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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2009

Gaining assurance in a voter-verifiable voting system

Résumé

The literature on e-voting systems has many examples of discussion of the correctness of the computer and communication algorithms of such systems, as well as discussions of their vulnerabilities. However, a gap in the literature concerns the practical need (before adoption of a specific e-voting system) for a complete case demonstrating that the system as a whole has sufficiently high probability of exhibiting the desired properties when in use in an actual election. This paper discusses the problem of producing such a case, with reference to a specific system: a version of the Prêt à Voter scheme for voter-verifiable e-voting. We show a possible organisation of a case in terms of four main requirements – accuracy, privacy, termination and 'trustedness'– and show some of the detailed organisation that such a case should have, the diverse kinds of evidence that needs to be gathered and some of the interesting difficulties that arise.

Dates et versions

hal-03653362 , version 1 (27-04-2022)

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Citer

Eugenio Alberdi, Lorenzo Strigini, Kieran Leach, Peter Ryan, Philippe Palanque, et al.. Gaining assurance in a voter-verifiable voting system. 2nd International Conference on Dependability (DEPEND 2009), Jun 2009, Athens Vouliagmeni, Greece. pp.99-104, ⟨10.1109/DEPEND.2009.21⟩. ⟨hal-03653362⟩
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