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# **“Econosophy”: limits and opportunities of a transdisciplinary approach to philosophy and economics**

**Valentina Erasmo<sup>1</sup>**

“The success of economists in moving into the other social sciences is a sign that they possess certain advantages in handling the problems of those disciplines”  
(R. H. Coase, 1978, p. 209)

## **0. Abstract (153 parole)**

This paper considers how the dialogue between economics and philosophy might give origins to a transdisciplinary approach (Bernstein 2015, Davis 2022) that I would call “econosophy”. This approach might produce a hybrid field characterized by high specialization in research that leads to nuanced disciplinary boundaries among the disciplines involved (Davis, 2018). In this regard, this paper will show limits and opportunities deriving from econosophy: about these limits, on the one hand, mainstream economics would potentially oppose this approach because favored the blurring of disciplinary boundaries; on the other hand, the non-exhaustiveness of the econosophical approach because there are issues that appears to be outside this intersection (e.g., econometrics, logics, metaphysics, statistics, and theology). About these opportunities, an econosophical perspective offers a methodological base for enhancing the dialogue between philosophy and economics through a high level of specialization that might improve the scientific dignity of these studies against the potential criticism of mainstream economics.

**KEYWORDS:** disciplinary (boundaries, interaction, relationships); econosophy; interfield research; transdisciplinarity.

## **1. Introduction**

One of the most widespread criticisms about modern economics is that several economists embraced scientific reductionism and privileged static economic models for analyzing a complex and instable reality like that of economics (Van der Berg, 2012). The origins of scientific reductionism in economics are very old and they might be principally traced among the Anglo-Saxon economists and their forerunner, such as Alfred Marshall and his *Principles of Economics* (1890). At the ending of the nineteenth century, this essay favored the diffusion of the neoclassical paradigm-that acknowledges scientific reductionism- in mainstream economics.

In this respect, neoclassical economists shared the refusal of broader explanations for economic outcome and adopted a more linear perspective in their economic analysis where only specific economic questions were examined, while disciplinary relationships were set apart from their studies. Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, neoclassical economists mostly focused on the analysis of market, especially banking, finance, individual markets, and resource allocation, availing of a reductionist approach (Nicolaidis, 1988). These scholars were oriented to this kind of analysis because they believed that economics ought to define which were the best institutions and/or economic policies in organized markets only.

Albeit this persisting trend, since the ending of the Sixties, some economists began to focus on methodological issues because economics was expanding its disciplinary boundaries and/or

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increasing its interactions also with other disciplines. This focus derives from the recognition that economics take advantage from handling the problems of other disciplines, as reminded in the epigraph (Coase, 1978). Many recent research programmes like agent-based complexity economics, behavioral economics, the capability approach cognitive and experimental economics, evolutionary game theory, new institutional economics, neuroeconomics have confirmed this methodological trend and deviated from the neoclassical core, locating in a 'mainstream pluralism' (Davis, 2006) where specialization exists without a reductionist monism<sup>2</sup> (Cedrini and Fontana, 2018).

However, the reductionist trend already survives among mainstream and/or orthodox neoclassical economists together with all its limits. Yesterday as today, among these limits, we should point out, on the one hand, the idea that it is satisfactory to analyze economic system's main components and their functioning in organized markets only; on the other hand, in turn, the missing consideration of the relationships between economics and all those disciplines that are in dialogue with it. These limits are relevant because economics is significantly affected by non-economic variables like those environmental, social, and political ones, among many others.

At the light of these limits, the dialogue between economics and philosophy could offer the methodological opportunity to develop a perspective that might be able, on the one hand, to acknowledge the relationships between economics and other disciplines (in this case, philosophy); on the other time, at the same time, to offer a specialized knowledge in line with the high degree of specialization generally required in scientific studies.

This paper considers how the dialogue between economics and philosophy might give origins to a transdisciplinary approach that I would call "economics philosophy". More in depth, economics philosophy analyses the same domain of inquiry of the philosophy of economics (Hausman, 1994), such as action theory<sup>3</sup>, ethics (or normative, social, and political philosophy) and economics, philosophy of science and economics. Differently from philosophy of economics, economics philosophy is based on a transdisciplinary perspective (Bernstein, 2015; Cat, 2017) where the dialogue between economics and philosophy might be finally understood as an intersection between these two disciplines. In accordance with a transdisciplinary approach, this "economics philosophical" intersection produces a hybrid field characterized by high specialization in research that leads to nuanced disciplinary boundaries among the disciplines involved (Davis, 2018). This is what happened, for example, in economic methodology.

