operation to support the deportees (De Regt & Tafesse, 2015). These mass deportations are not part of a war or an armed conflict, as were the 800,000 Yemenis expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1990 in the context of the Gulf war and the rallying of Yemen in the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein. These mass deportations should be apprehended as a national political tool of ‘saudization’ of employment. The system of sponsorship known as Kafala, which constitutes the main tool for the management of foreign labor in Saudi Arabia, generates structural violence and number of abuses. The xenophobic campaign led by the police and civilians that went together with the return of foreigners in 2013-2014 is an extreme example of the harsh treatment Saudi Arabia reserves to foreign workers.

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But deportations also belong to a broader migration framework, in which expulsion of aliens are becoming increasingly institutionalized and normalized (Kanstroom, 2010; Ngai, 2005; De Genova & Peutz, 2010). Since the end of the 1990s, it has involved a rising number of actors: states, international agencies, NGOs, and private companies in charge of migration control but also of assistance measures, during and after expulsion. Deportations, whether being processed individually or collectively, raise new issues: the support that the countries of origin may or may not provide to their deported nationals, the belongings lost or confiscated during the expulsion process, but also the difficulties experienced by deportees after their return. The increasing legitimization of deportations worldwide is based on the acknowledgement of states’ sovereignty on migration policy, but also on the need to complement their coercive dimension by humanitarian assistance and economic support (Agier, 2003). This legitimization of forced returns through humanitarian devices and reintegration projects is, at least in principle, a central component of the policy advocated by the IOM to promote “sustainable returns” and “reintegration”. It is also the framework of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) adopted in 2005 by the European Union, for which the IOM strongly advocated and was a major inspiration: it aims to associate the rhetoric of coercion and aid by strengthening cooperation with the countries of origin of immigrants, in order to increase their capacities to provide better alternatives to their nationals. Besides the national context of political radicalization against foreign workers, deportations from Saudi Arabia should therefore also be apprehended within a broader framework of migration management, which involves the IOM, states, NGOs, and private actors. The financial participation of associations of the Ethiopian diaspora in the operation set up by the Ethiopian Government and the IOM for the deportees is a significant illustration of the growing concern for post-deportation assistance, when Ethiopian emigration constitutes an important element of the economic vitality of the country.

The operation, which started in November 2013, resulted from an emergency request addressed to the IOM by the Ethiopian State, overwhelmed by the needs related to the imminent arrival of thousands of its nationals. It was then co-managed by the Ethiopian State, the IOM and NGO partners. Political and humanitarian issues overlapped. The Ethiopian Government covered the political aspect of the deportation campaign from Saudi Arabia. In a statement dated December 2013 the Foreign Affairs Minister, Tedros Adhanom, made the repatriation of 100,620 Ethiopian workers official and announced a ban on low skilled labor’s emigration for a period of 6 months. Meanwhile, the humanitarian crisis management was apparently left to the IOM, but broader political issues emerged with the implementation of an unprecedented high-scale operation for deportees. The device put in place for
The expulsion of Ethiopian workers from Saudi Arabia in 2013-2014 appears as an experimental one and differs from the classical humanitarian framework run by the UNHCR and NGOs towards refugees. It is explicitly presented as a test for other future repatriation operations. The operation may then strengthen the policy of the IOM in trying to fix migrant populations to their places of origin, discouraging them to leave (along with awareness campaigns against the dangers of illegal immigration), and reinforcing reintegration programs for deportees.

The humanitarian emergency device certainly belongs to a “crisis management” framework. The gathering of the expellees in camps around Addis Ababa has materialized the transfer of methods and logistics usually dealt with by the UNHCR in terms of management of refugees and displaced persons during African political crises. But the operation is also to be apprehended as experimental, as having a value of test for future operations of reception and reintegration of deportees. The interweaving of coercive methods and assistance contributes to the legitimization and systematization of return practices, including in authoritarian political contexts. Thus, the creation of camps is emblematic of the incorporation of humanitarian logistics into post-deportation management. But it is also emblematic of the marginalization that goes together with expulsion (Lecadet, 2014) and makes the return risky and sometimes impossible (Fekete, 2006).

