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# Switched-based Control Testbed to Assure Cyber-physical Resilience by Design

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**Keywords:** Cyber-Physical Systems, Resilience, Testbeds, Cyber-physical Adversaries.

**Abstract:** Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate control systems engineering, computer science, and networking to control a physical process. The main challenge after detecting malicious actions in a CPS is to choose the correct reaction that the system has to carry out. In this paper, we propose a deployment platform for cyber-physical configurations evaluation to satisfy cyber-physical resilience properties. Experimental testbeds are crucial to analyze new proposals. For this reason, we discuss some actions for the development of a replicable and affordable cyber-physical testbed for training and research. The architecture is based on real-world components. This solution combines diverse parameters that come from cyber and physical layers.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate physical infrastructures, computing, and networking resources to create more efficient control systems. These systems rely upon internally gathered information to perform correct, change or even stop actions. Traditional networking and computing security approaches cover cyber threats, but fail at addressing cyber-physical threats. Also, CPS normally provide critical functionalities. Hence, evaluation methods have to ensure safety and test the system automation properly to provide correct behavior even under an attack when the inputs are maliciously modified. For this reason, solutions that combine control-theoretic with network and computing security techniques can lead to powerful solutions to cover both physical and cyber-physical attacks at the same time.

In this paper we present an innovative and original approach, which has been implemented in a resilient platform based on a programmable CPS. In this environment, network and physical controllers get connected toward coordinating resilience strategies, for example, to maintain the resilient properties of the system under failure and attacks. As a main contribution, we provide an architecture combining control-theoretic solutions with programmable networking techniques to jointly handle crucial threats

to CPS. Also, the CPS and network controller work together to protect the system. The proposed deployment platform helps to evaluate cyber-physical resilience properties. To illustrate the application of our approach, we propose a testbed based on a quadruple-tank process (Johansson, 2000).


The remaining sections are structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work. Section 3 provides our resilience approach. Section 4 presents the blueprints of a testbed associated with our approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.


## 2 RELATED WORK


The research community use experimental testbeds as validation methods for new approaches. Testbeds have the advantage of incorporating physical devices such as sensors and actuators creating more realistic scenarios. However, they are more expensive and normally the implemented system is simpler than in simulation scenarios. In the sequel, we present the main testbed that have been used in the literature.


Firstly, the quadruple-tank process (Johansson, 2000) is a multivariable laboratory process consisting of four interconnected water tanks that move the water from one tank to another using pumps and level sensors.

Another commonly used testbed is the [Landshark robot](#)<sup>1</sup>, which is a fully electric unmanned ground ve-

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.blackirobotics.com/landshark-ugv/>

hicle. It has an onboard computer with a Linux system running. The computer performs all tasks such as PID control, LIDAR, GPS, IMU, and encoders. Also based on unmanned vehicles, authors in (Rubio-Hernan et al., 2016) propose a testbed based on Lego Mindstorms EV3 bricks and Raspberry Pi boards as PLCs to control some representative sensors (e.g., ultrasonic distance measurers) and actuators (e.g., speed accelerators) using SCADA protocols such as Modbus and DNP3 for the component communications.

For power grids systems, (Sanders, 2012) proposes a cyber-physical testbed based on commercial tools that combine emulation, simulation, and real hardware to experiment with smart grid technologies. Finally, the authors in (Koutsandria et al., 2015) implement a real-time testbed for CPS security on power grids, where the data are cross-checked using cyber and physical elements.

### 3 SWITCHED-BASED RESILIENCE CONTROL

#### 3.1 Architecture Design

Most industry control systems are Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems (Liu et al., 2019), i.e., the process consists of several measurement and control signals. There are often dependencies, called *couplings*, between these variables (Garrido et al., 2011). When designing the controllers for MIMO systems, it is necessary to handle the given problem into manageable subproblems. As a result, the overall plant is no longer controlled by a single MIMO controller but by several independent controllers which altogether represent a distributed controller (Bakule, 2008). A distributed control consists of a set of independent controllers, typically Single-Input-Single-Output (SISO) control loops, i.e., controllers that receive one input and return one control signal as output.