This paper is composed as follows: Section 2 will be an overview of the main forms of disciplinary relationships from crossdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity. This overview is seminal to introduce the disciplinary relationship that exists between economics and philosophy in economics philosophy and how this interfield research differs compared to other approaches where two or more disciplines are involved. Then, in Section 3, I will provide a "manifesto of economics philosophy" as a transdisciplinary approach to philosophy and economics, defining his main research interests, his methodology, his ideal audience, and his analogies and differences compared to other approaches which compares with economics and philosophy. In Section 4, I will analyze limits and opportunities of economics philosophy that respectively concerns, on the one hand, the potential opposition by mainstream economists and the point that it is

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<sup>2</sup> As Cedrini and Fontana (2018) emphasized, the phenomenon of specialization is an "inevitable consequence of the maturing of economics" (Turnovski, 1991, p. 143) due to the progress made in economics. Since this progress, it also follows that more detailed knowledge and skills are required.

<sup>3</sup> Although is part of philosophy of economics, action theory was born in sociological studies, introduced by Talcott Parsons. This is a theory of social action where Parsons integrated the analysis of social action and social order with macro and micro elements (Múnch, 2010). Action theory is an interfield research that comes from sociology and economics, not from philosophy and economics. So, I will not further explore this discipline in this work because I decided to focus on philosophy and economics only.

not an exhaustive approach to philosophy and economics; on the other hand, at the same time, econosophy offers a methodological (transdisciplinary) base for enhancing the dialogue between philosophy and economics and improving the scientific dignity of these studies against the criticism of mainstream economics. Then, some concluding remarks.

## **2. From crossdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity: an overview on the main forms of disciplinary boundaries and disciplinary relationships**

How may we imagine disciplinary boundaries? One of the most beautiful images is offered by Coase (1978): according to him, disciplinary boundaries are determined by competition between disciplines, like they were firms. In this analysis, Coase (1978) took an even more interesting leaf out of history, such as comparing disciplinary boundaries to the extent of empires. In this respect, he mentioned the historical writer Edward Gibbon (1776) and his description of Augustus' acceptance of the redefinition of Roman Empire's boundaries. Coase (1978) emphasized that Gibbon supported that it was easy for Augustus to realize that:

"Rome, in her present exalted situation, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms; and that, in the prosecution of remote wars, the undertaking became every day more difficult, the event more doubtful, and the possession more precarious, and less beneficial" (Gibbon, 1776, p. (...), quoted in Coase, 1978, p. 202)

As Augustus and his acceptance of a division of the Roman Empire into a different set of boundaries, academic scholars should accept that their disciplines might extend or narrow their disciplinary boundaries compared to the questions they have to address. Since the ending of the Sixties, when Coase (1978) wrote his contribution, economics began to expand its disciplinary boundaries and/or increased its interactions also with other disciplines.

For better understanding how these interactions changed the shape of economics, an overview on the main forms of disciplinary relationships is needed. In this overview, I adopted Jodi Cat (2017) classification because this is the most complete and recent one<sup>4</sup>. According to this classification, there are four forms of disciplinary relationships, such as crossdisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, multidisciplinary, and transdisciplinarity. Cat's classification enables us to better analyze the disciplines involved and characterized their interaction in terms of closeness or openness they have to each other. In particular, Cat's classification shows, on the one hand, how much these disciplines are respectively affected by this interaction; on the other hand, how this interaction is able to produce new interfield research (such as new discipline or project) that, in turn, also influences the disciplines from which these interfields derive (Davis, 2022). As Ambrosino, Cedrini and Davis (2021) pointed out, "disciplines influence each other not only by exporting their ideas but also by locating new territories within other disciplines outside their own, thereby influencing existing disciplinary forms through greater degrees of integration" (p. 634).