This article thus focuses on the coordination of states, intergovernmental agencies and NGOs in the deportation aftermath in Ethiopia in 2013-2014. It analyzes post-deportation in two sequences. The social and political impact of massive deportations from Saudi Arabia will be apprehended, in the short term, through the humanitarian devices put in place for Ethiopian deportees and through the political response given by the Ethiopian Government with so called “reintegration programs”. Instead of “crisis management”, one can see here the emergence of a model for post-deportation, which fits with the global approach of migration promoted by the IOM for the past twenty years and contributes to normalize deportation procedures by making them go hand in hand with humanitarian assistance. While the analysis of these sequences shows the key-role of the IOM in setting up an emergency device upon arrival, it also reveals that the longer term reintegration process was mostly ensured by the Ethiopian government. Not to say that the reintegration process of deportees was an original initiative from the Ethiopian State: the treatment, organization and eventual support of deportees in the deportation aftermath (Kanstroom, 2012) has indeed held much of the IOM’s attention. But the exceptional context generated by mass deportations from Saudi Arabia offers an insight on the impact of the IOM’s discourses and practices for the promotion of irregular migrants’ return, both on the global approach to post-deportation issues and on national policies towards deportees. It seems indeed necessary to examine the entanglement between the global discourse carried
out by the IOM on irregular migrants’ return and national policies in migrants’ host countries and countries of origin to comprehend the contemporary issues at stake with deportations, both in liberal democracies and authoritarian contexts. The reflection on the 2013-2014 mass deportation from Saudi Arabia may bring clues to put in perspective the recent announcement by the Saudi authorities of a new 90 days amnesty period for irregular migrants to leave the country. The campaign in which this amnesty period is taking place, called “A nation without violations”, appears as a new challenge for the Ethiopian government, who already anticipated it by exhorting its nationals to leave Saudi Arabia before the amnesty period expires and by assuring to provide those returning with income-generating activities. Will the lessons from 2013-2014 and what has already been tested, both in terms of humanitarian assistance and reintegration programs, contribute to establish a long lasting framework to face these recurrent mass deportation campaigns?

Law enforcement, xenophobic violence and deportation of hundreds of thousands of undocumented foreign workers from Saudi Arabia

Deportations are part of a political program of “saudization” of employment, used by Saudi authorities to manage their foreign workforce (Rigoulet-Roze, 2007). But they also come after a series of campaigns of large-scale expulsions that have marked the recent history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Bombacci, 1998). Usually used in the fight against irregular immigration, they also served during the Gulf war in order to expel 800,000 Yemeni, in response to the fact that Yemen refused to join the alliance of Saudi Arabia and the United States against the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein (Stevenson, 1993). The use of mass expulsions and the extreme visibility given to these campaigns contributed to consolidate a nationalist discourse, based on religious, economic and political arguments (Thiollet, 2010). In April 2013, the Government adopted an amendment to the 2007 Labor law. Composed of 14 articles, the “Rules Governing Law: Breaching Foreign Workers” empower the Ministry of Interior to pursue, apprehend, penalize and offset foreign workers living in the country under conditions regarded as “illegal” through its law enforcement agencies. After this amendment, King Abdullah announced an amnesty period, so that foreigners could update their status. Employment agencies in Saudi Arabia asked a huge ransom to regularize the status of undocumented migrant. Early deportees had shown no desire to return to Ethiopia until the Saudi Arabia security forces began the crackdown. Within the amnesty period, only 5,000 were repatriated. The 4th of November 2013, the Saudi authorities put an end to this period of amnesty granted to undocumented foreigners.
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Deportation procedures were processed in an environment of hostility and violence against foreigners; raids were operated in neighborhoods and shopping places held by foreigners, checkpoints were set up for identity control in major cities. The deportation campaign mostly targeted low-skilled workers from Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia. The moments (days) of crackdown and expulsion were tied with diverse horrific experiences. Different media outlets\(^1\) and international human right watchdogs heralded crisis of Ethiopian work migrants (HRW, 2013, 2015). Stories of abuse and returning without any savings were the most common experiences. Other factors attributing to the termination of labor and work permits included hatred of Ethiopian migrants and fear of the expansion of Christianity. Some said that even religious leaders were involved in crackdown operations. The Ethiopians were massively concerned by acts of cruelty and repression. The District of Manfouha in southern Riyadh, where resides a large Ethiopian community, became a target for the police, who multiplied raids. Groups of Saudi civilians armed with sticks, swords, machetes and firearms also hunted the aliens. This openly xenophobic environment caused the death of at least three Ethiopians on the 9\(^{th}\) of November, and many cases of rape and kidnapping of Ethiopian women, who are mainly domestic workers, were reported (Minaye, 2012, 2013).\(^2\) The harassment of foreigners by the police and civilians provoked several riots severely.

