



HAL
open science

A first-order completeness result about characteristic Boolean algebras in classical realizability

Guillaume Geoffroy

► **To cite this version:**

Guillaume Geoffroy. A first-order completeness result about characteristic Boolean algebras in classical realizability. LICS '22: 37th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, Aug 2022, Haifa, Israel. pp.1-8, 10.1145/3531130.3532484 . hal-03779966

HAL Id: hal-03779966

<https://hal.science/hal-03779966>

Submitted on 18 Sep 2022

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

A first-order completeness result about characteristic Boolean algebras in classical realizability

Guillaume Geoffroy
guillaume.geoffroy@irif.fr
Université Paris Cité, IRIF
Paris, France

Abstract

We prove the following completeness result about classical realizability: given any Boolean algebra with at least two elements, there exists a Krivine-style classical realizability model whose characteristic Boolean algebra is elementarily equivalent to it. This is done by controlling precisely which combinations of so-called “angelic” (or “may”) and “demonic” (or “must”) nondeterminism exist in the underlying model of computation.

ACM Reference Format:

Guillaume Geoffroy. 2022. A first-order completeness result about characteristic Boolean algebras in classical realizability. In *37th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS '22)*, August 2–5, 2022, Haifa, Israel. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 9 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3531130.3532484>

1 Introduction

Classical realizability. Realizability is an aspect of the propositions-as-types / proofs-as-programs correspondence in which each proposition is interpreted as a specification on the behaviour of programs: programs which satisfy this specification are said to *realize* the proposition. This interpretation defines a notion of truth value: a proposition counts as “true” if it is realized by a well-formed program. In particular, any provable proposition is true in that sense. Indeed, any proof, when be seen as a program through the correspondence, must realize the proposition that it proves. This fundamental result ensures that realizability is compatible with logical deduction.

Initially, this compatibility was restricted to intuitionistic deduction. Griffin’s discovery of a link between control operators and classical reasoning [4] overcame this limitation. More precisely, Griffin proved that Peirce’s law—a deductive principle that is valid in classical logic but not in intuitionistic logic—can be used as a specification (i.e. as a type) for

Scheme’s operator *call/cc* (“call with current continuation”), which allows a program to manipulate its own evaluation context as a first-class object.

Using this idea, Krivine developed a framework which could interpret all classical reasoning, first within second-order arithmetic [7], and then within Zermelo–Frænkel set theory with dependent choice [5]. Miquel then adapted this *classical realizability* to higher-order arithmetic and explored its connections with forcing [10]. Work on interpreting reasoning that uses the full axiom of choice is ongoing [9].

Characteristic Boolean algebras. Abstractly, a *classical realizability model* is the data of a *model of computation* (for example: a variant of the lambda-calculus enriched with the instruction *call/cc*), a *model of deduction* (for example: a first-order language, plus the rules of classical reasoning, and optionally a theory on this language, i.e. a set of axioms), and a *realizability relation* between *programs* (from the former) and *propositions* from the latter.

Each classical realizability model contains a *characteristic Boolean algebra* (which Krivine calls $\mathbb{2}$ —“gimel 2”). More precisely, each formula A in the language of Boolean algebras can be translated into a proposition which is usually denoted by $\mathbb{2} \models A$ —read “the characteristic Boolean algebra satisfies A ”.

In any given classical realizability model, the set of all first-order formulas A such that the proposition “the characteristic Boolean algebra satisfies A ” is realized by a well-formed program (i.e. “true”) forms a first-order theory on the language of Boolean algebras: this is called the *first-order theory of the characteristic Boolean algebra of the realizability model*. This theory may or may not be consistent, but it is always closed under classical deduction, and it always contains the theory of Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

The characteristic Boolean algebra, and in particular the ability to “shape” it, plays a central role in classical realizability. For example, consider Krivine’s *model of threads* [8]. One of its remarkable combinatorial properties is that in this model, there is a whole atomless Boolean algebra embedded in the poset of the cardinalities between the countable and the continuum; and the way this property was obtained was by first making the characteristic Boolean algebra is atomless, and then embedding it in this poset. As an other example, Krivine’s construction of a particular classical realizability model that satisfies the axiom of choice [9] depends crucially

Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM acknowledges that this contribution was authored or co-authored by an employee, contractor or affiliate of a national government. As such, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free right to publish or reproduce this article, or to allow others to do so, for Government purposes only.

LICS '22, August 2–5, 2022, Haifa, Israel

© 2022 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.

ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-9351-5/22/08...\$15.00

<https://doi.org/10.1145/3531130.3532484>

on the ability to reliably force a realizability model’s characteristic Boolean algebra to be isomorphic to any given *finite* Boolean algebra with at least 2 elements (in that case, the Boolean algebra with 4 elements).

Contribution. The contribution of this paper is to prove that the characteristic Boolean algebra can in fact be made elementarily equivalent to *any* given Boolean algebra with at least two elements, finite or not. More precisely, we prove that for each first-order theory \mathcal{T} over the language of Boolean algebras, the following two conditions are equivalent:

- The theory \mathcal{T} is closed under classical deduction and contains the theory of Boolean algebras with at least two elements;
- There exists a classical realizability model whose characteristic Boolean algebra’s theory is exactly \mathcal{T} .

Note that this fact holds independently from the consistency of the theory \mathcal{T} .

In particular, given a first-order formula A over the language of Boolean algebras, the proposition “the characteristic Boolean algebra satisfies A ” is universally realized (i.e. realized in all models) if and only if A is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

The proof we give is constructive: given a theory \mathcal{T} , we describe a concrete realizability model whose characteristic Boolean algebra’s theory is \mathcal{T} . The construction works as follows: it has been pointed out [3] that the properties of the characteristic Boolean algebra reflect the kinds of nondeterminism that exist in the underlying computational model; so for each formula A in \mathcal{T} , what we do is add to the computational model a nondeterministic instruction γ_A which has exactly the right combination of so-called “angelic” (or “may”) and “demonic” (or “must”) nondeterminism to realize the proposition “the characteristic Boolean algebra satisfies A ”.

Outline. Section 2 states well-known facts about classical realizability (including the fact that in the equivalence we want to prove, the second condition implies the first), and lays down the conventions that will be used throughout the paper. To keep the discussion focused and the notations simple, we restrict the language of propositions to the first-order language of Boolean algebras (rather than, say, the language of set theory, or the second-order language of Peano arithmetic). The main benefit is that, in this context, given any first-order formula A in the language of Boolean algebras, the proposition “the characteristic Boolean algebra satisfies A ” is simply the formula A : no translation is needed.

