

"Emotions in Cultural Dynamics": What Non-Humans Can Teach Us about the Role of Emotions in Cultural Evolution

Guillaume Dezecache, Christine Sievers, Thibaud Gruber

▶ To cite this version:

Guillaume Dezecache, Christine Sievers, Thibaud Gruber. "Emotions in Cultural Dynamics": What Non-Humans Can Teach Us about the Role of Emotions in Cultural Evolution. Emotion Review, 2022, 14 (2), pp.161-163. 10.1177/17540739221082217. hal-03875821

HAL Id: hal-03875821 https://hal.science/hal-03875821v1

Submitted on 7 Dec 2022

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

Emotion Review

What non-humans can teach us about the role of emotions in cultural evolution

Journal:	Emotion Review
Manuscript ID	EMR-21-1696
Manuscript Type:	Commentary
Date Submitted by the Author:	12-Nov-2021
Complete List of Authors:	Dezecache, Guillaume ; Clermont Auvergne University, Psychology Sievers, Christine; Universität Bern, Psychology Gruber, Thibaud; University of Geneva, Psychology
Area/Discipline:	emotion expression, psychological
Keywords:	
Abstract:	The role emotions play in the dynamics of cultural phenomena has long been neglected. The collection of articles recently published in Emotion Review provides an important first step into this necessary endeavor. In this commentary, we discuss this contribution by emphasizing the role epistemological parsimony should play in the future of this research agenda. The cultural behavior and emotions of chimpanzees is taken as reference.

SCHOLARONE™ Manuscripts

What non-humans can teach us about the role of emotions in cultural evolution

Guillaume Dezecache¹, Christine Sievers² & Thibaud Gruber³

¹Université Clermont Auvergne, LAPSCO CNRS;

²Department of Philosophy, York University Toronto;

³Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva

Abstract

- 8 The role emotions play in the dynamics of cultural phenomena has long been neglected. The
- 9 collection of articles recently published in *Emotion Review* provides an important first step into
- this necessary endeavor. In this commentary, we discuss this contribution by emphasizing the
- role epistemological parsimony should play in the future of this research agenda. The cultural
- behavior and emotions of chimpanzees is taken as reference.

Main text

Which role do emotions play in the dynamics of cultural phenomena? Upon reading the superb collection of articles gathered by Chentsova-Dutton (2020), one cannot but agree that emotions are, as Rimé nicely puts it, 'at the service of cultural construction' (Rimé, 2019). Emotion programs are thought to have evolved to respond to recurrent problems faced by early members of our lineage, and which enabled them to respond to challenges and strive in ancestral environments (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). In this light, they allow individuals to take into account what is *relevant* for them in their environment (Sander, 2013), whether because the event is of 'biological significance' (LeDoux, 1989) to them, or that it passes their 'novelty check' (Scherer et al., 2001). The biological and social significance of emotions is even greater, when one considers that they are often associated with facial (Ekman, 1997), bodily (De Gelder,

2006; Grèzes et al., 2007, 2013), vocal (Sauter et al., 2010), verbal (Devillers & Vasilescu,

2003) and even chemosensory signals (De Groot et al., 2014), which can in turn be picked up by members of the audience (Dezecache et al., 2013), through so-called emotional contagion or emotional transmission (Dezecache et al., 2015). This process then facilitates learning about features of our environment and solutions that can be used to deal with them, through associative learning (Olsson et al., 2020). In humans, ostensive communication (sensu Sperber & Wilson, 1987) also facilitates the mutual recognition of solutions to recurrent problems and their integration in publicly acknowledged group-specific behavioral repertoires (Kashima et al., 2020). The attractive character of solutions (and the emotions they trigger in individuals observing them) act as a force that selects cultural solutions over others, and actively transform behavioral repertoires (Eriksson & Strimling, 2020).

While we overall agree that the above-mentioned process actively participates in the construction and maintenance of cultural phenomena, at least two important aspects remain unanswered and threaten the usefulness of such theoretical narrative. First, signals associated with the experience of emotion (which may inappropriately be called 'emotional signals') are probably only contingently read-outs of the affective state expressers experience (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018, 2019). Indeed, environmental challenges cause emotions in individuals which can then be shared with other members of a community (Kashima et al., 2020; Rimé, 2019), provided there is a match between the emotion being felt and associated expressive displays (Dezecache et al., 2013, 2015). This is never guaranteed.

