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“Immigration and Support for Redistribution:
Lessons from Europe”

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Immigration and Support for Redistribution: Lessons from Europe^{*}

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Abstract

Research shows that opposition to policies that redistribute across racial divides has affected the development of the American welfare state. Are similar dynamics at play in Western Europe? For many scholars, the answer is yes. In contrast, we argue that researchers' understanding of the political economy of redistribution in diversifying European countries is too incomplete to reach a conclusion on this issue. First, existing evidence is inconsistent with the assumption —ubiquitous in this line of research— of a universal distaste for sharing resources with people who are culturally, ethnically and racially different. Second, important historical and institutional differences between the U.S. and Europe preclude any straightforward transposition of the American experience to the European case. We discuss what we see as the most promising lines of inquiry going forward.

Keywords: Immigration, parochial altruism, redistribution, welfare state, Europe, United State

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In the United States, social and political divisions along racial, ethnic, and religious lines have profound implications for redistributive politics (Katznelson, 2005; Michener, 2020). In an influential study, Alesina and Glaeser (2006) argue that these divisions explain the country's position as a welfare laggard among advanced capitalist countries. They hypothesize that people support income redistribution not only out of material self-interest but also out of altruistic concerns for the well-being of those who cannot provide for themselves. A key assumption is that these altruistic concerns are parochial, i.e., they only extend to in-group members. Because altruism is parochial, racial, and ethnic diversity threatens social solidarity, especially when ethnic and racial differences overlap with income and class. David Goodhart, a British commentator, summarizes this argument (the *parochial altruism* thesis for short) as follow: “(t)his is America versus Sweden. You can have a Swedish welfare state provided that you are a homogeneous society with intensely shared values. In the U.S., you have a very diverse, individualistic society where people feel fewer obligations to fellow citizens.”¹

Extrapolating to Europe, scholars worry about the consequences of five decades of low-skill non-white and non-Christian immigration into the old continent (Kitschelt, 1997). Since immigrants are over-represented among the poor and the unemployed, any policy that redistributes to this group will be increasingly perceived as benefiting outsiders. Anti-immigrant sentiment risks being instrumentally activated by political leaders wishing to rollback the welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser, 2006, 166). These concerns have percolated into public debate: in the words of David Willets, former Member of the British parliament, if “values become more diverse” and “lifestyles more differentiated,” then voters become less likely to support a welfare state that they perceive is no longer benefiting people like themselves (the *americanization* thesis for short).²

For anyone studying European politics, the parochial altruism and americanization theses are intuitively appealing. First, in Europe, the main conditions for the prophesied americanization of the European welfare state are met: a secular growth in non-Christian, non-white minority populations, which are over-represented among low-income households and have full access to the welfare state. Second, considered jointly, the parochial altruism and americanization theses provide a plausible

¹ David Goodhart, “Too Diverse” in *Prospect*, February 20th, 2004. Last retrieved on May 11th, 2022, at <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/too-diverse-david-goodhart-multiculturalism-britain-immigration-globalisation>.

² Cited by David Goodhart, see fn. 1.

explanation for the rise of welfare-chauvinist far-right parties in Europe (Schumacher and Van Kersbergen, 2016). Yet, as we argue in this review essay, researchers still lack a good understanding of the “many intriguing ways ... two central policy fields,” immigration and social policy, “interact with each other” (Crepaz, 2022, 1).

We identify two areas for improvement. One concerns the micro foundations of the parochial altruism thesis. There is a body of work documenting a negative relationship between the size of the immigrant population and support for redistributive social policies.³ However, as we discuss in Section 2, this evidence does not align with the parochial altruism thesis as usually conceived in the literature. Specifically, we show that altruism, while conditional, is not necessarily narrowly parochial. We propose what we see as a promising line of inquiry, namely an emphasis on evaluations of the status quo as conforming or deviating from culturally-specific instantiations of the reciprocity principle.

Another area for improvement, discussed in Section 3, specifically applies to the americanization thesis and concerns the importance of historical sequencing and institutional feedback. We emphasize a key difference between the U.S. and Europe: the visible presence of low-income minority groups preceded the formation of the American welfare state while in Europe, the formation of a generous and inclusive welfare state (with dark roots in the horrors of WWII) preceded immigration-induced racial and ethnic change. This insight sheds a new light on the robust yet rarely discussed finding that low-skill immigration has the largest effect on the preferences of high-income individuals (Rueda, 2018; Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Naumann and Stoetzer, 2018; Runst, 2018). More generally, the americanization thesis overlooks important ways in which immigration and social policy interact to shape Western politics. Among the overlooked implications is the fact that population movement in Europe do not favor anti-redistribution candidates, as commonly expected, but political candidates who combine closed borders with *more*, not less, redistribution.

³ Studies that use observational data tend to find a negative relationship between the size of the immigrant population and social policy preferences (e.g. Alesina, Murard and Rapoport, 2021) though results vary widely depending on the geographic unit of analysis and the type of policy preferences examined. Once the influence of confounding factors is — at least partially — accounted for, results better align with expectations (Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist, 2012; Elsner and Concannon, 2020). For an overview of this literature see Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013); Freeman and Mirilovic (2016); Crepaz (2022); Elsner and Concannon (2020)).

1. Immigration and Support for Redistribution in Europe

For parochial altruism to lead to the americanization of the European Welfare state, several conditions have to be met: 1) a growing “minority” population (i.e. a population perceived as non-Christian and non-white) with 2) full access to the welfare state, 3) over-represented among the bottom half of the income distribution and 4) perceived by most members of the majority as having at best a neutral, at worst a negative effect on the welfare state’s finances. As we show in Appendix A, many countries in Western Europe meet these conditions. Given that “generosity ... travels less well across racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality groups than it does within such groups” (Alesina and Stantcheva, 2020, 4), this implies the erosion of mass support for redistributive policies. If erosion there is, should we expect it to affect all types of policy preferences? A brief discussion of the concept of “redistributive policies” is here warranted.

Some Policy Preferences Will Be More Affected Than Others

Governments can affect the distribution of disposable income in a given society through at least three channels: 1) pre-distribution policies, which affect how market income is generated and distributed, 2) taxation policies, which affect how much market income people get to keep, and 3) policies designed to redistribute to the worse off. Examples of this third channel include increasing the generosity of means-tested benefits, tweaking the relative mix of earnings-dependent and non earnings-dependent benefits or changing eligibility criteria in ways that are favorable to low-income recipients.

This heterogeneity has implications for researchers examining the parochial altruism and americanization theses. Indeed, not all aspects of redistribution will be affected by parochial concerns and researchers need to adapt their empirical strategy accordingly. For example, one can plausibly assume that other-regarding altruistic concerns —such as parochial altruism— weight more heavily in the case of policies that redistribute to the worse off. In contrast, pre-distribution and taxation policies are less likely to prime such concerns. Relatedly, questions that prime respondents to think about their own self-interested position as beneficiaries of a social program are better avoided. This includes survey items that ask about social spending on pensions and healthcare. Researchers might focus instead on items that ask about support for tying pension levels

to past social contributions or limiting refugees' access to healthcare. This point is worth emphasizing: previous studies on the impact of immigration on attitudes toward redistribution tend to pick survey items indiscriminately. Without clear expectations regarding which types of policy preferences are more likely to be affected, findings are often difficult to interpret.⁴

[Insert Figure 1 about here]

The importance of carefully conceptualizing (and correctly measuring) the types of attitudes affected by anti-immigrant sentiment is illustrated in Figure 1. We use survey data from the European Social Survey to plot the correlation between anti-immigrant sentiments (a binned index) and two policy items. The item on the right measures agreement/disagreement with the claim that “the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” (support for redistribution as traditionally measured in existing research) while the item on the left measures agreement/disagreement with the claim that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed.

