'Mother's milk': Is there a social reversal in breastfeeding practices along with economic development?

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Why not breastfeeding (BF) is a major issue?

Health consequences

- For children, via a greater exposure to **infectious diseases**, **obesity** and **diabetes**, and a reduction in **cognitive and non-cognitive skills**, even in rich countries (e.g. Belfield & Kelly, 2012; Girard et al., 2017).
- For mothers, by increasing risks of post-partum depression, ovarian and breast cancer, heart disease and type-2 diabetes (UNICEF, 2018).
- 600,000 children and 100,000 women die each year due to inadequate BF behaviors worldwide (Walters et al., 2019).

Economic consequences

- Negative impacts on **educational attainment and labor market outcomes** in adulthood (e.g. Fletcher, 2010; Cesur et al., 2017), even in rich countries.
- Walters et al. (2019) estimated the global economic losses associated with not BF to be more than \$340.3 billions (including costs linked to child and maternal mortality as well as cognitive losses), accounting for approximately 0.7% of global GNI.

Appropriate BF practices are well below the 2030 international targets of the WHO (40% vs. 70%).

Causes of the choice to not breastfeed

Household-level determinants

• Socioeconomic causes (Rippeyoung & Noonan, 2012, Volk & Franklin 2020, Sarki et al. 2019, Victora et al. 2016)

- Preference for the present: temporal trade-off between short-term opportunity cost and future health benefits
- Formula milk is used as signal of **social distinction** (since formula milk has a direct cost and is associated with progress)
- Lack of nutritional and health **knowledge**
- o Maternal employment after birth

Country-level determinants

HOUSEHOLD

NATIONAL

WEALTH

WEALTH

• Environmental and cultural causes (Baker et al. 2016; Rollins et al. 2016, Neves et al. 2020)

- Low accessibility to safe water, and health and education services
- Development of the milk formula market (intensive marketing)
- o Cultural constraints against BF (or against formula milk in some contexts, e.g. China)
- Lack of **BF-friendly policy** (e.g., maternity leaves), public health campaigns and regulation of the milk formula market

Literature review

• A paradoxe between wealth and appropriate BF practices among high-income countries (e.g. Jones et al., 2011; Kohlhuber et al., 2008; Oakley et al., 2014; Sarki et al., 2019; Victora et al., 2016).



• In developing countries, results are mixed. Further investigations are needed!

Research questions applied to developing countries



- How household wealth affects the trade-off between the choice to breastfeed or not?
 - *H1: Presence of within-country inequality*

Research questions applied to developing countries



- How household wealth affects the trade-off between the choice to breastfeed or not?
 - *H1: Presence of within-country inequality*
- How national wealth affects this trade-off?
 H2: Presence of cross-country inequality

Research questions applied to developing countries



 How household wealth affects the trade-off between the choice to breastfeed or not?

• *H1: Presence of within-country inequality*

How national wealth affects this trade-off?
 H2: Presence of cross-country inequality

 How national wealth moderates and changes the household wealth-BF association

- H3: Existence of a **social reversal** along with economic development
- While the richer household adopt healthier (physiological) behaviors, the poorest have higher access to formula milk

Data and indicators

• We merged all the *Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)* available for the Asian continent

• Our analyses rely on 37 DHS conducted in 16 countries b/w 1990 and 2017 (a sample of 2,445,656 young children)

• Asia concentrates mostly 40% of the global health and economic costs of inappropriate BF practices

• We constructed:

• 4 dummy indicators of adequate BF practices (according to the WHO & UNICEF)

- Exclusive BF (EBF) for the 6 first months
- Early initiation of BF (EIBF)
- Continued BF at one year (CBF1), 12-15months, and at two years (CBF2)

o 2 household wealth scores allowing for comparison across DHS waves and countries (as proxy of SES)

- Using PCA and MCA approaches including 7 dummies of durables ownership (radio, TV, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, car, and phone), 2 dummies of access to public facilities (water and electricity), and 3 dummies of housing conditions (number of sleeping rooms, quality of floor material, and toilet facility)
- o Each score varies from 0 to 1

o 3 indicators of national wealth at a given time (low vs. medium vs. high)

• Based on tercile of GNI per capita (\$PPP 2017), tercile of GDP per capita (\$PPP 2017), and tercile of HDI.

Descriptive: BF across time

Figure 1: Rates of BF practices across DHS rounds.



Source: Authors from Asian DHS data (rounds 2 to 7).

