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Electromagnetic Leakage Assessment of a Proven Higher-Order Masking of AES S-Box

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Abstract—Many digital systems need to provide cryptographic capabilities. A large part of these devices is easily accessible by the malicious user, and may be vulnerable to side channel attacks such as power or electromagnetic analysis. From one side, the designer has to protect the architecture with proven countermeasures; on the other, the actual implementation must be validated in order to prove the absence of undesired leakages. In this paper, we present an implementation of two optimized and proven masking schemes of order 3 and 7 for an embedded software AES, and prove its robustness by showing the absence of significant leakage in the nonlinear layer.

Index Terms—Masking, Side channel, Leakage Assessment.

I. INTRODUCTION

Digital systems often support cryptographic operations and protocols in order to protect sensitive data or communications. As well-designed as a cryptographic algorithm may be, vulnerabilities may appear during its implementation and execution. Side-channel attacks aim to exploit physical variations during the program execution. These physical variations are called side-channels and can be, for example, the time it takes for the program to execute [1], or the power consumption of the circuit [2] but also the electromagnetic radiations [3] emitted during the computations. When these fluctuations depend on secret internal data, an attacker may be able to extract information that would be not available in a model where they only have a "black box" access to the cryptographic function. Even a partial knowledge of the intermediate values of a program implementing cryptographic primitives can be devastating for its security. A recent example is given in [4] where the authors published a practical side-channel attack against Titan security keys: they exploited electromagnetic leakage during the computation of an ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature to retrieve the full private key, allowing to generate new valid signatures and thus clone the security key.

The attacker usually needs to have physical access to the device in order to do measurements: thus, embedded devices are the most targeted. Additionally, measurements in these devices are often with very little noise, which makes the attack easier on embedded devices than on any other setup.

Embedded devices are the most susceptible to be targeted by side-channel attacks, but they also have hard efficiency and production constraints. These are even stronger than for other

devices and they must be taken into account when designing and choosing countermeasures.

Most countermeasures against side-channel attacks aim at limiting the exploitability of the hypothetical signal an attacker could be able to measure from the device and to increase the cost (in time, technical expertise, hardware measurement tool, . . .) of the attack. A first approach is the more obvious one: by reducing the signal strength, it is harder for an attacker to get useful information for it. To do so in practice turns out to be hard: in a context where the attacker has physical access to the device, this countermeasure can often be defeated by a direct intervention of the attacker. Most importantly, this countermeasure is specific for a given side channel: protecting against a wide range of side-channels can be very costly without any guarantee that the attacker will not find a new side-channel to exploit.

Another approach is based on lowering measure reproducibility. In practice, the attacker often must gather several traces in order to reduce measurement noise and improve signal quality. However, these traces must be synchronized: the attacker must be able to know which measurement points in the traces correspond to the same computation. Adding dummy code at random location during runtime makes this synchronization difficult [5], [6], [7]. This approach has its limits: if only one trace is enough to attack the device [8], desynchronization does not help; also, using signal processing and pattern recognition techniques, the points of leakages can be nonetheless identified and one may be able to counteract desynchronization attempts [9], [10].

For this reason, there is a strong need to provide countermeasures that are at the same time efficient, cost-effective, and formally proven to guarantee the absence of vulnerabilities in the actual implementation. The current trend is to use masking schemes of order (i.e., the degrees of random variability) larger than one, as simple masking can still be easily broken. Our goal is therefore to improve the efficiency of masked implementations (in our case, of the Advanced Encryption Standard – AES), especially at higher orders, in the hope that it will help moving from ad hoc and specialized countermeasures against side-channel attacks toward formally secure and generic ones. In this paper, we present an implementation of two optimized and proven masking schemes of order 3 and 7 (in order to compare with similar state of the art) for an embedded software AES, and prove its robustness by showing

¹OMITTED FOR BLIND REVIEW

1 the absence of significant leakage in the nonlinear layer.

2 The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, some
3 theoretical concepts about masking are recalled. Section III
4 deals with the way masking can be actually implemented in
5 embedded software. Section IV describes our implementations
6 choices and the resulting raw performance, while the exper-
7 imental security assessment against side channel attacks are
8 discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the
9 paper.