As Figure 1 shows, individuals with more negative attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are also more likely to disagree that it is the government’s job to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed. Notice, in contrast, the absence of a correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and support for income redistribution.⁵ In line with the parochial altruism thesis, this pattern suggests (with some exceptions, see Sweden in Fig. 1), a connection between hostility to immigrants and a *subset* of social policy preferences, namely preferences toward policies that explicitly redistribute to the worse off.

The Parochial Altruism Thesis: Existing Evidence

What evidence do we have for the parochial altruism thesis? Decades of experimental research show that, when allocating resources, many people tend to favor members of their own group over non-members (Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982; Hogg and Abrams, 1993;

⁴ See Elsner and Concannon (2020) for a similar point.

⁵ For a discussion of the lack of correlation between support of income redistribution and attitudes toward benefits targeted to the poor and the unemployed see Cavaille and Trump (2015).

Massey, 2007; Brewer and Caporael, 2006). In the American context, Alesina and Glaeser (2006) document a state-level correlation between the size of the black population and the generosity of welfare benefits. Relatedly, Luttmer (2001) finds a correlation between white respondents' support for cuts to welfare benefits and the size of the black population receiving welfare benefits in a respondent's area (which may be a state, metropolitan area, or census tract). Tabellini (2020), exploiting exogenous variations in European immigration to U.S. cities induced by World War I and the Immigration Acts of the 1920s, shows that immigration triggered hostile political reactions and most importantly, reduction in public spending and local tax revenue (see also Derenoncourt (2021)). According to Hopkins (2009), this relationship is conditional on demographic change being large and concentrated in time.

Transposed to the European context, tests of the parochial altruism thesis have mostly focused on the relationship between the size of the foreign-born population in a given area (country, region, municipality) and social policy preferences as captured in survey data.⁶ There is some evidence that a *change* in the size of the *local* foreign population (region or municipality) increases support for social spending cuts (e.g. Eger (2009)). The best causal evidence comes from Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist (2012) who exploit the exogenous variation in local immigrant shares stemming from a nationwide program placing refugees in municipalities throughout Sweden from 1985 to 1994. They find that, on average, respondents living in areas that received more refugees express comparatively higher support for cuts to social spending than people in areas that did not receive refugees.⁷

In all these studies, the immigrant population is low-skill. Based on the parochial altruism thesis, high-skill immigration should not have the same implications. Indeed, high-skill immigrants are more likely to be perceived as net contributors to redistributive social policies, implying that parochial altruistic concerns are less likely to be activated. Evidence reviewed by Murard (2022) aligns with this expectation.

⁶ Effects magnitude varies significantly across income and ideological groups, as well as across political and institutional contexts (see Elsner and Concannon (2020) and Crepaz (2022), chapters 2 and 6, for a detailed review of the evidence). We will come back to this heterogeneity in Section 3.

⁷ See Nekby and Pettersson-Lidbom (2017) for a counterpoint.

As this brief review shows, a number of studies document a link between immigration and attitudes toward programs that visibly redistribute to low-income individuals. In line with the americanization thesis, we should consequently expect Western European countries with a large immigrant population to have experienced a decline in mass support for these policies. In the next section, we examine this expectation using longitudinal survey data.

The Americanization Thesis: Existing Evidence

While many surveys ask about government-sponsored income redistribution in general terms, few ask about attitudes toward policies that redistribute to low-income groups in particular. Two notable exceptions are longitudinal surveys found in Great Britain and France. We discuss this evidence, focusing first on items that ask about means-tested benefits and second on items that ask about access to social benefits based on needs instead of past contributions.

Attitudes Toward Means-Tested Benefits

Since the late 1980s, the British Social Attitudes Survey has asked at regular intervals whether respondents support increasing or cutting means-tested benefits. As we describe in Appendix B, the general pattern in Great Britain is one of growing support for cuts to means-tested benefits from a low of 15% in favor in 1989 to 44% in favor in 2009. Since the Great Recession, this decline has stalled and even reversed for Labour voters.⁸ Still, attitudes toward welfare are more hostile today than in the 1980s.

Could anti-immigrant sentiment, which culminated in the Brexit vote, explain the trends found in Great Britain? Potentially. First, as we document in Appendix B, alongside growing support for welfare cuts, there is also a growing share of the population expressing concerns over free riding among beneficiaries of means-tested benefits. Second, these concerns are themselves correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Jointly, the data suggests, in line with the parochial altruism thesis, a tight connection between anti-immigrant sentiment and support for cuts to means-tested benefits, itself mediated by lower empathy for recipients increasingly perceived as less “deserving” of means-tested

⁸ According to O’Grady (2021), this latter reversal is partly a reaction to benefit cuts that took place during the height of the Great recession under Conservative control of Parliament.

programs. In Appendix C, we also describe evidence of a similar decline in support for more generous means-tested transfers in France.

Note that in Great Britain, during the period of declining support for means-tested benefits, agreement with the claim that “income and wealth should be redistributed toward ordinary people” remained roughly stable, oscillating between 45 and 55% of the population (British Election Study, 1974-2010).⁹ Relatedly, a stable 70% of the population expressed support for the claim that “it should be the government’s responsibility to redistribute income” (ISSP Research Group (2008, 2018)). Again, when studying changes in mass attitudes and its connection to racial and ethnic diversity, what is being measured and how it is being measured matter.

Attitudes Toward Unconditional Access

What about support for making social benefits unconditionally accessible to all legal residents? Here again, evidence points to the expected decline in support for redistributing resources to the worse off. As we show in Appendix C, support for making benefit access conditional on past contributions has increased over time in France.

In this section, we have discussed correlational and longitudinal patterns that suggest that hostility toward immigrants and the belief that they overwhelmingly benefit from redistributive social policies combine to undermine redistribution to low-income individuals. First, how helpful is the concept of parochial altruism for understanding these correlations and trends (Section 2)? Second, to what extent is the evidence of a convergence between Western Europe and the United States in line with the americanization thesis (Section 3)?

⁹ See Cavaille (2022) for a detailed discussion of attitudinal trends in Great Britain, including measurement bias due to framing effects in the British Social Attitude Survey.

2. Beyond Parochial Altruism

In the previous section, we described findings that align with the parochial altruism thesis: a change in the size of the immigrant population negatively affects social spending and social policy preferences, especially if this population is low-skill. In a recent paper, Alesina and Stantcheva (2020) use a survey experiment to further study the link between immigration and social policy attitudes in five Western democracies, including the United States. From the perspective of the parochial altruism thesis, their results are somewhat mixed. On the one hand, priming respondents to think about immigration¹⁰ significantly reduces support for redistributive policies. On the other hand, evidence that this relationship is mediated by the belief that immigrants are “more represented among the beneficiaries of redistribution” is limited. Indeed, correcting people’s beliefs about the size of the immigrant population and its reliance on social benefits does not seem to affect support for redistributive social policies. They find that one of the most effective treatments in moving attitudes is one that presents an anecdote about a “hard working” immigrant. Based on these results, and against the parochial altruism thesis, the key factor does not appear to be whether or not immigrants are perceived as over-represented among benefit recipients. The “hard-working immigrant” experiment suggests researchers focus instead on perceptions of “deservingness,” i.e., beliefs about the extent to which immigrants “deserve” to benefit from social solidarity.¹¹ Perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness need not align with beliefs about their over-representation among benefit recipients.