Centralized controllers have better performance.




Figure 1: Distributed feedback controller topology.

However, distributed SISO control is often preferred because it has several advantages such as they are easier to implement, the tuning is simplified and they are more robust to model errors.

The design of such a control system introduces the *pairing problem* which is concerned with defining the system structure, i.e., which of the available plant inputs will be used to control each of the plant outputs (Campo and Morari, 1994). For a fully non-interacting plant, the choice is obvious. However, in any practical problem, there are interactions in the plant. This means that even if the control system is distributed, subsystems of the closed-loop design are not independent of each other.

For an  $n \times n$  plant, there are  $n$  factorial ( $n!$ ) possible SISO pairings to choose and each controller has only available a part of the overall a priori and a posteriori information. Most of the decoupling control synthesis strategies firstly compute a decoupling pre-compensator (called *Decoupler*) to turn the resultant system into a more nearly diagonal transfer matrix as showed in Figure 1. These aforementioned system properties allow having many possible implementations for the same system. We use it to implement an approach to improve system resilience.

#### 3.2 Switched-control Systems

To improve the system resilience, we model our physical process as a switched linear system. Switching control techniques are based on changing between different controllers in an adaptive context while achieving stability. Switched systems with all the subsystems described by linear differential equations are called switched linear systems.

Many systems encountered in practice exhibit switching between several subsystems that are dependent on various environmental factors. For example, in a car, the first, second, and third gears experiment different dynamics that can be modeled using different controller models. In particular, switched systems have gained major attention in the control theory community in the last years since there exist unstable processes that are not possible to control with just one model, but it is possible to design switched controllers for stabilizing it with piece-wise signals (Decarlo et al., 2000)

#### 3.3 System Model

Our approach aims at protecting the system from network adversaries working at the network layers modifying the endpoint information and at the node level by modifying the controller model. To achieve that,

the system design uses a distributed architecture of controllers and calculates the system feedback using a model based on Switched Linear Control. This way, the model is represented as a Linear Time-Variant (LTV) system. A switched system consists of a finite number of subsystems and a logical rule that orchestrates the switching between the subsystems. It may be modeled as follows:

$$x_{k+1} = f_{\sigma(k)}(x_k, u_k) \quad (1)$$

where  $k \in \mathbb{Z}^+$  is the time interval,  $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$  is the state,  $u \in \mathbb{R}^p$  is the control input and  $\sigma$  is the logical rule that orchestrates the switching between the subsystems. It means that  $\sigma$  is a function  $\sigma : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow I$ , where  $I = \{1, \dots, N\}$  contains the indexes of the subsystems. A subsystem is determined by a pair  $(\mathcal{M}_i, \mathcal{G}_i)$  where  $\mathcal{M}_i = \{A_i, B_i, C_i : i \in I\}$  is the set of physical system models and  $\mathcal{G}_i = \{V_i, E_i : i \in I\}$  is the set of graphs that represent the network connections in the CPS. Hence,  $\sigma$  defines a piece-wise switching signal that is a time-varying definition of the process model and the network graph that is activated at time  $k$ . The physical model activated at time  $k$  is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} x_{k+1} &= A_{\sigma(k)}x_k + B_{\sigma(k)}u_k \\ y_k &= C_{\sigma(k)}x_k \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $x_k$  and  $u_k$  are equal to the previous equation and  $w_k \in \mathbb{R}^n$  is the process noise that is assumed to be a zero-mean Gaussian white noise with covariance  $Q$ , i.e.  $w_k \sim N(0, Q)$ . Moreover,  $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$  and  $B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times p}$  are respectively the *state* matrix and the *input* matrix. The value of the output vector  $y_k \in \mathbb{R}^m$  represents the measurements produced by the sensors that are affected by a noise  $v_k$  assumed as a zero-mean Gaussian white noise with covariance  $R$ , i.e.  $v_k \sim N(0, R)$  and  $C \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  is the output matrix that maps the state  $x_k$  to the system output.

