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Journal Articles Philosophical Psychology Year : 2022

Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past

Kourken Michaelian
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Abstract

On the simulation theory of memory, to remember is to imagine an event from the personal past. McCarroll has recently argued that, because it implies not only that a genuine memory need not be caused by the rememberer’s experience of the remembered event but also that the rememberer need not even have experienced that event, simulationism is unable, first, to explain infantile amnesia (the inability to remember events that occurred in one’s early childhood) and, second, to rule out certain “impossible” memories (namely, memories of events that occurred before one was born). Responding to McCarroll, this paper argues that simulationism is in fact able to explain infantile amnesia but concedes that it is unable to rule out pre-birth memories. It goes on to argue, however, that, rather than leading us to reject the theory, this should lead us to endorse a radicalized simulationism on which to remember is simply to imagine an event from the past, regardless of whether that event belongs to the personal past.
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Dates and versions

hal-03701405 , version 1 (22-06-2022)

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Kourken Michaelian. Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past. Philosophical Psychology, 2022, pp.1-27. ⟨10.1080/09515089.2022.2082934⟩. ⟨hal-03701405⟩

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