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Journal Articles Journal of Philosophical Economics Year : 2019

Morality and value neutrality in economics: a dualist view

Abstract

This paper proposes a dualist view that economics exhibits the properties of both moral science and value-neutral approach, regardless of the normative-positive distinction. Our argumentation is derived from the understanding that, analytically, economics is a broadly-defined rational choice theory. As implied by this claim, on the one hand, economics behaves as a moral science for two main reasons: all economic theories and policy discussions are necessarily based on moral premises about means-end considerations; economics as an analytical approach can be and has been applied to explanations of a wide range of moral phenomena. On the other hand, since economists — without being informed of some ethical presuppositions of higher order — cannot deal with the comparisons among different value criteria, their approach remains neutral regarding judgmental positions, which should be given a priori to make economic enquiries possible. Ultimately, by this view we reconcile morality with value neutrality in economics, without slicing the discipline into two distinctive branches.
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hal-03710958 , version 1 (01-07-2022)

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Cheng Li. Morality and value neutrality in economics: a dualist view. Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2019, Volume XII Issue 2 (2), pp.75-118. ⟨10.46298/jpe.10725⟩. ⟨hal-03710958⟩
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