The overall process is controlled by several independent controllers and altogether represent a distributed controller. The feedback controller topology for a 2x2 system (i.e., with two inputs and two outputs) is showed in Figure 1. The controllers take one input and send one output. Each of them will be executed in one node. All the executed system models are equivalent and they are obtained applying factorization matrices techniques similar to the ones used by the different approaches for distributed control design (Liu et al., 2019).

The dynamics of the physical process are expressed by a transfer function  $G$  that we obtained from (Johansson, 2000). The controller topology is based on the matrices  $Q$  and  $D$  which correspond respectively to the diagonal transfer function and the decoupler (Segovia-Ferreira et al., 2020). This way, the

process dynamics are expressed using a set of independent processes as shown next:

$$G(s) \cdot D(s) = Q(s) \quad (3)$$

To create the set of distributed model designs, i.e., the set of matrices  $D(s)$  and  $Q(s)$ , the first step is to calculate  $adjG(s)$  the adjugate matrix of  $G$  which is the transposition of the co-factor matrix of  $G$ . Then, we build matrix  $D(s)$  as follows. For each column  $\hat{j} = \{1, \dots, N\}$ , we select a row  $\hat{i}$  to set that element  $d_{\hat{i}\hat{j}}$  in the matrix  $D(s)$  to unity. It is necessary to choose one for each column but not necessarily the diagonal ones.

After choosing the elements  $(\hat{i}, \hat{j})$  to be set to one, the matrix  $D(s)$  can be completed as follows:

$$d_{i\hat{j}} = \frac{adjG_{i\hat{j}}}{adjG_{\hat{i}\hat{j}}}$$

where  $i$  varies from  $1, \dots, N$  with  $i \neq \hat{i}$  and  $adjG_{i\hat{j}}$  is the  $(i, \hat{j})$  element of  $adjG(s)$  the adjugate matrix of  $G$ . This means that for each column in the matrix,  $\hat{j}$  is fixed and it corresponds to the column where the value was set to one previously. Hence, each element  $d_{i\hat{j}}$  is obtained from dividing the element  $(i, \hat{j})$  in the  $adjG(s)$  matrix between the value in the position  $(\hat{i}, \hat{j})$  of the matrix  $adjG(s)$ .

We have to repeat this process for each column by fixing a new  $\hat{j}$  to obtain the complete matrix  $D(s)$  corresponding to one single model. After we obtained the complete matrix  $D(s)$ , we repeat the whole process by selecting a different row  $\hat{i}$  to obtain another model different from the previous one.

Finally,  $Q(s)$  is a diagonal matrix built using Equation (3) and multiplying  $G(s) \cdot D(s)$ . Each matrix  $D(s)$  gives, as a result, a different matrix  $Q(s)$ . In addition, each entry of matrices  $D(s)$  and  $Q(s)$  correspond to the transfer function of one controller.

### 3.4 Resilience Orchestrator

To coordinate the resilience, there is an orchestrator, physically located within the SDN Controller. The responsibilities of the orchestrator are detailed next.

#### Model Selection and Transformation Time —

There are  $I = \{1, \dots, N\}$  possible subsystems to activate and the orchestrator chooses randomly a key  $K_1$  which will be used to select the next model to activate using a hash function as follows  $hash(K_1, j) \bmod N$  where  $j$  is the switching interval. The common sharing of  $K_1$ ,  $j$  and  $N$  allows each device to compute the next active model in a distributed manner. The key is renewed periodically using one of the existing approaches for key generation and distribution such as (Kumari and Anjali, 2018).

In addition, the orchestrator has to choose and coordinate the switching in a master-slave mode. For that, it requires a distributed timing synchronization, such as (Sivrikaya and Yener, 2004) to ensure the maintenance of a common time for all the nodes of the network.

**Coordinating the Network Configuration Transformation** — Each component will change its network configuration in each switching period of the physical model. To do this, each device gets a real IP address (RIPA) and a virtual IP address (VIPA). The RIPA is used for management purposes making the network configuration transformation transparent to administrators. The VIPA is used to communicate the data packets of the CPS, i.e., the hosts communicate with another host using their VIPAs. In addition, VIPAs change periodically and synchronously in a distributed fashion over time. In every transformation interval, the hosts will be associated with a unique VIPA.