A closer look at experimental studies used to motivate the assumption that altruism is parochial also suggests a more complicated picture. As previously mentioned, experimental studies reliably find that people condition their decisions on group membership. Refined experimental designs show that this pattern is not simply about unconditional in-group love and out-group hate. According to one line of work, in-group love and out-group hate is partly an artifact of competition for scarce resources, which activates latent group boundaries (Tajfel, 1982). This would suggest, at a minimum, adding perceived resource scarcity to amended versions of the parochial altruism thesis.

¹⁰ This is done by randomizing the order in which respondents answer a block of questions about immigration and a block of questions about redistributive social policies.

¹¹ The potential disconnect between perceptions of immigrants’ prevalence among net-beneficiaries of redistribution and perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness is best illustrated in Larsen’s comparison of Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden (Larsen and Deigaard, 2013). In Denmark and Sweden, Larsen shows, the stereotypical recipient is non-white but deserving, while in Great Britain, she is white and undeserving.

For example, Cavaillé (2022) finds that the Great Recession and resulting austerity measures better explain the decline in support for redistribution documented in France than the refugee crisis (see also Fetzner (2019)).

Other studies find that in-group bias is often mostly the result of shared group membership serving as a cue to infer the likelihood that someone will: 1) behave kindly, 2) reciprocate in kind. In other words, people use group boundaries to infer who is most likely to behave kindly (i.e. cooperatively), as well as respond to kind (unkind) behavior with kind (unkind) behavior. Once these expectations and interactions are taken into account, there is no direct evidence of in-group bias (see Rusch (2014) for a review).

In the process of moving out of the lab and into the complicated world of redistributive politics, these nuances are often lost. Most studies model parochial altruism as unconditional in-group love and out-group hate. Yet vignette experiments on the willingness to transfer resources to a low-income individual show that assuming unconditional out-group hate comes at a cost. These experiments find that, absent additional information about a recipient, information on this person's ethnic or religious background results in a penalty (i.e., fewer resources transferred). However, once information regarding time spent in the country or birthplace is provided, evidence of a strict ethnic penalty disappears: while people born abroad are penalized more, the penalty decreases with the amount of time spent in the country, irrespective of ethnic background. Ultimately, the most robust evidence of in-group bias takes the form of a double standard for "worse-case" profiles: benefit recipients who are born abroad, recently migrated and have failed to look for work, are "punished" more when they migrated from non-European countries than when they migrated from Western European countries (see Haderup Larsen and Schaeffer (2020) and Kootstra (2016) for recent examples).

These results suggest that group boundaries are porous: a few years living and working in a country is often enough for a non-white Muslim immigrant to be treated in a hypothetical experimental context as if a native with similar job history. Instead of parochial altruism, evidence points to a form of conditional altruism at least partially tied to work effort and prior payroll contributions, which are used to infer whether someone is at risk of becoming a "free rider" and a

weight on shared resources.¹² One interpretation of these results is that people evaluate whether immigrants can be reliable members of the “Nation” defined not only as a cultural construct, but also as a resource pooling endeavor. Table 1 provides additional evidence for this argument. In the 2016 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS, round 8), respondents were asked at what point people migrating from other countries “should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here.”

[Insert Table 1 about here]

First, notice how very few respondents think that immigrants should never get equal social rights (with a maximum of 15% in Austria). The stance that newcomers should immediately be granted full access to benefits and services is endorsed by an equally small minority (with the exception of Portugal and Sweden, with around 20% choosing to grant immediate access). Instead, in most countries, the modal position is to condition social rights on residence and payment of taxes for at least a year. In other words, with the exception of Finland, the Netherlands and Austria, topline results point to an implicit “good faith effort” criterion. Results from 2008 produce very similar results (Mewes and Mau, 2012), which suggests that the 2014 refugee crisis did not trigger a wave of welfare chauvinist sentiments across Europe, as one would have predicted assuming a simple version of the parochial altruism thesis.

The 2008 wave of the ESS (though not the 2016 wave) also includes an item asking whether people think immigrants receive more in benefits than they contribute in taxes. As we show in Appendix D, people who think immigrants receive more than they contribute are more likely, relative to people who think immigrants receive as much as they contribute, to want to exclude foreign-born individuals from accessing social benefits. Yet, even within this group, the modal (when not majority) answer is to make access conditional on having worked for a year. This is also true of people who think immigrants contribute more than they receive. In other words, as found in Alesina and Stantcheva (2020), people’s beliefs about immigrants’ reliance on redistributive social policies are only weakly informative of preferences over immigrants’ access.

¹² Other research has documented the importance of cues that signal “intent to assimilate,” such as language skills (see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a review).

We propose to interpret these results as a manifestation of reciprocity, i.e. the norm according to which cooperative and uncooperative (i.e. free riding) behavior should be met in kind. In this case, perceived “good faith effort” to not free ride promotes inclusion. What counts as good faith effort? Based on existing research, people are particularly sensitive to what is known about an individual’s choice-set (constrained or not), agency (is one’s behavior a conscious decision or not) and intentions (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Meier, 2006; Akbas, Ariely and Yuksel, 2014). Moral outrage and the drive to punish (here by denying access to social benefits) is especially likely against individuals who have the option to not free ride on the collective effort but explicitly choose to shirk (Oorschot, 2000). Moral outrage at “welfare shoppers” or “economic migrants” who try to “pass” as refugees is one manifestation of this general form of reasoning. For some people—but not others—immigrants’ access to social benefits is evidence of a violation of the norm of reciprocity. The conclusion people reach on this issue does not appear to be related in a straightforward fashion to people’s perceptions of immigrants’ reliance on social transfers.

Note that in the case of immigration, this violation can take two forms: immigrants unfairly receiving benefits they do not deserve and deserving natives unfairly receiving less benefits than immigrants. For example, in the 2014 wave of the ESS, respondents were asked if the government treats them better, the same, or worse than it treats immigrants. In Great Britain, the share of people who think immigrants are better treated than they themselves are is 44%, in France 34% and in Austria 34%. In Scandinavian countries, the share is much lower (see Appendix E). A next step for researchers is to explain why people come to very different fairness evaluations, and under what conditions a majority comes to experience immigrants’ access to social benefits as unfair. Based on the evidence discussed in this essay, the impact of immigration-induced diversity on such evaluation is still poorly understood.

Our claim here is not that racist or xenophobic motives do not matter. They very likely explain why a subset of people conclude that immigrants’ access to social benefits violates the norm of reciprocity. For these individuals, rhetoric of deservingness and fairness provides a fig leaf for less socially acceptable opinions. Instead, our emphasis has been on the limits of building explanatory models on this behavioral assumption alone. We also do not mean to imply that parochial altruism does not correctly describe the American situation. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that a large share of the population finds recipients undeserving of redistribution *because* of their perceived racial

background (e.g. Fong and Luttmer (2011)). One way to reconcile evidence across the Atlantic is to think of parochial altruism, i.e., whether people rely on ethnic and racial boundaries to make judgments of deservingness, as an equilibrium *outcome*, not a fundamental *behavioral trait* akin to material self-interest. If this is indeed the case, then theories that start by assuming parochial motives are more likely to struggle to account for individual and cross-national differences, as well as over time change.

