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When the Cold War started, France found it difficult to choose which side it was on due to the aura that the United States and the USSR had with public opinion after the Second World War and also due to the power of the French Communist Party (FCP). Moreover, Paris did not wish to break off its political and economic ties with Moscow's new satellites and, above all, wanted to broker an agreement with Stalin aimed at stopping Germany from causing any further damage. Although the absence of Soviet support for French ambitions for the Saar River, the development of East-West relations and the Marshall Plan put an end to these hesitations,¹ at least those of the political leaders from the socialist and Christian democrat parties, French interest in the ideas of neutrality and neutralism did not weaken and regularly came back to the fore all through the Cold War.

From the outset, although certain groups belonging to the non-communist left advocated "positive neutralism", the Gaullists called for greater independence from Washington and London.² The concept of neutrality was never far and partly explains the attention given by some to countries which, voluntarily or forcibly, chose this option. Initially, neutrality was perceived by French diplomats and leaders in the context of their vision of French politics and according to a certain idea of the national interest, not from the angle of an abstract theoretical position of principle.

Intrinsically, the neutral countries, with the exception of Switzerland, were of secondary strategic importance for France. But the French vision of European neutrality and of relations between the Neutrals and the Kremlin systematically reflected France's European orientations during the period, i.e. the German question, European construction, maintaining relations with Central and Eastern Europe, the defense of national territory and the concern for independence. From a broader viewpoint, the perception of the Neutrals and their relations with Moscow led the French to question the position of their country in international relations and the way to reinforce European security.

Although this perception of neutrality underwent change in line with developments in the international situation, it reveals a certain continuity in French foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1980s. With respect to our particular focus, this continuity was expressed through the constant interest that Paris showed in Finland and Switzerland and in their relations with Moscow, more than with other countries. Sweden and Austria's relations with the USSR also remained under permanent scrutiny, but, as the *Quai d'Orsay* archives testify, this raised less questions. This paper will be limited to these four countries and will not refer to Yugoslavia which, in view of the importance attributed to it by France, is not comparable with the French vision of the Alpine and Nordic Neutrals. Moreover, as access to the archives is more limited concerning the 1980s, this analysis will cover the 1947-1981 period.

How did French diplomacy perceive the relations that Finland, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria had with the Kremlin in fact? How did its vision of neutrality evolve from 1947 to 1981? Did the French consider the neutral status as being viable in the long term? What political and strategic relations did they have with these countries?

If strategic questions with respect to the Neutrals – and particularly Switzerland – were above all present during the first years of the Cold War, which corresponded to the French Fourth Republic (1947-1958), Gaullist diplomacy (1958-1969) developed a vision of neutrality which was in line with his plan for a Europe of nations. The repression of the Prague spring then the CSCE created the conditions for a fresh debate on the position of the Neutrals in East-West relations all through the 1970s, at the very time that détente reached its limits and the Cold War entered its final phase.

The Fourth Republic and neutrality, 1947-1958

Until the outbreak of the Korean War, French leaders did not believe in a military conflict between the two newly formed blocs, which explains their preference for the European echelon rather than for Atlantic cooperation, even after 1950.³ The French leaders' aversion to the "blocs" arose therefore at an early stage and explains the unease with which they perceived the Kremlin's attempts to extend its influence to Northern Europe. The Soviet threat and the particularities of the Cold War nevertheless obliged Paris to reconsider its vision of neutrality and to think about its adaptability to the new international context.

Nordic neutrality in question

The crisis which led to the signature of the Finno-Soviet treaty of friendship on 6 April 1948 was one of the first opportunities for French diplomacy to consider the question of neutrality during the Cold War. It also triggered an era of friendship and solidarity with regard to Finland that was in evidence throughout the period and was symbolic of the French vision of East-West relations.

The 1947-1948 period was a heartrending experience, both interior and exterior, for the French leaders. In France, the communists were seen as a threat during the violent strikes which shook the country; outside, the understanding with Moscow on Germany's future seemed to be compromised and Soviet refusal of the Marshall Plan confirmed the rift between East and West. France, particularly the Christian democrat minister of Foreign affairs Georges Bidault, resolved to accept the recovery of West Germany and to take part in a military alliance alongside the United States.

The emotion caused by the erection of the Iron curtain led French diplomats to monitor with great concern the diplomatic offensive carried out by Moscow from the end of 1947 with respect to Helsinki, denouncing both Soviet aggression and American fatalism in the days that preceded the negotiation of the bilateral treaty.⁴ But what is striking about the French documents, is the admiration that the *Quai d'Orsay* had for President Paasikivi when he managed to get Stalin to accept his counter-project which proposed a neutral Finland. The French ambassador to Helsinki François Coulet was full of praise for the "courage" of the Finns, who were able to avoid another "Czech coup".⁵

In his eyes, the Soviets' moderation towards Finland revealed Moscow's desire to maintain this country and the whole of Scandinavia in a state of neutrality and not to sovietize them. This could be explained, according to the French, by several factors: These States were Western democracies, were not "ready for an internal conquest" and, unlike the Balkans and Czechoslovakia, would get immediate external support in the event of a Soviet attack.⁶ Moreover, with respect to Finland itself, public opinion had a deep hate for the USSR and would be ready to fight in the event of a Soviet invasion. "The USSR would therefore have more to lose than to gain in bringing Finland to heel in a similar way to what it inflicted on Romania or Czechoslovakia. Finland remains without doubt, in the Soviet Union's eyes, a reserved land, but it is a reserved land to which it just had to prevent access for others".⁷

Finnish neutrality, which was feared to be less than durable due to the constant pressure applied by Moscow on the State,⁸ seems to have been extremely precious in the minds of French diplomats, who saw it as a barometer of international relations.⁹

Finland's status was all the more important for the *Quai d'Orsay* as its situation had some of the same characteristics as that of France. When French diplomats addressed the Finnish question, they could not help making a connection between the discomfort that the Soviet neighbor caused Finland and the power of the FCP, which *via* the Kominform, constituted a roundabout means for Moscow to intervene in French affairs. This was particularly the case during the worker's strikes in 1947 and 1948, which affected both France and Finland. The ambiguous relationship with the USSR was, according to the French ambassador to the Kremlin

Yves Chataigneau, a common point for the two nations: In his opinion, the Soviets were frustrated that they did not find “the security guarantees that they were looking for” in Finland and in France.¹⁰

However, this dynamic reliance on Finnish neutrality coupled with the disarray in face of the emergence of the blocs did not lead France to come out in firm support of neutrality in Europe. When Sweden proposed to Norway and Denmark to set up a Scandinavian defensive military alliance in spring 1948 on condition the two countries adopted the Swedish neutrality policy, Bidault was categorically opposed to it. For him, a conception of neutrality which would only really have been founded on the legal insurance that it procured, could be considered as fallacious. Bidault thought that no declaration of neutrality seemed to be able to create “a real obstacle to the imperatives of modern warfare”, and all the more so given that the Northern regions had a strategic interest of the highest order: “In a possible conflict, continental Denmark, as well as Finmark and North Cape would constitute essential areas that none of the opponents would be ready to relinquish without a fight with the other party”. In the minister’s view, the Swedish plan would favor the USSR rather than the Western democracies as it would establish “a kind of curtain behind which the Soviet Union could prepare a surprise attack”. Nordic neutrality would therefore have been extremely precarious.¹¹

Bidault, as well as part of the French diplomatic corps, did not envisage Scandinavia being independent from the Western world given that Sweden, Denmark and Norway were committed to the Marshall Plan: “Economic cooperation cannot take place unless production is aligned to a certain extent, and this appears incompatible with the adoption of a rigorous neutrality policy”.¹² In fact, in 1948, the French minister was convinced that Swedish neutrality, no matter how far back into the past it went, was not viable in the context of the Cold War due to the strategic position of the country and the fact that Stockholm would forge a military alliance with the West.