→ Improvement of EBF & EIBF across time, but not for CBF

Descriptive: BF across national wealth

| Groups of GNI/capita (\$PPP2017) | EBF | EIBF | CBF1 | CBF2 |
|-------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Low | 42.75% | 25.11% | 82.45% | 60.09% |
| Medium | 44.69% | 38.50% | 82.23% | 59.52% |
| High | 49.57% | 48.37% | 77.09% | 54.52% |
| ALL | 46.11% | 38.33% | 79.93% | 57.22% |

Table 1: BF practices rates by groups of GNI/capita (\$PPP2017).

Source: Authors from Asian DHS data (rounds 2 to 7).

Descriptive: BF across household & national wealth

Figure 2: Rates of BF practices by groups of household wealth (based on PCA quintiles) and GNI/capita (\$PPP2017).



\rightarrow A social convergence across national wealth

Econometric OLS models

$$BF_{i} = \beta_{0} + \beta_{1}Wealth_{j} + \beta_{2}Dev_{k} + \beta_{3}X_{i} + \beta_{4}X_{j} + \omega_{t} + \varepsilon_{i}$$

$$BF_{i} = \alpha_{0} + \alpha_{1}Wealth_{j} + \alpha_{2}Dev_{k} + \alpha_{3}Wealth_{j} * Dev_{k} + \alpha_{4}X_{i} + \alpha_{5}X_{j} + \omega_{t} + \mu_{i}$$

$$[1]$$

<u>Control variables (X)</u>: The **infant's characteristics (Xi)** include sex, age (in months), birth order, birth interval (in months), size at birth (5-point score), multiple births. **Obstetric data (Xi)** include wantedness of pregnancy, number of antenatal visits, mode of delivery (C-section or not), place of delivery (at home or not). The **mother's characteristics (Xj)** include her age (in years), marital status (married or not), number of children, level of education (no education; primary; secondary; higher), place of residence (urban or rural). ω refers to rounds of DHS.



Figure 2: Marginal effects of OLS regression of BF behaviors on household wealth (including covariates).

Figure 3: Marginal effects of OLS regression of BF behaviors on household wealth interacted by the level of a GNI/capita (\$PPP2017) (including covariates).



-> Towards a social convergence of EBF and CBF2 in richer Asian countries (suggesting a future social reversal?)14

OLS results

| Dependent outcome: | Exclusive breastfeed | ling (dummy) | my) Early initiation (dummy) | | Continued breasftee | eding at 1 yo | Continued breasfteeding at 2 yo | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|------------------------------|------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|------------|
| - | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted |
| Household wealth score | -0.144*** | -0.366*** | -0.097*** | -0.100*** | -0.137*** | -0.169*** | -0.164*** | -0.247*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.031) | (0.011) | (0.020) | (0.017) | (0.030) | (0.022) | (0.040) |
| Medium GNI per capita (dummy) | -0.017 | -0.088*** | 0.021** | 0.036*** | -0.019* | -0.022 | -0.030** | -0.015 |
| | (0.011) | (0.021) | (0.008) | (0.014) | (0.010) | (0.018) | (0.014) | (0.025) |
| High GNI per capita (dummy) | 0.039*** | -0.077*** | 0.064*** | 0.060*** | -0.002 | -0.020 | -0.038*** | -0.085*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.017) | (0.007) | (0.011) | (0.009) | (0.014) | (0.013) | (0.020) |
| Wealth*MediumGNI | | 0.208*** | | -0.046 | | 0.008 | | -0.048 |
| | | (0.052) | | (0.031) | | (0.049) | | (0.062) |
| Wealth*HighGNI | | 0.336*** | | 0.016 | | 0.053 | | 0.143*** |
| | | (0.036) | | (0.023) | | (0.034) | | (0.044) |
| Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 34,452 | 34,452 | 133,506 | 133,506 | 25,449 | 25,449 | 21,890 | 21,890 |
| R-squared | 0.086 | 0.088 | 0.084 | 0.084 | 0.080 | 0.080 | 0.118 | 0.119 |
| Children age interval (in month) | [0-5] | [0-5] | [0-23] | [0-23] | [12-15] | [12-15] | [20-23] | [20-23] |

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the PSU-level. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 4: Marginal effects of OLS regression of BF behaviors on household wealth quintiles interacted with time (including covariates).



