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When Theologians play Philosopher in Paris 1369:
a lost confrontation between James of Eltville and his *socii*
on the perfection of species and its infinite latitude

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This paper is an ambitious attempt to reconstruct a lost philosophical debate held in Paris in 1369. The protagonists of this confrontation, bachelors in theology, are authors but their texts are often lost. Among them we find James of Eltville. New evidence in the form of surviving fragments containing his ideas will guide us to uncover his intellectual contribution to the doctrinal history of the second half of 14th century.

The project of editing the *Sentences* commentary of James of Eltville¹ excavated, in its initial stage, the medieval dissemination of this text. The 22 surviving manuscripts (four other codices are known to have existed)² together provide a complete witness to the Cistercian's lectures on the *Sentences* delivered at the Collège de Saint-Bernard in Paris during the 1369-1370 academic year. Yet while these codices contain questions corresponding to each of the four books of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*,³ they preserve no evidence of Eltville's *Principia*, presented before the assembled Faculty of Theology. True, the first question of book II relates that it is asked *circa principium secundi libri*,⁴ but the use of term *principium* here merely informs the reader about the beginning of the second book of Eltville's questions on the *Sentences*.

The lack of Eltville's *Principia* is not surprising, since proportionally just a very small number of *Principia* have survived from the fourteenth century. Unlike questions on the *Sentences*, *Principia* derive from the inaugural debates among the bachelors of the *Sentences*, thus opening the academic year at the universities. *Principia* are still a largely unexplored genre, a potential gold mine that could provide some surprising findings, especially because the texts are based on the direct confrontation between the candidates for the title of master of theology. From a historical point of view, the written remnant of the principial debate can

¹ See the Grant CNCS PN-II-ID-PCE-2012-4-0272, project PC-IDEI:www.jacobusdealtavilla.ro. A draft of this paper circulated among the THESIS team members and I am grateful to Alexandra Anisie, Alexandra Baneu, Ioana Curut, Luciana Cioca, Andrei Marinca, and Chris Schabel for their remarks. Di Liscia was also one of my readers.

² After the publication of my "Enquête sur la tradition manuscrite du commentaire des *Sentences* du cistercien Jacques d'Eltville," in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 56 (2014), pp. 247-261, Thomas Falmagne (whom I thank) drew my attention to an anonymous *Sentences* commentary in Toulouse, Archive Departementale 158, that I was able to identify as another copy of Eltville's *Sentences*.

³ For a list of Eltville's questions, wrongly attributed to Langenstein in the codex München, Bayerische Stadtbibliothek Clm 11591, see P.J. LANG, *Die Christologie bei Heinrich von Langenstein*, Freiburg 1966. For an analysis of this manuscript, see M. BRINZEI, L. CIOCA, "New Attribution of Texts in the Manuscript Munich, Clm 11591", in *Chora* 12 (2014), pp. 269-286.

⁴ Initially I was tempted to think that this question was a fragment of his second *Principium*, because, unlike most questions on distinction 1 of book II of Lombard's *Sentences*, Eltville's question deals with causation. Nevertheless, the question does not contain any element specific to *principia*, for example mentions of *socii* and traces of the debate. In the same period, moreover, the commentary of *Sentences* of John Hiltalingen of Basel also initiates book II with a discussion on causation quite similar to the one from Eltville's *Sentences*. Hiltalingen's second *Principium* survives, however, and comparing the texts we can eliminate the hypothesis that his question on causation from the start of book II introduced with *circa principium* is recycled from the initial debate. For the contents of q. 1 of book II being based on material recycled from *Principia*, see W. DUBA, "Masters and Bachelors at Paris in 1319: The *lectio finalis* of Landolfo Caracciolo, OFM", in *Schüler und Meister*, ed. A. SPEER, TH. JESCHKE (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 39), Berlin-Boston 2016, pp. 315-366, here p. 347.