Opposition to the neutralization of Scandinavia as a whole then became a constant in French diplomacy up to the end of the Cold War. When, from the 1960s to the 1980s, Urho Kekkonen regularly proposed a plan for the neutralization of the Nordic regions, France systematically refused, judging it too dangerous for European security. However, the French position with respect to Swedish neutrality changed after Norway and Denmark took part in the founding of NATO in 1949. From the moment part of Scandinavia adopted the Western defense system, it was clear that the maintenance of a neutral Sweden was a determining – and therefore necessary – condition for the maintenance of Finnish security.¹³ In other words, the USSR would not accept Finnish neutrality unless there was also Swedish neutrality. From this point on, Paris only perceived the latter in the light of the former and vice versa. This point of view hardly changed subsequently. The *Quai d’Orsay*’s archives prove that, throughout the Cold War, all interest in these two countries, was first and foremost an interest in the relations they had with Moscow.

The question of Swiss neutrality as it was perceived by France raises other concerns.

Switzerland, from useful neutrality to strategic partnership

Although French diplomacy has a long history of interest in the idea of neutrality as it is understood by Switzerland, at any early stage the ideological nature of the Cold War led the *Quai d’Orsay*’s representatives to wonder about the limits of this policy. As the East-West conflict, above all political, went beyond simple inter-State logic and the purely military aspects of strategy, France paid sustained attention to the attitude adopted by its Alpine neighbor with respect to Moscow and Washington. A strictly quantitative approach of the archives shows that Soviet-Swiss relations were at the core of French considerations.

It was security imperatives above all which dictated the thoughts and reactions of the French on the place of Switzerland in East-West relations, firstly because the Swiss showed throughout

the two World Wars that they could be a key partner in the transmission of information in times of war.¹⁴ This is fundamental to the understanding of the globally positive assessment that the French made of Swiss policy during the Cold War.

This thought stemmed in the main from the declarations of Max Petitpierre, head of the Federal Policy Department from 1945 to 1961. In 1945, he warned that if Switzerland's neutrality "obliged it to keep away from games of grand politics", it did not prevent it "from collaborating with the other countries in the pacific domain of international cooperation".¹⁵ In fact, even though when the international situation worsened in 1947 Bern re-affirmed the sacrosanct character of its neutrality, from 1950 Switzerland engaged in a lively debate on the adaptability of this policy to the Cold War period.

This debate followed from the ideological nature of the conflict and was based on a very simple postulate, clearly stated by Petitpierre in 1952: Switzerland is opposed to communism; "it belongs to Western Europe geographically, it belongs to Europe spiritually and economically as well".¹⁶ The positions taken by Petitpierre in favor of the Western and European organizations show that, in his mind, neutrality was neither political nor economical but strictly military.¹⁷

In Paris it was understood that in spite of outwardly advocating a return to conventional neutrality, Swiss neutrality was not "neutralism attempting to escape the realities of the East-West conflict and that the Confederation was essentially a part of the West".¹⁸ For all that, French diplomacy was also conscious that other Swiss decision-makers uphold more finely thought out points of view and were less suspicious than Petitpierre of the USSR. This was the case for example for Alfred Zehnder, Political director then Secretary General of the Federal policy department, whose contacts with French diplomats in posts in Switzerland were very frequent between 1946 and 1956.

These men – the ambassadors Henri Hoppenot (1945-1952), Jean Chauvel (1952-1955) and Etienne Dennerly (1955-1961) – were particularly sensitive to Zehnder's arguments on German rearmament in the framework of the European Defence Community (EDC), on exaggerated Atlanticism and on the risk of German-Soviet collusion that encouraged the Soviet desires for the neutralization of Germany.¹⁹ The mid-1950s was a period of real Franco-Swiss convergence between those who, in Paris and Bern, continued to see Germany as a more pressing danger than the USSR and called for real détente with the latter.

This common desire to work toward the easing of tensions reached its height with the arrival in power of Pierre Mendès France in June 1955. The new President of the French Council, attentive to the advice of Jean Chauvel with whom he was in regular correspondence,²⁰ was favorable to the idea of extending neutrality in Central Europe so as to encourage détente and to give the French more room for manoeuvre in the region.

He played a major role at the time of the negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty. In agreement with Moscow on the fact that the Western occupied zones should not be integrated into NATO and that the *Anschluss* with Germany was unacceptable, Pierre Mendès France reopened the question of the State Treaty with the speech that he gave to the United Nations on 22 November 1954 and convinced London and Washington to make headway.²¹

In spite of this, it would once again be incorrect to interpret this initiative as a collective wish, in France, to develop neutrality in Europe at all costs. On this point, Mendès France was relatively isolated. For most French diplomats, such as Jean Laloy for example who was minister-counsellor to Moscow and a very influential personality at the *Quai d'Orsay*, neutrality was only conceivable in certain specific cases, such as in Switzerland, because too often the Soviet idea of European security led the Kremlin to use neutrality as an instrument of the Cold War. The French thus understood that the precarious Finnish neutrality was used by the Soviets "to show the Scandinavians that it was worthwhile earning their trust" and thus convince Norway to distance themselves from the West and Sweden to remain outside NATO.²²

In any case, it was throughout these years of détente that France and Switzerland initiated meaningful relations in the military domain, Bern was looking more broadly to collaborate with NATO to reinforce the security of the Swiss territory. The French saw an advantage in this rapprochement, especially after the effective neutralization of the Austrian territory. In 1955, the head of the federal military department Paul Chaudet thought that in case of East-West conflict, Switzerland would not be protected and should definitely form an alliance with the West, hence the interest of initiating immediate consultations with the Western countries.²³ From February 1955, Divisional Colonel Primault, who controlled the Aviation troops, met General Fay, Chief of Staff of the French Air force, in order to improve the air cover of the Confederation, particularly by allowing the Swiss system to integrate French anti-aircraft defenses in the event of violations of Swiss neutrality by the USSR.²⁴ Even though the French needed the SHAPE's approval, they showed they were favorable to making their first tactical air corps available to the Swiss, which, according to General Fay, would only "increase the prestige of the French anti-air defense system in a particularly sensitive and delicate region".²⁵ Also, in the field of military broadcasting, contacts have been confirmed in summer 1955 between Bern, Paris, London and Rome.²⁶ However, in view of the extreme sensitivity of Swiss public opinion with respect to questions relating to the neutrality of the country, the Confederation's authorities redoubled their efforts to avoid any publicity regarding these contacts. Therefore, when in 1957 the French offered the Swiss the use of the Valdahon camp three weeks a year to allow them to carry out training with their tanks, Bern refused.²⁷

In spite of this and even though Great Britain remained the main strategic partner of the Confederation, the 1950s marked the start of veritable Franco-Swiss military cooperation. In 1960, the Swiss ambassador in Paris Pierre Micheli underlined the frequency of the relations in the domain of officer training and in that of technical cooperation.²⁸ At this time, the Cold War had found renewed vigor and, in France, General de Gaulle had returned to power.