On the basis of Cat (2017), crossdisciplinarity represents the most closed disciplinary interaction because it "involves borrowing resources from one discipline to serve the aims of a project in another". In this case, the disciplines involved are largely unaffected by interaction and no interfield research discipline follows from this interaction (Davis, 2022). Interdisciplinarity is the second most closed example of disciplinary interaction: this kind of disciplinary relationship creates a new interfield research where the original disciplines are not extensively affected by their interaction because the influence of interfield research is relatively weak. In contemporary economics, interdisciplinarity is probably the prevailing form of disciplinary relationships.

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<sup>4</sup> This passage is drawn upon Davis (2022) being the most authoritative and recent reference on this issue.

Then, multidisciplinary where the disciplines involved are juxtaposed in their treatments, but their scholars get together at the aim to address a common issue. In this case, we have an open approach because the disciplines are relevantly affected by their interaction and interfield research is able to compete with the original disciplines. An example of multidisciplinary is complexity economics that is focused on the need to introduce that complexity reasoning that characterizes many disciplines into economics (Davis, 2006). Among these forms of disciplinary relationships, “multidisciplinary” is probably the oldest term (Colander et al., 2004): at the very early beginning, the contribution of every discipline involved could be enough identifiable in the interfield research because everyone kept their distinct identities in the contribution provided, like they were different chapters of the same book.

Finally, there is transdisciplinarity which will devote most of our attention because this approach is at the basis of econosophy. It is generally acknowledged that the concept of transdisciplinarity was introduced by the psychologist Jean Piaget (1972) during a seminar about the phenomenon of interaction among disciplines in academics -with a focus on interdisciplinarity-held at the University of Nice (López-Huertas, 2013). In his conclusions, Piaget defined interdisciplinarity in terms of a “higher stage succeeding interdisciplinary relationships” (Piaget, 1972, p. 138) that covers interactions among disciplines and elaborated an interfield research without tight disciplinary boundaries (Bernstein, 2015).

This interfield research can even encompass works from the original disciplines (Repko 2012). In this regard, transdisciplinarity offers a knowledge that goes beyond disciplinary boundaries because it follows a process that recombines information from the original disciplines towards a new disciplinary form. This process is possible because this recombination of information is due to the breaking down of the original disciplines into their basic elements and their recombination into a new interfield research (Alvargonzalez, 2011). Since this phenomenon of recombination, transdisciplinarity includes the flow of information among different disciplines in terms of ‘unity amidst diversity’ and ‘diversity through unity’ (Nicolescu, 1987). At the basis of transdisciplinarity, thus, there is an act of deconstruction that admits that an object can belong to different levels of reality where conflicts, contradictions, and paradoxes are included (Klein, 2004).

An example of transdisciplinarity is econophysics that was born as a multidisciplinary field but has the ambition to become transdisciplinary, elaborating a new hybrid field (Ambrosino et al., 2021). Another possible example of transdisciplinarity is represented by ecological economics that has favored the diffusion of the term to describe deep interactions among disciplines that lead to new synthesis (Colander, 2004). All these elements make transdisciplinarity the most opened example of interfield research.

### **3. “A manifesto of econosophy”: its main research interests, methodology, audience, and analogies-differences compared to other approaches**

Once analyzed what transdisciplinarity is compared to disciplinary boundaries and disciplinary relationships, we have to provide a “manifesto of econosophy” is. For this purpose, it is seminal to define which might be its main research interests, its ideal audience, its methodology and its analogies and differences compared to other approaches which compares with economics and philosophy, for example, like philosophy of economics. This comparison is useful for better defining the distinguishing features of econosophy.

About the main research interests, econosophy should analyse the same domain of inquiry of the philosophy of economics (Hausman, 1994), such as action theory, ethics (or normative, social, and political philosophy) and economics, philosophy of science and economics. These domains of inquiries

often overlap, especially when we refer to ontology and gnoseology of economic phenomena and rational choice theory. Therefore, the distinction in action theory, ethics and economics, philosophy of science and economics is helpful for better establishing the main subjects of philosophy of economics.

In respect to their respective domains of inquiries, philosophy of economics and econosophy might also have in common the same philosophical theses and their audience, especially scholars from fields like political and social philosophy, as well as philosophical sociology (Hausman, 1994). Thus, “econosophers” might be philosophers by training but interested in economics and vice versa, as well as its audience might be potentially composed of economists engaged in epistemology and philosophy of science or philosophers with marked interests in economic methodology. They will mostly adopt philosophical reasoning.