help us reconstruct networks of contemporary scholars. The present paper is a case-study showing how the surviving *Principia* of one of James of Eltville's *socii*, or fellow bachelors, the Franciscan John Regis,⁵ actually allow us to rediscover much of Eltville's own doctrine as developed in his lost *Principia*. They are also a perfect occasion to witness theologians playing philosophers. In addition to this case study, I will also argue that an anonymous fragment in codex Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47 is part of Eltville's *Principia*. Therefore, my paper is divided into two parts: part one is dedicated to manuscript Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15156, focusing on the confrontation between John Regis and Eltville, and part two will further illuminate the debate of 1369 via an analysis of the Jena manuscript.

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 15156

John Regis lists James of Eltville among his *socii*⁶ for the 1369-1370 academic year who were: a Carmelite bachelor, a Dominican *frater*, the Augustins Franciscus Christofori de Tortosa, Johannes de Diadona and Onofrius de Florentia, Johannes Textoris and the most famous among them at that time Richardus de Bellomonte, who happened to be the secretary of Queen Joanna of France (*secretarius domine regine regnantis*). Since Jean Regis engaged with Eltville in debate, he reports arguments from Eltville's own *Principia*. Before discussing these passages, let us begin with a brief presentation of Regis's text, in order to place Eltville's confrontation with his Franciscan *socius* in its proper context. This will also help us identify some of the pieces of the puzzle of Eltville's *Principia*.

In 1951 Palémon Glorieux published an exhaustive study of John Regis' commentary on the *Sentences*.⁷ The French historian established Regis' authorship of the text transmitted in manuscript Paris, BnF lat. 15156, a codex that had been initially attributed to Jean Gerson,⁸ because at the end of the last folio of the manuscript a signature from the sixteenth century reads 'Jean Gerson'. Glorieux bases his demonstration in favour of the attribution to Regis mostly on information gathered from the four *Principia* that are placed at the beginning of the following *Sentences* commentary. Two details need to be corrected in Glorieux's analysis.

First, the French historian interprets a statement on folio 49r, *Octavus ego fr. Jo. minorum dixi in secundo corollario tertie conclusionis articuli secundi*, as Regis' self-reference, concluding that the Franciscan joined the debate as the eighth *socius*.⁹ As we shall see, however, the eighth position was occupied by the Augustinian friar Onofrius of

⁵ For John Regis see A. Marinca's entry in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy* (https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-024-1151-5_551-1 (last accessed 21 May 2018) Glorieux refers to him also as Jean Regis (de St.-Nazaire) O.M.: P. GLORIEUX, « L'enseignement au Moyen Age. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIIIe siècle », in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 35 (1965), pp. 65-168, here p. 140.

⁶ For some biographical information on these *socii*, see P. GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* attribué à Jean Gerson », in *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 18 (1951), pp. 128-139, here pp. 131-134. For a few additions to Glorieux, see W.J. COURTENAY, "Principial Cohorts in the Fourteenth Century", in *Principia between institutional exercise and philosophical debate*, ed. M. BRINZEL, W. DUBA (Studia Sententiarum, 4) (forthcoming).

⁷ GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », pp. 128-139.

⁸ E. LONGPRÉ, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* de Jean Gerson », in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 23 (1930), pp. 251-252; A. COMBES, « Notes sur les *Sententiae Magistri Johannis Gerson* du manuscrit B.N. lat. 15156 », in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 12 (1939), pp. 365-385, here pp. 381-385; G. OUY, « Enquête sur les manuscrits autographes du Chancelier Gerson et sur les copies faites par son frère le célestin Jean Gerson », in *Scriptorium* 16 (1962), pp. 275-300.

⁹ GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », p. 134.

Florence.¹⁰ Instead, the passage following this quotation constitutes a summary of the debate between Regis and Onofrius, and the personal pronoun *ego* refers to Onofrius rather than to Regis. The abbreviation *fr. Jo.* should thus be expanded as *fratri Johanni*.