Gaullist diplomacy, the Neutrals and the Kremlin, 1958-1969

We can divide into two distinct periods the years that Charles de Gaulle was President of the Fifth French Republic, that he himself founded owing to the political crisis resulting from the Algerian war: The years 1958-1962 correspond to the "Algerian" period of the General's presidency, and were also marked by the Berlin and Cuba crises; from 1963 to 1969, de Gaulle wanted to restore France's lost influence *via* his "détente, entente, cooperation" policy with Moscow, an exit from NATO's integrated command, its rapprochement with the FRG and his wish to create a Europe of nation states. The idea of independence with respect to any entity which could restrict French sovereignty became the key principle of Gaullist foreign policy. The ostensible objective was just to provoke a general movement of emancipation from the two major powers throughout Europe. In these conditions, it was hardly surprising that French diplomacy continued to pay a certain measure of attention to the Neutrals of Europe and to their relations with the Kremlin, even though the strategic questions were not as prominent as during the preceding period.

Facing up to Khrushchev, 1958-1963

From 1958, with the reinvigoration of the Cold War and the risk of armed conflict between the East and the West, Neutrals were likely to appear, for Paris, as allies or potential victims, even though – except for Switzerland – the French archives do not provide evidence of any military cooperation between France and these countries in the 1960s. Although de Gaulle denounced the "Yalta order" and the submission of Europe to the two major powers, the crisis triggered in 1958 by Khrushchev's attitude to Finland and amplified by the note that he handed to the Finnish government in 1961 was in particular a time for deep reflection with respect to European neutrality.²⁹

The French view of Finland took on a new dimension from the moment President Kekkonen took advantage of the restitution of Porkkala in September 1955 to “give more substance to the idea of neutrality”³⁰ and thus prove that his country could be really neutral. The *Quai d’Orsay*’s archives on Finland are significant in this regard: Almost all the boxes relate to the policy of neutrality and relations with the USSR. For French diplomacy, talking about Finland almost systematically meant referring to the Kremlin, especially when Finnish neutrality was once again threatened by Moscow from 1958 onwards on the pretext of imminent German rearmament. Analyzing the period 1958-1961 just after Khrushchev’s downfall, the French ambassador to Helsinki from 1955 to 1960 Géraud Jouve said that he was convinced that it was the West’s duty to help Finland to bolster its neutrality, even if it meant extending this status to the whole of Scandinavia. He was thus one of the rare French diplomats in the 1960s to come out in favor of Kekkonen’s plan to neutralize the whole of this region to circumvent the Soviet argument according to which Western aggression against the USSR would necessarily be carried out *via* Scandinavia.³¹

The Soviet threat to Finland and Khrushchev’s adventurism had, noted the French diplomats, immediate repercussions in the other neutral countries, starting with Austria. French interest for the relations between Vienna and Moscow was indeed important after the signature of the Austrian State Treaty, particularly because, like Switzerland, Austria was perceived in Paris as a neutral country but committed to the West, as evidenced by its membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 – alongside Sweden and Switzerland – and its openly expressed desire from 1961 onwards to be associated with the EEC. For the French ambassador to Vienna, this attachment to the West was due to the painful memory left by the Soviet occupation of part Austria after the war.³²

The French noted that relations between Austria and its neighbors in the East were limited to strictly neighborly relations. Because it aroused anger and disquiet in Vienna, the 1958-1961 Finno-Soviet crisis, triggered although the Finnish commitments to Moscow were scrupulously fulfilled by Helsinki, led the French – as well as the Austrians themselves – to ask questions about the pretext that the USSR could find to pick a quarrel with Austria. For the French ambassador to Vienna, although a Finnish style scenario was difficult to envisage in as much as the Austrians did not have the same obligations as the Finnish with regard to the USSR, the fact that they were also “reluctant Neutrals” and attached to Western values may have been enough to convince Khrushchev “who did not bother with legal niceties” to take issue in one way or another with the Alpine Republic.³³ The French were not surprised therefore when Moscow decided to attack Austria’s desire to be associated with the Common market. For the Ambassador René Brouillet, this attitude had no other effect than to bring Austria closer to the West by gradually convincing the Austrians that “neutrality alone would not eliminate the dangers inherent in a particularly exposed geographically location”.³⁴

The *Quai d’Orsay* came to the same conclusions with regard to Switzerland. The “power politics” inaugurated by Khrushchev caused, according to the French embassy in Bern, renewed anticommunism from the officials, public opinion and the press.³⁵ The French were particularly pleased by the support given by the Swiss German papers for the firm attitude adopted by General de Gaulle with respect to the Soviets during the Berlin crisis.³⁶ They also appreciated the fact that the Swiss called upon “the West not to capitulate to the artificial war psychosis created by Moscow”.³⁷

There was nothing surprising for the French diplomatic services about the Swiss engaging, in their turn, in a lively debate about whether or not they accessed the nuclear deterrent. On 11 July 1958, the Federal Council published a declaration – complemented by the secret order of 23 December – in which they affirmed that “the army must be given more efficient means to allow it to maintain [Swiss] independence and protect [its] neutrality. Atomic weapons were

part of these means”.³⁸ Although this declaration did not prejudice any final decision, it caused stupor in Moscow, who accused Bern of undermining Swiss neutrality.

This affair only added to French diplomacy’s scrutiny of Soviet-Swiss relations, and all the more so since the explosion of the first French atomic bomb in 1960 led Paul Chaudet to consider informing France of Swiss interest in French nuclear technology and of its desire to take part in tests in this field.³⁹ Although Petitpierre calmed Chaudet’s ardor arguing that neither France nor any nuclear power would agree to Swiss requests and that these request would make the Confederation look foolish because they would be accused of imitating Paris,⁴⁰ the Swiss nuclear option remained available, due in particular to the fact that the Berlin and Cuba crises ran the risk of leading to war. Thus, the debate was lively in Bern between those for and those against the Swiss signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of Moscow in August 1963.⁴¹

And, on this question, Gaullist France, itself opposed to a treaty that it considered to be an obstacle to the composition of its atomic arsenal, was trying to convince the Federal Council to imitate it, which would only enhance French policy. To do so, Jean Laloy, assistant director of the Political affairs at the *Quai d’Orsay*, raised not only the argument that the Swiss would not in any case be able to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere or in water, but it also colored its proposal with a Gaullist shade by stating on the one hand that “Swiss independence demanded suitable national defenses, organized freely, without assistance or outside constraints, and without limits laid down in a treaty”, and on the other hand that signing any such treaty would be playing into Soviet and American hands who both wanted to limit Chinese power and influence.⁴² Precisely, in 1962, de Gaulle envisaged recognizing the People’s Republic of China, partly to mark his difference with the two major powers.⁴³

Although Bern finally decided to sign the treaty, this episode appears to be an attempt by France to use a neutral country to put the spotlight on its foreign policy. This attitude took on a permanent status during the years of *détente*.