The methodology of econosophy will be transdisciplinary. This methodology might be summarized into three axioms, such as the ontological axiom, the logical axiom, and the complexity axiom (Nicolescu, 2010). According to the ontological axiom: “there are, in Nature and society and in our knowledge of Nature and society, different levels of Reality of the Object and, correspondingly, different levels of Reality of the Subject” (Nicolescu, 2010, p. 22). Instead, for the logical axiom “the passage from one level of Reality to another is ensured by the logic of the included middle” (p. 22). Finally, the complexity axiom establishes that “the structure of the totality of levels of Reality or perception is a complex structure: every level is what it is because all the levels exist at the same time” (p. 22). The first two axioms have their basis in physics, but they are suitable for going beyond that understanding of economics as a natural science-that it would be unacceptable from an econosophical approach. Instead, the third axiom is also based on other human sciences, including social sciences that will play an essential role in econosophy. Thus, econosophy puts its emphasis especially on the third axiom, understanding the reality as a complex structure where every level is interconnected to the others in time, but also in space.

The ideal audience of econosophy might be composed of human sciences scholars from (not only philosophers and economists, but also pedagogists, psychologists, and sociologists) interested in boundaries questions between philosophy and economics. Econosophy might be appealing for human sciences scholars because understood economics as a social science. This understanding of economics as social science is not new in the history of economic thought and methodology. In his obituary in honor of Alfred Marshall, Keynes (1924) introduced the distinction between natural and social sciences. On the basis of this distinction, natural sciences are oriented to the study of material phenomena, while social (as well as moral) sciences are oriented to psychological phenomena. According to Keynes (1924), economics is a social science because it is different from that clearness, determinism, linearity, and regularity of natural sciences (Coates, 1996). Differently from neoclassical economics and its scientific reductionism that considered economics like a natural science, Keynes suggested that economy is a very complex reality where a state of rest is highly improbable (Erasmus, 2022). This distinction between natural and social sciences demands the urgency to acknowledge that economics cannot be analyzed from a physical and monistic perspective. On the contrary, the analysis of economic phenomena requires the adoption of a social and plural perspective that we might also apply in the dialogue between economics and philosophy.

Economics should include the study of social aspects, as emphasized by economists and sociologists: among these scholars, we should remember the contributions of Mirowski, Sent, Wade Hands and Weintraub (Maki, 2012). Not only these scholars devoted a significant effort to highlight the influence of social aspects on economics, but they also considered the relationship between economics and philosophy. This effort is important for a better analysis of the philosophy of economics. In turn, this effort is also useful towards econosophy since they share the same domains of inquiry.

According to the mentioned above scholars, economics is gradually “naturalizing” the philosophy of science because philosophy is adopting tools that derive from sciences. Likewise, economics has

social elements that demand a “socialization” of philosophy bringing elements from social sciences. In this respect, econosophy might refuse a naturalization of the philosophy of science because the interfield research deriving from a transdisciplinary approach does not enable to distinguish the disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and economics. Indeed, transdisciplinarity “produces a new hybrid field that develops in a free-standing way outside of the fields which contribute to it that presumably bears less of the imprint of its contributing disciplines” (Davis, 2018, p. 63). So, it would be improper to talk about a naturalization of philosophy of science in econosophy, differently compared to what happens in philosophy of economics. Instead, about the socialization of philosophy, this process certainly will occur because econosophy might also consider those non-economic variables who acts in the dialogue between philosophy and economics, socializing both philosophy and economics.

Economics should also include a plural perspective in its dialogue with philosophy from an econosophical perspective: the right way to think pluralism in econosophy is not that pluralism to which heterodox economists refers- a generical pluralism in economics-rather a more constructive pluralism that adopts the perspective of social sciences (Colander, 2014). This perspective is in line with the understanding of economics in econosophy, such as economics as a social science. Among these sciences, philosophy has a pivotal, but not exclusive role for better understanding the economic reality against monistic reductionism.

Considering these analogies and differences, the most relevant difference between philosophy of economics and econosophy is methodological and it should be found in the transdisciplinary perspective (Bernstein, 2015; Cat, 2017) adopted by econosophy. This is what still happens in economic methodology. One of the effects of high level of specializations in research is that disciplinary boundaries become more nuanced (Davis, 2018): this is what has already happened in economic methodology that might be considered a first example of econosophical approach.