Second, Glorieux misunderstands the structure of Regis' *Principia* when he states that, "Au f. 41 se lit le quatrième principium, de beaucoup le plus développé".¹¹ In fact, the fourth *principium* runs only from f. 41r to f. 42r (*Sermo* f. 41r-v, *Questio collativa* ff. 41v-42r), not down to f. 55v, as Glorieux claimed. The entire section on ff. 42r-55v consists of a collection of arguments likely compiled by a student¹² bit-by-bit. The units gather together the *replicationes*¹³ of all of Regis' *socii*. This section can be interpreted as a repository document or a notebook serving perhaps in a preliminary stage in the composition of the text or as the personal manuscript of the author¹⁴. In some cases, these small folders are introduced by a rubric indicating the names of *socii*: f. 46v: *Frater Jacobus*; f. 47v: *Frater dominicus*; f. 49v: *Frater Onofrius de Florentia bachalarius ordinarius Augustini*; or f. 52r: *Frater Iohannes Corbechon bachalarius secundarius Augustini*. For this reason, I will call the section containing Eltville's *replicationes* the 'Eltville folder'.

The style of each of these 'folders' seems to capture the oral confrontation between Regis and his *socii*. The scribe or the *reportator* of the codex most likely summarizes the actual debate from the auditorium, perhaps so that it would be reworked into a published version of these *Principia*. Here and there we find corrections that seem to guide the preparation for the publication, for example marginal additions requesting rectifications concerning the chronology of some arguments or the removal of passages (f. 42, reformulation of the second conclusion of 4th *Principium*).

This hypothesis would help explain why some sets of arguments are repeated, once in the corpus of *Principia* and once inside these folders. I shall expand on this in the beginning of the final Appendix. In sum, the manuscript probably contains a work-in-progress version of

¹⁰ This Augustinian is known as Onofrio dello Steccuto, who was active in Florence after he left Paris: F. ALLEGREZZA, « Onofrio dello Steccuto », in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 38 (1990), pp. 93-94; A. ZUMKELLER, *Theology and History of the Augustinian School in the Middle Ages*, ed. J.R. ROTELLE, Villanova 1996, p. 51. Stegmüller dedicated an entry to Onofrius as "Ps. Onofrius" and mentioned that the *Sentences* commentary in manuscript Roma, Biblioteca Angelica 217, was wrongly attributed to him, since it actually preserves the text of Hannibald de Hannibaldis: F. STEGMÜLLER, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi*, Würzburg 1947, vol. 1, no. 612, p. 296; F. GALLO, « La Rethorica del magister Onofrio fiorentino », in *Aevum* 84/3 (2010), pp. 593-608. I analyze Onofrius' *Principia* fragments in M. Brinzei, « Le portrait d'Onofrio della Steccuto à la manière de l'École de Chatou », in *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 25 (2019), forthcoming.

¹¹ GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », p. 132.

¹² There are other examples from Paris, such as manuscript Paris, BnF 3074, where one finds the notes of Richard of Basoches concerning reading *Sentences* in 1391-1392 in Paris: P. GLORIEUX, « L'année universitaire 1392-1393 à la Sorbonne à travers les notes d'un étudiant », in *Revue des sciences religieuses* 19 (1939), pp. 429-482; there is also the case of Etienne Gaudet, or the *Principia* of Peter of Plaout: Z. KALUZA, *Thomas de Cracovie: contribution à l'histoire du Collège de la Sorbonne*, Wrocław 1978; Z. KALUZA, « Etienne Gaudet devant le problème de la preuve en théologie », in *Preuve et raisons à l'université de Paris. Logique, Ontologie et Théologie au XIV^e siècles*, ed. Z. KALUZA, P. VIGNAUX, Paris 1984, pp. 231-251. Another relevant case is the lost manuscript of the teachings of Brinkley compiled by Galeran of Pentfler, which provided Etienne Gaudet with access to the theses of English theologians. See Z. KALUZA, *Etudes doctrinales sur le XIV^e siècle. Théologie, logique, philosophie* (Études de philosophie médiévale), Paris 2013, pp. 100-101, 106-108. On Galeran, a *socius* of Denys de Montina, see M. BRINZEI, « La faculté de théologie de Paris au XIV^e siècle à travers les lunettes de C.-E. du Boulay », (forthcoming).