10 II. HIGH-ORDER MASKING

11 The concept at the root of masking is to use a secret
12 sharing algorithm to split the sensitive data into multiple shares
13 that are individually statistically independent from the original
14 data. All computations are done on those shares such that
15 what an attacker is observing looks like noise and does not
16 directly depend on the sensitive data. This approach has been
17 introduced simultaneously by Goubin et al. [11] and Chari et
18 al. [12] in 1999.

19 Masking is said to be at order d when the number of shares
20 is equal to $d + 1$. When using an additive secret sharing
21 scheme, an order d masking is achieved by drawing uniformly
22 at random the first d shares $x_0; \dots; x_{d-1}$ and computing the last
23 share x_d such that $x = \bigoplus_{i=0}^d x_i$. This way, every subset made
24 by less than d shares is uniformly distributed.

25 There is a strong need for formal security models, which
26 are needed to adopt a generic and modular approach to the
27 design of masked implementations based on the composition
28 of smaller secure masked circuits. In particular, these models
29 apply to the implementation, as well as to the capabilities of
30 an attacker. The d -probing model is an attack model where the
31 attacker is given access to up to d probes on the target. An
32 attacker is often not strictly limited by the number of probes,
33 especially on a software implementation where the sequential
34 execution can lead an attacker to observe the leakage of each
35 operations over a whole period of time. On the other hand, an
36 attacker observation always embeds measurement noise.

37 Additionally, the masking order d plays an important role
38 in the security because, for equivalent noise level, the number
39 of measurements needed for a successful attack increases
40 exponentially in d . Unfortunately, generic high-order schemes
41 also come with a significant overhead as shown in Section V.
42 A detailed and formal analysis of secure compositional models
43 goes beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader can
44 find more details in [13], [14].

45 III. MASKING IN PRACTICE

46 As explained in Section I, the devices that are the most
47 vulnerable against side-channel attacks are embedded ones. In
48 this context, the processor used often implements the ARM
49 architecture. It is thus natural to consider implementing a
50 masking scheme specifically for this architecture. Following
51 Schwabe and Stoffelen’s work [15], we will further focus on
52 one of the most popular modern microprocessor family in this
53 context: the ARM Cortex-M4¹. This family of microprocessors

1 implements the ARMv7E-M architecture which provides all
2 the Thumb-1, Thumb-2 and Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
3 instructions.

4 In the 2000’s, many attempts have been made to design
5 ad hoc masked implementations and “provably secure” ones.
6 However, many were found to be vulnerable to side-channel
7 attacks a few years after their publication. In the light of those
8 attempts, we will use the more recent compositional security
9 models introduced by Barthe *et al.* [13]. As shown before,
10 these models’s goal is specifically turned toward the design of
11 complex masked circuits given only elementary gadgets (i.e.,
12 operations).

13 Since the ultimate goal of masking is to amplify noise
14 during the critical computations by introducing random values,
15 the effect of masking in practice will be demonstrated by
16 comparing the leakages when random gates in the masked
17 circuit are leveraging an embedded TRNG, or rather when
18 they use deterministic values.

19 A. *That’s too much to (m)ask: the masking order*

20 The choice of the masking order at which these gates
21 are instantiated is crucial for both security and performance
22 since it has a quadratic impact on both. As recalled in the
23 introduction, however, simple low-order masking is not enough
24 against a skilled attacker.

25 The most recent and optimized implementations using the
26 same generic approach as ours [16], [17] chose an order such
27 that the number of shares is a power of two. Their choice was
28 made because they are based on a specific implementation
29 approach that provides the best performance when the size of
30 the registers (expressed in bits) is a multiple of the number of
31 shares. For a fair comparison, we chose to also use an order
32 where the number of shares is a power of two. Additionally,
33 we chose to use gadgets that give better performance while
34 still being proved secure [18]. With these constraints in mind,
35 we provide two masked implementations: one at order 3 (four
36 shares) and one at order 7 (eight shares).