Next Steps

Why do people come to different conclusions regarding the fairness of immigrants' access to the welfare state? An emphasis on violations of reciprocity suggests several avenues of research.

One avenue pertains to measurement and descriptive inference. First researchers need to better understand if perceptions of (un)fairness are consequential, i.e., the expression of the type of moral outrage that can affect policy preferences and voting behavior (Scott, 1977). Assuming they are, items purposefully designed to capture perceived deviations from what reciprocity prescribes can be used as diagnostic tools. For example, asking about the perceived prevalence of free riding among both immigrant beneficiaries and native beneficiaries could help understand if the issue is immigration per se or a larger malaise over the unravelling of the social contract underpinning large welfare states. Additionally, a systematic assessment of the extent to which race is used as a cue to infer “deservingness” could help identify countries that are moving closer to an American equilibrium and countries that are not.

Another avenue for research is to start from the reciprocity norm to identify overlooked contextual factors beyond immigration-induced diversity. For example, using an American sample, Skitka and Tetlock (1992) find that when resources are scarce, people establish a pecking order from most to least deserving of scarce funds. The criteria used echo what we know about the reciprocity norm: those who, by their behavior have “recklessly” put themselves in the position to need help are ranked last in this pecking order. Relatedly, in a survey experiment in Great Britain, Cavallé (2022) finds that, when people are reminded of the National Health Service's precarious financial situation, they are more likely to want to exclude not only immigrants, but also smokers and people who have

contributed little in taxes. While an emphasis on reciprocity can explain this result, an emphasis on anti-immigrant sentiment and parochial altruism cannot.

A third avenue explores the relationship between citizenship and the welfare state. In the previous section, we have argued that people form opinions that classify immigrants as more or less reliable members of the “Nation,” itself defined as a resource pooling endeavor. In the European context, there is indeed a tight connection between citizenship and the welfare state: citizenship gives unconditional access to the welfare state (more on this in Section 3) and the welfare state is what gives citizenship its economic and symbolic value. The latter point is worth emphasizing: as described by Castel (1995), in the post-war era, having social rights, i.e. access to social insurance, which was derived from stable employment, was central to individuals’ (usually white male breadwinners) self-worth. Put differently, in Western Europe, meaning and status derived from being a “productive” member of society has at least two distinct sources. One source is an individual’s market value made visible to all through one’s income. The other is an individual’s membership in a resource pooling endeavor of unprecedented scope. Relatively easy access to social benefits can threaten the status-boosting properties of this club good and generate hostility toward people who can “easily join.” From this perspective one might find immigrants’ unconditional access unfair on the one hand, yet support granting benefits to the hardworking type of immigrant on the other. Both increase the symbolic value of having social rights by making them hard to access unless one is “worthy.” Not all individuals need this status boost and identifying those who do could shed new light on who is most likely to experience immigrants’ access as an affront (see Shayo (2009) for a related example).

A final possible line of inquiry draws from work in social psychology and political theory. Anyone having taken an introductory course in political theory will be aware of the famous contrast between a Hobbesian and a Lockean approach to the social contract. Isaiah Berlin, for example, talks of “philosophers with an optimistic view of human nature,” among which he includes Locke and Smith, who believe “that there should be a large area for private life over which neither the State nor any other authority must be allowed to trespass.” He contrasts this group to Hobbes “and those who agreed with him” who, concerned with men’s ability to “destroy one another, and mak[e] social life [im]possible,” favor instituting “greater safeguards [...] to keep them in their places,” even if this means “increasing the area of centralized control and decreasing that of the individual” (Berlin,

1958, 7). While Hobbesian thinkers are concerned with protecting the group from individuals' selfish impulses (i.e., they emphasize negative reciprocity), Lockeans see a more pressing problem to address: carving a space for individual autonomy to minimize the claims made by the group on their own members (i.e. they emphasize positive reciprocity). While Lockeans advocate for a more inclusive definition of membership (e.g., Human rights), Hobbesians berate the latter as disconnected from true human nature and argue instead for a narrower definition of the group to which one is owed cooperation from and owes cooperation to.

Social psychologists have shown that these scholarly debates over order-promoting institutions and principles echo differences found in the general public. Findings from Moral Foundation Theory are here particularly helpful. Indeed, a close read of Jonathan Haidt's work on morality suggests that people systematically differ in terms of the "moral matrices" they rely on to navigate social dilemmas.¹³ Moral Foundation Theory scholars describe two ideal-typical mindsets that echo the Lockean versus Hobbesian distinction described above. One mindset, they argue, is built on the belief that "suppressing selfishness" requires "strengthening groups and institutions" and "binding individuals into roles and duties in order to constrain their imperfect natures." This binding approach rests on a pessimistic understanding of human nature and focuses on the "group as the locus of moral value" (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009, 1030). The other mindset seeks to favor prosocial behavior by "protecting individuals directly (often using the legal system) and by teaching individuals to respect the rights of other individuals" (Turiel, 1983; Shweder et al., 1997). Such a perspective is rooted in a more optimistic conception of human nature, according to which humans are inherently prosocial once protected from harm and injustice. In its ideal-typical form, the Hobbesian approach assumes low baseline trust, obsesses over the undeserving getting unfairly rewarded, and advocates for strong and narrow group boundaries. In its ideal-typical form, the Lockean approach assumes high baseline trust, obsesses over the deserving being unfairly punished, and advocates for porous and inclusive group boundaries.

If people differ, whether at birth or as a result of class socialization, in terms of which ideal-typical moral matrix they rely on the most when faced with a social dilemma, then we can expect

¹³ In this approach, the moral domain is defined as "interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible" (Graham, Haidt and Nosek, 2009, 70). In other words, "moral matrices" help suppress free-riding and encourage cooperative behavior to overcome social dilemmas.

them to reason differently about moral hazard, whether tied to immigrants' access to the welfare state (and welfare shopping), social benefit generosity (and recipients' work effort) or lenient approaches to criminal justice (and the crime rate). As documented in Appendix F, attitudes on these topics go hand-in-hand,¹⁴ suggesting that differences in moral matrices exist and might help researchers understand why different individuals reason very differently about the immigration-welfare state nexus.

In this section, we have argued that the perception that immigrants are net beneficiaries of redistribution is not as predictive of social policy preferences as one would expect under the parochial altruism thesis. We have highlighted a set of stylized facts and findings that jointly, invite researchers to look for new micro-foundations, and have proposed possible avenues for research.

3. The Americanization of the European Welfare State Revisited

In this third section, we turn specifically to the americanization thesis, focusing on the issue of timing. In the United States, the politicization of racial boundaries and prejudice hindered the *creation* of a generous welfare state. In Europe, immigration-induced ethnic diversity became politically visible at least two decades *after* welfare states had matured into generous and all-encompassing institutions sustained by high trust (i.e., the belief that deviations from a fair allocation of benefits are rare) and material self-interest (Rothstein, 1998; Pierson, 1998).

This has important implications for the americanization thesis. Indeed, a long line of work in political science has documented the existence of policy feedback effects: social programs create interest groups in the form of recipients and bureaucrats, explaining why once a social program is created, it is very hard to rollback (Pierson, 2011; Campbell, 2003). Relatedly, there is good evidence that universal welfare states both rely on and foster high degrees of trust in the government and in others, i.e., the widely shared beliefs that the prevalence of free riding is low and everyone is roughly

¹⁴ Specifically, there is a robust correlation between attitudes toward sentencing and discipline in school, anti-immigrant preferences and perceptions of free riding among welfare recipients. As it stands, the parochial altruism thesis cannot account for this pattern.