→ Towards a social convergence across time

Robustness checks

• Two IV regression models using two sets of instruments

- IV1: proportion of households equipped with clean and modern fuel for cooking (i.e., biogas, LPG, electricity, ethanol, or natural gas) compared to dirty traditional fuel (i.e., charcoal, wood, or other organic combustibles) at the PSU level, excluding household j (Kim et al., 2010; Barnes et al., 2013; Kpelitse et al., 2014; Bonnefond & Clément, 2014; Clément, 2017; Daran & Levasseur, 2022)
- IV2: the average height of mothers at the PSU level, excluding the household j (Case & Paxson, 2008)
- Including confounding covariates: mother's BMI (body mass index), mother's employment (yes or no), and religion (Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and others)
- **Other measurements** of household wealth (MCA approach) and national wealth (GDP/capita and HDI)



Robustness: IV regression I

| Dependent outcome: | Exclusive breastfeeding (dummy) | | Early initiation (dummy) | | Continued br | easfteeding at 1 | Continued breasfteeding at 2 | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | yo | yo | |
| | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted |
| Household wealth score | -0.751*** | -1.219*** | -0.509*** | -0.776*** | -0.335*** | -0.499*** | -0.676*** | -0.782*** |
| | (0.089) | (0.148) | (0.047) | (0.071) | (0.074) | (0.118) | (0.095) | (0.162) |
| Medium GNI per capita (dummy) | -0.006 | -0.143*** | -0.007 | -0.126*** | -0.028** | -0.132*** | -0.006 | 0.081 |
| | (0.012) | (0.050) | (0.009) | (0.029) | (0.011) | (0.042) | (0.015) | (0.058) |
| High GNI per capita (dummy) | 0.016 | -0.205*** | 0.034*** | -0.091*** | -0.015 | -0.079** | -0.040*** | -0.103** |
| | (0.012) | (0.042) | (0.009) | (0.024) | (0.011) | (0.034) | (0.014) | (0.046) |
| Wealth*MediumGNI/c | | 0.391*** | | 0.331*** | | 0.312*** | | -0.276 |
| | | (0.140) | | (0.077) | | (0.121) | | (0.171) |
| Wealth*HighGNI/c | | 0.623*** | | 0.340*** | | 0.169** | | 0.198* |
| | | (0.104) | | (0.056) | | (0.085) | | (0.117) |
| Control variables | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Number of instruments | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Instruments | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean | Area clean |
| | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel | cooking fuel |
| | use | use and its | use | use and its | use | use and its | use | use and its |
| | | interactions | | interactions | | interactions | | interactions |
| | | with with | | with with | | with with | | with with |
| | | medium GNI/c | | medium GNI/c | | medium GNI/c | | medium GNI/c |
| | | and high GNI/c | | and high GNI/c | | and high GNI/c | | and high GNI/c |
| Observations | 33,999 | 33,999 | 131,359 | 131,359 | 25,061 | 25,061 | 21,486 | 21,486 |
| Children age interval (in month) | [0-5] | [0-5] | [0-23] | [0-23] | [12-15] | [12-15] | [20-23] | [20-23] |

Robustness: IV regression II

| Dependent outcome: | endent outcome: Exclusive breastfe (dummy) | | stfeeding Early initiation (dummy) y) | | | reastfeeding at ummy) | Continued breastfeeding at 2 yo (dummy) | |
|-------------------------------|---|------------|--|------------|-----------|--------------------------|---|------------|
| | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted |
| Household wealth score | -0.425*** | -1.325** | -0.575*** | -0.293 | -0.367*** | -0.203 | -1.165*** | -2.381*** |
| | (0.140) | (0.517) | (0.079) | (0.268) | (0.131) | (0.419) | (0.168) | (0.605) |
| Medium GNI per capita (dummy) | 0.025 | -0.097 | 0.056*** | 0.199** | -0.033 | -0.040 | -0.072*** | -0.341** |
| | (0.021) | (0.153) | (0.014) | (0.082) | (0.021) | (0.125) | (0.026) | (0.168) |
| High GNI per capita (dummy) | 0.052*** | -0.322** | 0.078*** | 0.183** | -0.020 | 0.054 | -0.094*** | -0.572*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.161) | (0.012) | (0.085) | (0.019) | (0.129) | (0.024) | (0.178) |
| Wealth*MediumGNI/c | | 0.471 | | -0.480* | | 0.011 | | 1.003* |
| | | (0.524) | | (0.283) | | (0.427) | | (0.601) |
| Wealth*HighGNI/c | | 1.268** | | -0.357 | | -0.248 | | 1.658*** |
| | | (0.545) | | (0.288) | | (0.434) | | (0.628) |

Robustness: adding confoundings

Table S15: Alternative regressions including (less well-answered) additional covariates about mothers' characteristics (working status. BMI, and religious affiliation).

