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Monika Fludernik. *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction: The Linguistic Representation of Speech and Consciousness.* London and New York: Routledge, 1993. xvi + 536 pp. £50.00, \$74.50 cloth.

In the long history of reflection on the nature of narrative, narratology can best be distinguished by the privileged relation it has established between the features of narrative content and linguistically inspired theories of the mediation of such narrative content. Perhaps no one has stated this more boldly than the inventor of the term "narratology," Tzvetan Todorov, for whom character is a noun and action a verb and who suggests that noun and verb might be better understood in considering the role they play in narrative. While Todorov's analogy is guilty of the exaggeration and approximation typical of nascent disciplines, there does remain a grain of truth in his formulation, which, even with the multitude and diversity of developments in literary theory over the past thirty years, stands as a watershed in modern approaches to narrative. This is not to say, however, that "pre-"narratological studies are to be dispensed with in the wake of scientific or critical progress, for it has become clear in recent years that narratology, which now possesses a history of its own, has entered a phase where further refinements are likely to come—at least in part—from the reconsideration of issues that were earlier seen either to lie outside the scope of narratology (e.g., fictionality) or to be incompatible with the aims and methods of narratology (e.g., style). The "crisis of narratology" that has gathered force over the past ten years or more as the Saussurean-inspired paradigms have weakened has at the same time produced new theoretical frameworks for the study of narrative, for it is now clear that today's inheritors of the earlier narratology tend either towards a narrative semantics derived from possible-worlds logic (the most comprehensive work to date being Marie-Laure Ryan's *Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory* [1991]) or, with greater attention devoted to textual surface structures, towards the various

modes of the inscription of subjectivity in language as a key feature of narrative fiction. With a variety of sources running back to (among others) Charles Bally's stylistics and Käte Hamburger's phenomenologically inspired *Logik der Dichtung* (1957; second edition 1968)—a work having provided an important theoretical basis for Dorrit Cohn's *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (1978)—this latter tendency in narratology has found in Monika Fludernik's *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction* an achievement of cardinal importance. Fludernik's accomplishment is to have produced an exhaustive study of the representation of speech and consciousness in fiction through a sustained analysis of free indirect discourse and related devices, addressing numerous issues that have not been adequately resolved previously, be it due either to limitations inherent in the paradigms commonly accepted or to the failure of critical and theoretical insight. All of this, and more, is brought to bear on extracts drawn from no fewer than two-hundred and fifty English language, French, and German texts (both literary and journalistic as well as oral), backed up by extensive readings in the relevant bibliography on recent narratological and linguistic research, together with penetrating discussions of earlier studies that serve to enrich and to put into historical perspective work currently being done in the field.

From the time it was first observed, free indirect discourse has remained a privileged area of linguistically informed approaches to narrative. The dominant approach over the decades—even among narratologists—has been to locate the device midway between direct speech (assumed to be the most “mimetic” form of speech representation) with its syntactic and expressive elements and indirect speech with its tense and referential shifts. However, this “tripartite” model of speech representation, as Fludernik and others have shown, does not stand up under empirical verification: in addition to the “direct discourse fallacy” denounced by Meir Sternberg, it is now generally accepted among linguists that indirect speech and free indirect discourse cannot be generated from direct speech and consequently that direct speech does not constitute a point of reference for the analysis of speech and thought representation. Fludernik (following Cohn) maintains, moreover, that such a model cannot account for differences between represented speech and consciousness, an important shortcoming in the field of narrative theory that her book seeks to redress. A more refined version of this scheme, allowing for gradations between types, can be found in the “scale model” embraced by Gérard Genette, Cohn, Franz Stanzel, Seymour Chatman, and others and set forth most systematically in a well-known article by Brian McHale in a typology including seven categories of speech representation going from the most “diegetic” to the most “mimetic.” While Fludernik is too judicious a scholar to reject either of these models outright, she does provide evidence suggesting that the rapid change from one type to another in actual texts, involving a greater variety of syntactic, lexical, semantic and pragmatic criteria than the smoothed-over transitions included in a formal definition might lead us to suppose, cannot be accounted for by the scale, nor can the scale adequately explain functional

differences between the verbal representation of utterances and that of consciousness (see the summary table on page 311).

Another widely acknowledged approach to free indirect discourse and related devices is that of the "dual voice" hypothesis (the standard presentation of this approach can be found in Roy Pascal's *The Dual Voice: Free Indirect Speech and Its Functioning in the Nineteenth-Century European Novel* [1977]). Fludernik notes that the dual-voice hypothesis, more than the grammatical models, allows for "the gradational overlap of diegetic and mimetic features, of linguistic form and mimetic voice," while at the same time "voice is aligned with the theoretical constructs of narrator and characters, and the diegetic and mimetic levels therefore become identified with hierarchical structural levels of narrative" (330). However, this more supple approach, while it does make possible a closer coordination of speech and thought representation with other narratological phenomena as well as allow a place for irony and for the reader's sense of a mingling of narrator's and characters' voices, suffers from a vague conception of narrative voice and from a lack of analytical precision, as it blurs distinctions between types. Fludernik maintains that the dual voice approach to free indirect discourse consists, ultimately, in two theses: "(a) that the pronominal and temporal shifts constitute an authorial 'voice'; and (b) that there is an intermingling of voices in free indirect discourse passages where the register tends to be 'authorial' or narratorial (as, mostly, in Henry James) and there is a faint hint of the character's idiom between lines" (355).