“doing their part” whether due to efficient monitoring by the government or “good behavior” or both (Rothstein, 1998; Cavaillé, 2022). What happens when the recipient pool diversifies?

Bringing Material Self-Interest Back In

Let’s assume ethnic diversity undermines trust and that a growing share of people are concerned about free riding among net-beneficiaries of redistribution: what impact will this have on attitudes toward redistributive social policies? To answer this question, researchers need to explicitly examine the interplay between such concerns and material self-interest. Simply put, only high-income individuals may have the “luxury” to update their policy preferences in line with a changing recipient pool (see also Rueda and Stegmueller (2015)). Low-income individuals, in contrast, are cross-pressured: they might oppose generous social transfers as a baseline because it benefits what they perceive to be undeserving free riding immigrants; yet for pocketbook reasons, they ultimately oppose such cuts.

A close review of existing research reveals patterns fully in line with this argument. For example Dahlberg, Edmark and Lundqvist (2012) find that the effects of change in the refugee population on social policy preferences is limited to economically secure respondents. Relatedly, Rueda (2018) find that only among high-income respondents does support for redistribution covary with the size of the immigrant population (see also Eger (2009); Alesina, Murard and Rapoport (2021)). In Appendix B, we revisit attitudinal trends in Great Britain, discussed in Section 1, broken down by income group. We find that, despite a general shift in belief about the prevalence of free riding among welfare recipients, low-income individuals do not increase their support for welfare cuts while high-income individuals do.

Material self-interest mitigates the potential corrosive effects of immigration-induced erosion in at least two ways. First, negative affect towards immigrants is often most prevalent among low-income natives, meaning that material self-interest kicks in for voters most likely to resent immigrants’ reliance on social benefits. Second, the importance of material self-interest as a protection against immigration-induced erosion varies across social programs: the more targeted a social program, the smaller the group of cross-pressured voters and the larger the effect of ethnic and racial diversity on mass support for cuts. Relative to the United States, fewer social programs in Europe are means-tested and targeted to the worse off, meaning more people are cross-pressured

and less likely to support cuts that would affect them directly. This also affects stereotypes about the modal recipient: she is less likely to be perceived as an undeserving immigrant and more likely to be positively stereotyped as a deserving native instead.

Another important issue to consider is the ideological diversity of high(er)-income voters who are comparatively less cross-pressured. As extensively documented in political science and replicated recently by Piketty (2018), this group includes a mix of traditional conservatives who vote for center-right parties on the one hand and university-educated bleeding-heart liberals who vote for “new” social democrats on the other. This latter group of voters stands out for their high support for generous and inclusive social insurance, itself rooted in their high level of trust in the welfare state, i.e. belief that free riding is not something to worry about (Cavaillé, 2022). As documented by Oesch (2013), this group of voters’ livelihoods is tied to the expansion of public education and healthcare. This suggests that trust is partly a result of their role as managers of an expanding and maturing welfare state, another way in which timing and sequencing matter.

Targeting Benefits to Natives Only: Theory and Practice

The americanization thesis rests on the assumption that immigrants have access to social benefits and that restricting access is not a viable policy option. As a result, native voters —because they cannot exclude immigrants— will vote for less redistribution as their best option for limiting redistribution to members of the out-group. This assumption seems plausible: as we will briefly discuss, legal precedents make it very difficult to exclude immigrants’ from accessing benefits. Furthermore, many sons and daughters of immigrants are now citizens and thus fully entitled to social benefits. Yet there is enough evidence to suggest that this assumption only holds in the short to medium run. Indeed, there have been many efforts to “close” the welfare state to immigrants, be it through border controls or challenges to legal norms that give social rights to immigrants (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006; Cavaillé, Ferwerda et al., 2017).

Historically, access to welfare benefits in Europe was restricted to citizens only.¹⁵ As documented by Guiraudon (1999), immigrants' access was ultimately granted in the 70s and 80s. The granting of social rights to immigrants was far from obvious: following the first oil crisis in 1973 and in the face of rising xenophobia, many European countries had started to limit recruitment of foreign manpower. Guiraudon shows that these new social rights were mostly granted through bureaucratic and judiciary means, with political leaders doing their best to avoid raising the public's awareness of these issues. Why did political incumbents grant these new rights? Guiraudon points to a combination of bureaucratic and judicial activism, external pressures from international organizations—including the European Union—¹⁶ and of domestic pressures to address poor living conditions among migrants (in part to guaranty public safety and social order).

Today, in most countries, the welfare state is opened to legal residents irrespective of citizenship. As previously highlighted, a plurality opposes this status quo. Countries like Denmark have recently sought to establish a strong differentiation of social rights according to nationality and length of presence on the territory (Martinsen, 2020). Each time, they have faced strong opposition from the European Union: directives from the early 2000s explicitly prevent discrimination against not only E.U. citizens but also legal third-country residents (see Cavaillé, Ferwerda et al. (2017)). Another recent example of the tensions between European norms and immigrants' social rights is Brexit. During pre-Brexit negotiations with the European Union, David Cameron demanded that limits be placed both on the E.U. citizens' right to free movement and their right to social benefits. Cameron argued that immigrants should only have access to tax-funded benefits after four years of tax-paying residence on British soil. Ultimately, Great Britain voted to leave the E.U. partly to achieve this objective. In the most recent French presidential elections, Marine Le Pen ran promising a referendum on immigration that would include a clause allowing her government to overrule E.U. law and limit non-citizens' access to social benefits.

Efforts to “close” the welfare state to immigrants can be interpreted as expressing a form of lower demand for income redistribution, as selectively excluding populations who stand to benefit

¹⁵ As a reminder of the importance of citizenship as the first “default” boundary for solidarity, Freeman (1986) quotes the French Republican Constitution of 1793, which proclaims that “Public relief is a sacred debt. Society owes subsistence to *citizens* in misfortune” (our emphasis).

¹⁶ These organizations have been behind a push to move from a normative criterion based on citizenship to a criterion based on residence and human rights (see Soysal (1995)).

more from redistributive social policies mechanically decreases redistribution. However, the political economy of redistributing less by excluding more is very different from the political economy of welfare state retrenchment in response to declining support for redistribution as hypothesized by the americanization thesis. In this latter world, we should observe people “voting against their interests” for candidates who campaign in favor of benefit cuts, even if these cuts might also affect native voters. This expectation aligns with the first wave of far-right parties (starting in the 1980s), which combined a right-wing anti-tax platform with anti-immigrant policies (Kitschelt, 1994, 1997) and received a significant support from low-income native workers. However, these parties have changed significantly over the past two decades. Breaking with their previous emphasis on the need to ‘starve the beast’, far-right leaders in countries like France or Austria have now embraced the welfare state and put welfare chauvinism – in which social transfers are generous but limited to citizens – at the center of their platforms (Betz, 2016). Notice how in Great Britain, the current Johnson Government, far from slashing social benefits is increasing them — especially benefits for the elderly —, as well as increasing taxes to support this welfare expansion.

Because the political economy of “dismantling” a generous and inclusive welfare state is different from that of creating such bundles of policies, one cannot easily extrapolate from the American experience to understand what is happening in Europe. Indeed, institutional feedback effects and the difficulty of targeting benefits to natives only provide some protection against social policy retrenchment. Still, this does not mean there is little to learn from the American case. We conclude by discussing features of the American experience that are currently overlooked by existing research and highlight their potential relevance for understanding the European case.