37 Even if recent symmetric block cipher proposals were made
38 that were specifically designed to be masked, they are not yet
39 widely used in concrete applications as of today. We therefore
40 focus on AES, which is used in a wide range of applications,
41 most commonly as a building block of symmetric encryption
42 schemes. Implementations of the AES has been the target of
43 heavy optimization efforts, which are often made to decrease
44 its running time or its memory footprint. This is perfectly
45 acceptable where the physical access to the device is near
46 impossible; for embedded devices, however, the threat model
47 is different and side-channel attacks must not be overlooked. In
48 this section, we present our proposal for a secured embedded
49 implementation of AES against high-order attacks.

50 B. *Masking the AES S-Box*

51 Every step other than SubBytes in the AES being linear
52 and easily masked, the biggest differences between masked
53 implementations are often found in the computation of the
54 S-Box. There are mainly four popular approaches.

¹<https://developer.arm.com/ip-products/processors/cortex-m/cortex-m4>

1 Table lookups is a popular way to implement the AES S-
 2 box, even in implementations that are not masked. This method
 3 consists in pre-computing tables to be used during the actual
 4 computation. During the actual computation of the S-Box,
 5 the implementation just has to fetch the value at the offset
 6 corresponding to the byte for which we want to compute the
 7 S-Box. However, it may lead to cache-timing attacks when the
 8 implementation is running on a processor where a data cache
 9 is available [19]. Thus, the precomputed tables must be built
 10 depending on the value of the first $d - 1$ masks of the masked
 11 byte. However, doing so is very memory consuming when
 12 trying to protect against high-order attacks, as it requires to
 13 pre-compute and store tables for every possible different value
 14 for each mask.

15 The second approach is to consider the original description
 16 using an inversion in \mathbb{F}_{2^8} and designing a masked implemen-
 17 tation of this operation using multiplication and squaring.

18 The third approach is based on bitslicing. Instead of apply-
 19 ing a (potentially complex) operation on one of the 16 bytes at
 20 a time, the idea is to slice each byte and see them as eight 16-
 21 bit words instead of sixteen 8-bit words, by gathering all the
 22 i -th bits in the i -th 16-bit word. For a masked implementation
 23 of the AES, instead of using a masked circuit for the inversion
 24 in \mathbb{F}_{2^8} and applying it to the 16 bytes of the state, masking
 25 gadgets for the binary AND are used to build the full circuit of
 26 the S-Box from Boyar and Peralta [20] which will be executed
 27 on the 16 bytes in parallel thanks to bitslicing.

28 Another approach, called shareslicing, consists in regroup-
 29 ing the shares of the same value inside the same register.
 30 As in the case of bitslicing, this allows to parallelize the
 31 computation of the masked gadget by using only the most
 32 common instructions.

33 IV. MAKING CHOICES: OUR IMPLEMENTATION

34 We first considered both shareslicing and bitslicing to im-
 35 plement the nonlinear layer of the AES. However, the security
 36 of shareslicing heavily relies on the assumption that there is no
 37 interaction between the bits of a register during the execution.
 38 In light of the work of Gao et al. [21], since our target uses a
 39 Cortex-M4 processor and to avoid relying on this assumption,
 40 we choose to not use this techniques for our implementation.
 41 Additionally, to avoid unwanted effects due to bit interactions
 42 inside registers, we make sure that the shares of a given
 43 value are always stored in different registers throughout the
 44 execution.

45 Hence, our implementation uses the bitsliced approach to
 46 implement all 16 S-boxes in parallel as in [22]. In non-
 47 masked implementations, bitslicing techniques are often used
 48 together with n -bit registers (with $n \geq 16$) to compute the
 49 AES encryption on $\frac{n}{16}$ blocks in parallel. In our case, $n = 32$
 50 on Cortex-M4. However, during the computation of a masked
 51 implementation, each one of the eight 16-bit words of the
 52 bitsliced state is masked, which means that each word is in
 53 fact a masked state of $d + 1$ 16-bit words. Without going too
 54 much into the details, our implementation is largely based on
 55 each of the 32 AND gates of the circuit must be replaced by

a masked AND gadget working on 16 masked bits in parallel. 1
 Nonetheless, since our target is a microprocessor with 32-bit 2
 registers, we still want to maximize the use of our registers. To 3
 do so, we exploit the same technique shown in [22], where the 4
 authors proposed to group the 32 AND gates by pairs allowing 5
 to replace each pair by a masked AND gadget working on 32 6
 masked bits in parallel such that each share is 32-bit wide. 7