“Détente, entente, cooperation” and neutrality

With the relaxation of tensions, French perception of the Neutrals took place in the light of a threefold Gaullist view of “*détente*, *entente* and *cooperation*” which dominated France’s foreign policy. Thus, while General de Gaulle planned to adopt a concrete approach to *détente* by intensifying the links with the socialist world, Paris was very concerned about the difficulty of Swiss public opinion to depart from its Cold War reflexes.⁴⁴ In fact, the staunch anti-communism of part of the Swiss population, which was perceived favorably by the French diplomatic service while East-West tensions remained high, became a drawback as soon as the two blocs started working towards the establishment of real and sustainable ties.

However, France took great care to distinguish between public opinion and the opinion of the political leaders and, from 1964, was pleased with the improvement of the relations between Bern and the Kremlin, and particularly with the nomination as Swiss ambassador to Moscow of Anton R. Ganz, known for his important role at the time of the negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR between 1944 and 1946. Free from “anti-communist blinkers”,⁴⁵ he said, as soon as he took up his post, he was in favor of “an open door policy” with the USSR and, noted the French ambassador to Bern, “opposed to an overly negative policy of certain sections of Swiss politics, particularly in Zurich, with respect to the countries in the Eastern bloc”.⁴⁶ The French noted with satisfaction as time went by that as relations softened between the East and the West, the Swiss were less and less hesitant to follow the Western movement towards appeasement, which also reinforced the French sentiment that the Confederation was committed to working hand in hand with the West.⁴⁷

In the eyes of French diplomats, this improvement in Soviet-Swiss relations was due in the main to the relations that their Austrian neighbor had both with the USSR and the European Economic Community (EEC). In fact, Austria was engaged, from 1961 to 1967, in negotiations

– albeit unsuccessful – with the EEC with a view to joining the Common Market. The Swiss, who were initially favorable to this exercise, very quickly become hostile to any such moves as, according to the ambassador in Bern Gabriel Bonneau, the success of the negotiations between a neutral country and the Six countries in the Community would undermine the argument put forward by the Confederation to avoid the path suggested by its external trade structure – essentially oriented towards the Western world – i.e. that an accord for association was not necessary to have good commercial relations with the Western countries and that it would run the risk of erecting additional trade barriers with third party countries.⁴⁸ Moreover, Switzerland would find itself isolated between the Common market and Austria which would be associated with. It was clear, for Bonneau, that Bern based its hopes on a Soviet veto using the example given by “a real neutral” (Switzerland), if Vienna and Brussels managed to reach an agreement.⁴⁹

This question of the relations between Austria, the USSR and the EEC is omnipresent in the *Quai d’Orsay*’s enormous dossier on Austro-Soviet relations in the 1960s, even though French representation to Vienna focused just as much attention on the relations Austria had with the rest of the World. However, this dossier was particularly interesting for Paris because it was closely linked to the French concerns with European cooperation.

Although at the beginning de Gaulle supported the principle of a bilateral agreement between Austria and the EEC, as he mentioned to Bruno Kreisky in February 1960,⁵⁰ this support was mainly aimed at hindering the UK, who had struck up close ties with Austria in the framework of the new EFTA, created to compensate for France’s refusal to allow London to gain membership of the Common market.

There was however a certain sensitivity of part of the French diplomatic services with respect to the Kremlin’s arguments against an association between Vienna and the EEC. The numerous telegrams from the French ambassador to Moscow Maurice Dejean regularly insisted on “*Economic Anschluss*” constantly brought up by the Soviets. In their opinion, in as much as the EEC was only an “economic arm” of NATO and given the dominant position of the “vengeful” FRG within the Common Market and the already meaningful economic dependence of Austria with respect to Germany, any association would inevitably lead Austria to fall under the influence of Bonn and, de facto, call into question its neutrality and the Austrian State Treaty.⁵¹ Dejean, who was a fervent partisan of dialogue between Paris and Moscow and another very influential personality at the *Quai d’Orsay*, only saw French support for the Austrian initiative as another obstacle to improved Franco-Soviet relations.

In fact, French support for Austria was more reserved once détente started to take effect and Paris was trying to develop its relations with the Kremlin to move on from “bloc-to-bloc” regime. For France, the Austrians should have handled the Soviets with care but, for their part, the Soviets should have stopped continually using “the specter of West Germany’s expansion”, including the question of the links between Austria and the EEC.⁵² French interference in this Austro-Soviet debate contributed to Paris’ desire to defuse the mutual mistrust between Bonn and Moscow: Because real détente was only possible, according to de Gaulle, if the FRG and the USSR agreed to enter into talks, it fell to France to convince the Kremlin that Germany no longer posed a threat.⁵³

Hence the French viewed the relative easing of tensions in Austro-Soviet relations from the mid-1960s favorably, as this headed in the direction of better relations between States and not between blocs. In August 1964, the French ambassador in Vienna Louis Roché encouraged the Austrian leaders to move closer of to the East so as to give back to Austria “the role of the Danubian power, inherent in its history, and even more so, the role as the meeting place between two worlds for which its past had made it the perfect candidate”.⁵⁴

All the same, the French remained mistrustful as regards the uses that Moscow may make of neutrality and called upon the Neutrals to be prudent, particularly with respect to the Soviet

proposal for a conference on European security (CES) intended to establish the European political and territorial *status quo*.⁵⁵

The 1970s: a new way of looking at the Neutrals?

Elected in June 1969 to succeed General de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou pursued the policy of “*détente*, *entente* and *cooperation*” but added a West European multilateral element that was absent during his predecessor’s tenure. He decided on arrival in power to relaunch European construction by opening the doors of the Common Market to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway and Denmark and by working on creating European political cooperation (EPC) and monetary union.

Although his relations with Washington and Moscow were cordial at the outset, they hardened from 1972 onwards, as Pompidou accused the two Superpowers of creating a “*condominium*” on the back of the Europeans. It was one of the reasons for which he brought France into the CSCE. In this way, his support for the Helsinki process and his policy in favor of EPC converged on a very Gaullist objective: to allow the Europeans to speak in their own name, outside the blocs. It was through this EPC/CSCE prism that the French perception of the Neutrals should be understood in the 1970s.

Commitment to the CSCE, a means of supporting Finnish neutrality

As mentioned above, French interest in Finland was due to the deep movement of friendship to a nation in which France sometimes seemed to see itself, in that it “attempt[ed] to be in control of its own destiny and to escape the determinism and fatality that history and geography seem[ed] to impose upon them”.⁵⁶ We note on France’s part a real will to help the Finns to maintain their precarious neutrality. The repression of the Prague spring by the troops of the Warsaw Pact appeared in this regard to be a real turning point in Franco-Finnish relations and resulted in the nomination of the Ambassador Gérard André in 1969 in Helsinki, a real artisan of the rapprochement between the two countries.