Section 3 details the construction, given any first-order theory \mathcal{T} that is closed under classical deduction and contains the theory of Boolean algebras with at least two elements, of a realizability model that satisfies \mathcal{T} .

Section 4 proves that this model’s characteristic Boolean algebra’s theory does indeed contain \mathcal{T} , and Section 5 proves

the converse inclusion, which concludes the proof of this paper’s main result.

Finally, Section 6 gives an example of application of this result to the problem of sequentialisation in a denotational model of the lambda-calculus with a control operator.

2 Conventions and reminders about classical realizability

2.1 First-order formulas on Boolean algebras

The *language of Boolean algebras* is the first-order language with equality over the signature $(0, 1, \vee, \wedge, \neg)$ (respectively: two constants, two binary function symbols with infix notation, and one unary function symbol). To make it clear which symbols we take as primitives, we spell out its grammar:

First-order terms:

$$a, b := z \text{ (first-order variable)} \\ | 0 \mid 1 \mid a \vee b \mid a \wedge b \mid \neg a$$

First-order formulas:

$$A, B := a \neq b \mid A \rightarrow B \mid \forall z A$$

Note that, as is customary in classical realizability, we take non-equality rather than equality as a primitive symbol, because its realizability interpretation is simpler.

The other usual symbols can be encoded as follows:

- \perp is $0 \neq 0$,
- for all first-order terms a, b , $a = b$ is $(a \neq b) \rightarrow \perp$,
- for all first-order formulas A, B , $A \wedge B$ is $(A \rightarrow B \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \perp$,
- for all first-order formulas A, B , $A \vee B$ is $(A \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow (B \rightarrow \perp) \rightarrow \perp$,
- for all first-order formulas A and all first-order variables z , $\exists z A$ is $(\forall z (A \rightarrow \perp)) \rightarrow \perp$.

A set of closed first-order formulas is called a *first-order theory*. Over the signature we have chosen, the theory of Boolean algebras can be axiomatised by a finite set of equations. As a result, there exists a finite first-order theory $\mathcal{T}_{\text{Bool}}$ consisting of:

- the first-order formula $0 \neq 1$,
- plus a finite number of closed first-order formulas of the form $\forall \bar{z} a = b$ (where \bar{z} is a list of variables),

such that for each first-order structure \mathbb{B} over the language of Boolean algebras, \mathbb{B} satisfies $\mathcal{T}_{\text{Bool}}$ if and only if \mathbb{B} is a Boolean algebra with at least two elements.

First-order formulas are defined up to α -renaming. Given a first-order formula A (respectively, a first-order term a), a list \bar{z} of variables and a list \bar{b} of first-order terms of equal length, we denote by $A[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]$ (respectively, $a[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]$) the simultaneous, capture-avoiding substitution of \bar{z} with \bar{b} in A (respectively, in a).

2.2 The λ_c -calculus

Syntax. The λ_c -calculus consists of three kinds of syntactic objects: λ_c -terms (which represent programs), stacks (which represent execution environments), and processes (which represent a program running in a given environment). They are defined by the following grammars, up to α -renaming:

λ_c -terms:

$$\begin{aligned} t, u := & x \mid tu \mid \lambda x. t \\ & \mid \text{cc} \quad (\text{call with current continuation}) \\ & \mid k_\pi \quad (\pi \text{ stack}) \\ & \mid \zeta_n \quad (n \in \mathbb{N}: \text{unrestricted additional instructions}) \\ & \mid \eta_n \quad (n \in \mathbb{N}: \text{restricted additional instructions}) \end{aligned}$$

Stacks:

$$\begin{aligned} \pi, \pi' := & t \cdot \pi \quad (t \text{ closed } \lambda_c\text{-term}) \\ & \mid \omega \quad (\text{empty stack}) \end{aligned}$$

Processes:

$$p, q := t \star \pi \quad (t \text{ closed } \lambda_c\text{-term})$$

Given a λ_c -term t , a list \bar{x} of variables and a list \bar{u} of λ_c -terms of equal length, we denote by $t[\bar{x} := \bar{u}]$ the simultaneous, capture-avoiding substitution of \bar{x} with \bar{u} in t .

Operational semantics. Processes are evaluated according to the rules of the *Krivine abstract machine*. Namely, we denote by $>_1$ (“evaluates in one step to”) the least binary relation on the set of processes such that:

$$\begin{aligned} tu \star \pi & >_1 t \star u \cdot \pi && (\text{Push}) \\ \lambda x. v \star t \cdot \pi & >_1 v[x := t] \star \pi && (\text{Grab}) \\ \text{cc} \star t \cdot \pi & >_1 t \star k_\pi \cdot \pi && (\text{Save}) \\ k_{\pi_2} \star t \cdot \pi_1 & >_1 t \star \pi_2 && (\text{Restore}) \end{aligned}$$

for all closed terms $t, u, \lambda x. v$ and all stacks π, π_1, π_2 .

Moreover, we denote by $>$ (“evaluates to”) the reflexive and transitive closure of $>_1$.

The rules Push and Grab simulate weak head β -reduction, and the rules Save and Restore allow programs to manipulate continuations (cc stands for “call with current continuation”). In the context of realizability, the former pair will ensure compatibility with intuitionistic logic, and the latter with classical logic.

Note that there are no rules for the additional instructions: their purpose will be to help construct specific *poles* (see next subsection), and they can be ignored for the time being.

Typing. Typing judgements have the following form: $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$, where x_1, \dots, x_n are pairwise distinct variables, t is a λ_c -term with no free variables other than x_1, \dots, x_n , and A_1, \dots, A_n are first-order formulas (possibly with free variables).

Typing judgements are defined up to α -renaming (i.e. $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$ is the same as $y_1 : A_1, \dots, y_n : A_n \vdash t[\bar{x} := \bar{y}] : B$), and up to permutations of the context (i.e.

$x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$ is the same as $x_{\sigma(1)} : A_{\sigma(1)}, \dots, x_{\sigma(n)} : A_{\sigma(n)} \vdash t : B$ for all permutations σ).