| Dependent outcome: | Exclusive b | reastfeeding | | | Continued bro | easfteeding at 1 | Continued bre | easfteeding at 2 |
|-------------------------------|-------------|--------------|--------------------------|------------|---------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|
| | (dummy) | | Early initiation (dummy) | | yo | | yo | |
| | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted | Linear | Interacted |
| Household wealth score | -0.147*** | -0.595*** | -0.090*** | -0.126** | -0.100** | -0.222*** | -0.024 | -0.243*** |
| | (0.046) | (0.073) | (0.024) | (0.050) | (0.042) | (0.085) | (0.049) | (0.089) |
| Medium GNI per capita (dummy) | 0.173*** | 0.036 | 0.162*** | 0.163*** | -0.057 | -0.099** | -0.112*** | -0.208*** |
| | (0.039) | (0.048) | (0.023) | (0.028) | (0.036) | (0.040) | (0.043) | (0.046) |
| High GNI per capita (dummy) | -0.001 | -0.121*** | 0.069*** | 0.056** | -0.092*** | -0.125*** | -0.269*** | -0.319*** |
| | (0.035) | (0.042) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.034) | (0.038) | (0.040) | (0.044) |
| Wealth*MediumGNI | | 0.670*** | | -0.008 | | 0.201* | | 0.477*** |
| | | (0.127) | | (0.074) | | (0.114) | | (0.123) |
| Wealth*HighGNI | | 0.535*** | | 0.052 | | 0.144 | | 0.239** |
| - | | (0.083) | | (0.054) | | (0.091) | | (0.098) |

Contributions & conclusions

- This paper is the first:
 - To empirically demonstrate from a large sample of developing countries the occurrence of a shift in the wealth-BF association across levels of economic development.
 - To provide econometric evidence on this topic and to intend to address endogeneity issues.
- We can speculate that the household wealth-BF relationship will become positive when developing Asian countries will reach higher levels of economic development

 Important implication for BF-friendly public policies (a need to target the poorest households of developing countries).



| | | | <i>v</i> |
|------------------|-----------------------|--|---|
| Countries | Region ^a | Classification by income level ^b | Years of surveys |
| Afghanistan | South Asia | LIC | 2015 |
| Armenia | Europe & Central Asia | LMIC | 2000; 2005; 2010; 2015-2016 |
| Azerbaijan | Europe & Central Asia | UMIC | 2006 |
| Bangladesh | South Asia | LMIC | 1993-1994; 1996-1997; 1999-2000; 2004; 2007; 2011; 2014 |
| Cambodia | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 2000; 2005; 2010; 2014 |
| India | South Asia | LMIC | 1992-1993; 1998-1999; 2005-2006; 2015-2016 |
| Indonesia | East Asia & Pacific | UMIC | 1991; 1994; 1997; 2002-2003; 2007; 2012; 2017 |
| Kazakhstan | Europe & Central Asia | UMIC | 1995; 1999 |
| Kirghizstan | Europe & Central Asia | LMIC | 1997; 2012 |
| Maldives | South Asia | UMIC | 2009; 2016-2017 |
| Myanmar | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 2015-2016 |
| Nepal | South Asia | LMIC | 1996; 2001; 2006; 2011; 2016 |
| Pakistan | South Asia | LMIC | 1990-1991; 2006-2007; 2012-2013; 2017-2018 |
| Papua New Guinea | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 2016-2018 |
| Philippines | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 1998; 2003; 2008; 2012; 2017 |
| Tajikistan | Europe & Central Asia | LIC | 2012; 2017 |
| Timor-Leste | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 2009-2010; 2016 |
| Turkey | Europe & Central Asia | UMIC | 1993; 1998; 2003; 2008; 2013 |
| Uzbekistan | Europe & Central Asia | LMIC | 1996 |
| Viet Nam | East Asia & Pacific | LMIC | 1997; 2002 |

Table S1: List of countries and waves included in the study.

Notes: (a) UNICEF definition; (b) World Bank FY21 analytical classification according to 2020 per capita GNI, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. Lower-income countries (LIC) with per capita GNI of \$1,045 or less in 2020. Lower-middle income countries (LMIC) with per capita GNI between \$1,046 and \$4,095). Upper middle-income countries (UMIC) have a per capita GNI between \$4,096 and \$12,695. Source: Authors.

Robustness: IV regression I

Figure 5: Marginal effects of IV regression of BF behaviors on household wealth interacted by the level of a GNI/capita (\$PPP2017) (including covariates).