André played a central role at the time of French acceptance of the Soviet CES project, which had thus far been seen as pure propaganda. With other diplomats, he was among those who thought it necessary to broaden the conference agenda with subjects which would prevent the Kremlin from repeating in Helsinki or Belgrade what it had done in Prague in 1968.⁵⁷

At the *Quai d’Orsay*, it was thought that the Soviet desire to maintain its *glacis* was such that nothing must be left to chance in order to ensure the safety of the nations under direct threat from Moscow. In Helsinki, Gérard André kept in close contact with his Finnish links and, thanks to the many reports on internal and external policies that he sent to Paris, pushed French diplomats to give more support to Finland and its European security initiatives. Hence, when in April 1969 most of the Westerners saw Moscow’s hand in the memorandum on the holding of a CES distributed by the Kekkonen government, André was convinced that it was really a Finnish initiative in as far as, contrary to Brezhnev’s wishes, the memorandum invited the United States and Canada to attend the conference.⁵⁸ It was clear, for the ambassador that by working toward *détente* by promoting the CES, Finland was looking for “public recognition of [its] neutrality from the major powers” and trying to increase its security with respect to the USSR.⁵⁹ If the CES was held in Helsinki, Finland would automatically be protected from any advances by the participants: This was a strong argument for accepting the CES, an argument used by Pompidou himself.⁶⁰

The Franco-Finnish rapprochement which took place in the first half of the 1970s was also based on the French desire to gain insurance against the effects of EEC enlargement to include Denmark and Norway. While André shared Finnish fears that any such enlargement would accentuate the cleavage between the East and the West, would isolate Finland and would disturb the precarious balance upon which the safeguarding of its relative independence vis-à-vis the

USSR was based,⁶¹ the *Quai d'Orsay* and the President gave assurances to Helsinki about the maintenance of solid economic and commercial cooperation with the EEC, which resulted in the signature of free trade agreements in 1972 and 1973.⁶² Elsewhere, France urged the Finns to continue their commitment to the Nordek project, designed to achieve economic integration of the Nordic countries.⁶³ When Kekkonen suspended the Nordek negotiations, Gérard André immediately explained that the desire not to provoke the Kremlin was behind this decision and that, from then on, French support for the CES was even more necessary than ever: The conference could reinforce Finnish neutrality.⁶⁴ A CES including a section on human rights and proclaiming the inviolability of frontiers would allow Finnish attachment to the Western way of life and to democracy to be protected while showing the Soviets that the maintenance of Finland's independence had more advantages than disadvantages.⁶⁵

Even though André managed to convince the *Quai d'Orsay*, his arguments in favor of Finland had no effect on French military authorities which, contrary to the peoples in charge of diplomacy, considered Finland to be subject to the Soviets, as shown by the Finnish hesitation to sign the agreement with the EEC. Consequently, Franco-Finnish cooperation in the military field was close to nil. In 1972 and 1974, the Interministerial Committee for Export of War Equipment refused to sell the antitank missiles Milan to Helsinki because of interference with military confidentiality that the presumed affinity between the Finnish army and the Red Army could cause.⁶⁶ The *Quai d'Orsay's* efforts aiming to convince the French general staff that precisely this kind of refusal could make Finland dependent on Soviet armament, led to nothing.⁶⁷ For the French Ministry of Defense, the Finno-Soviet proximity would not encourage France's allies – and particularly the U.S. – to buy these reputable missiles if Helsinki purchased them.⁶⁸ According to André, such a lack of goodwill made the CSCE more indispensable than ever.

The result, although French commitment to what would become the CSCE could also be explained by Pompidou's refusal to tag along behind Willy Brandt as regards East-West relations, the will to help the Neutrals after the events in Prague, and particularly Finland, and to guarantee their security against Moscow was a factor that could not be ignored. We find it throughout the negotiations which led to the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

When the Neutrals served France's European policy. The Swedish example.

The other main issue which concerned French diplomacy at the beginning of the 1970s was that of the enlargement and extension of the EC. From the summit in The Hague in December 1969, Pompidou lifted the French veto to the United Kingdom's membership and committed himself to European intergovernmental political cooperation. In his view, co-opting London would allow him to combat the federalist and supranational tendencies of the Benelux countries. Moreover, he wanted to transform the Community into a major player in East-West relations. From this perspective, the objective of certain neutral countries to try to create closer ties with the EEC was perceived as an advantage by the new French President, even though he was conscious that no membership was possible in the short term due to the fact that the foundations of the Common Market were firmly in the Western camp. Sweden's case was symptomatic in this regard.

Up to 1970, the *Quai d'Orsay's* carried out few analyses of the relations that Sweden had with the other countries, and particularly with the Kremlin, compared to those produced on the other European Neutrals. In 1970, the new French ambassador to Stockholm, Pierre Francfort, was forthright in his complaints that he did not “find in the archives of this embassy any information on the details of past [Sovieto-Swedish relations]”.⁶⁹ However, the decade that was beginning then brought renewed interest, which went together with the evolution of the political situation in France. In Paris in the 1970s, Sweden was in the spotlight because of the social-democrat model that it constituted for part of the French left and center who were seeking new

solutions to reform the economic and social system at the time and to adapt it to the upheavals of the 1960s and “sexual liberation”.⁷⁰

In terms of foreign policy also, Sweden was getting good press in Paris and the critiques of Olof Palme with respect to the United States did not go unnoticed. However, speaking about Sweden often meant also speaking about Finland. Although these two countries had a status of neutrality with differing origins, the French bore in mind that to interfere with the neutrality of one, was to upset the neutrality of the other. Thus, noted the French ambassador to Stockholm, although the Swedish were always prudent with regard to Moscow, it was not so much because they feared intimidation by the Kremlin – which could, in this case, only be achieved *via* press campaigns – but rather because they feared that Finland would pay the consequences.⁷¹ This explained, according to the embassy, Sweden’s firm neutrality with respect to Washington even more than to Moscow: Palme was more inclined to attack American interventionism in Vietnam than that of the USSR in Czechoslovakia.⁷² In fact, French considerations of Swedish neutrality were always related to geographical realities: Sweden was a “Buffer state” between two rival areas of influence, Finland subject to Soviet threats to the East, Norway and Denmark members of NATO to the West.⁷³

Swedish neutrality was above all an excellent means for France to promote its European ideas. Thus, while the EC Six considered all Swedish applications for membership unacceptable due to its neutrality, Pompidou called for discussions to be initiated between the European Community on the one hand and Austria, Switzerland and Sweden on the other when the negotiations began with the four countries who were official candidates for membership of the Common market – the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Norway.⁷⁴ If the aim was to avoid economic barriers within of the Scandinavian world, Pompidou’s objective was above all to encourage convergence between the idea of European economic integration on the one hand and that of political neutrality on the other. In this way, the EC would not appear to be NATO’s economic arm and at the same time an instrument was created to combat the “Sovieto-American *condominium*”. For Pompidou, the attitude of the two superpowers, détente and the necessity to consider Europe as a whole meant that “a certain incompatibility between membership of an integrated NATO and the European tendency towards independence” gradually developed.⁷⁵