As an alternative to the dual-voice hypothesis, Fludernik refers to a series of articles by Ann Banfield, and particularly to Banfield's book, *Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction* (1982), in which a "single voice" theory of free indirect discourse is set forth, echoing Bally's and Lips's early research on this subject. This controversial and innovative work in fact serves as a catalyst for Fludernik's critique of research previously carried out in the area of speech and thought representation in narrative fiction, and to no insignificant degree Fludernik's own theory proves to be a closely reasoned reformulation of Banfield's technically linguistic and provocative, yet insightful, contribution within the framework of a broad view of literary and linguistic theory and a wide spectrum of texts, literary and journalistic as well as oral. Essentially, Fludernik finds that Banfield has revolutionized the frame of reference laid down in previous studies dealing with free indirect discourse by confronting them with modern linguistics, most notably with transformational grammar (for syntactic aspects of speech and thought report) and with Benveniste's distinction between *discours* and *histoire* (for deictic and anaphoric features which oppose subjectivity in language to the absence of communicative structures). Among the numerous results of this reorientation, unpalatable to those narratologists who remain attached to traditional linguistic categories, are the following: (1) that neither indirect speech nor free indirect discourse are derivable from direct speech; (2) that both free indirect discourse and narrative (as with Benveniste's *histoire*) are speakerless. The former point undermines the deeply ingrained mimetic doctrine of verbatim transcription as

the basis of speech and thought representation while the latter flies in the face of the various theories of the communicational structure of narrative (inspired, more or less directly, from Jakobson's scheme of verbal communication) that underlie so much of narratological research, a fact that explains much of the hostile reaction to Banfield's theory.

One of the outstanding merits of Fludernik's careful scholarship is her capacity to explore a diversity of currents of research without being diverted by sectarian controversy. In her reevaluation of Banfield's paradigm, for example, she maintains that although the Chomskian Extended Standard Theory employed by Banfield has been superseded by more recent developments in transformational grammar and that although the practice of analyzing isolated sentences in literary texts is no longer tenable, the syntactic approach to speech and thought representation through the evocation of subjectivity by means of the expressive features evoked by textual signals remains fundamentally valid. Moreover, in order to update the theory further, she also proposes complementing the syntactic dimension by devoting closer attention to pragmatic features overlooked by Banfield: for example, Banfield's deictic-center thesis of subjectivity gains in coherence when integrated into pragmatic theory, thanks in particular to the adoption of the distinction (current in the notion of linguistic utterance) between the deictic center of the reporting instance and that of the reported instance, thereby enabling Fludernik (as the subtitle of her book denotes) to address better the problem not only of the linguistic representation of speech, but also that of consciousness. In an equally important aspect of her critique, Fludernik demonstrates how Banfield's expression for free indirect discourse—"Represented Speech and Thought" (RST)—designates a broader range of phenomena than is usually taken into consideration by the traditional term, as it concerns the narrative's representation of reflective consciousness and speech together with that of nonreflective consciousness. She goes on to explain how, as far as narrative theory is concerned, Banfield's work on the narrative representation of reflective consciousness can be subsumed under the "reflector" mode, where no communication between narrator and narratee takes place, as opposed to the "narrator" mode, where a "communicative situation" does exist, but solely through the presence of an overt narrator-personae. (The reflector mode was introduced by Stanzel in the revision of his own earlier work on the "figural" narrative situation.) And finally, one of the ways in which Fludernik differentiates RST from her own approach to these complex matters is to divide the field of analysis into psychonarration, free indirect discourse, and narrated perception. This typology proves to be of central importance in her study, for it is conceived with the aim of providing a more rigorous account of the nuances separating spoken from unspoken discourse by characters in fiction than has been offered by the traditional triad or its variants. A considerable portion of the book can be described as a series of analyses and examples that systematically develop the author's revision of Banfield's theory.