A typing judgement is *valid* if it can be derived from the following rules:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. t : A \rightarrow B} & \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B} \\ & \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall z. A} \quad (z \text{ not free in } \Gamma) & \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall z. A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A[z := b]} \\ & \frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash x : A}{\Gamma \vdash \text{cc} : ((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A} & \\ & \frac{\Gamma[z := a] \vdash t : a \neq b}{\Gamma[z := b] \vdash t : a \neq b} & \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : a \neq a}{\Gamma \vdash t : A} \end{aligned}$$

The first five are the usual rules of natural deduction, and the sixth types cc with Peirce’s law (which allows classical deduction). The last two reformulate the usual elimination and introduction rules for equality using the symbol \neq instead:

Lemma 1. *The following rule is admissible:*

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A[z := a]}{\Gamma, x : a = b \vdash \text{cc}(\lambda k. x(kt)) : A[z := b]}$$

Proof. If the typing judgement $\Gamma \vdash t : A[z := a]$ is valid, then so is the judgement $\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := a] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash t : A[z := a]$. Then we can use the following derivation:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := a] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash t : A[z := a]}{\vdots} \\ & \frac{\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := a] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash kt : a \neq b}{\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := b] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash kt : a \neq b} \\ & \vdots \\ & \frac{\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := b] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash x(kt) : \perp}{\Gamma, x : a = b, k : A[z := b] \rightarrow a \neq b \vdash x(kt) : A[z := b]} \\ & \frac{\Gamma, x : a = b \vdash \lambda k. x(kt) : (A[z := b] \rightarrow a \neq b) \rightarrow A[z := b]}{\vdots} \\ & \frac{\Gamma, x : a = b \vdash \text{cc}(\lambda k. x(kt)) : A[z := b]}{\Gamma, x : a = b \vdash \text{cc}(\lambda k. x(kt)) : A[z := b]} \end{aligned}$$

□

2.3 Classical realizability

Poles. A *pole* is a set \perp of processes that is *saturated*, i.e. such that for all processes p, q , if $p > q$ and $q \in \perp$, then $p \in \perp$.

Falsity values and truth values. For each pole \perp and each closed first-order formula A , we define inductively its *falsity value* $\|A\|_{\perp}$ (which is a set of stacks) and its *truth value* $|A|_{\perp}$ (which is a set of closed λ_c -terms) with respect to \perp :

- $|A|_{\perp} = \{t; \forall \pi \in \|A\|_{\perp} t \star \pi \in \perp\}$,
- $\|a \neq b\|_{\perp} = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if } a \neq b \text{ is true (in the} \\ & \text{Boolean algebra } \{0, 1\}), \\ \{\text{all stacks}\} & \text{if } a \neq b \text{ is false.} \end{cases}$

- $\|A \rightarrow B\|_{\perp} = \{t \cdot \pi; t \in \|A\|_{\perp}, \pi \in \|B\|_{\perp}\}$,
- $\|\forall z A\|_{\perp} = \|A[z := 0]\|_{\perp} \cup \|A[z := 1]\|_{\perp}$.

We say that a given closed λ_c -term t *realizes* a given closed first-order formula A *with respect to* a given pole \perp if $t \in \|A\|_{\perp}$.

Adequacy. A key fact about classical realizability is that it is compatible with the above typing rules, and therefore with classical reasoning:

Lemma 2 (Adequacy lemma). *Let $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$ be a valid typing judgement (with A_1, \dots, A_n closed), and let u_1, \dots, u_n be closed λ_c -terms. For all poles \perp , if u_1, \dots, u_n realize A_1, \dots, A_n respectively with respect to \perp , then $t[\bar{x} := \bar{u}]$ realizes B with respect to \perp .*

2.4 Realizability theories

We would like to associate with each pole a first-order theory of “all first-order formulas that are realized with respect to that pole”. However, given any non-empty pole \perp , there is bound to be a closed λ_c -term which realizes \perp (namely: take any $t \star \pi \in \perp$ and consider tk_{π}). Therefore, in order to obtain a meaningful notion, we must put some restrictions on which terms are allowed as realizers.

We call *proof-like* any closed λ_c -term which contains no stack constants (k_{π}) and no restricted instructions (η_n).

Definition 3. Let \perp be a pole. The *first-order theory of \perp* is the set of all closed first-order formulas which are realized by at least one proof-like term with respect to \perp . We denote it by $\text{Th}(\perp)$.

Remark 4. As stated in the introduction, the benefit of restricting the formulas to the language of Boolean algebra is that each pole \perp can be interpreted as a realizability model whose characteristic Boolean algebra’s theory is simply $\text{Th}(\perp)$: no translation is needed.

We say that a pole \perp is *consistent* if its first-order theory is, i.e. if there exists a first-order structure which satisfies $\text{Th}(\perp)$.

Logical closure. As a consequence of the adequacy lemma and the completeness theorem of first-order logic, the first-order theory of a pole is always *closed under classical deduction*:

Lemma 5. *Let \perp be a pole and A a closed first-order formula. If $\text{Th}(\perp)$ implies A (in the sense that any first-order structure which satisfies $\text{Th}(\perp)$ also satisfies A), then $A \in \text{Th}(\perp)$.*

In particular, \perp is consistent if and only if no proof-like term realizes \perp with respect to it.

Remark 6. In fact, because we chose a very restricted language for formulas, Lemma 5 would hold even in the absence of the instruction cc . However, the goal here is to describe a method which can be generalised to richer contexts, and

that requires an instruction such as cc that is capable of altering the control flow: otherwise, all we get is closure under intuitionistic deduction.

Boolean algebras. In addition, the first-order theory of a pole is always an extension of $\mathcal{T}_{\text{Bool}}$, and therefore any first-order structure which satisfies it is a Boolean algebra with at least two elements. This is a consequence of the following lemma:

Lemma 7. *Let A be a closed first-order formula that is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}$.*

- If A is of the form $\forall \bar{z} a \neq b$, then A is realized by all closed λ_c -terms, universally (i.e. with respect to all poles);
- If A is of the form $\forall \bar{z} a = b$, then A is universally realized by $\lambda x. x$.

Corollary 8. *For all poles \perp , $\text{Th}(\perp)$ contains $\mathcal{T}_{\text{Bool}}$.*

Proof of Lemma 7. Let \perp be a pole. First part: for all lists \bar{w} of elements of $\{0, 1\}$, we know that $a \neq b$ is true in $\{0, 1\}$, therefore the falsity value of $\forall \bar{z} a \neq b$ is empty, and so this first-order formula is realized by all closed λ_c -terms.