8 The transformations of the linear layer can be applied
 share-wise which introduces much less overhead than for the 9
 nonlinear layers. Since we are using a bitsliced approach to 10
 the computation of the AES S-Box, the inputs and outputs of 11
 the nonlinear layers are in a bitsliced representation. To avoid 12
 having to pay costly bit manipulations that are needed to go 13
 from and into a more standard representation where each byte 14
 of the block state is stored in a single byte in memory, the 15
 linear components (*MixColumns*, *ShiftRows* and *AddRound-*
Key) are implemented using the same bitsliced representation. 16
 Our implementation reuses already existing bitsliced version 17
 of *MixColumns* [15], [23] and *Shiftrows*. 18

19 During the design of the masked nonlinear layer, Tight-
 20 PROVE [24] is used to ensure that the circuit for the S-
 21 Box is secure at order d . However, this is not sufficient for 22
 the composition of rounds to secure as well at the same 23
 order. For this reason, in this paper only the security of the 24
 nonlinear layer circuit is formally proven. We conjecture that 25
 the composition is nonetheless secure and it can be done, for 26
 example, by using TightPROVE on the circuit that includes 27
 every linear operations after the output of the last AND gates 28
 of the previous nonlinear layer and the circuit of the S-box 29
 itself. The validation of the full implementation is thus left 30
 for future work. 31

32 A. Randomness Generation

33 Each gadget for the masked AND gate at order 3 (re-
 34 spectively 7) requires the generation of 5 (respectively 20)
 35 random masks. In our implementation, the masked functions
 36 for text encryption and key scheduler take as parameter a
 37 function pointer to `rng_fill`, a function that is used to fill
 38 a buffer of arbitrary size with random values. For our specific
 39 environment, `rng_fill` is implemented using the Random
 40 Number Generator (RNG) embedded in the STM32L432. This
 41 RNG is based on ring oscillators and allows to generate 32-
 42 bit words. A specific control register in memory is updated
 43 by the RNG module to tell whether or not the random value
 44 is ready to be read for the data register in memory. It takes
 45 approximately 64 cycles to generate each 32-bit word. The
 46 performance impact of the RNG on the overall implementation
 47 is discussed in Section IV-B.

48 The embedded RNG is working asynchronously with the
 49 rest of the chip and thus it may induce unexpected and non-
 50 deterministic delays while waiting for new random values to
 51 be drawn. Thus, during the leakage assessment presented in
 52 Section V-B, all needed random values are drawn beforehand
 53 and stored in a buffer. This buffer contains as many random
 54 values as needed by the function on which the assessment is
 55 conducted. This impacts negatively on the memory footprint of

TABLE I: Number of cycles to compute AES-128 keyschedule, encryption and S-Box, using either the embedded RNG or deterministic values.

| Order d | 3 | | 7 | |
|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|
| | With RNG | Without RNG | With RNG | Without RNG |
| AND gate | 491 | 145 | 1771 | 497 |
| S-Box | 9353 | 3929 | 31025 | 10721 |
| Keyschedule | 100644 | 46393 | 323758 | 120716 |
| Encryption | 102442 | 48203 | 327383 | 124343 |

the implementation, but has the major advantage that two consecutive runs of the same function are taking exactly the same number of cycle to execute, allowing the analysis of multiple traces without risking desynchronization between them. This approach to random values generation is thus advantageous for an attacker and detrimental to its performance (since the RNG is a device running parallel to the processor). It is done only for leakage assessment and not in the final implementation.

The experimental leakage assessment exploits this RNG (through `rng_fill`), but also uses a fake alternative function that fills the buffer with deterministic values. This allows to observe almost directly the impact of masking by comparing the effect of the RNG on the detection of leakages.

