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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail (Working Paper) Année : 2022

The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection

Eric Kamwa

Résumé

In committee selection setting, we introduce the Condorcet Loser Committee (CLC) which when it exists, is a committee such that each of its members is defeated in pairwise comparisons by any outside candidate. It turns out that most popular committee selection rules can elect the CLC when it exists. From the perspective of the Condorcet majority criterion, the election of the CLC is simply not acceptable. We identify the few rules that will never elect the CLC when it exists. We show among others that the k-Borda rule is the only k-scoring committee rule that never select the CLC. This also holds with k-iterative Borda rule, Nanson rule, Kemeny rule, Copeland rule. As a corollary, it appeared that the Chamberlin-Courant rule can elect the CLC when it exists.
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Dates et versions

hal-03880064 , version 1 (30-11-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03880064 , version 1

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Eric Kamwa. The Condorcet Loser Criterion in Committee Selection. 2022. ⟨hal-03880064⟩
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