Second part: let \bar{a} be a list of elements of $\{0, 1\}$. We must prove that $\lambda x. x$ realizes $(a = b)[\bar{z} := \bar{a}]$. Let $t \cdot \pi$ be in the falsity value of $(a = b)[\bar{z} := \bar{a}]$, i.e. t realizes $a \neq b$ and π is any stack. Since $a \neq b$ is false, its falsity value contains all stacks, which means that $t \star \pi$ is in \perp . Since $\lambda x. x \star t \cdot \pi$ evaluates to $t \star \pi$, it is also in \perp . \square

Horn clauses. We have just seen that any (universally quantified) equation or non-equation that is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}$ is universally realized. In fact, this “transfer” property holds for all Horn clauses:

A *Horn clause* is a closed first-order formula of the form either $\forall \bar{z} (a_1 = a'_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow a_n = a'_n \rightarrow b = b')$ (*definite clause*) or $\forall \bar{z} (a_1 = a'_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow a_n = a'_n \rightarrow b \neq b')$ (*goal clause*).

Lemma 9. *Let A be a Horn clause. Then A is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}$ if and only if it is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.*

Corollary 10. *Let A be a Horn clause. If A is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}$, then it is universally realized.*

Proof of Lemma 9. Assume that A is true in $\{0, 1\}$, and let \mathbb{B} be a Boolean algebra with at least two element. There exists a nonempty set X and an injective morphism of Boolean algebras (i.e. a non-necessarily elementary embedding) φ from \mathbb{B} to $\{0, 1\}^X$ [2, Corollary IV.1.12] (alternatively, this is also an immediate consequence of Stone’s representation theorem). Since A is a universal (Π_1^0), it is sufficient to prove that A is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}^X$.

Let $\bar{\delta} \in \{0, 1\}^X$. Let $\alpha_1, \alpha'_1, \dots, \alpha_n, \alpha'_n, \beta, \beta'$ be respectively the values of $a_1[\bar{z} := \bar{\delta}], \dots, b'[\bar{z} := \bar{\delta}]$ in $\{0, 1\}^X$.

Assume that for all $i \leq n$, $\alpha_i = \alpha'_i$, i.e. for all $x \in X$, $\alpha_i(x) = \alpha'_i(x)$.

For all $x \in X$, evaluation at x is a morphism of Boolean algebras from $\{0, 1\}^X$ to $\{0, 1\}$. Therefore, the value of $a_1[\bar{z} := \bar{\delta}(x)]$ in $\{0, 1\}$ is $\alpha_i(x)$, the value of $a'_1[\bar{z} := \bar{\delta}(x)]$ in $\{0, 1\}$ is $\alpha'_i(x)$, etc.

Therefore, if A is definite, then for all x , we have $\beta(x) = \beta'(x)$, because A is true in $\{0, 1\}$. In other words, $\beta = \beta'$, which means that A is true in $\{0, 1\}^X$.

On the other hand, if A is a goal clause, then for all x , we have $\beta(x) \neq \beta'(x)$. Since X is non-empty, this means that $\beta \neq \beta'$, and so A is true in $\{0, 1\}^X$. \square

With all these conventions written down, we can precisely state the main result of this paper:

Theorem 11. *Let \mathcal{T} be a first-order theory. The following two statements are equivalent:*

- \mathcal{T} is closed under classical deduction and contains the theory of Boolean algebras with at least two elements;
- There exists a pole whose theory is exactly \mathcal{T} .

In particular, a first-order formula is universally realized if and only if it is true in every Boolean algebra with at least two elements.

We have already seen that the second point implies the first. The task of the remainder of this paper will be to prove the converse implication.

3 Constructing the pole

From now on, \mathcal{T} will denote a fixed first-order theory which is closed under classical deduction and contains $\mathcal{T}_{\text{Bool}}$. We will construct a pole $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ whose theory is exactly \mathcal{T} .

For each first-order formula A (closed or not), let γ_A denote:

- one of the unrestricted instructions if $A \in \mathcal{T}$,
- one of the restricted instructions otherwise.

Furthermore, let the γ_A be pairwise distinct.

We will construct a pole $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ in such a way that γ_A realizes A for all closed first-order formulas A : this will imply that its theory contains \mathcal{T} . Then, we will prove the converse inclusion.

3.1 The structure of first-order formulas

Any first-order formula A can be decomposed as:

$$\forall \bar{y}_1 (B_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{y}_m (B_m \rightarrow \forall \bar{y}_{m+1} b \neq b') \dots),$$

with $n \geq 0$, B_1, \dots, B_m first-order formulas, each \bar{y}_i a list of variables, and b, b' two first-order terms. Moreover, this decomposition is unique, up to renaming of the variables $\bar{y}_1, \dots, \bar{y}_{m+1}$.

Each B_i can itself be decomposed as:

$$\forall \bar{z}_{i,1} (C_{i,1} \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{i,n_i} (C_{i,n_i} \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{i,n_i+1} c_i \neq c'_i) \dots),$$

so that A is decomposed as:

$$\frac{\frac{\forall \bar{y}_1 (\dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{y}_m (\dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{y}_{m+1} b \neq b') \dots)}{\forall \bar{z}_{1,1} (C_{1,1} \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{1,n_1} (C_{1,n_1} \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{1,n_1+1} c_1 \neq c'_1) \dots)}}{\forall \bar{z}_{m,1} (C_{m,1} \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{m,n_m} (C_{m,n_m} \rightarrow \forall \bar{z}_{m,n_m+1} c_m \neq c'_m) \dots)}$$

Whenever we decompose a formula A in this way, we will denote by \bar{y} the concatenated list $\bar{y}_1, \dots, \bar{y}_{m+1}$, and for all $1 \leq i \leq m$, we will denote by \bar{z}_i the concatenated list $\bar{z}_{i,1}, \dots, \bar{z}_{i,n_i+1}$. Furthermore, we will assume that the variables $\bar{y}, \bar{z}_1, \dots, \bar{z}_m$ are chosen all different from one another and from the free variables of A .