Overlooked Lessons from the American Experience

Another way to limit redistribution to immigrants is through institutional segmentation and policy drift. Here we have in mind failures to reform a social program, which can gradually diminish their redistributive impact (Hacker, Pierson and Thelen, 2015). These processes are well documented in studies comparing the trajectory of Medicare and Medicaid. The former program has been regularly reformed to meet new needs and address existing coverage gaps (see the famous doughnut hole closed under G.H.W Bush) while the latter’s generosity, absent the political will to match benefits to growing healthcare costs, has eroded over time. Mirroring the American

experience, there is some evidence in Europe of dualization through drift, especially in continental welfare states (Emmenegger et al., 2011; Emmenegger, Palier and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012). Soroka et al. (2015), for example, take a disaggregated approach to social spending and show that spending for policies targeted to unemployed workers do not increase as fast in countries and in periods with larger immigration inflows. This relationship does not extend to social programs that benefit a larger share of the population.

Relatedly, many European countries, echoing well-documented patterns in the U.S., have experienced labor market segmentation between “good” jobs that provide benefits and “bad” jobs that do not, where immigrants are over-represented. To the best of our knowledge, the over-representation of immigrants among workers with weak labor market attachment has not been systematically investigated as a potential driver behind this type of policy drift, though see Alt and Iversen (2017); Jantti, Jaynes and Roemer (2014) for important exceptions.

A third way to target benefits to natives is through what political scientists call “in-kind resource hoarding,” an outcome that has been well described in the American case and has rarely been considered in the European case. In-kind resource hoarding is the process through which actors re-draw political and administrative boundaries to create in-kind club goods such as primary and secondary education or quality housing. In-kind resource hoarding is well documented in the United States (Hacker et al., 2021; Derenoncourt, 2021; Boustan, 2016). Part of the reason is that America’s unique brand of federalism makes it very easy to engage in such behavior. Simply put, privileged communities use and often redraw jurisdictional boundaries to limit redistribution, immigration, and the provision of public goods to less affluent (and almost always more diverse) neighboring places (Freemark, 2020; Trounstein, 2018). Institutional incentives to sort and hoard are less potent in the European context, yet recent trend to de-centralize the provision of key public goods and introduce “market” competition to increase the quality of in-kind goods such as education suggests this might be changing. To the best of our knowledge, these types of reform have only been discussed from the point of view of ideological shifts from traditional left-wing parties to “neo-liberalized leftism” (Mudge, 2018). A closer look at the American experience suggests revisiting these dynamics with an eye to a growing demand for club goods in reaction to a sharp increase in ethnic diversity.

Conclusion

The rise of far-right parties that embrace a welfare chauvinist platform and events such as Brexit, which tie immigration to fiscal concerns, point to a tight connection between ethnic and racial divisions and the welfare state. Furthermore, the correlation between support for cuts to welfare, beliefs about the prevalence of free riding (whether due to moral failure or moral hazard) and anti-immigrant sentiment suggests that hostility to immigrants undermines mass support for policies believed to mostly benefit undeserving outsiders. However, we have argued that researchers lack a good theoretical and empirical handle on this phenomenon.

First, the perception that immigrants are net beneficiaries of redistribution is not as predictive of social policy preferences as one would expect under the parochial altruism assumption. Second, this assumption cannot explain cross-sectional variation beyond the tautological claim that some people are more parochial than others. We have suggested possible ways to investigate how these differences emerge across individuals and between countries. Third, due to historical sequencing and institutional feedback, immigration-induced retrenchment is likely to be the exception, not the norm. Instead, we recommend researchers focus on processes such as institutional dualism, resource hoarding and tensions over border control and E.U. membership.

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
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Figure 1: Social Policy Preferences and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment



Note: Anti-immigrant sentiment is measured by combining six survey items asking about immigration's economic and cultural "costs" and about preferences for increasing or decreasing migration inflows. See Appendix F for precise wording. The variable on the X-axis is split into 10 bins of roughly equal size. Y-axis plots percentage of respondents who agree with the statement.

Source: ESS round 8, weighted.

Table 1: When Should Immigrants Access the Welfare State? (2016)

	BE	GB	DE	FI	AT	FR	PT	SE	NL
Immediately on arrival	12	5	12	6	9	12	20	19	8
After living in (cntry) for a year	10	8	13	15	10	11	6	19	8
Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year	51	59	50	34	39	50	51	33	34
Total	73	72	75	55	58	73	77	71	50
Once they have become a citizen	21	22	23	42	26	19	18	27	48
They should never get the same rights	6	6	2	3	15	7	4	1	2
Total	27	28	25	45	42	27	23	29	50

Note: reports percentages. Wording: *Thinking of people coming to live in (Britain/the UK) from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view.*

Source: ESS 2016, weighted. Select countries. Small adjustments have been made so that the two total lines add up to zero.

Immigration and Support for Redistribution: Lessons from Europe

Online Appendix

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Contents

A. Immigration in Western Europe: Brief Overview	A1
B. Attitudinal Trends in Great Britain	A2
B.1. Support for Welfare Cuts	A2
B.2. Support for Welfare Cuts By Income Level	A5
C. Attitudinal Trends in France	A6
C.1. Attitudes Toward Welfare	A6
C.2. Support for Making Benefits Conditional on Past Contributions	A6
D. Immigrants' Access to Social Benefits	A8
E. Fairness Perceptions: Who is Better Treated?	A9
F. Immigration, Liberal-Authoritarian Values and Free Riding Perceptions	A10

A. Immigration in Western Europe: Brief Overview

Today, in most Western European countries, 1 in 10 legal residents are not citizens of the country they live in. The share of people born abroad ranges from a low of 12% in France to a high of 18 and 20% in Austria and Germany. According to a recent survey, in France, a third of the population has a connection to immigration through either one or both of their parents (Beauchemin, Lhommeau and Simon 2016).¹ This number is closer to 20% in Germany.² Based on the 2011 Census, in Great Britain, 1 in 5 residents do not identify with the category “white British.”

Immigrant households have lower wages and higher poverty rates than native households. According to 2014 data, native workers in Germany, Austria or Italy earn on average 20% more than foreign born workers. A 2009 study (pre-Great Recession) found that, in France, Germany and Sweden, the overall household minority poverty rate was more than twice the majority poverty rate. On average, “poverty rate for children of minorities and immigrants (was) 20 percent, compared to 10 percent for comparable majority child populations” (Smeeding et al. 2009). Based on a Eurostat study (Marlier 2008), the poverty rate for immigrant households with children (heads or spouses born outside the EU country of destination) was 40.6 percent compared to 17.6 percent for households with both parents born within the country of residence.

Western European countries have not experienced a race to the bottom in confining benefits to majority-only citizens or cutting benefits for immigrants and minorities. As shown by Smeeding et al. (2009), the welfare state’s impact on poverty rate reduction is the same for native and immigrant/minority households. In other words, the key ingredients for Alesina and Glaeser’s prophesized Americanization of the European Welfare state are present: a non-Christian, non-white minority, over-represented among low-income households and with full access to the welfare state. Survey data shows that, in many countries, a majority of voters perceive immigrants as net-beneficiaries of redistribution. As shown in Table A1, in 2014, 50% of Austrian respondents believed that “people who come to live in (Austria) pay less in taxes than they receive in benefits.” A third of respondents express no opinion. However, notice the cross-country differences: in Sweden and Germany, a third or less of respondents perceived immigrants as net-beneficiaries.