The deportation campaign was preceded by the detention of foreigners in jails, like Shimeisi in Riyadh and Buraiman in Jeddah. Places were also specially allocated for this operation, which caused an intense diplomatic activity. The Philippine consular thus intervened to accelerate the repatriation of their nationals. Detention conditions, marked by hunger and violence, were denounced by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2013) and caused a riot in al-Shumaisi detention center in Jeddah.\(^3\) Detention and deportation were marked by the absence of legal recourse and the confiscation of personal property; as in many other situations of deportation worldwide, these experiences were marked by material and moral destitution (Lecadet, 2016).

The set-up of transit camps for deportees in Ethiopia: the ambiguity of the “humanitarian” response

On December 5\(^{th}\) 2013, more than 100,000 Ethiopians had arrived in Ethiopia. They were 158,125 on February 6\(^{th}\), 2014 (Source: US Association for


International Migrations [USAIM]). These mass deportations were treated like a humanitarian crisis by the IOM, who received the deportees at the airport and directed them first to a reception center. At the end of 2013, the International Rescue Committee was operating five transit camps around Addis Ababa, whose logistics was common with the one usually reserved to refugee camps. The humanitarian device was organized around Bole airport, where the flights transporting the deportees were arriving. Bole International Airport Processing Centre had hosted 158,125 expellees on the 6th of February; 97,666 were male, 52,119 were female, and 8,340 were children, including 504 Unaccompanied Minors (UAMs). When the deportees arrived in Ethiopia, they stayed for a short time at the reception center located around Bole area. This reception center consisted of a wide area where tents were set up for the deportees, a few small buildings that functioned as offices, and a big hangar where luggage was kept. At the height of the crisis, these were five transit camps among which deportees were divided. The transit camp in the District of Gerji had a capacity of 1500 to 2000 people and received about 113 people per day, for instance. One of the objectives of the IOM was to avoid the congestion of these centers by accelerating the return of the expellees. Accommodation was thus conceived as temporary, and funds were allocated to the expellees so that they could pay their transportation to their place of origin. The main areas of return included the Amhara, Tigray, Oromia and SNNP regions. The IOM’s aim was to bring some fluidity to the traffic in these centers, so that they can easily be dismantled once the wave of deportation would end. Certain deportees, waiting for their luggage, went back and forth at the Bole airport and remained more than the two days originally allowed in these transit places (IOM, 2014). The use of camp device for the institutional reception of expellees is rather exceptional in the context of deportation linked with migration politics. Camps run by the UNHCR are usually reserved to situations of exile due to war, conflict, and political tension. It is rather unusual that the IOM became involved in setting up those camps, even though it occurred several times in recent years following the Arabic uprising; the Choucha camp in Tunisia being one example. Migration policies provoke in their own term forced mass displacements that underline the need for unformal or formal places of reception.

These camps were conceived as temporary and the support provided to the deportees was minimal. This combines administrative measures of registration, with humanitarian and financial assistance (Eylettens, 2014). The deportees were registered at their arrival in Addis-Ababa and received a phone

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card to make phone calls and a small sum of money so that they could travel to their places of origin. Some of them were given $47 and directly sent back to their home region by bus. While some return with luggage and savings, the IOM says others return empty handed. However, those who arrived in the evening or could not find their luggage stayed overnight in one of the many transit centers set up around the city. There they were fed and assisted by the International Rescue Committee, which provided basic necessities, such as dignity kits that include sanitary pads, clean underwear and soap. Non-food items were being disbursed by the IOM at the airport. This includes blankets, soap, dignity kits (IOM, 2014). “IOM provides also shoes for those who came barefoot. IOM also provides a meal for those who stay at the transit centers. Water and energy biscuits would also be provided” said a member of IOM, and “For other needs that women might have, for example, if there are pregnant women, we refer them to the health center. And if there are women who need counselling support, we refer them to the counselors”, said a member of the International Rescue Committee in an interview. Unaccompanied minors may stay ten days in transit centers and were accompanied back home to their families by staff members of the UNICEF and the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs.