B. Performance

The performance of our implementation in the number of cycles by block encryption is presented in Table I. As a comparison with an unprotected AES optimized for the same platform, Schwabe and Stoffelen report that their implementation is computing a single block encryption in 661.7 cycles [15]. In the same paper, they proposed an implementation masked at order 1 that takes 7422 cycles by using an RNG that outputs a 32-bit every 40 cycles, while the RNG we are using for our implementation is slower (64 cycles for each 32-bit words).

For masked implementations at higher orders, we do not directly compare to the one by Journault and Standaert [16] since they use masking schemes only at order 32. Also, we do not compare to the implementation [25] because it is targeted at ARM Cortex-A, a higher end family of processors with vectorized instructions. Instead, we compare our implementation to [22] which has the same target (ARM Cortex-M) and the same range of masking order. They report that their implementation uses $3280d^2 + 14075d + 12192$ cycles to compute an AES encryption where d is the masking order, including the cost of randomness generation. However, they use a RNG that is even faster than the one used by Schwabe and Stoffelen: it is able to produce a 32-bit random value every 10 cycles.

C. Taking RNG performance into account

As seen in Table I and also reported in almost every implementations [15], [16], [17], [22], the performance of the RNG itself is crucial to be taken into account. In fact, in our implementation the cost of randomness generation is

taking around 53% (respectively 62%) of the total number of cycles needed for a block encryption at order 3 (respectively order 7). Indeed, this impact strongly depends on the efficiency of the RNG used. Thus, to achieve a fair comparison, we approximate the cost of generating the needed random values as a function of the parameter n_{RNG} , which represents the number of clock cycles taken by the RNG to output a 32-bit random word.

At order 3, each S-Box is using 32 AND gates and each bitsliced AND gate on 16-bit operands uses 16×5 random bits; at order 7, each bitsliced AND gate on 16-bit operands uses 16×20 random bits. For each nonlinear layer of the AES, 32 AND gates on 16-bit operands are computed. Thus, the overall randomness usage of an S-Box computation is $32 \times 16 \times 5$ bits, that is **80** 32-bit words at order 3 and $32 \times 16 \times 20$ bits, that is **320** 32-bit words at order 7. In AES-128, there are 10 nonlinear layers to apply to the state, which means that at order 3 (respectively 7) our implementation needs $80 \times 10 = 800$ (respectively $320 \times 10 = 3200$) 32-bit words of randomness. Then, the cost of randomness generation for a full block encryption takes approximately $800n_{RNG}$ at order 3 and $3200n_{RNG}$ at order 7.

The implementation of Schwabe and Stoffelen [15] at order 1 is using $n_{RNG} = 40$. With the same value for n_{RNG} , our implementation would take approximately $48203 + 800n_{RNG} = 80203$ cycles to run at order 3 and $124343 + 3200n_{RNG} = 252343$ at order 7.

The implementation of Goudarzi and Rivain [22] is using $n_{RNG} = 10$ and takes 83937 cycles to run at order 3 and 271437 cycles at order 7. With the same value for n_{RNG} , our implementation would take approximately $48203 + 800n_{RNG} = 56203$ cycles (vs 83937) at order 3 and $124343 + 3200n_{RNG} = 156343$ (vs 271437) at order 7. This is an improvement of around 33% at order 3 and around 42% at order 7.

V. SECURE EVALUATION

A. Experimental Setup

Our implementation's test target is an STM32L432 Nucleo development board² that embeds an ARM Cortex-M4 processor, 256 kilobytes of flash memory and 64 kilobytes of SRAM. The processor has an embedded Random Number Generator (RNG) using ring oscillators to generate 32-bit random output.

We monitor the target board and acquire traces using a ChipWhisperer Lite Capture board³. To do so, we configure and connect six of the 30 pins available on the STM32L432 to establish a synchronization protocol between the target board and the capture board.

Since masking is a generic counter-measure that is side-channel agnostic, we chose to measure leakages from the processor using an electromagnetic directional probe from Langer EMV-Technik⁴. The probe is then connected to a pre-

²<https://www.st.com/en/evaluation-tools/nucleo-l432kc.html>

³<https://store.newae.com/chipwhisperer-lite-cw1173-two-part-version/>

⁴<https://www.langer-emv.de/en/product/lf-passive-100-khz-up-to-50-mhz/36/lf-b-3-h-field-probe-100-khz-up-to-50-mhz/3>




Fig. 1: The hardware bench.