¹³ A definition of this term in the context of the practice of *Principia*, see W.O. DUBA, *The Forge of Doctrine. The Academic Year 1330-31 and the Rise of Scotism at the University of Paris* (Studia Sententiarum, 2), Turnhout 2017, p. 52.

¹⁴ For another case study of recycled fragments of *principia* and the excerpts, see DUBA, "Master and Bachelors at Paris in 1319", p. 350.

Regis' *Principia*. In addition, this material is a new example¹⁵ of a *Principia* practice that reinforces Duba's theory that *principia* were more a 'paper debate'.¹⁶

Each *Principium* is composed of a sermon and a so called *quaestio collativa*. All four *sermones* give the impression of an incomplete effort to combine poetry and other rhetorical tools in praise of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.¹⁷ It is possible that they were prepared at a preliminary stage of the confrontation between the *socii*. The degree of completion is not the same in the sermons as in the four *quaestiones collative*, which are very uneven. One infers that Regis did not finish the composition of his text and he had to hurry to deliver a first draft for the oral debate. For example, while the first *Principium* is very well articulated, the other three are poorly designed. Here the plan of Regis' *Principia* as I have been able to read, *pace* Glorieux, in manuscript Paris, BnF lat. 15156, ff. 34r-55v:

Principium I: (ff. 34r-39r)

<Sermo> (ff. 34r-v)

<Quaestio collativa> (ff. 34v-39r)

> 3 articuli

> 3 conclusiones

> 3 corollaria for each conclusion (9 total)

Total of 36 units of doctrinal thesis. At the end of each article the socii are introduced following this order:

Articulus Primus:	Bachalarius Carmelita Magister Richardus de Bellomonte
Articulus Secundus:	Magister Franciscus Christofori de domo Cerbone Magister Johannes Textor de domo Cerbone
Articulus Tertius:	Sextus bachalarius Bernardista Bachalarius ordinarius Predicatorum Bachalarius magister Johannes de Diadona

Principium II: (ff. 39r-40r)

<Sermo> (ff. 39r-v)

<Quaestio collativa> (ff. 39v-40r, total of 23 lines)

Quod sic: Bachalarius de ordine Predicatorum

In oppositum: Iohannes de Corbechon

3 conclusions with one corollarium for each

Total of 6 units of doctrinal thesis.

Principium III¹⁸: (ff. 40r-41r)

¹⁵ A similar situation is encountered in Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'Agglomération 504, which contains one *Principium* of Pierre d'Allouagne and some *replicationes* of his *socii* Jacobus de Padua and an unnamed Franciscan: S.J. LIVESEY, "Pierre d'Allouagne and Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l'agglomération 505", in *Portraits des maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, ed. C. ANGOTTI, M. BRINZEL, M. TEEUWEN (FIDEM-Thema, 58), Porto-Turnhout 2013, pp. 381-392, esp. p. 383.

¹⁶ DUBA, *The Forge of Doctrine*. p. 52.

¹⁷ This seems to be a commun practice. See: S. BROWN, "Peter of Candia's Sermons in Praise of Peter Lombard", in *Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles Brady Friar Minor*, ed. R.S. ALMAGNO, New York 1976, pp. 141-176, and more recently K. SCHUT, "The next best Thing to a Saint? Peter Lombard and the *Sentences* in the *Principia* of John of Naple", in *Recherche de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 86/2 (2017), pp. 343-381.