¹ The analysis in Beauchemin, Lhommeau and Simon (2016) stops at the second generation as third generation connections are often too difficult to trace using the data.

² Source: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-Germanycasestudy.pdf>

Table A1: Perceptions of Immigrants' Fiscal Burden, ESS 2014 (2002 in parenthesis)

	Pay less taxes than receive in benefits/services (0/4)	Neutral Answer or DNK (5 or DNK)	Pay more taxes than receive in benefits/services (6/10)
Austria	0.53 (0.45)	0.27 (0.30)	0.19 (0.25)
Belgium	0.49 (0.53)	0.29 (0.29)	0.22 (0.18)
Denmark	0.44 (0.53)	0.29 (0.28)	0.27 (0.19)
Finland	0.44 (0.53)	0.28 (0.24)	0.27 (0.23)
France	0.43 (0.41)	0.36 (0.38)	0.21 (0.21)
Germany	0.34 (0.56)	0.38 (0.31)	0.27 (0.14)
Great Britain	0.42 (0.56)	0.26 (0.24)	0.32 (0.20)
Sweden	0.27 (0.40)	0.31 (0.32)	0.42 (0.28)
Portugal	0.39 (0.28)	0.35 (0.24)	0.26 (0.48)

Wording: "Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?" Answers were collected using a 0/10 scale.

Percentages. Choosing 5 on the 0 to 10 scale is considered the neutral answer. Note that people who answer DNK are coded as neutral (equal to 5). Values for 2002 are displayed in parenthesis.

Source: ESS round 1, ESS round 7, weighted. Select countries.

B. Attitudinal Trends in Great Britain

B.1. Support for Welfare Cuts

Figure B1 (left panel) plots changes in support for cuts to means-tested benefits. With the exception of a recent reversal in reaction to benefit cuts during the height of the Great recession, the general pattern in Great Britain is one of growing support for such cuts. This decline is correlated with a change in perception of the prevalence of free riding among the poor and the unemployed (right panel). See Cavaille (2022) for more details.

To measure free riding beliefs, we combine the following survey items into an index using weights recovered from a factor analysis (eigenvalue = 2.4). The index is then standardized:

- The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other
- If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
- Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one
- Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help.
- Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another
- Unemployment benefits are too high and disincentive work

Figure B1: Attitudes Towards Means-Tested Benefits in Great Britain



Left panel: "The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes", respondents who disagree with this claim are coded as 1.

Right panel: free riding index, see text for wording. Variable is standardized, higher (lower) value imply the belief that free riding is more (less) prevalent.

Source: BSAS 1983-2017, weighted.

Next, we show that concerns over the prevalence of free riding, which affect support for welfare cuts, are themselves correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Due to the absence, in the BSAS, of items that ask about immigration, we turn to the British Election Study (BES), specifically the online panel.³ The BES panel includes the following items:

- **Anti-immigrant sentiment (Group preferences):**

Immigration good (1) or bad (7) for economy?

Immigration enriches (1) or undermines (7) cultural life

Immigrants are a burden on the welfare state [Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly agree (5)]

- **Attitudes toward welfare benefits:**

Welfare too low (1) or too high (5)


- **Free riding beliefs:**

Too many people these days like to rely on government handouts [Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly agree (5)]

As shown in Figure B2, people with more negative views on immigration and immigrants are more likely to find welfare benefits too generous (left panel). As the right panel shows, people with negative views about immigrants are also more likely to believe that too many people prefer to live on handouts: once the latter is included as a control, the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and support for welfare cuts weakens. These empirical patterns suggest, in line with Alesina and Glaeser's conjecture, a tight connection between anti-immigrant sentiment on the one hand, and free riding beliefs and support for cuts to means-tested benefits on the other.

³ For more information, see <https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/about-the-bes-internet-panel-study>

Figure B2: Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Welfare Attitudes and Free Riding Beliefs



Anti-immigrant sentiment items are combined using weights recovered from a factor analysis (eigenvalue = 2.25). The variable on the X-axis is split into 10 bins. A quadratic fit based on the underlying data is overlaid on the binned scatter plot.

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel, wave 2. Fieldhouse et al. (2014)


B.2. Support for Welfare Cuts By Income Level

Figure B3 plots support for cuts to welfare benefits (left panel) and free riding beliefs (right panel) by income group. Both variables were computed using the same measurement strategy as the one described in Section B1. Notice how, low-income individuals, despite a conservative shift in free riding beliefs (right panel), do not increase their support for welfare cuts. In contrast, this conservative shift is fully reflected in the welfare attitudes of high-income individuals.

Income measure To measure income, we rely on a categorical income measure available in the BSAS. Respondents were asked to provide an assessment of household income from all sources by choosing an income bracket (bracket differences were around 1000 pounds on average). New top income brackets were regularly added each year. First, we transform the income intervals into their common-currency mid-points.⁴ Second, for the top category, we use the method recommended by Hout (2004), which imputes an income value as a function of the number of respondents in the top category and the number of respondents in the interval that precedes it. This information, combined with a few assumptions regarding the skew of the income distribution, seeks to compensate for under-estimating income levels among those with the highest income in the sample (see replication file for more information). Finally, we divide this income measure by the square root of the number of people living in this household.

⁴ For example, [2000-3000] becomes 2500.

Figure B3: Support for Welfare Cuts By Income Level



Red line: Low-income respondents (≤ 20 th percentile). Purple line: High-income respondents (≥ 80 th percentile).
 Left panel: support for welfare cuts, see fn. Figure B1.
 Right panel: free riding index, see fn. Figure B1.
 Source: BSAS 1983-2010, weighted.

C. Attitudinal Trends in France


C.1. Attitudes Toward Welfare

The Credoc, through the Conditions de vie et aspirations longitudinal survey has collected information on French respondents' attitudes toward government support for the poor starting in 1990. Figure C1 plots the share of respondents who say that the government's financial effort for helping the worse off is either too little, about right or too generous. Up until the Great Recession, the overall pattern is one of stability with roughly 60% of respondents answering that the government is doing too little. There is a peak at 73% during the 1993-1994 recession. The pattern post-2009 is strikingly different: despite an increase in unemployment and paltry growth rates, the share of individuals who believe that the government is doing too little decreases steadily to 45%.

C.2. Support for Making Benefits Conditional on Past Contributions

The DREES barometer is a data collection effort focused on social policy preferences which started in the early 2000s. It includes repeated measures of people's support for unconditional access to non means-tested benefits. Specifically, one set of items asks respondents whether they believe that access to social benefits should be limited to those who have paid into the system (versus uncondi-

Figure C1: Government Intervention and the Poor in France (1991-2015)




Source: Conditions de vie et aspiration, longitudinal data

tional access to all).⁵ Respondents are asked their opinion about conditional versus universal access with regards to healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance and child benefits. The answers across the four items are highly correlated (Cronbach's alpha is equal to 0.80). The maximum (minimum) score identifies individuals who support (oppose) excluding non-contributors for all four programs. To facilitate interpretation, the final index score is also standardized. As show in Figure C2 support for making benefit access conditional on past contributions has increased over time.

⁵ In your opinion, [benefit type] should 1) only be accessible to those who pay payroll taxes, 2) only be accessible to those who cannot make ends meet or 3) be accessible to all irrespective of social background and job type. Very few people choose option 2.