Neutrality was thus once again used to serve the French policy of “independence”. When Olof Palme wondered how to reconcile neutrality and membership of the EEC, Pompidou replied that there was no antinomy between these two statuses in fact: After all, France itself was not part of the integrated NATO organization... What’s more, by joining the Neutrals, the EC would be obliged to check any moves towards a supranational state in order to respect the neutrality of certain of its members; in fact, the French vision of intergovernmental cooperation would triumph once and for all.⁷⁶

However, Pompidou had no illusions about the possibility of bringing Sweden into the Common market, as he pointed out to Palme: “If you decide to join the Common market, you know that you will have a problem with the Soviet Union. This is perhaps not a serious problem, but this will pose a serious question to Finland and will assuredly affect your relations with these two countries”.⁷⁷ Once again, Swedish neutrality is seen from the Finnish angle. And the French President was really aware of the constraints that were weighing upon the Nordic Neutrals. Hence, in his mind the absolute necessity for the CSCE. It was the only way that the West had to protect the status of the Neutrals of Europe against the USSR while encouraging convergence and cooperation between the different nations which made up the continent. It was only once this convergence had been achieved that the blocs would disappear and that there would no longer be any obstacles to the creation of a European Defense structure, independent of NATO. Moreover, it would not have been advisable to disappoint the Finns, who were pulling out all the stops to escape from Russian influence and who perhaps also felt a little isolated due to the membership of or association with the EEC of its Scandinavian neighbors.⁷⁸

Thus, if the CSCE was to come into being, said Pompidou to Willy Brandt, it would have to be partially linked to Helsinki.⁷⁹

In spite of this, the French diplomats remained prudent, always suspecting the Soviets of wanting to pull the strings. The French disagreed with the future CSCE being able to give birth to a permanent pan-European security organization which would have its headquarters in Helsinki, “in a country so sensitive to Soviet solicitation”.⁸⁰ The extension of neutrality in Europe was far from being the order of the day for Pompidou: Political détente had first to be put on a more stable footing. It was precisely for this reason that he was against the MBFR (*Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions*) negotiated in Vienna in 1973 and supported by the Neutrals. In his opinion, there was a risk that they could lead to the neutralization of the whole of Central Europe, including Germany. This zone would be the center of a race for new territories in case of renewed tensions.⁸¹ Pompidou thought that such a reduction of forces would favor the “Finlandization” of Germany by the Soviets: Neutralization would solve the problem of the reunification because the FRG and the GDR would get a same military status.⁸²

In the same way, in the 1960s and 1970s, French leaders were opposed to the Kekkonen project designed to denuclearize Northern Europe. Not only would this make the zone vulnerable to Soviet pressure, but it would also compromise the security of the whole continent. Paris also refused the “European disarmament program” proposed by Kekkonen to the United Nations in October 1979, considering it to be contradictory and dangerous.⁸³

The ambiguous attitude of France at the CSCE

Since the start of the Cold War, the French diplomatic services had always underlined the commitment of the Alpine and Nordic Neutrals to Western style democracy and liberalism. The fact that these four countries were attached, within the *Quai d'Orsay's* administration, to the Western Europe sub-department is significant.

However, the commitment of the Neutrals to Western ideas in the CSCE was striking for the French diplomats present at the Helsinki and Geneva negotiations between 1972 and 1975. For them, the collusion between the West and the Neutrals took a more concrete turn at the CSCE as a result of the new subjects that were addressed, starting with human rights, cultural cooperation and human contacts. Switzerland in particular “gave the strongest impression” in that it expressed “with remarkable clarity, views that characterized both restraint and firmness, as well as total independence with respect to the ideas of the “major powers”, particularly the Kremlin”.⁸⁴

The French remarked the discomfort that this created for the Soviets, “who found it difficult to accept that the participation [of the Neutrals] could be full and complete” and who “expected the Neutrals to take up more or less equidistant positions between the two main groups on delicate subjects”.⁸⁵ The French delegation underlined in the reports that it sent to Paris the exemplary behavior of these Neutrals which had decided not to give in to Soviet intimidation but which, at the same time, did not intend to engage in provocation of Moscow, falling in line with the attitude adopted by France.⁸⁶

For all that, this positive view of the Neutrals had its limits and, on certain subjects, the divergences between the French and the representatives of these countries led to real confrontations. This was particularly the case when the Neutrals tried to promote disarmament or when France sought to insert a clause relating to the protection of the quadripartite rights and responsibilities over Germany in the Helsinki Final Act. It then had to face the Swedish, the Swiss, the Yugoslavians, the Spanish and the Maltese, who criticized it for creating discrimination, amongst the participants of the CSCE, between large and medium-sized powers.⁸⁷ Thus, France was accused of adopting an attitude that it had always denounced. This behavior was condemned all the more as the best support the French received in this matter came from the Soviets.

The unanimity of views between the Neutrals and France was not total therefore. France was keen on preserving the interests that it shared with Moscow and which, in the same way as the quadripartite rights, granted it a privileged role in East-West relations. French diplomacy perceived the relations between the USSR and the Neutrals in the light of this paradigm: It agreed to help the Neutrals to increase their security as regards Moscow and work towards overthrowing the *status quo*, but only on condition it kept its place in the agreement between the great powers, even if this gave the impression it was content with the established order, the same order whose disappearance had been elevated to the supreme objective of the country's foreign policy.

The French perception of the Neutrals was not completely free of ulterior motives therefore: Despite the positive Gaullist view of independence and the right to neutrality, the Neutrals should not forget that they could be neutral because other countries had chosen not to be. Neutrality was possible because NATO existed. And if France could afford to be independent, it could not afford to be a neutral.

Forging closer ties with the Neutrals to save détente

When détente reached its limits after 1975, France under Valéry Giscard d'Estaing – elected in spring 1974 after the death of Pompidou – tried in the face of great opposition to maintain the policy of détente inaugurated by de Gaulle and to use the gradual deterioration of Soviet-American relations to underline its credentials to act as a bridge between the East and the West to the Kremlin.⁸⁸ This explains the meeting between Giscard and Brezhnev in Warsaw in May 1980, just a few months after the Red Army entered Kabul.

