Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue International Journal of Game Theory Année : 2018

Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods

Résumé

This paper explores a voluntary contribution game in the presence of warm-glow effects. There are many public goods and each public good benefits a different group of players. The structure of the game induces a bipartite network structure, where players are listed on one side and the public good groups they form are listed on the other side. The main result of the paper shows the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. The unique Nash equilibrium is also shown to be asymptotically stable. Then the paper provides some comparative statics analysis regarding pure redistribution, taxation and subsidies. It appears that small redistributions of wealth may sometimes be neutral, but generally, the effects of redistributive policies depend on how public good groups are related in the contribution network structure.

Dates et versions

hal-03732089 , version 1 (21-07-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Lionel Richefort. Warm-glow giving in networks with multiple public goods. International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, 47 (4), pp.1211-1238. ⟨10.1007/s00182-018-0616-z⟩. ⟨hal-03732089⟩
15 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More