Figure C2: Changes in Support Universal Access



Outcome captures the extent to which respondents, on average, support excluding non-contributors for all four programs. Respondents are asked their opinion about conditional versus universal access with regards to healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance and child benefits. Answers are combined into an index. The maximum (minimum) score identifies individuals who support (oppose) excluding non-contributors for all four programs. To facilitate interpretation, the final index score is also standardized. A quadratic fit using the underlying data is also overlayed on the binned data.

Source: DREES, barometre d'opinion

D. Immigrants' Access to Social Benefits

The survey item used for Table 1 in the manuscript was also asked in 2008, alongside a question on immigrants' perceived fiscal burden. The wording of the latter item was similar to the one used in Table A1, specifically: "On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?" As Table D1 shows, people who think immigrants receive more than they contribute (i.e., provide an answer between 0 and 4) are also more likely to want to make access to benefits conditional on citizenship or to reserve access to native born citizens only. Yet even within this group of respondents, less than half supports excluding immigrants from accessing the welfare state. Most people support a short delay of one year in the work force before allowing immigrants' to access the welfare state. Furthermore, support for excluding immigrants does not vary dramatically based on beliefs about immigrants' reliance on social benefits. In other words, only a minority both perceives immigrants as net beneficiaries and supports excluding them from accessing the welfare state. Instead, most people supported a weak version of reciprocity, something that cannot be accounted for under the parochial altruism assumption.

Table D1: When Should Immigrants Access Benefits? ESS 2008

	Great Britain			France			Germany		
	Get More	Neutral	Give More	Get More	Neutral	Give More	Get More	Neutral	Give More
Immediately on arrival	2	10	11	3	18	18	5	12	17
After living in (cntry) for a year	4	8	7	5	13	19	9	16	13
Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year	47	50	51	47	45	43	43	43	38
Once they have become a (British/UK) citizen	34	30	27	36	22	18	33	27	28
They should never get the same rights	13	2	4	10	2	2	10	2	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Wording for row item "Thinking of people coming to live in (country) from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view." Wording for column item: "On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?"

Percentages, each column adds to 100%. DNK are coded as missing for the row item and coded as 5 for the column item. Column item: if 0/4 then coded as "Get More." If 5 or DNK coded as "Neutral." If 6/10 then coded as "Give More."

Source: ESS round 4, weighted. Select countries.

E. Fairness Perceptions: Who is Better Treated?

Table E1 reports the share of respondents who perceive that their government treats immigrants better (or worse) than it treats the respondent.

Table E1: Are Immigrants Treated Better or Worse? ESS 2014

	Better	Same (or DNK)	Worse
Austria	0.36	0.31	0.33
Belgium	0.35	0.40	0.24
Denmark	0.19	0.41	0.41
Finland	0.16	0.42	0.42
France	0.34	0.37	0.28
Germany	0.25	0.28	0.47
Great Britain	0.45	0.38	0.17
Sweden	0.12	0.37	0.51
Portugal	0.38	0.50	0.12

Wording: Compared to yourself government treats new immigrants better or worse?

Percentages. "Better" ("Worse") includes respondents who pick either "much better (worse)" or "a little better (worse)."

Note that people who answer DNK are coded as "same."

Source: ESS round 7, weighted. Select countries.

F. Immigration, Liberal-Authoritarian Values and Free Riding Perceptions

In Figure B2, we documented a strong correlation between welfare attitudes and free riding beliefs on the one hand, and anti-immigrant sentiment on the other. Here, we show how a third set of items is also highly correlated with the latter attitudes and beliefs. We will follow common practices and call these items "Liberal-Authoritarian Values" (LAV) items.


The first step of the analysis builds on the same British dataset as the one used in Figure B2. In the BES panel, wave 2, LAV items are worded as follow:

- Young people today don't respect traditional [British/country] values
- For some crimes, death penalty most appropriate sentence
- Schools should teach children to obey authority
- Lawbreakers should be given stiffer sentences

LAV items are described by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) as capturing "disagreement over how to best organize the polity:" on one side are people who support a more "libertarian [form of governance] with broader participation of members and more subjects left to personal autonomy" and on the other are people who support a more "authoritarian [form of governance] with less participation and a broader realm of subjects covered by binding codes of conduct." Items commonly used to measure these LAVs include law and order items asking about the need for stiffer sentences or support for the death penalty or child rearing items asking about the value of teaching kids discipline and obedience (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). The emphasis on autonomy to describe the liberal end of the continuum echoes Inglehart's definition of post-materialist values. As a result, LAVs have often been associated with differences towards policies that can be interpreted as giving all individuals the same right to live according to their "true self" (e.g. multiculturalism) and to make individual decisions that go against collective norms and traditions (i.e. divorce, abortion, gay rights).

As shown in Figure F1, people with more negative views on immigration and immigrants are more likely to find welfare benefits too generous and to be concerned about free riding. Notice how, in Figure F1, the correlation decreases once LAV items are controlled for. In the main manuscript,

Figure F1: Immigration, Welfare, LAVs



Individual scores are computed using weights recovered from a factor analysis. Scores have been standardized using sample mean and SD.

The variable on the X-axis is split into 20 bins. A quadratic fit based on the underlying data is overlaid on the binned scatter plot.


Data: British Election Study, Panel wave 2, 2014.

we hypothesize that differences in moral matrices underpin these correlations.

For evidence beyond Great Britain, we turn to the European Social Survey (2008), which includes the items listed in Table F1. Figure F2 presents binned scatter plots examining average free riding beliefs according to one's score on the LAV index (20 bins in total), with and without controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment. We reproduce the same analysis using anti-immigrant sentiment, controlling for LAVs. In Great Britain, the two attitudinal variables explain roughly a similar share of the variance in free riding beliefs. In Germany, free riding beliefs are correlated with LAVs only: any correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and free riding beliefs disappears once the LAVs index is included. In most Western democracies, the pattern is similar to the one in Germany, with some notable exceptions including France and Denmark, which are closer to the British case (not shown).

If people differ, whether at birth or as a result of class socialization, in terms of which ideal-typical moral matrix they rely on the most when faced with a social dilemma, then we can expect them to reason differently about moral hazard, whether tied to immigrants' access to the welfare state (and welfare shopping), social benefit generosity (and recipients' work effort) or lenient approaches to criminal justice (and the crime rate). In contrast, an emphasis on parochial altruism cannot explain why LAVs underpin the correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and attitudes toward welfare and welfare recipients.

Figure F2: free riding beliefs, Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Authoritarian-Libertarian Values (G.B. and Germany)



Individuals scores are computed using weights from a factor analysis. Scores have been standardized using country-specific mean and SD.

The variable on the X-axis is split into 20 bins.

For an idea of the substantive relationship: in Great Britain, one SD increase in the LAV score is roughly equal to half a SD increase on the free riding score (no controls).

Source: ESS round 4, weighted

Table F1: Item Wording

<i>Free Riding Beliefs</i>	<i>Anti-Immigrant Sentiment</i>
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job	Immigration bad or good for country's economy
Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
Employees often pretend they are sick to stay at home	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
Social benefits/services make people lazy	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
Social benefits/services make people less willing to look after themselves/family	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
Social benefits/services make people less willing to care for one another	Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
<i>Liberal-Authoritarian Values Items</i>	
Schools should teach children to obey authority	
People who break the law should receive much harsher sentences	
Terrorist suspect in prison until police satisfied	

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