In this framework, French diplomacy openly formulated its desire to create closer ties with the neutral countries, which were able to prove at the CSCE that they were, like Paris, very attached both to détente and to democracy. Of course, as the *Quai d'Orsay* noted, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria condemned Soviet expansionism in the second half of the 1970s but, for all that, they did not follow the Americans in their crusade against communism. In other words, these countries were on the same wave length as France, at least up to the arrival of François Mitterrand in power in 1981. The fact that it supported them as regards their policy of neutrality appeared more than ever as a means of showing French opposition to the “bloc-to-bloc” system.⁸⁹ Moreover, the move towards closer ties with the Neutrals – whose dynamism in terms of the battle for disarmament was well known – also aimed to promote the French plan for a conference on disarmament in Europe launched in 1978 and which was aimed at extending confident-building measures put forward by the CSCE. In this way, Paris short-circuited Finnish plans for nuclear disarmament.⁹⁰

In parallel, everyone in France was well aware that Moscow's initiatives were creating disquiet amongst the Neutrals in Europe, starting with Finland. In January 1978, the *Quai d'Orsay* noted a rise in the USSR's military potential in the Arctic sea and, de facto, the deterioration in relations between Moscow and Oslo, these two factors tended to pose a threat to Finnish security.⁹¹ It was therefore to ensure its friendship and support, to underline the continuity of its policy and also to prepare the meetings of Belgrade and Madrid on the follow-up of the CSCE that Giscard decided to strengthen its ties with the neutral countries. Although the Cold War was regaining momentum, he travelled to Switzerland in December 1979, made a State visit to Finland in June 1980 then, in the same month, received the Swedish Royal couple in Paris. Finland was given special consideration due to its role during the Helsinki process, its position with respect to the USSR and its efforts to keep the peace at the United Nations.⁹² Moreover, the French foreign ministry pointed out several times that Finland was the only neutral country not to condemn intervention in Afghanistan and that, unlike Sweden, it had “the wisdom”, like Giscard, not to apply pressure on the question of human rights.⁹³ The French President was indeed highly critical of Jimmy Carter's *moralpolitik* that he considered to be

counter-productive and clumsy.⁹⁴ Intensifying relations with Helsinki was therefore a good way for France to maintain the USSR's esteem. Economic considerations should not be ignored either: Indeed the French noted that there was an increase in Finland's economic dependence on the USSR following the oil crisis of 1973 and due to the gradual implementation of the accord passed between Helsinki and the COMECON that same year.⁹⁵ In fact, France intended to contribute to the diversification of Finland's imports and attempted to penetrate the Finnish market further, by trying in particular to sell French know-how in terms of nuclear civil technology to Kekkonen.⁹⁶ Franco-Finnish military cooperation remained weak, despite the relative evolution of the French military authorities' viewpoint towards Finnish neutrality: while France tried to sell the Franco-German trainer Alpha-Jet to Finland in 1975-1976, it came up against the provisions of the treaty of Paris of 1947, which forbade Helsinki to acquire German aeronautical equipment.⁹⁷ On the other hand, Paris planned to send a civil and military mission to Helsinki in October 1979 in order to discuss the politico-strategic problems related to Finnish Lapland.⁹⁸ The consulted archives do not tell us whether this meeting actually took place or not.

As regards Sweden, the economic crisis that affected it at the end of the 1970s led the French to think that the Swedes would be obliged to forge closer ties with the EEC and particularly with France, "a neighbor that was not as close and not as powerful as Germany whose economic weight was worrying".⁹⁹ The meeting with the King of Sweden in June 1980 was not without economic interest. In the military field, even though a Franco-Swedish committee of cooperation which exchanged information about aeronautics, naval equipment and electronics had been meeting once a year since the early 1970s,¹⁰⁰ and while both countries had signed a security agreement in 1973 to protect secret data given as part of military orders,¹⁰¹ cooperation between Paris and Stockholm remained close to nil. Admittedly France sold some of its radar systems to Sweden in 1969 and 1973, but it had to recognize that the Swedish market was reserved for national industry and that this situation was partly due to the neutrality policy.¹⁰² As a result, Paris highlighted its singular position inside NATO to convince the Swedish government to purchase its weapons.¹⁰³ Besides, it wished to link Sweden to the new European cooperation in the field of armament (European Ordonnancement Group, February 1976) in order to strengthen the distinction between this new authority and NATO, which would make European Defense more independent.¹⁰⁴ Once again, neutrality served the French view of international relations.

In the end, the changes in the 1970s and 1980s heralded a new rapprochement between France and the Neutrals which, even after Mitterrand had softened the policy of his predecessor by helping Ronald Reagan in his fight against "the Evil Empire", did not weaken and would reach its apotheosis with the inclusion of Finland, Sweden and Austria in the Common Market in 1995. This did not come about smoothly however.

Thus, when the Berlin Wall came down, France's position as regards the Neutrals once again reflected the country's foreign policy. Mitterrand's ambiguous attitude at the end of the Cold War and German reunification was also evident vis-à-vis Finland, Sweden and Austria. On the one hand, it was clear that these countries aspired to join the Western world, then triumphant, through membership of the Common Market; on the other, Paris was looking to keep them away so that they would serve the Mitterrandian plan which consisted in gradual coming together of the two sides of the Iron curtain so that dialogue would be facilitated between Paris and Moscow.¹⁰⁵ Once again, France assured the Neutrals of Europe of its friendship and its support, but not to extent of sacrificing its status and its relations with the USSR.

Such an attitude was symptomatic of the French vision of neutrality during the Cold War. Even though interest for the Neutrals remained secondary compared to other stakes over this period, it was constant and was determined by a willingness – born of the East-West conflict and consecrated by de Gaulle – not to sacrifice national identities for "the policy of the blocs".

This structural position explains to a great extent Paris's use of neutrality: France's support to the Neutrals was undeniably sincere but it mainly appeared as a way to emphasize French foreign policy, especially towards disarmament, European integration and relations with the USSR. In Paris, thinking about the relations between the Neutrals and Moscow meant reflecting on the Franco-Soviet links. That was not unequivocal, far from it.

Thus, the French strongly supported the Neutrals, as long as this did not harm the basis of French power, as for example nuclear weapons or the rights and responsibilities over Germany. In this way, France seemed to be satisfied with the *status quo* it proclaimed to be against. Likewise, the French often professed their interest for neutrality but were opposed to its expansion in Europe. On the contrary, while French diplomacy admitted that Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Finland stood by the West, it never envisaged – except during the first years of the Cold War – their integration into the Atlantic bloc or the EEC in the short and middle term. However, that did not prevent it from seeking military cooperation with these countries, as shown with Switzerland, which was early included in the French Defense plans.

The result of this analysis is that French perception of European neutrality was tinged with pragmatism, empathy, condescension and, probably, pusillanimity. This perception changed according to the needs of French diplomacy, the state of international relations and the countries concerned. It was clear for France that the nature itself of the Cold War made total neutrality impossible, as each country had a social and economic structure which inevitably brought it closer to one of the two main models and because a nuclear conflict would not spare the Neutrals. For French diplomacy, neutrality, be it effective or envisaged, was only a Cold War instrument, used by the Soviets, the Westerners and the Neutrals themselves to defend their own conception of European security and the future of Europe. France was not an exception and knew it.

¹ Frédéric Bozo, *La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), pp. 6-13.

² Georges-Henri Soutou, "Les Français et la question d'une éventuelle politique soviétique de "neutralité" en Europe, 1954-1955," in Georges-Henri Soutou and Emilia Robin Hivert, eds., *L'URSS et l'Europe, de 1941 à 1957* (Paris: PUPS, 2008), pp. 428-429.

³ On the Atlantist policy of France between 1945 and 1958, see Jenny Raflik-Grenouilleau, *La IVe République et l'Alliance atlantique. Influence et dépendance (1945-1958)* (Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013).