Readers will be fascinated to see how Fludernik's study of free indirect discourse, a subject that may seem to many to be nothing more than a stylistic

quirk in the narrative text with little interest beyond its immediate context, reveals the extent of the ramifications this device has for the theory of narrative. The present review should give some idea, however, as to the degree that free indirect discourse represents "a test case within the paradigm of speech and thought representation" as well as to what extent "reported speech and the representation of consciousness are crucially central marginal issues which constitute a challenge for the respective disciplinary paradigms" (25-26). Within this framework, Fludernik defines her methodology "as a text linguistics of narrative language" (13) based on three levels of analysis: (1) a transformationalist approach to the description of syntax at the sentence level; (2) textual or discourse units as developed by narratologists, especially by Stanzel; (3) interpretative and cognitive principles derived from frame theory and developed, most notably, in discourse analysis. Such a methodology clearly marks Fludernik's orientation off from that characterizing the work of most narratologists, for the general practice has been to base methodology on categories derived from a model of the narrative text itself as is the case with the "story" versus "discourse" paradigm popularized by Chatman, with Genette's *histoire, discours, narration*, or with Stanzel's story versus mediation, among others. The failure (or refusal) to offer a "unified" model of the narrative text can be explained, in part, by the object of Fludernik's inquiry, for as her book illustrates, the representation of speech and thought in narrative—and particularly of consciousness—constitutes a perturbing factor in the pursuit of such overarching schemes. This is a significant issue that calls for debate more extensive than can be undertaken in the present review. Suffice it to say here, however, that one of the principal targets of Fludernik's critique is the communication model of the narrative text, which, in one form or another, runs through virtually the whole of narratological theory. As the author demonstrates (mainly in her first chapter), there continues to exist a chronic tendency to conflate Plato's mimesis and diegesis with the grammatical features of direct and indirect discourse, and this only serves to sustain those theories of speech and thought representation that she, following Banfield's lead, is seeking to refute and to supplant.

The theoretical backdrop against which Fludernik develops her antimimetic approach to the representation of speech and thought is outlined in two chapters devoted to "schematic language representation," a concept laying down the initial steps in an interesting alternative to the communicational model, which future research may prove to be highly fruitful. Basically, this theory focuses on the linguistic devices of typification and schematization that enable speech and thought representation to "manufacture" fiction (rather than to "imitate" reality) through the inventive and projective use of the preestablished formulas, clichés, stock phrases, and so on with which verbal expression is permeated. The sources for Fludernik's work in this area come not only from linguistics and literary theory, but also from research being done in frame theory, sociolinguistics, cognitive science, pragmatics, and discourse analysis, and it is conceivable that, for example, the "plan" and "script" components contained in frame theory will one day help to bridge the gap between schematic language representation and

matters relating to story and plot structure, thereby opening the way to a new paradigm in narratological research.

One defect with which *The Languages of Fiction and the Fictions of Language* might be reproached is its chapter organization. Following the introduction and two chapters in which the author spells out the linguistic, narratological, and philosophical context in which she places her study of speech and thought representation are two chapters containing detailed analyses of free indirect discourse and related devices, analyses that reflect the critique and revision of Banfield's work; the next two chapters deal with the scale model and the dual-voice hypothesis, succeeded by the chapter on Banfield and two final chapters on schematic language representation. While Fludernik is highly adept at interrelating the parts of her book, referring the reader to earlier or to later points in the text wherever appropriate, the succession of chapters is nearly the opposite of what might be expected, so that many readers will feel the need to embark on a second, retroactive, reading in order to gain a better mastery of the book's arguments and detail.

On closer consideration, however, this defect is more than offset by the book's valuable encyclopedic function, for the wealth of information on, and insight into, current problems of narrative theory set within a linguistic framework covers a range of such breadth that the book can well serve as a work of reference for study as well as for further research. This is true particularly for readers working in the tradition of Anglo-American narrative theory, for Fludernik, who teaches English at the University of Freiburg and who is a former student of Stanzel, approaches narrative theory in the tradition of German literary scholarship, which has long been concerned with problems arising from free indirect discourse. A phenomenon virtually unknown in Anglo-American criticism as little as thirty years ago, free indirect discourse, together with related issues—and this is a particularly striking aspect of Fludernik's handling of the subject—calls for a serious rethinking of the criteria underlying narrative analysis. To take only one example, the traditional study of point of view, a feature of narrative long granted excessive attention at the expense of numerous other issues, was partially modified by Wayne Booth's treatment of authorial voice and was further corrected by Genette in opposing "Who sees?" (focalization) to "Who speaks?" (voice) within a broadly based system of narrative categories. Theorizing about point of view must now be placed within a radically new context. Although Fludernik does not deal with point of view (or focalization or perspective) in any detail, one of the significant and innovative results of her study is that the traditional approaches to point of view must now be seen as having been absorbed into the analysis of speech and thought representation. Not only do the deictic, lexical, semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic criteria involved in such an analysis prove to be more precise and fruitful empirically speaking (especially in the explanation of word-by-word typological modulations) than the often-intuitive and approximative use of point of view theories, but they also allow for a more unified approach to the problems of perspective, voice, and the typology of characters' speech than do the various structuralist

models. Furthermore, the antimimetic conception of language contained in the schematic language representation approach would seem to undermine the "showing-telling" paradigm upon which point of view (and related) theories are based. These, however, are but mere suggestions of the consequences that readers will draw from *The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction*.

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