While the device was inspired by a global framework for assistance and humanitarian aid, it was also implemented by local NGOs, such as The Good Samaritan Association and AGAR Ethiopia. The Good Samaritan Association, a local non-governmental non-profit making and non-religious volunteer organization established in December 1996 in Addis Ababa, works with marginalized groups in the sectors of health and education and implemented programs towards women deported from the Middle-East. Agar Ethiopia was funded in 2013 and has instigated various programs—Vocational and Basic Business Skills Training Program, Elder Rehabilitation Program, Construct Health Facilities—which also correspond to a global agenda of development. These local NGOs partnered with the IOM to assist deportees with psychological disorders, in the wake of other mental health programs for deportees, notably those carried out by the NGO Médecins du Monde and associations of expellees in Mali (Lecadet, 2010; Michaud, 2012). Those with mental or physical problems were hospitalized in Addis Ababa. The only mental hospital in the city was full of deportees, and so were the shelters of NGOs working on migrants’ return. Hand in hand with the process of destitution and meltdown provoked by deportation go psychological disorders. The coordinator of the overall repatriation process described the situation upon arrival at the airport: “Some of the returnees were taking their clothes off and walking around

5 http://www.voanews.com/content/future-unsure-for-repatriated-female-ethiopians/1813122.html
naked. Some had mental problems but others hated the clothes they were wearing as the cloth reminded them of what they had gone through. Those with mental problems were sent to mental hospitals and the others got new clothes.”

Nevertheless, this humanitarian approach to deportation should not be solely seen as a compassionate gesture towards deportees. Even though deportations from Saudi Arabia take place in an extremely authoritative context, they offer a somehow high-scale picture of the deportation regime worldwide. They should indeed be put in a global migration frame, in which the promotion of return of irregular migrants became a predominant motive for legitimizing deportations. In this global migration frame, humanitarian devices are associated with repressive and coercive measures towards migrants. The amount of deportations from Saudi Arabia is emblematic because it provoked the creation of an exceptional device and the set-up of transit camps. But it should not hide away the fact that the use of deportations in the context of migration policies is blurring the lines between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies, as it arose from a globalized and common tool of migration control.

Ethiopia, a laboratory of the global approach to migration?
The IOM has been one of the main proponents of a concerted management of migration, which contributed to legitimize and institutionalize the expulsion of undocumented foreigners. Created in 1951 by European Governments to manage the influx of refugees and displaced persons caused by the 2nd world war, the intergovernmental organization now works on transposing the political principle of return into measures of assistance, information campaigns and statistical data collection. In proposing the “framework of a migration policy of return,” the IOM appears as the main relay of Western States in the diffusion of the return policy of undocumented foreigners. It calls for enhanced cooperation between the emitting and receiving countries. It raises the question of return on a global scale through partnerships and cooperation between states. It also intends to give priority to voluntary return, even though the distinction between voluntary and forced returns is considered as illusory by many authors (Willame, 2000). This political framework is emblematic of a willingness to manage migration by strengthening the power of the state, both in immigration and emigration countries; it is proactively lobbying to consolidate national legislation on immigration in numerous African countries, but also to provide support in terms of technical and police means for migration control purposes. The IOM is therefore a key actor of an international political project of migration governance (Constant, 2009). The cooperation of the IOM with the states of origin of migrants as well as with a network of NGOs is part of this process of legitimation and standardization of
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deportations, conceived as the end of the migration routes. It aims on the one hand at strengthening the adoption of legislation in the field of migration at the international level, including in African States where the issue of migration has never been subject to any legal framework, and on the other hand, at encouraging the return of undocumented migrants.

In 2013–2014, the IOM has accompanied the massive campaign of expulsions from Saudi Arabia in Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia. The magnitude of the operation carried out in Ethiopia was explicitly a test for future reintegration programs. Several documents illustrate the experimental dimension of the operation. It is indeed a test for other large-scale deportees’ reception operations, but also for the implementation of reintegration programs. The operation in Ethiopia was largely discussed during meetings between the IOM, the International Labour Organization and UNICEF on the one hand, and within the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MoLSA) and its partners on the other hand. These organizations were keen to learn the lessons of this operation and to discuss the points to be improved for future reintegration programs (CERF, 2014). The IOM has been collecting data on returnees since the beginning of the operation: “Following this, IOM is currently conducting an assessment to gather data on the status of returnees, efforts being made so far by stakeholders, and the capacities and limitations of the local government and International Organizations (IOs), which will be used to inform the strategy towards complementing the GoE’s efforts to sustainably reintegrate returnees from KSA”. This post-deportation strategy goes hand in hand with awareness campaigns about the risks of illegal migration carried out by the IOM in many African States.