3.2 The pole $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$

We define by induction an increasing sequence $(\perp_{\mathcal{T},k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ of sets of processes: $\perp_{\mathcal{T},0}$ is empty, and for all k , $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k+1}$ is the smallest set of processes such that:

- For all processes p, q , if $p >_1 q$ and $q \in \perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$, then $p \in \perp_{\mathcal{T},k+1}$;
- For each closed first-order formula A (decomposed as in section 3.1), for all closed λ_c -terms t_1, \dots, t_m , all stacks π and all lists $\bar{\beta} \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $(b = b') \left[\bar{y} := \bar{\beta} \right]$ is true, if the set of processes

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} t_i \star \gamma_{C_{i,1} \left[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta} \right]} \cdot \dots \cdot \gamma_{C_{i,n_i} \left[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta} \right]} \cdot \pi; \\ i \leq m \text{ and } \bar{\delta}_i \in \{0, 1\} \text{ such that} \\ (c_i = c'_i) \left[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta} \right] \text{ is true} \end{array} \right\}$$

is included in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$, then the process

$$\gamma_A \star t_1 \cdot \dots \cdot t_m \cdot \pi$$

is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k+1}$.

Then, we define the pole $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ as the directed union $\bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N}} \perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$.

Remark 12. The rule for the instructions γ_A have the following general shape:

If there exists $\bar{\beta}$ such that for all $i, \bar{\delta}_i$, $t_i \star \pi'_{\bar{\beta}, i, \bar{\delta}_i}$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, then $\gamma_A \star t_1 \cdot \dots \cdot t_m \cdot \pi$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$.

It has been pointed out [3] that such a rule can be interpreted as saying that γ_A is a special kind of nondeterministic instruction: part “may” (because of the existential quantification), and part “must” (because of the universal quantification).

4 The theory of $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ contains \mathcal{T}

We wish to prove that $\text{Th}(\perp_{\mathcal{T}})$ contains \mathcal{T} . Since γ_A is proof-like whenever A is in \mathcal{T} , it is sufficient to prove the following result:

Proposition 13. *For all closed first-order formulas A , γ_A realizes A with respect to $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$.*

Proof. We proceed by induction on the height of A . Let A be decomposed as in 3.1.

Let $t_1 \dots t_n \cdot \pi$ be in the falsity value of A . In other words, let $\bar{\beta}$ be a list of elements of $\{0, 1\}$, let t_1, \dots, t_n be closed λ_c -terms such that t_i realizes $B_i[\bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$ for all i , and let π be in the falsity value of $(b \neq b')[\bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$, which is the same as saying that $(b = b')[\bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$ is true. All we need to do is prove that

$$\gamma_A \star t_1 \dots t_m \cdot \pi$$

is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$.

Let $i \leq m$ and $\bar{\delta}_i \in \{0, 1\}$ be such that $(c_i = c'_i)[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$ is true. By the induction hypothesis, we know that for all $j \leq n_i$, $\gamma_{C_{i,j}[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]}$ realizes $C_{i,j}[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$.

Since t_i realizes $B_i[\bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$ and π is in the falsity value of $(c_i \neq c'_i)[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]$ (because this inequality is false), we have that

$$t_i \star \gamma_{C_{i,1}[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]} \dots \gamma_{C_{i,n_i}[\bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}]} \cdot \pi$$

is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$.

Therefore, by definition of $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, $\gamma_A \star t_1 \dots t_m \cdot \pi$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$. \square

5 The theory of $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ is contained in \mathcal{T}

All that remains is to prove that The theory $\text{Th}(\perp_{\mathcal{T}})$ is contained in \mathcal{T} .

For all λ_c -terms t (respectively, all stacks π ; all processes p), let C_t (respectively, C_π ; C_p) denote the conjunction of all first-order formulas A such that γ_A appears anywhere in t (respectively, in π ; in p)—including nested within a stack constant k_π . Note that C_t is not necessarily closed even if t is (because the former notion of closure is about first-order variables, while the latter is about variables of the λ_c -calculus).

We are going to prove that for all processes p such that C_p is closed, if p is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, then p must contain a contradiction, in the sense that C_p must be false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

In order to prove this, we will need to state and prove a more general result that also covers the case when C_p is not closed. To that end, we will need the following notation: for all λ_c -terms t , all lists \bar{z} of first-order variables, and all lists \bar{b} of first-order terms, we denote by $t[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]$ the λ_c -term obtained by replacing each instruction of the form γ_A by

$\gamma_{A[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]}$ (including when they appear nested within a stack constant). Similarly, we define $\pi[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]$ when π is a stack, and $p[\bar{z} := \bar{b}]$ when p is a process.

Proposition 14. *Let p be a process, $\bar{a} = a_1, \dots, a_r$ and $\bar{a}' = a'_1, \dots, a'_r$ two lists of first-order terms, and \bar{w} a list of distinct first-order variables that contains all the free variables of C_p , \bar{a} and \bar{a}' .*

Assume that for all lists $\bar{\alpha}$ of elements of $\{0, 1\}$ such that $(\bar{a} = \bar{a}')[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is true, $p[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ (where $\bar{a} = \bar{a}'$ denotes the conjunction $(a_1 = a'_1) \wedge \dots \wedge (a_r = a'_r)$).

Then the first-order formula $\exists \bar{w} (C_p \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}'))$ is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

Corollary 15. *Let t be a closed λ_c -term such that C_t is closed, and A a closed first-order formula. If t realizes A with respect to $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, then the formula $C_t \rightarrow A$ is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.*

Proof. If t realizes A with respect to $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, then $\gamma_{A \rightarrow \perp} \star t \cdot \omega$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$, therefore $C_t \wedge (A \rightarrow \perp)$ is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. \square

Corollary 16. *The theory $\text{Th}(\perp_{\mathcal{T}})$ is contained in \mathcal{T} .*

Proof. Let $A \in \text{Th}(\perp_{\mathcal{T}})$. Let t be a proof-like term which realizes A . The formula C_t is in \mathcal{T} by construction, because t is proof-like. By the previous corollary, the formula $C_t \rightarrow A$ is also in \mathcal{T} , therefore A is in \mathcal{T} . \square

We now prove the proposition:

Proof of Proposition 14. We will prove by induction that for all natural numbers k , for all $p, \bar{a}, \bar{a}', \bar{w}$, if $p[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$ for all $\bar{\alpha} \in \{0, 1\}$, then the first-order formula $\exists \bar{w} (C_p \wedge \bar{a} = \bar{a}')$ is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. (This is sufficient to prove the proposition because the sequence $(\perp_{\mathcal{T},k})_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is cumulative and the set of all $\bar{\alpha} \in \{0, 1\}$ is finite.)

Note that if the formula $\exists \bar{w} (\bar{a} = \bar{a}')$ is false in $\{0, 1\}$, then it is false in all Boolean algebras, because its negation is equivalent to a Horn clause (Lemma 9). In particular, $\exists \bar{w} (C_p \wedge \bar{a} = \bar{a}')$ is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. Therefore, from now on, we will assume that $\exists \bar{w} (\bar{a} = \bar{a}')$ is true in $\{0, 1\}$.

