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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2022

Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Switching Costs

Résumé

We study how switching costs affect the sub-game perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.
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Dates et versions

hal-03888188 , version 1 (07-12-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03888188 , version 1

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Yevgeny Tsodikovich, Xavier Venel, Anna Zseleva. Folk Theorems in Repeated Games with Switching Costs. 2022. ⟨hal-03888188⟩
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