International fundraising for this operation shows that it is not only a regional political issue but that it is dependent of this global approach, defended by the IOM and its partners, on the return and reintegration of deportees. The IOM contributed to this operation which cost nearly 10 million dollars, for an amount of 1.5 million dollars through the Central Emergency Response Fund of the United Nations. The device, which involves numerous

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actors, is thus emblematic of a partnership between the state, international agencies in charge of migration, NGOs and private actors. Originally funded by the Humanitarian Response Fund and Central Emergency Response Fund, the operation will also rely on contributions from the UNICEF, the UNHCR, the World Food Program (WFP), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, but also Ethiopian diasporas who play a role in this operation: “The Ethiopian diaspora association, People to People (P2P), this week contributed USD 11,000 to IOM for emergency assistance to Ethiopian migrants returning home from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). This latest donation from the Kentucky-based P2P, follows previous contributions from Ethiopian diaspora around the world who have come to aid of their fellow nationals returning home destitute and in need of immediate support and assistance” (IOM, 2015). The US Association for International Migration (USAIM) was also deeply involved in the funding of the operation and in the assistance provided.

When the operation was re-evaluated for a cost of 15 million dollars, there was another call for funds. This funding lies on a global scale and is particularly dependent on the Western States’ priorities on migration. An ambiguous process is at stake; although brutal practices and their inhuman consequences are criticized, it endorses the principle of territorial sovereignty and state prerogatives concerning the right of residence. The purpose of this kind of operation is not to avoid the use of deportation by states, but rather to implement assistance programs likely to make the conditions of return acceptable.

Volunteers from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UNICEF, the UN Development Program (UNDP), the WFP, the World Health Organization (WHO), World Vision International (WVI), the UN Economic Commission for Africa, OXFAM Canada, the Spanish Cooperation Agency, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) are supporting activities at the airport reception and transit centers/OM’s operations are being run with the valuable support from: deer-OCHA, HRF-OCHA, ECHO-ERM, BPRM, Plan International, Indian Business Forum, Irish Aid, Global Alliance for the Rights of Ethiopians in Saudi Arabia - through US Association for International Migration (USAIM) / In-kind contributions, IRC, Save the Children, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Plan International, MSF Spain, Ethiopian Red Cross Society, ICRC, VIGNAN Ethiopia Telugu-Association, Association of French in Ethiopia (ADFE), Ethio-French Association, Medhanialem Church Fellow Members Association (IOM, 2014).

Post-arrival and reintegration assistance; Emergency medical assistance; Transportation within Addis Ababa and onwards; Cash allowances for reintegration and transportation; Psychological aid, treatment, and referrals; Blankets, soap, dignity kits, and shoes; Family tracing and reunification for unaccompanied minors.

http://ronairobi.iom.int/news/item//five.seven.eight-iom-appeals-for-funds-to-assist-ethiopian-returnees-from-saudi-arabia
The political response of the Ethiopian government to the deportation of its citizens