The result is vacuously true for $k = 0$, because $\perp_{\mathcal{T},0}$ is empty.

Assume the result holds for some k , and let $p, \bar{a}, \bar{a}', \bar{w}$ be such that $p[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k+1}$ for all $\bar{\alpha} \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $(\bar{a} = \bar{a}')[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is true.

If we look back at the definition of $\perp_{\mathcal{T}}$ in section 3.2, we see that we must be in one of the following cases:

(i) There exists a process q such that p evaluates in one step to q . In that case, for all $\bar{\alpha} \in \{0, 1\}$, if $(\bar{a} = \bar{a}')[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is true, then $q[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ must be in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, the formula $\exists \bar{w} (C_q \wedge \bar{a} = \bar{a}')$ is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

On the other hand, evaluation can only remove or copy the constants γ_A , and not add new ones. This means that the formula $\forall \bar{w} (C_p \rightarrow C_q)$ is a propositional tautology, which proves the result.

(ii) The process p is of the form $\gamma_A \star t_1 \cdot \dots \cdot t_n \cdot \pi$. In that case, let A be decomposed as in section 3.1. Then for all $\bar{\alpha}$ in $\{0, 1\}$ such that $(\bar{a} = \bar{a}')[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is true, there exists a list $\bar{\beta}_{\bar{\alpha}}$ in $\{0, 1\}$ such that $(b = b') \left[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}_{\bar{\alpha}} \right]$ is true and that set of processes

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} t_i[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}] \star \gamma_{C_{i,1} \left[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}, \bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}_{\bar{\alpha}} \right]} \cdot \dots \cdot \pi[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]; \\ i \leq m \text{ and } \bar{\delta}_i \in \{0, 1\} \text{ such that} \\ (c_i = c'_i) \left[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}, \bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i, \bar{y} := \bar{\beta}_{\bar{\alpha}} \right] \text{ is true} \end{array} \right\}$$

is included in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$.

Every function from $\{0, 1\}^k$ to $\{0, 1\}$ can be represented by a first-order term with k free variables. Therefore, one can choose a list \bar{e} of first-order terms with no free variables other than \bar{w} such that for all $\bar{\alpha}$ in $\{0, 1\}$, if $(\bar{a} = \bar{a}')[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ is true, then the value of $\bar{e}[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}]$ (in $\{0, 1\}$) is $\bar{\beta}_{\bar{\alpha}}$.

Let $i \leq m$. For all $\bar{\alpha}, \bar{\delta}_i$ in $\{0, 1\}$ such that $((\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge (c_i = c'_i)[\bar{y} := \bar{e}])[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}, \bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i]$ is true, we know that the process

$$(t_i \star \gamma_{C_{i,1}[\bar{y} := \bar{e}]} \cdot \dots \cdot \gamma_{C_{i,n_i}[\bar{y} := \bar{e}]} \cdot \pi)[\bar{w} := \bar{\alpha}, \bar{z}_i := \bar{\delta}_i]$$

is in $\perp_{\mathcal{T},k}$. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, we know that the formula

$$\begin{aligned} \exists \bar{w} \exists \bar{z}_i (C_{t_i} \wedge C_{i,1}[\bar{y} := \bar{e}] \wedge \dots \wedge C_{i,n_i}[\bar{y} := \bar{e}] \\ \wedge C_{\pi} \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge (c_i = c'_i)[\bar{y} := \bar{e}]) \end{aligned}$$

is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. In other words, for all $i \leq m$, the formula

$$\exists \bar{w} (C_{t_i} \wedge C_{\pi} \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge (B_i[\bar{y} := \bar{e}] \rightarrow \perp))$$

is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

This means that the formula

$$\begin{aligned} \exists \bar{w} (C_{t_1} \wedge \dots \wedge C_{t_m} \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge C_{\pi} \\ \wedge (B_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B_m \rightarrow \perp)[\bar{y} := \bar{e}]) \end{aligned}$$

is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

The formula $\forall \bar{w} (\bar{a} = \bar{a}' \rightarrow (b = b')[\bar{y} := \bar{e}])$ is true in $\{0, 1\}$. Since it is a Horn clause, it is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements (Lemma 9). Therefore the formula

$$\begin{aligned} \exists \bar{w} (C_{t_1} \wedge \dots \wedge C_{t_m} \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge C_{\pi} \\ \wedge (B_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow B_m \rightarrow b \neq b')[\bar{y} := \bar{e}]) \end{aligned}$$

is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. This formula is a logical consequence of the formula

$$\exists \bar{w} (C_{t_1} \wedge \dots \wedge C_{t_m} \wedge C_{\pi} \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}') \wedge A),$$

which is itself a logical consequence of the formula

$$\exists \bar{w} (C_p \wedge (\bar{a} = \bar{a}')).$$

Therefore, this last formula is false in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. \square

This completes the proof of Theorem 11.

6 Application: sequentialisation in a denotational model of the λ_c -calculus

It is known [12] that, by performing Scott's construction D_{∞} with $D_0 = \{\perp, \top\}$ (the two-elements lattice), one obtains a denotational model of the λ_c -calculus. As with any such model, one natural question [11] is: among its elements, which ones are sequentialisable. In other words, which ones are the denotation of an actual λ_c -term. We will show how the techniques developed in this paper can give a partial answer.

6.1 The construction of D_{∞}

We recall the construction of D_{∞} [1]. The first step is to define a finite lattice D_n for all natural numbers n . We let:

- $D_0 = \{\perp, \top\}$ (the two-elements lattice, with $\perp < \top$),
- $D_{n+1} = [D_n \rightarrow D_n]$ (the complete lattice of all Scott-continuous functions from D_n to D_n , which is the same as the lattice of all non-decreasing functions, because D_n is finite).

Then for all n we define an injection $\varphi_n \in [D_n \rightarrow D_{n+1}]$ and a projection $\psi_n \in [D_{n+1} \rightarrow D_n]$:

- for all $\alpha \in D_0$, $\varphi_0(\alpha)$ is the function $\beta \mapsto \alpha$,
- for all $f \in D_1$, $\psi_0(f) = f(\perp)$
- for all $n \geq 0$ and all $\alpha \in D_{n+1}$, $\varphi_{n+1}(\alpha) = \varphi_n \circ \alpha \circ \psi_n$,
- for all $n \geq 0$ and all $f \in D_{n+2}$, $\psi_{n+1}(f) = \psi_n \circ f \circ \varphi_n$.