⁴ Cable by François Puaux, 24 February 1948, in French Foreign Ministry Archives (hereinafter referred to as FFMA), Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 11.

⁵ Cable by François Coulet, 7 April 1948, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 12.

⁶ Cable by René Massigli, 13 April 1948, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 12.

⁷ Dispatch by Coulet, 20 September 1949, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 22.

⁸ Cable by Coulet, 30 December 1948, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 8.

⁹ Dispatch by Coulet, 20 September 1949, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 22.

¹⁰ Cable by Yves Chataigneau, 23 October 1948, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 12.

¹¹ Dispatch by Georges Bidault, 20 May 1948, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Suède, Box 8.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Dispatch by Coulet, 20 September 1949, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 22.

¹⁴ Georges-Henri Soutou, "Réflexions franco-suisses et modération dans la guerre froide (1945-1955)," in *Relations internationales*, No. 98 (Summer 1999), pp. 189-199.

¹⁵ Speech by Petitpierre on 29 October 1945 at a meeting of the "parti radical". Quoted by Georges-Henri Soutou, "La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle: de la méfiance stratégique à la confiance et à la complicité," in *Stratégique*, Vol. 107, No. 4 (2014), pp. 17-33.

¹⁶ Dispatch by Jean Chauvel, 5 February 1952, quoted by Soutou, "La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle," p. 25.

¹⁷ Soutou, "Réflexions franco-suisses," pp. 192-193.

¹⁸ Soutou, "La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle," p. 26.

¹⁹ Report by Chauvel, 17 April 1953, quoted by Soutou, "Réflexions franco-suisses," p. 196.

²⁰ Jean Chauvel, *Commentaire* t. III (Paris: Fayard, 1973), p. 109.

- ²¹ Pierre Jardin, “‘Österreich wird frei’. Le traité d’Etat autrichien du 15 mai 1955,” in *Relations internationales*, No. 71 (Autumn 1992), pp. 311-325.
- ²² Dispatch from Helsinki, 22 July 1954, in FFMA, Europe 1944-1960, Finlande, Box 34.
- ²³ Dispatch from Bern, 22 February 1955, quoted by Soutou, “La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle,” p. 31.
- ²⁴ Soutou, “La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle,” p. 31.
- ²⁵ Letter by General Fay to Colonel divisionnaire Primault, 8 February 1955, quoted by Soutou, “La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle,” pp. 31-32.
- ²⁶ Soutou, “La France et la Suisse au XXe siècle,” p. 32.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Pierre Micheli, “Rapport sur les relations franco-suissees au cours de l’année 1960”, in Swiss Federal Archives-Bern (SFA), dodis.ch/15035.
- ²⁹ On 30 October 1961, the USSR gave a note to Finland which referred to article 2 of the Finno-Soviet treaty of 1948 according to which Moscow and Helsinki had to confer in case of military threat. The Soviet excuse was that rearmament of the FRG and its agreements with Denmark and Norway seemed to foreshadow German aggression against the USSR across the Finnish territory.
- ³⁰ Report by Bernard Dufournier, 3 June 1967, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ³¹ Conference by Géraud Jouve, 17 October 1967, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ³² Report by Louis Roché, 6 August 1964, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440.
- ³³ Dispatch from Vienna, 23 November 1961, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Cable by Etienne Dennery, 30 September 1961, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ³⁶ Report by Dennery, 5 September 1961, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ “Déclaration relative à l’acquisition d’armes atomiques pour notre armée”, 11 July 1958, quoted by Mauro Cerutti, “Neutralité et sécurité : le projet atomique suisse”, in Antoine Fleury and Sacha Zala, eds., *Wissenschaft und Aussenpolitik : Beiträge zur Tagung anlässlich des 50. Jubiläums der Schaffung des ersten Postens eines schweizerischen Wissenschaftsattachés* (Bern: Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz, 2012), pp. 73-91.
- ³⁹ Mauro Cerutti, “Neutralité et sécurité,” pp. 80-81.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 80-81.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- ⁴² Cable by Micheli, 20 August 1963, in Swiss Federal Archives-Bern (SFA), dodis.ch/30607.
- ⁴³ Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958-1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 515.
- ⁴⁴ Report by Gérard Gaussen, 30 January 1964, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ⁴⁵ Report by Gaussen, 7 January 1964, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ⁴⁶ Report by Gaussen, 27 January 1964, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ⁴⁷ Report by Gabriel Bonneau, 23 August 1967, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ⁴⁸ Report by Bonneau, 10 August 1966, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suisse, Box 206QO/111.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid.
- ⁵⁰ Conversation de Gaulle/Kreisky, 13 February 1960, in *Documents diplomatiques français* (DDF), 1960-I, n°67.
- ⁵¹ Cables from Moscow, 1 December 1961, 10 February 1962, 24 October 1962 and 15 May 1963, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440.
- ⁵² Cable by Philippe Baudet, 24 February 1965, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440.
- ⁵³ Alain Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), p. 1416.
- ⁵⁴ Report by Roché, 6 August 1964, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440.
- ⁵⁵ Dispatch by Roché, 24 November 1966, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Autriche, Box 182QO/440; and Cable by Olivier Wormser, 4 February 1967, in FFMA, Europe 1966-1970, URSS, Box 2666.
- ⁵⁶ Conference by Jouve, 17 October 1967, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁵⁷ Nicolas Badalassi, *En finir avec la guerre froide. La France, l’Europe et le processus d’Helsinki* (Rennes, France: PUR, 2014), pp. 116-120.
- ⁵⁸ Cable from Helsinki, 13 June 1969, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁵⁹ Report by the *Sous-direction d’Europe occidentale* (SDEO), 12 August 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁶⁰ Conversation Pompidou/Ceausescu, 15 June 1970, in French National Archives – Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (FNA), 5 AG 2, Roumanie, 1969-1972, Box 111.
- ⁶¹ Cable by Gérard André, 12 January 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁶² Cable from Paris to Helsinki, 12 January 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁶³ Report by the SDEO, 24 August 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suède, Box 205QO/80.
- ⁶⁴ Cable by André, 6 April 1970 ; and Report by the SDEO, 12 August 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.

- ⁶⁵ Dispatch by André, 18 March 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Finlande, Box 188QO/72.
- ⁶⁶ Report by André, 10 August 1973; Report by Chef d'Escadrons Milliot, 3 August 1973, in FFMA, Europe 1971-1976, Finlande, Box 188QO/97.
- ⁶⁷ Report by General Jean Simon, 25 September 1973, in FFMA, Europe 1971-1976, Finlande, Box 188QO/97.
- ⁶⁸ Report, 8 January 1974, in FFMA, Europe 1971-1976, Finlande, Box 188QO/97.
- ⁶⁹ Dispatch from Stockholm, 18 August 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suède, Box 205QO/80.
- ⁷⁰ Gilles Vergnon, *Le « modèle » suédois. Les gauches françaises et l'impossible social-démocratie* (Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015), p. 9.
- ⁷¹ Report by the SDEO, 24 August 1970, in FFMA, Europe 1961-1970, Suède, Box 205QO/80.
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