In Ethiopia, the magnitude of these expulsions provoked a political crisis. As André R.T. Eylettens has shown, the Ethiopian government became a central actor in the reintegration process (Eylettens, 2014). The increase of deportations worldwide raises new political issues for the States of origin of migrants. Accepting these measures can be interpreted as a sign of political weakness concerning the protection of their own citizens. The Ethiopian Government temporarily froze permits for low-skilled workers and announced the preparation of a law for the protection of its nationals. But the Government response was then criticized for encouraging clandestine immigration networks. In late October 2013, following the intensification of exploitation and abuse of migrant work, and partly due to Saudi Arabia’s inevitable measure of deportation, the Ethiopian government decided to withdraw the licenses of all private employment agencies (PEA) and banned unskilled migration to the Gulf States for at least 6 months. Experts from the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) indicated that the main purpose was to allow the Ethiopian government to further develop its strategy to prevent human trafficking, to deal with the expected large number of Ethiopian migrants who would be deported from Saudi Arabia, and to create structures to manage future labor migration from Ethiopia to the Gulf States. The other purpose of the ban was to correct the problems related to PEAs. The lack of labor agreement with the destination countries of Ethiopians, except the signed agreement with Kuwait, precipitated the crisis of migrants’ work. The ban on contracts and unskilled labor migrations was meant to address the above administrative and legal loopholes. Thus, before lifting the ban, the Ethiopian government specifically intended to correct the problems that exposed migrants’ work to exploitation. Pressured by external and internal forces, the government declared a ban on legal work contract migration. In the MoFA, the tasks that would be achieved before lifting the ban were outlined; capacity building training for personnel working in emigration sectors but also in the MoLSA, MoFA, Federal police and Emigration Office. Thus, among others, the crucial purpose of banning was to reach an agreement with the destinations of Ethiopian migrants. The ban would be lifted after installing labor attachés in Middle Eastern countries where Ethiopian nationals go, but the ban has not been lifted since then. In addition, a separate department called “Citizen’s Affairs” was aimed to be established in embassies and consulates situated in Middle Eastern countries; it would only deal with the protection of migrant labor. Since the ban period started, the Ethiopian government has also been preparing a new law of foreign employment.

The consular directorate from MoFA said: “Before declaring the ban the government has done necessary preparations to curb illegal roads taking
migrants to Saudi Arabia or any country. Tightening the common border outlets, criminalizing illegal brokers and smugglers, and mass awareness raising programs under the auspices of National Task Force to combat human trafficking were done before the decree.” (interview with the Consular Directorate Director of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 2014). Even though the expert from MoFA denies the proliferation of illegal routes due to the ban on legal routes, different media outlets and news agencies were exposing the re-influx of Ethiopians deported from Saudi Arabia. Injustices chiefly emanate from the indifference of the Ethiopian government in protecting its citizens’ entitlements as migrant workers, low pay contracts signed before going to Saudi Arabia, and lenient government structure in sending citizens with poor communication and work skills. Above all, the apathy or recklessness of the Ethiopian government was observed in allowing its citizens to travel through contract labor to a country where there is no minimum legal agreement nor observers such as an embassy and a consulate. Thus, efforts should be made to strengthen Ethiopian embassies in the Middle East, both in terms of personnel and finance, including having labor attachés so that they could advocate for migrants’ rights in destination countries. In this regard, the government of Ethiopia is greatly reproached for hardly shielding of its citizens rights, particularly in the Middle East. The lack of labor agreement with destination countries, the absence of proper structure to entertain work migration in the places of origin and destination, and the unwillingness to abide by international labor migrant laws, all exacerbated the exploitation and the misery of Ethiopian labor migrants.

The Ethiopian government launched reintegration programs for deportees to support the return process. As much as the humanitarian angle of post-deportation assistance aims to alleviate the most dramatic consequences of deportation, reintegration programs are part of a broader political strategy which aims to fix populations in their place or origin after they have been expelled. This strategy, actively promoted by the IOM, has had great effects in migrants’ countries of origin, especially in Africa. It gives emigration countries a responsibility to prevent their nationals to migrate without proper documents, but also to discourage them to leave again after deportation. This task of policing the movements of their own population is embodied through border control enforcement, but also so called “reintegration”. Reintegration programs focus on education and professional training, but also on projects funding, even though their efficiency is highly debatable. André Eyl ettens has shown how such programs were implemented in the region of Dire Dawa in the wake of mass deportations from Saudi Arabia in 2013-2014, but interestingly they were neither run by the IOM nor by NGOs, as it was the case in other contexts, but by the Ethiopian government. They mostly consisted...
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in professional training (driving lessons, cook training, business courses, hair-
dressing training, etc.), projects funding, but also in providing housing and psychological assistance for the most vulnerable and traumatized among the deportees (Eylettens, 2014). Direct cash assistance was never given, as it could have been used for funding another journey. A few deportees were hired by the State, while some others found employments in private companies. Thus, even not supervised by the IOM, these programs follow the same pattern: the reintegration process is aimed at fixing migrants after deportation and at discouraging them to leave again.