The VIPA transformation is managed by the SDN devices by selecting an address from the unused address space. Each host will be allocated an IP address ranges to choose the VIPAs and they are selected using a hash function from the designated ranges. Since the VIPAs are chosen from the assigned network subnets, there is no need to do a routing update advertisement for internal routers. In addition, SDN devices will forward packets from old connections until the session is terminated or expired.

Each SDN device is responsible for the management of the hosts in one or more subnets. The VIPAs selection is done in a similar way to the physical model selection. It uses a hash function and a secret random key to guarantee unpredictability. If there are  $p$  available VIPAs for a host, then the SDN device can compute the index of the VIPA for the switching interval  $j$  as  $\text{hash}(K_2, j) \bmod p$ . The SDN controller is responsible for the management of the SDN devices and the key  $K_2$  distribution.

## 4 EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM

### 4.1 Testbed Architecture

A typical CPS architecture is composed of a multitude of physically and functionally heterogeneous components that work in a distributed networked-based manner. The controllers coordinate the action of the system in a distributed manner by receiving information and sending commands.

We model the different parts of a CPS using the




Figure 2: Proposed Testbed Architecture.

structure shown in Figure 2. The resilience hybrid system approach is composed of two main blocks: a *Data Domain* block, and a *Management and Control* block. The *Data Domain* block contains the *Physical System* that we want to control using *Sensors* and *Actuators*. Its components communicate through a *Network*. The *Management and Control* includes the *Java Feedback Controllers* and the *SDN Network Controllers*.

CPS may be disrupted by *Cyber-Physical Adversaries* that cause tangible damage to physical components, e.g., by adding disturbances to a physical process via the exploitation of vulnerabilities in some computing and networking resources of the system. This adversary gains position into the system from a remote location and then, learns about the physical model to generate an attack with a *Physical Impact* but without being physically placed in the CPS physical location. A taxonomy of cyber-physical adversaries is provided in (Teixeira et al., 2015).

Feedback controllers located within the cyber layer of the system monitor and supervise information produced by physical sensors reporting measurements from physical processes. Based on the sensor measurements (*Probes*), controllers dynamically compute corrective actions (*Effectors*) which are put in place by system actuators, to steer the physical processes to the desired states. Programmable networks can be represented using similar elements. The network controller manages the behavior of all the interactions at the data domain. For that, it collects data from the network devices to monitor permanently the system state. The monitoring at the data domain is effectu-

ated by several network probes that report networking measurements to the controller. Then, it effectuates corrective actions over the network policies.

In this architecture, the feedback and network controllers work together and integrate a *Resilience Framework*. Its goal is to have a full vision of the system and send a coordinated answer to the system components in order to recover from the attacks. The network controller is in charge of the proper functioning of the network. Its function is to guarantee an optimal operation and to be able to react to any anomaly, both due to errors, transmission problems, and malicious interventions. The feedback controller takes charge of the proper functioning of the physical system process. Its function is to guarantee a quality of control of the system. For this reason, this controller as well as the network controller have to be robust to send the correct answer to the data domain and keep the global system working correctly. These controllers are linked by the component named *Controllers Gateway*. This communication allows having a full vision of the system and interchange of information between the two previous controllers. This interchange favors a coordinated response to any unusual event.

## 4.2 Testbed Implementation

To validate the feasibility of our proposal, we are currently implementing a proof-of-concept prototype based on the architecture proposed in this paper. The code and results of our simulations are available online, in a companion github repository available at <https://j.mp/QuTanksTestbed>. The Matlab simulations provide a dataset that we will compare with the testbed and show in a follow up. We are working to add the SDN network in the testbed. This way, real network noises are considered.

The testbed works as follows. All the elements can be distributed across several nodes in a shared network using the IEC-60870-5-104 protocol. The feedback controllers (running on a Personal Computer) communicate with three Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) running on three Raspberry Pi boards to control some representative sensors (e.g., ultrasonic distance sensors) and actuators (e.g., water pumps). The sensor and actuators are connected to the RTU through printed circuits boards to create a more scalable system and create the architecture showed in Figure 1. One single RTU controls various sensors and actuators. In addition, the controllers send the data to a Human Machine Interface (HMI) running the graphical interface to show the behavior of the system to the operator.