This can be seen as a necessary condition to potential attacks against the implementation, but the number of total traces analysed is crucial in experimental evaluation. It is not uncommon to start observing significant differences between the two datasets only after several hundred thousands traces measured if the environmental measurement noise is significant or when some counter-measures are implemented.

The underlying statistical test commonly used is a Welch's t -test done for each point in time. The common approach to aggregate every trace inside each dataset is to compute their mean and to try to distinguish this mean from the mean of the other dataset. The Welch's t -test is producing a statistic t :

$$t = \frac{\mu_1 - \mu_2}{\sqrt{\frac{s_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{s_2^2}{n_2}}},$$

with μ_i the mean of the i -th dataset, s_i its variance and n_i its size. The greater the absolute value of t , the more statistically significant the difference.

In the original proposal of the TVLA, the two datasets are compared using a common threshold directly on the value of t . This threshold is fixed to ± 4.5 for every point in time. This means that the device under test is said to successfully pass the test (i.e., no leakage is found) if the maximum absolute value of t over all points in time is lower than 4.5. In [26], the authors proposed to try to distinguish these datasets by using moments of higher order (variance, skewness, kurtosis, ...) instead of the variances.

Replacing the Welch's t -test by Pearson's χ^2 -test has been proposed in 2015 as a complementary approach [27]. As for the t -test, this test aims at trying to distinguish the two datasets. However, it does not consist in comparing the means (or higher-order moments) of the observations but instead it works directly on the whole distribution. Nonetheless, this test also works at the granularity level of a single point in time.

In the χ^2 -test setting, there is no concept of moment of higher order as for the t -test since it does not use moments. In some cases the χ^2 -test can directly detect leakages that otherwise would need a higher-order analysis in the case of the t -test. We use this test as it was intended and described in the work of Moradi *et al.* [27], that is as a complementary approach to the t -test. The results are visible in Figure 2: on the left for order 3, and on the right for order 7. The latter looks more leaking than the former, which is a likely artifact created by more complex code. From top to bottom, the reader can see the TVLA analysis for the deterministic (i.e., unprotected) and random masks using Welch's t -test, and the χ^2 -test using random masks. The latter has also been performed on deterministic masks: it shows obvious leakages and the result is thus not shown for brevity.

C. Multivariate analysis

In the TVLA methodology, both the t -test and the χ^2 -test are conducted on each point in time independently. This is sometimes called a univariate (or vertical) analysis, in opposition with a multivariate (or horizontal) analysis where $n > 1$ points in time are considered simultaneously. In a

amplifier in order to amplify the signal before it reaches the capture board. This setup is illustrated in Figure 1.

Every experiment will be done twice: once using deterministic values in lieu of random masks (RNG off); and a second time using the integrated RNG of the STM32L432 (RNG on) to generate these random masks. Doing so allows to directly compare the effect of masking on the leakages. It also helps distinguishing between points in time that are not depending on the processed data (e.g., loop counter increment or unconditional jump) with points in time actually leaking information to the attacker. Thus, this can be used to get rid of many points before doing a multivariate analysis by keeping only the most information-carrying points, reducing the overall cost of the assessment.

The capture board used in our setup is limited to 24 000 time samples at once. This means that we are not able to make a measurement for each cycle during the full masked encryption for neither order 3 nor order 7, which takes respectively 48 203 and 124 343 cycles to execute. Instead, we assess the leakages that occurs during the computation of the S-boxes. We generate the required random values beforehand. This allows to run the implementation at both order 3 (in less than 4000 cycles) and order 7 (in less than 11000 cycles) and assess the leakage under the same conditions. A full assessment of the complete implementation and with an improved setup is planned for the near future.