As a political and social hub of the nation, Addis Ababa city administration was also massively involved in the reintegration process and launched a two rounds skill training and reintegration assistance. According to the Labour and Social Affair Bureau of Addis Ababa, returnees of Addis Ababa are estimated to reach 3,000; 2748 of them being registered for support. In the first and second sessions, respectively 1,999 and 749 returnees were registered for training and assistance. 74.6 % of them were females and the rest quarter of them were males. The support program started by providing six days of psychosocial counseling and refreshment programs. Afterwards, returnees were offered to choose from various menus of skill training opportunities (such as food preparation, beauty salon, urban agriculture such as poultry raising, and producing construction material such as bricks) brought by the authority. Based on their choice of profession, returnees were then given a one and half month skill training in one of six Technical and Vocational Colleges. After finishing the training, assessment was conducted by Addis Ababa Center of Competence (COC). Afterwards, returnees obtained a certificate in the profession they were trained for. The major problems of the reintegration process took place when the task was delegated to the Sub-City Administration. The main tasks expected from the Sub-City Administration were to facilitate the acquirement of licenses, to provide working premises, and to create access for credit services. Due to the influx of returnees, providing credit access and sheds became hindrances for reintegration assistance efforts. The credit institution in charge, Addis Credit and Saving Institution, was not prepared to provide flexible credit services for such a huge number of returnees. Returnees were expected to be entertained like others fulfilling the existing requirements: to present collateral (either house blueprint or a person with significant capital) which was unfeasible for many. Providing sheds or places for work was the other problem of the reintegration program. The scale of returns was unprecedented; lack of capacity on the part of the government to entertain an important number of sheds according to a specific timeline was thus the main problem. Returnees who managed to access credit or wanted to use their savings could not obtain sheds. Another problem was the lack of monitoring from the concerned bodies. Most Sub-City Administration offices
were not prepared and interested in addressing the situation. A few sub-cities like Yeka and Gulele did the maximum to achieve a successful reintegration, which was confirmed by the interviewed returnees, but most of them were very frustrated about the assistance they received. Even if their number is handful, some returnees started to work in cooperatives.

Upon arrival, the returnees assumed that the government would start to fulfill its promises; but as time passed, the attention of the government declined, and in some offices, they were approached oddly. As a deportee put it: “During the first five months after we had returned, we were going from office to office. Yet nothing happened... Since we have returned we are idle, we used the money we brought from Saudi Arabia and are now again dependent on our family.” Deportees expressed frustration on how the government’s focus has declined since the early days of return. Asnakech (24 years old and a BA graduate) said: “I was expecting that the government would keep on behaving in the same way it did upon our arrival. The government’s focus is dwindling as days are passing. Still now (5 months after the return) nothing has happened and there is nothing to show.” To sum up, the main economic problems returnees encountered upon arrival were housing problems, the inaccessibility of job opportunities, betrayal of transferred money (incidents mainly faced by female returnees), inflation in price of goods and services, and different barriers in terms of government assistance. As Abebaw Minaye puts it: “Many Ethiopian migrants are engaged in a process of circular migration, where detection in and deportation from Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia is followed by another attempt to enter the Kingdom or other Gulf countries” (Minaye, 2012; RMMS, 2014a, 2014b). Returnees that were coming from rural areas did not always return home. Some stayed in Addis Ababa because they did not want to go home empty-handed. The failure to achieve migration goals, returning empty-handed and the associated embarrassment, weak and unreliable government support, and the weak economic opportunities at home, in addition to returnees looking for wealth, all provoked the returnees’ desire for remigration. The design of a sustainable return, made possible through assistance and reintegration programs implemented by the IOM and the Ethiopian State, is challenged by the harshness of deportees’ experiences and the process of remigration through illegal channels.

Conclusion
This article is an attempt to analyze post-deportation assistance and political responses in the context of mass deportation of foreign workers from Saudi Arabia in 2013-2014. The post-deportation phase was characterized by an unprecedented emergency device set up by the Ethiopian government, the IOM and international and local organizations to assist deportees at their
arrival. Some of the logistics and humanitarian tools usually used for refugees inside camps were exceptionally applied to the reception of deportees coming back from Saudi Arabia. Conceived as temporary, these measures barely helped deportees with the situation of loss, social destitution and psychological breakdown that they experienced. This humanitarian assistance, with all its ambiguity when it comes to legitimizing deportation policies, took place in the short term. The reintegration programs nevertheless aimed to help deportees to settle again in the long term. They appear as a political strategy from the Ethiopian government for preventing deportees to leave again the country (Elleytens, 2014), but they are also part of the policy of return promoted by the IOM and funded by various States, international agencies and organizations.