The physical system that we integrated into the

testbed is the quadruple-water tank from (Johansson, 2000). The scenario is a simple representation of the architecture proposed in this paper. The controller is always correcting the water level in the tanks and polling the level of water in the tank, i.e., the sensor measures the distance between the water surface and the upper part of the tank. To start the testbed is necessary to launch a Java program on the controller and the intermediary Java software in the Raspberry Pi boards. The components are connected using an SDN switch Dell S3048 and the Floodlight SDN controller. To test the resilience approach, we implemented a cyber-physical adversary who intercepts the traffic using a Man in the Middle and captures traffic to learn the model parameters described in Equation 2. Then, the adversary uses the model to inject malicious traffic into the network and avoid the detection mechanism, using evasion techniques as those explained in (Barbeau et al., 2021).

The objective of the adversary is to cause a malfunction in the system by performing actions that affect the control system. The adversary is situated in a remote location but gained access to the internal network exploiting some cyber vulnerabilities and uses the network traffic to perform the attack as an insider. The cyber-physical adversary can be modeled mathematically as follows

$$x'_{k+1} = A_{\sigma(k)}x_k + B'_{\sigma(k)}sat(u'_k) \quad (4)$$

$$y'_k = C'_{\sigma(k)}x_k \quad (5)$$

where  $B'_{\sigma(k)}sat(u'_k)$  represents an attack to the control input. The matrix  $B'_{\sigma(k)}$  is estimated by the attacker for the system model matrix  $B_{\sigma(k)}$  and  $u'_k$  is a malicious command.  $C'_{\sigma(k)}$  represents an attacker that is able to create a malicious sensor outputs  $y'_k$ . This means that the attacker will try to send a sensor output according to the system state  $x_k$  that the controller is expecting. This attack is designed intentionally to mislead the system or destabilize it without being detected. In opposite to faults that have a random nature and are much easier to be detected and mitigated. The closer the matrices  $B'_{\sigma(k)}$  and  $C'_{\sigma(k)}$  are to the real matrices  $B_{\sigma(k)}$  and  $C_{\sigma(k)}$ , the more dangerous is the adversary. These malicious actions may be done by compromising sensors, actuators, controllers or network links.

## 4.3 Discussion

The aforementioned prototype promotes cooperation between controllers located at both management and



control domains of a CPS. The testbed aims at developing a mechanism that continually and unpredictably changes the parameters of the system. The goal is to increase the cost of attacking the system, as well as to limit the exposure of vulnerable components and deceive the opponent, i.e., it changes the attack surface to protect the system. The attack surface of a system can be seen as the subset of resources that an adversary can use to attack the system.

To be successful, in each reconfiguration period, the adversary has to (1) build the network topology, (2) collect network traffic and (3) use this data to learn the model, for example, using machine learning. The time required for (1) can be depreciated. However, Tasks (2) and (3) involve tasks that require in the order of several minutes to be performed. The time required for a model switching can be in the order of the seconds to leave enough time to converge the network devices in charge of the packets forwarding. Hence, this can make the task of the adversary hard to achieve.

## 5 CONCLUSION

CPS and programmable networks are two complementary paradigms that are often addressed separately by control and computing-network communities. Both paradigms use similar elements to control the system and execute corrective actions. In addition, testbeds are essential to develop and experiment new security approaches. These approaches help to ensure stability and correct the behavior of the system. This is specially important when the system is under an attack and the inputs are maliciously modified. Addressing the security testing in CPS, this paper provides a practical description of an ongoing platform to test resilience approaches considering theoretical cyber-physical defense techniques. The architecture of the testbed is based on real-world components to emulate CPS and integrates a programmable network. One SCADA protocol implementation is included within our platform. We used the quadruple-water tank scenario as the physical process. Also, we implemented a resilience approach to test the platform. The next steps include a more thorough evaluation of the system performance, the stability, and the improvement of the resilience produced by the implemented approach.

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