The collective schedules problem consists in computing a schedule of tasks shared between individuals. Tasks may have different duration, and individuals have preferences over the order of the shared tasks. This problem has numerous applications since tasks may model public infrastructure projects, events taking place in a shared room, or work done by co-workers. Our aim is, given the preferred schedules of individuals (voters), to return a consensus schedule. We propose an axiomatic study of the collective schedule problem, by using classic axioms in computational social choice and new axioms that take into account the duration of the tasks. We show that some axioms are incompatible, and we study the axioms fulfilled by three rules: one which has been studied in the seminal paper on collective schedules, one which generalizes the Kemeny rule, and one which generalizes Spearman’s footrule. From an algorithmic point of view, we show that these rules solve NP-hard problems, but that it is possible to solve optimally these problems for small but realistic size instances, and we give an efficient heuristic for large instances. We conclude this paper with experiments.