#### **4. Further exploring “econosophy”: limits and opportunities**

Econosophy might provide new opportunities in the dialogue between economics and philosophy, but this approach is certainly not without limits. About the main limits, we should consider, on the one hand, the potential opposition of mainstream economics compared to this approach; on the other hand, the non-exhaustiveness of the econosophical approach to philosophy and economics.

Since econosophy represents a reversal compared to that reductionist monism of mainstream economics, these scholars could potential opposite econosophy from their old criticism towards those who have already favored the blurring of disciplinary boundaries, promoting interdisciplinarity in economics, like Bataille, Foucault, Habermas, and Sen, just to name a few (Giri, 2002). But econosophy is based on transdisciplinarity that is even a more radical approach compared to interdisciplinarity, as seen in Section 2. Transdisciplinarity significantly reduces disciplinary boundaries compared to interdisciplinarity. In this way, it becomes hard to distinguish what concerns the field of philosophy and what concerns the field of economics because their interfield research is naturally intertwined.

Probably one of best examples of this intertwining is represented by the analysis of social choice theory provided by non-standard mainstream economists: for example, when we analyze what economic agents are and which are their (rational) motivations in decision making, it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish the disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and economics (at least, if we also consider non-selfish economic motives and a broad understanding of rationality, refusing reductionism). In this domain of inquiry, we assist to a very deep interaction among disciplines that leads to a new synthesis especially when ethical elements are not avoided.

For instance, we might consider Sen’s analysis of what economic agents are: since his earlier works, Sen (1977, 1985) reintroduced categories like those of normativity, responsibility, and rights in

social choice theory for offering a superior welfare economics' framework compared to that prevailing in mainstream economics (Erasmus, 2022). Differently from mainstream economists and their neglect of ethical elements in social choice theory, Sen acknowledged the importance of these more philosophical elements in individual decision-making. This acknowledgment leads to the building of responsible economic agents (better known as "rational fools") in social choice theory who are also careful of the consequences of their decisions on others' well-being. In a case like this, it is hard to define the disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and economics because we are in front of an "ethical social choice theory" that might be considered an econosophical social choice theory.

But Sen's understanding of economic agents has already been criticized by mainstream economists. According to Khalil (1999), the weakest point of Sen's understanding of economic agents is represented by his notion of commitment. This notion is problematic because makes economic agents pursue certain goals or make certain choices sometimes against their own individual welfare. The reason why for this economic behavior is that economic agents are also inspired by ethical reasons when they follow commitment in decision-making. So, they enter commitment without considering their individual interests. Under a methodological profile, the interaction between philosophy and economics becomes so close that it is hard to distinguish the disciplinary boundaries between these two disciplines in decision-making. On the contrary, Khalil (1999) reduced all kind of commitments to interest in order to avoid those economic behaviors that make economic agents like "sentimental fools". Khalil's criticism towards an ethical social choice theory is a valuable example about how mainstream economists might criticize econosophy, for example, in social choice theory, confirming their methodological need to carefully distinguish disciplinary boundaries.

At the same time, about its limits, there is the non-exhaustiveness of the econosophical approach to economics and philosophy because there are issues that are respectively outside this intersection. For instance, there are issues related to economics or philosophy only, like those respectively studied by econometrics, metaphysics, statistics, and theology. Their disciplinary boundaries do not enable to have interaction between philosophy and economics because they are focused on elements that will never dialogue with other subjects. Furthermore, there is another limit about econosophy that concerns academic contexts, and it is mostly represented by its distinguishing transdisciplinarity. This approach is at the basis of econosophy and it is simultaneously the biggest opportunity and the worst limit of transdisciplinarity. It depends on the perspective adopted. At the eyes of mainstream economists, econosophers might be "too much economists to be philosophers, too much philosophers to be economists" because of the nuanced disciplinary boundaries between philosophy and economics.