Finally, we define D_{∞} as the limit of the diagram $(D_n, \psi_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ in the category of complete lattices and Scott-continuous functions, namely:

$$D_{\infty} = \{\alpha = (\alpha_{[n]} \in D_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}; \forall n \alpha_{[n]} = \psi_n(\alpha_{[n+1]})\}.$$

In fact, D_{∞} is also a colimit of the diagram $(D_n, \varphi_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ [1]; for all n , the injection from D_n into D_{∞} is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha_{[n]} \mapsto & (\psi_0 \circ \dots \circ \psi_{n-1}(\alpha_{[n]}), \dots, \psi_{n-1}(\alpha_{[n]}), \\ & \alpha_{[n]}, \\ & \varphi_n(\alpha_{[n]}), \varphi_{n+1} \circ \varphi_n(\alpha_{[n]}), \dots). \end{aligned}$$

As is customary with colimits, we identify each D_n with the corresponding subset of D_{∞} .

This defines an extensional reflexive object in the category of complete lattices and Scott-continuous functions, because

we can define two inverse isomorphisms $\Phi : D_\infty \rightarrow [D_\infty \rightarrow D_\infty]$ and $\Psi : [D_\infty \rightarrow D_\infty] \rightarrow D_\infty$:

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi((\alpha_{[n]})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}) &= (\beta_{[n]})_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \mapsto (\alpha_{[n+1]}(\beta_{[n]}))_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \\ \Psi(f) &= (\gamma_{[n]})_{n \in \mathbb{N}}, \text{ where} \\ \gamma_{[0]} &= f(\perp)_{[0]} \in D_0, \\ \gamma_{[n+1]} &= (\alpha_{[n]} \mapsto f(\alpha_{[n]})_{[n]}) \in D_{n+1}. \end{aligned}$$

A model of the λ_c -calculus. It is known [12] that D_∞ can be equipped with the structure of a model of the λ_c -calculus. One way to present this structure is as follows: for each λ_c -term t and each list x_1, \dots, x_n of pairwise distinct variables containing at least all the free variables of t , define a Scott-continuous function $\llbracket t \rrbracket : D_\infty^n \rightarrow D_\infty$:

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket x_k \rrbracket(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) &= \alpha_k \\ \llbracket \lambda x_{n+1}. t \rrbracket(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) &= \Psi(\alpha_{n+1} \mapsto \llbracket t \rrbracket(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n+1})) \\ \llbracket tu \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) &= \Phi(\llbracket t \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}))(\llbracket u \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha})) \\ \llbracket \zeta_m \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) = \llbracket \eta_m \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) &= \perp \\ \llbracket k_{t_1 \dots t_m} \omega \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) &= \llbracket \lambda y. y t_1 \dots t_m \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) \\ \llbracket cc \rrbracket(\bar{\alpha}) &= \bigvee_{\beta, \gamma \in D_\infty} ((\beta \rightarrow \gamma) \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \beta, \\ &\text{ where } \delta \rightarrow \varepsilon \text{ is the least} \\ &\text{ element of } D_\infty \text{ such that} \\ &\Phi(\delta \rightarrow \varepsilon)(\delta) \geq \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

This structure is compatible with evaluation in the Krivine abstract machine [12]: for all closed λ_c -terms $t, t', u_1, \dots, u_n, u'_1, \dots, u'_n$, if

$$t \star u_1 \dots u_n \cdot \omega > t' \star u'_1 \dots u'_n \cdot \omega,$$

then $\llbracket t u_1 \dots u_n \rrbracket = \llbracket t' u'_1 \dots u'_n \rrbracket$.

In addition, this model characterises solvability [12]. Namely, for each closed term t , we have $\llbracket t \rrbracket > \perp$ if and only if there exist $k \leq n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for each stack $u_1 \dots u_n \cdot \pi$, there exists a stack π' such that

$$t \star u_1 \dots u_n \cdot \pi > u_k \star \pi'.$$

6.2 Sequentialisation

In this context, the problem of sequentialisation can be formulated as follows: given $\alpha \in D_\infty$, is there a closed λ_c -term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket = \alpha$? We will show how the techniques developed in this paper can answer a simplified version of this problem. Namely, whenever α is in D_n for some finite n , we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a closed λ_c -term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \alpha$.

Remark 17. Alternatively, one might also ask whether there exists a *proof-like* term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \alpha$. However, due to how $\llbracket \eta_m \rrbracket$ and $\llbracket k_\pi \rrbracket$ are defined, we have that for each closed λ_c -term t , there exists a proof-like term t' such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket = \llbracket t' \rrbracket$, so that is in fact the same question.

Remark 18. One can prove that the set $\bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} D_n$ is in fact the least subset of D_∞ that contains \perp and \top and is closed under the binary operations \vee and \rightarrow (where $\delta \rightarrow \varepsilon$ is defined as the least element of D_∞ such that $\Phi(\delta \rightarrow \varepsilon)(\delta) \geq \varepsilon$).

Interpreting first-order formulas in D_∞ . For each closed first-order formula A , we can define an element $\llbracket A \rrbracket \in D_\infty$:

$$\begin{aligned} \bullet \llbracket a \neq b \rrbracket &= \begin{cases} \perp & \text{if } a \neq b \text{ is true,} \\ \top & \text{if } a \neq b \text{ is false} \end{cases} \\ \bullet \llbracket A \rightarrow B \rrbracket &= \llbracket A \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket B \rrbracket, \\ \bullet \llbracket \forall x A \rrbracket &= \llbracket A \rrbracket(0) \vee \llbracket A \rrbracket(1) \end{aligned}$$

In fact, for each A , there exists n such that $\llbracket A \rrbracket$ is in D_n . Conversely, thanks to Remark 18, for all n and all $\alpha \in D_n$, one can construct inductively a closed formula Θ_α such that $\llbracket \Theta_\alpha \rrbracket = \alpha$.