Second, this narrative is certainly very informative with regards to explaining the current functioning of cultural phenomena in humans, and contributing to a comprehensive account of what human culture is, yet, it remains desperately silent about the origin of culture and how emotions may have themselves helped in setting cultural evolution in motion, beyond modern

humans. We understand this is a different question from the one posed in Rimé (2019) and Kashima et al. (2020). This question though has an important epistemological virtue: it invites to parsimony. We reckon this is a valuable exercise for it can reveal the necessary conditions for the emergence of cultural phenomena and ignoring more incidental features. This could eventually help provide a parsimonious answer to the question of which psychological elements are necessary for a species to show culture, or for culture to appear at all. Finally, it can

illuminate the role of emotions in early forms of culture.

Modern humans (*Homo Sapiens*) have only been around for a few hundred thousand years in their behaviorally modern form (Powell et al., 2009). Among the small subset of species under scientific study, humans are not the only one that show forms of culture, or group-specific behaviors that cannot be explained by genetic or environmental singularities (Whiten et al., 1999). Convergent evidence also suggests that cultural evolution (or 'dynamics', Kashima et al. 2020) is also present in some animals (Whiten, 2019), at least in limited forms, with an increasing number of cases documented in line with the increasing impact of humans on their environment (Gruber et al., 2019). Yet, the debate on animal cultures has stalled for many years, owing to often unrealistic cognitively-loaded criteria set for attributing culture to other species than humans, particularly with respect to social processes, with the bar being raised each time a particular species threatens to reach the imposed threshold (Gruber, 2020).

The consideration that chimpanzee communities display forms of culture without language and without clear signs that cultural items are being mutually acknowledged and recognized as such by community members (in other words: chimpanzees have culture, but may not know that they do) (Gruber et al., 2015) invites us to revisit the proposals of Rimé (2019) and Kashima and colleagues (2020), and appreciate that two possibilities are offered: first, neither emotional

sharing nor mutual recognition are necessary for cultural phenomena to appear; or, second, emotional sharing is present in a larger number of species than suggested, and may even provide an elegant way to come out of the conundrum of animal culture. Note that such argument can also be made regarding early hominin cultures, whose brain organization may have differed from ours (Bruner, 2018; Gruber, 2020).

The question then becomes: do emotions play any role in the emergence of non-human and early human cultural forms? Beyond the largely cognitive layer attached to modern human cultures, can these forms truly be considered 'primeval', not because of their seemingly ancestral state, but rather because of the direct impact of emotion on their development? Affective variables certainly do play a role in the display of animal cultural behavior: physiological forces like thirst, hunger and other motivational forces surely make organisms more likely to invest physical and cognitive efforts in solving environmental problems (Gruber et al., 2016). They also likely make organisms pay attention to their conspecifics when facing environmental problems, in search for solutions. In fact, the emotions of the agents - regardless of whether they are being shared or not with others - may be one of the leading forces behind social learning, as recently argued by Dukes and Clément (2017; 2019), with the novel framework of Affective Social Learning. These solutions in turn, could become cultural, without language nor mutual recognition. Elsewhere, some of us have argued that emotions provide a fertile ground to study culture and communication in non-humans (Gruber & Sievers, 2019; Sievers & Gruber, 2020). In this light, emotions may truly be one of the leading forces in the emergence of culture across species.

References

- Bruner, E. (2018). Human Paleoneurology and the Evolution of the Parietal Cortex. *Brain*, Behavior and Evolution, 91, 136–147. https://doi.org/10.1159/000488889 Chentsova-Dutton, Y. (2020). Emotions in Cultural Dynamics: *Emotion Review*. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073920921467 Clément, F., & Dukes, D. (2017). Social Appraisal and Social Referencing: Two Components of Affective Social Learning: Emotion Review. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073916661634 Crivelli, C., & Fridlund, A. J. (2018). Facial Displays Are Tools for Social Influence. *Trends* in Cognitive Sciences, 22(5), 388–399. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.02.006 Crivelli, C., & Fridlund, A. J. (2019). Inside-Out: From Basic Emotions Theory to the Behavioral Ecology View. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 43(2), 161–194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-019-00294-2 De Gelder, B. (2006). Towards the neurobiology of emotional body language. *Nature Reviews Neuroscience*, 7(3), 242–249. De Groot, J. H., Semin, G. R., & Smeets, M. A. (2014). I can see, hear, and smell your fear: Comparing olfactory and audiovisual media in fear communication. *Journal of* Experimental Psychology: General, 143(2), 825. Devillers, L., & Vasilescu, I. (2003). Prosodic cues for emotion characterization in real-life spoken dialogs. Eighth European Conference on Speech Communication and Technology. Dezecache, G., Jacob, P., & Grezes, J. (2015). Emotional contagion: Its scope and limits.
 - Dezecache, G., Mercier, H., & Scott-Phillips, T. C. (2013). An evolutionary approach to
 - emotional communication. *Journal of Pragmatics*, *59*, 221–233.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(6), 297–299.

