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Journal Articles Journal of Philosophical Economics Year : 2008

Not anything goes: a case for a restricted pluralism


The current discussion on theoretical and methodological pluralism is plagued with confusions and misunderstandings. Some problems arise because an appropriate framework for conducting a fruitful discussion about these issues is still lacking. Many other problems derive from the fact that a rational pluralist should be both tolerant with the many different points of view and able to discriminate among them. In the first and second sections we use some of Mäki's ideas for developing a general framework for discussing pluralism and apply it to the ongoing debate on theoretical and methodological pluralism, showing its strong compromise with demarcationism. In the third section a looser framework for approaching pluralism is outlined, and a detailed discussion of Caldwell's critical pluralism is conducted, pointing out its achievements and some of its shortcomings. The fourth section provides an outline of what a sound notion of restricted pluralism should encompass for avoiding "anything goes".
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hal-03704455 , version 1 (24-06-2022)


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Gustavo Marqués, Diego Weisman. Not anything goes: a case for a restricted pluralism. Journal of Philosophical Economics, 2008, Volume II Issue 1 (1), pp.115-136. ⟨10.46298/jpe.10571⟩. ⟨hal-03704455⟩
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