True formulas give sequentialisable elements. These two translations, from λ_c -terms and first-order formulas into D_∞ , are linked by a variant of the adequacy lemma (Lemma 2), which can be proved using the same standard techniques:

Lemma 19. *Let $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : B$ be a valid typing judgement (with A_1, \dots, A_n closed), and let u_1, \dots, u_n be closed λ_c -terms. If $\llbracket u_1 \rrbracket \geq \llbracket A_1 \rrbracket, \dots, \llbracket u_n \rrbracket \geq \llbracket A_n \rrbracket$, then $\llbracket t \rrbracket(\llbracket u_1 \rrbracket, \dots, \llbracket u_n \rrbracket) \geq \llbracket B \rrbracket$.*

In addition, a variant of Lemma 7 also holds in D_∞ (with essentially the same proof):

Lemma 20. *Let A be a closed first-order formula that is true in the Boolean algebra $\{0, 1\}$.*

- If A is of the form $\forall \bar{z} a \neq b$, $\llbracket A \rrbracket = \perp \leq \llbracket t \rrbracket$ for all closed λ_c -terms t ;
- If A is of the form $\forall \bar{z} a = b$, then $\llbracket A \rrbracket = (\top \rightarrow \top) \leq \llbracket \lambda x. x \rrbracket$.

As a result, for each closed first-order formula A , if A is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements, then there exists a (proof-like) closed λ_c -term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \llbracket A \rrbracket$.

Sequentialisation gives universal realizers. Given two closed first-order formulas A and B , if $\llbracket A \rrbracket \geq \llbracket B \rrbracket$, then for all poles \perp , we have $\llbracket A \rrbracket_{\perp} \geq \llbracket B \rrbracket_{\perp}$. This can be proved by induction on the pair $(\min(h_A, h_B), \max(h_A, h_B))$ (where h_A and h_B denote the heights of A and B respectively), using the decomposition from section 3.1 (the single-level version).

In addition, for each closed λ_c -term t and each closed first-order formula A , one can prove by induction on the structure of t that if $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \llbracket A \rrbracket$, then t realizes A universally. More precisely, for each pole \perp and each λ_c -term t with free variables \bar{x} , one can prove by induction on t that for all closed formulas A, \bar{B} , if $\llbracket t \rrbracket(\llbracket \bar{B} \rrbracket) \geq \llbracket A \rrbracket$, then for all \bar{s} that realize \bar{B} , $t[\bar{x} := \bar{s}]$ realizes A . The proof has much in common with the proof of the adequacy lemma, but it relies heavily on the previous paragraph.

Thanks to Theorem 11 (and Remark 18), this means that for all closed first-order formulas A , if there exists a closed λ_c -term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \llbracket A \rrbracket$, then A is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements.

Combining all these results, we get:

Proposition 21. *Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\alpha \in D_n$. The following two statements are equivalent:*

- *There exists a closed λ_c -term t such that $\llbracket t \rrbracket \geq \alpha$,*
- *The formula Θ_α is true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements (where Θ_α is any closed first-order formula such that $\llbracket \Theta_\alpha \rrbracket = \alpha$. Such a Θ_α does exist for all α and it can be obtained effectively. The choice of Θ_α does not matter).*

7 Concluding remarks

We have proved that the only *first-order* formulas that are true in the characteristic Boolean algebra ($\mathbb{J}2$) of every classical realizability model are those that are true in all Boolean algebras with at least two elements. In a sense, as far as the first order is concerned, the only thing we always know about $\mathbb{J}2$ is that it is a Boolean algebra with at least two elements. This does not extend to the second order: indeed, for example, Krivine [6] has proved that there always exists an ultrafilter on $\mathbb{J}2$, even though the axiom of choice does not necessarily hold in a realizability model. This raises the question: what are the second- and higher-order properties of $\mathbb{J}2$ that are true in all realizability models? And what about $\mathbb{J}\mathbb{N}$?

In a different direction, it would be interesting to know if and to what extent the technique presented in section 6 can be adapted to other denotational models of the lambda-calculus, and notably to non-lattice and non-continuations-based models.

References

- [1] Hendrik Pieter Barendregt. 1985. *The lambda calculus - its syntax and semantics*. Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, Vol. 103. North-Holland.
- [2] Stanley Burris and H. P. Sankappanavar. 1981. *A Course in Universal Algebra*. Springer.
- [3] Guillaume Geoffroy. 2018. Classical realizability as a classifier for non-determinism. *Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science* (Jul 2018). <https://doi.org/10.1145/3209108.3209140>
- [4] Timothy G. Griffin. 1990. A Formulae-as-type Notion of Control. In *Proceedings of the 17th ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages* (San Francisco, California, USA) (POPL '90). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 47–58. <https://doi.org/10.1145/96709.96714>
- [5] Jean-Louis Krivine. 2011. Realizability algebras: a program to well order \mathbb{R} . *Logical Methods in Computer Science* 7, 3:02 (2011), 1–47. [https://doi.org/10.2168/LMCS-7\(3:2\)2011](https://doi.org/10.2168/LMCS-7(3:2)2011)
- [6] Jean-Louis Krivine. 2015. On the structure of classical realizability models of ZF. In *Proceedings TYPES 2014 - LIPICs*, Vol. 39. 146–161. <http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1868>
- [7] Jean-Louis Krivine. 2003. Dependent Choice, ‘Quote’ and the Clock. *Theor. Comput. Sci.* 308, 1-3 (Nov. 2003), 259–276. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975\(02\)00776-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3975(02)00776-4)
- [8] Jean-Louis Krivine. 2012. Realizability algebras II : new models of ZF + DC. *Logical Methods in Computer Science* 8, 1:10 (Feb. 2012), 1–28. [https://doi.org/10.2168/LMCS-8\(1:10\)2012](https://doi.org/10.2168/LMCS-8(1:10)2012)
- [9] Jean-Louis Krivine. 2021. A program for the full axiom of choice. *Logical Methods in Computer Science* Volume 17, Issue 3 (Sep 2021). [https://doi.org/10.46298/lmcs-17\(3:2\)2021](https://doi.org/10.46298/lmcs-17(3:2)2021)
- [10] Alexandre Miquel. 2011. Forcing as a Program Transformation. In *Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, LICS 2011*. IEEE Computer Society, Toronto, Canada, 197–206. <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00800558>
- [11] Dana S. Scott. 1993, first written 1969. A Type-Theoretical Alternative to ISWIM, CUCH, OWHY. *Theor. Comput. Sci.* 121, 1&2 (1993, first written 1969), 411–440. <http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/tcs/tcs121.html#Scott93>
- [12] Th. Streicher and B. Reus. 1998. Classical logic, continuation semantics and abstract machines. *Journal of Functional Programming* 8, 6 (1998), 543–572. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0956796898003141>