About the opportunities, an econosophical approach might offer a methodological base for enhancing the dialogue between philosophy and economics through a high level of specialization that might improve the scientific dignity of these studies against the potential criticism of mainstream economics. As previously discussed in Section 2 and 3, econosophy is focused on a broad domain of inquiry compared to ethics and economics that also includes action theory and philosophy of science and economics. Among the already existent approaches to this domain of inquiry, we might consider ethics and economics, in particular, the recent works of White (2018) and Davis (2018). According to White, ethics and economics should be understood as a crossdisciplinary field, while Davis (2018) opened the doors to transdisciplinarity in ethics and economics, understanding this interfield research as a complexity theory approach<sup>5</sup>. Thus, econosophy is mostly indebted to Davis (2018) for his effort to enhance the dialogue between ethics and economics towards transdisciplinarity. But we have to proceed gradually.

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<sup>5</sup> Although Davis (2018) focused on transdisciplinarity in the relationship between ethics and economics, he is tendentially more oriented to multidisciplinary for the success of the dialogue between economics and philosophy. For more, see Davis (2019).

White (2018) argued that ethics and economics is a crossdisciplinary field within economics that has two different kinds of development: “one, carried out largely by heterodox economists, is essentially a critical discourse that examines what is regarded as a misuse and distortion of concepts and theories borrowed from ethics in their introduction into economics. The other, carried out mostly by orthodox or mainstream economists, he labels ‘accommodationist’ to capture their goal of adapting concepts and theories from ethics to the goals of explanation in economics” (Davis, 2018, p. 58).

Since his development of ethics and economics, White (2018) makes the first field closer to philosophy of economics, while the second field represents an accommodation of ethics to mainstream economics. Although White (2018) undoubtedly suggested an interesting understanding of ethics and economics, his proposal is based on crossdisciplinarity where the original disciplines are mostly unaffected by their interaction. Instead, the most important opportunity offered by econosophy is a high level of specialization thanks to transdisciplinarity, such as the same disciplinary relationship that we might find in Davis (2018). In his comment to White (2018), Davis (2018) emphasized that White also suggested multidisciplinarity as an alternative to crossdisciplinarity, but he went a step further and considered the opportunity to make economics and ethics a transdisciplinary perspective.

For this purpose, Davis (2018) understood economics and ethics as a complexity theory approach<sup>6</sup>. Towards transdisciplinarity in ethics and economics, he suggested to overcome the separation between researchers’ training and professionalization because specialization is equally important to research activity for their analysis of economic reality. It follows that highly specialized scholars might become experts on equally highly specialized topics. This high specialization represents the biggest opportunity also for econosophy because it might be also applied to the other issues that are interesting for this interfield research, like action theory and philosophy of science and economics.

## 5. Concluding remarks

This paper considers how the dialogue between economics and philosophy might give origins to econosophy. Once provided its manifesto, the exploration of econosophy has shown how specialization is the main opportunity offered by this approach.

Specialization certainly has consequences, as Davis (2018) highlighted in his transdisciplinary proposal to ethics and economics: on the one hand, disciplines might become more and more fragmented, and scholars often do not have incentive for synthesizing the result of this disciplinary fragmentation; on the other hand, in turn, those nuanced disciplinary boundaries we have in transdisciplinary approach do not help to understand what the disciplines are as a whole. These consequences would be the same if we apply transdisciplinarity not only to ethics and economics, but also to action theory and philosophy of science and economics, such as the broad domain of inquiry of econosophy.

Although these consequences also meet the mentioned above limits of econosophy, we have to wonder about the costs-benefits of this transdisciplinary approach to economics and philosophy. In the dialogue between philosophy and economics, a high level of specialization together with a plural and social understanding of economics based on transdisciplinarity is the ideal alternative to that reductionism that already survives among mainstream and/or orthodox neoclassical economists. At the same time, this high level of specialization that characterizes econosophy is able to communicate with mainstream pluralist economists.

Certainly, specialization without an academic acknowledgement of this kind of research activity might be dangerous, given that “there are few research outlets independent of traditional disciplinary location for economics and ethics” (Davis, 2018, p. 66). But this exactly what econosophy and

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<sup>6</sup> I will not further explore how Davis (2018) elaborated a complexity theory vision of economics and ethics because it would go beyond the aim of this paper. See his comment to White (2018) for further details.

economists should be able to do. The promotion of econosophy in academic context is pivotal to improve the scientific dignity of this transdisciplinary perspective to the dialogue between philosophy and economics towards serious scientific publications right based on this approach.

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