Examining the structure of deportation therefore supposes to apprehend altogether national and international levels as well as a plurality of actors. It seems particularly necessary to examine without separating them deportation measures with their social and political impact in the countries of origin of immigrants. Because as we see from the pressure put by the EU on African countries to sign readmission agreements, adopt restrictive legislation in the field of migration or participate in border control enforcement inside Africa, the burden of deportation policies tend more and more to be shared with the migrants’ States of origin and transit. The harshness of deportations from Saudi Arabia has been widely condemned and attributed to the authoritarian context in which these deportations take place. But are there really “soft deportations”? If scholars are usually keen of drawing a clear distinction between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes (Gibney, Hansen, 2003) in their use of deportations, and notably in the place of the rule of law in this process, could one think that these limits are more porous than we imagine?

We have argued that the specific treatment of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, and their reception in Ethiopia after being deported, should not be separated from a global migration framework, in which the acceptance of sending back irregular migrants is central. Testing a high-scale operation for the reception of deportees would certainly provide lessons that can be used in other contexts. When European countries announce their will to accelerate systematic deportations of rejected asylum seekers, there is a sense of some mass deportation plan going on. What has been experienced in Ethiopia could be reproduced, even at a smaller scale, in other countries. This also shows the limits of the deportation studies which are generally focusing on contemporary migration policies in Europe and America. The multi-sited nature of deportation practices and policies does not draw much attention, especially in the case of deportation enacted as a tool of migration control, in the South (Bredeloup, 1995). Still, it can help us understand how deportations and post-deportation measures are in reality included in a global migration frame,
which tends to blur the lines between liberal democracies and authoritarian contexts.

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Abstract
Between November 2013 and March 2014, 163,018 Ethiopians were expelled from Saudi Arabia, according to the IOM registration. The high-scale humanitarian operation set up to support the deportees certainly belongs to the “crisis management” framework. The creation of camps around Addis Ababa is emblematic of the incorporation of humanitarian logistics into post-deportation management. But the operation is also to be apprehended as experimental, serving as a test for future operations of reception and reintegration of the deportees. Since the legitimization of forced returns through humanitarian devices and projects funding is central to the policy advocated by the IOM to promote “sustainable returns” and “reintegration”, this post-deportation device should be apprehended within a broader framework of migration management, which involves the IOM, states, NGOs, and private actors. Then, is it still relevant to speak in term of “crisis management”, or did this conjecture allow to test a sustainable model for post-deportation assistance and reintegration programs for deportees?

Keywords: Mass deportation, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, International organization for migration, post-deportation, reintegration, humanitarian support

Résumé
L’expulsion des travailleurs éthiopiens d’Arabie Saoudite (2013-2014) : la gestion d’une crise humanitaire et politique. - Selon la déclaration de l’IOM, entre novembre 2013 et mars 2014, 163 018 Éthiopiens furent expulsés d’Arabie Saoudite. L’opération humanitaire à grande échelle mise en place pour soutenir les déportés appartient certainement au système de “gestion de crise”. La création de camps autour d’Addis-Abeba est emblématique de l’intégration de la logistique humanitaire dans la gestion post-déportation. Mais l’opération doit aussi être comprise comme expérimentale, en servant de test pour de futures opérations d’accueil et de réinsertion des déportés. Étant donné que la légitimation des retours forcés par les mécanismes humanitaires et le financement des projets est au cœur de la politique préconisée par l’IOM pour promouvoir les “retours durables” et la “réintégration”, ce dispositif post-déportation devrait être envisagé dans le cadre plus large de la gestion des migrations, qui implique l’IOM, les États, les ONG et les acteurs privés. Est-il alors encore pertinent de parler en terme de “gestion de crise” ou cette conjoncture a-t-elle permis de tester un modèle durable pour les programmes d’assistance et de réinsertion post-déportation pour les déportés ?

Mots-clés: déportation de masse, Arabie Saoudite, Éthiopie, Organisation internationale pour les migrations, post-déportation, réintégration, support humanitaire