124	Dukes, D., & Clément, F. (Eds.). (2019). Foundations of Affective Social Learning:
125	Conceptualizing the Social Transmission of Value. Cambridge University Press.
126	https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108661362
127	Ekman, R. (1997). What the face reveals: Basic and applied studies of spontaneous
128	expression using the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Oxford University Press,
129	USA.
130	Eriksson, K., & Strimling, P. (2020). Using Models to Predict Cultural Evolution From
131	Emotional Selection Mechanisms. <i>Emotion Review</i> , 12(2), 79–92.
132	Grèzes, J., Philip, L., Chadwick, M., Dezecache, G., Soussignan, R., & Conty, L. (2013).
133	Self-relevance appraisal influences facial reactions to emotional body expressions.
134	PloS One, 8(2), e55885.
135	Grèzes, J., Pichon, S., & De Gelder, B. (2007). Perceiving fear in dynamic body expressions
136	Neuroimage, 35(2), 959–967.
137	Gruber, T. (2020). A cognitive approach to cumulative technological culture is useful and
138	necessary but only if it also applies to other species. The Behavioral and Brain
139	Sciences, 43, e165. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X2000014X
140	Gruber, T., Luncz, L., Mörchen, J., Schuppli, C., Kendal, R. L., & Hockings, K. (2019).
141	Cultural change in animals: A flexible behavioural adaptation to human disturbance.
142	Palgrave Communications, 5(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0271-4
143	Gruber, T., & Sievers, C. (2019). Affective social learning and the emotional side of cultural
144	learning in primates. In Foundations of affective social learning: Conceptualising the
145	transmission of social value (pp. 41-66). Cambridge University Press.
146	Gruber, T., Zuberbühler, K., Clément, F., & Van Schaik, C. (2015). Apes have culture but

may not know that they do. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 91.

150.

148	Gruber, T., Zuberbühler, K., & Neumann, C. (2016). Travel fosters tool use in wild
149	chimpanzees. ELife, 5, e16371.
150	Kashima, Y., Coman, A., Pauketat, J. V., & Yzerbyt, V. (2020). Emotion in cultural
151	dynamics. Emotion Review, 12(2), 48-64.
152	LeDoux, J. E. (1989). Cognitive-emotional interactions in the brain. Cognition & Emotion,
153	3(4), 267–289.
154	Olsson, A., Knapska, E., & Lindström, B. (2020). The neural and computational systems of
155	social learning. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 1–16.
156	Powell, A., Shennan, S., & Thomas, M. G. (2009). Late Pleistocene demography and the
157	appearance of modern human behavior. Science, 324(5932), 1298–1301.
158	Rimé, B. (2019). Emotions at the Service of Cultural Construction: <i>Emotion Review</i> .
159	https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073919876036
160	Sander, D. (2013). Models of Emotion. In J. Armony & P. Vuilleumier (Eds.), The
161	Cambridge Handbook of Human Affective Neuroscience (pp. 5-54). Cambridge
162	University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511843716.003
163	Sauter, D. A., Eisner, F., Ekman, P., & Scott, S. K. (2010). Cross-cultural recognition of basic
164	emotions through nonverbal emotional vocalizations. Proceedings of the National
165	Academy of Sciences, 107(6), 2408–2412. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0908239106
166	Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (2001). Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory,
167	Methods, Research. Oxford University Press.
168	Sievers, C., & Gruber, T. (2020). Can nonhuman primate signals be arbitrarily meaningful
169	like human words? An affective approach. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 7(2), 140-

171	Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1987). Précis of relevance: Communication and cognition.
172	Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 10(4), 697–710.
173	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00055345
174	Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2008). The evolutionary psychology of the emotions and their
175	relationship to internal regulatory variables. In Handbook of emotions, 3rd ed (pp.
176	114–137). The Guilford Press.
177	Whiten, A. (2019). Cultural Evolution in Animals. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and
178	Systematics, 50(1), 27–48. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-ecolsys-110218-025040
179	Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., Tutin, C.
180	E., Wrangham, R. W., & Boesch, C. (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature,
181	399(6737), 682–685.
182	399(6737), 682–685.