B. Leakage Assessment

The Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) is a procedure that consists in trying to detect statistically meaningful differences between two datasets containing traces measured during the computation on the device under test and differing with respect to a specific parameter: for instance, one containing the traces measured during the encryption of a constant plaintext with a constant key, whereas the second dataset contains the traces measured during the encryption of a random plaintext with the same key. Being able to statistically distinguish the two sets of traces would mean that what is leaked during the execution depends on the plaintext on which the encryption is performed.




Fig. 2: TVLA (fixed vs. random) on the S-box layer masked at order 3 (left) and 7 (right). Top figures (a,b) use deterministic masks (i.e., no masking).

1 multivariate setting, the distribution of subsets of n points are
 2 compared in order to distinguish between the fixed and the
 3 random dataset.

4 An univariate leakage assessment is more adapted to an
 5 implementation where multiple shares are manipulated in
 6 parallel as in hardware implementations of masked circuits.
 7 However, in software implementations the computation are
 8 done sequentially and different shares of the same value are
 9 manipulated at different clock cycles, except when the value
 10 in memory or in a register is overwritten with another value.
 11 Thus, a multivariate analysis is often needed to successfully
 12 achieve a side-channel attack on masked software implementa-
 13 tion.

The major drawback of a multivariate analysis is its ef-
 2 ficiency: when the number of datapoint of a single trace
 3 increases, the number of different subsets of n points grows
 4 exponentially. The goal of an attacker is then to find the so-
 5 called *Points of Interest* (PoI), which are a reduced set of
 6 points in time that are carrying the most information and are
 7 thus more susceptible to lead to an attack. Detecting those
 8 points is often the most challenging part, while the Welch's
 9 t -test or the χ^2 -test can be adapted to the multivariate case by
 10 carefully choosing an aggregation function that is applied on
 11 the subsets of n points.

We conduct a bivariate analysis using the χ^2 -test on our
 12 implementation by following the methodology of Moradi *et*
 13




Fig. 3: Bivariate χ^2 -test (fixed vs. random) on the S-box layer masked at order 3 (183 Points of Interest) and 7 (585 POI).

1 *al.* [27]. In order to limit the time and memory complexity of a
 2 bivariate analysis, we keep only the points in time that actually
 3 carry information. We do so by filtering out the ones that do
 4 not go above the threshold during the univariate χ^2 analysis
 5 on the implementation using deterministic masks. Thanks to
 6 this step, we are able to reduce the number of points from
 7 4000 to 183 at order 3, and from 11000 to 585 at order 7,
 8 corresponding to an improvement by a factor of about 20.

9 The result of the bivariate analysis is shown in Figure 3. The
 10 colour of each pixel represents the p -value of the combination
 11 of the two points in time at the corresponding coordinate.
 12 The diagonal thus corresponds to the univariate analysis.
 13 Since our bivariate analysis relies on a symmetric combination
 14 function of each point, the resulting graph is also symmetric.
 15 p -values above the threshold are shown in levels of red and
 16 the ones that are below the threshold are in plain white. When
 17 deterministic masks are used, only 30 000 traces for each
 18 dataset are sufficient to detect clear differences between the

two datasets whereas after 1 000 000 traces for each dataset,
 no bivariate leakage has been found for the implementation
 at both order 3 and 7 when the embedded RNG is used to
 generate the masks.

VI. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES

5 In this paper, we presented a secure implementation of the
 6 AES and conducted an experimental assessment of the leakage
 7 that occurs when executing it giving more confidence in its
 8 security. We have shown that performance is largely affected
 9 by the RNG production rate, and that our implementation
 10 [28] improves comparable implementations by 30 to 40%. We
 11 have shown the effectiveness of the masking scheme, formally
 12 proven, against univariate and bivariate statistical analysis to
 13 prove the actual absence of leakages. It must be pointed out,
 14 however, that only the nonlinear layer of this implementation
 15 is formally proven to be d -order secure, and that only this
 16 step has been assessed against leakage due to limitations of
 17 our experimental platform. In the future, the analysis will
 18

1 be extended to the whole AES implementation, by formally
2 proving the complete code, assessing the leakage through
3 higher-order statistical tests, or by more extensive experiments
4 on the EM leakage, and porting to RISC-V architectures.

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