¹⁸ In fact the composition of the third *Principium* is reversed in the manuscript and we read first the *quaestio collativa* and then the *sermo*. This chronology confused Glorieux (« Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », p. 132), who mentioned it: « Au f. 40 le troisième principium. Même thème. Il n'est suivi d'aucune dispute, à moins que la question précédente ne doive lui être rattachée ». A detailed codicological description of the manuscript may

<Quaestio collativa> (f. 40r, total of 27 lines)

Quod sic: bachalarius ordinarius de domo fratrum de ordine s.

Augustini

In oppositum: magister Franciscus bachalarius de domo Cerbone

3 conclusions with one corollarium for each

Total of 6 units of doctrinal thesis.

<Sermo> (ff. 40r-41r)

Principium IV: (ff. 41r-42r)

<Sermo> (ff. 41r-v)

<Quaestio collativa> (ff. 41v-42r, total of 27 lines)

Pater meus bachalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum

In oppositum: bachalarius secundarius de domo fratrum Augustini

3 conclusions with one corollarium for each of them¹⁹

Total of 6 units of doctrinal thesis.

Folders of *Socii*: (the order of the masters is given following the order in the manuscript)

<Primus> Bachalarius de domo Carmelitarum (ff. 42r-43v)

Secundus magister Richardus de Bellomonte secretarius regine (ff. 43v-44r)

Tertius bachalarius magister Franciscus Christofori de Cerbono (ff. 44r-45v)

Quartus bachalarius Johannes Textoris de Cerbono (ff. 45v-46v)

Sextus bachalarius bernardista <Jacobus de Altavilla> (ff. 46v-47v)

<Septimus> alius bachalarius ordinarius de domo Predicatorum (ff. 47v-49v)

Octavus: Frater Onofrius de Florentia bachalarius ordinarius Augustini (ff. 49v-52r)

<Nonus> Frater Johannes Corbechon bachalarius secundarius Augustini (ff. 52r-54v)

Quintus bachalarius magister Johannes de Diadona (ff. 54v-55v)

Mapping the four *Principia* of Regis helps to locate the two places where Regis mentions James of Eltville. The Franciscan presents our Cistercian as being the sixth *socius* taking part in the debate and he introduces him in the third article of his first *Principium*. Under the title: *Utrum divina potentia sanet sui gratia vulnera mortalia peccatorum* (f. 34v), Regis investigates the irregularity of mortal misery (*difformitas mortalis miserie*). At first glance one anticipates a moral reflection on the difficulty of life, but the presence of terms like *difformitas* suggests a different way of reading the debate. Actually, this term has a double meaning: it can express the idea of a distortion or an abnormality, but it is also charged with a mathematical meaning during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a key element in discussions of intensity and its variations (*latitudo difformiter difformis*).²⁰ Indeed, from the

explain this; for example, the passage of the third *quaestio collativa* is inserted with a different ink in a spot that seems to have been left blank.

¹⁹ For the last two conclusions and their *corollaria* we find two variants in the manuscripts, the first one marked in the margin of the manuscript with a *vacat* and replaced by the text inserted at the end of the initial third *corollarium*.

²⁰ Unfortunately, there is not yet a dictionary of philosophical terms from the fourteenth or fifteenth century and it is almost impossible to find references explaining this technical vocabulary. See for this terminology C. BOYER, *The History of Calculus and Its Conceptual Development*, New York 1959, pp. 73, 89-91. J.E. MURDOCH, "From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning", in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages – September 1973*, ed. J.E. MURDOCH, E.D. SYLLA

outset Regis abandons any ethical considerations concerning the end of life and focuses on appreciating mathematically the intensity and variation of moral acts.

The philosophical issue is whether the intensity of a sin can be increased and in what way the variation of mortal acts can be infinite. The second conclusion of this third article states that mortal misery is either infinite or finite. Regis tries to show how inside of an infinite act other finite acts can increase its infinity. The first corollary of his third conclusion states that in the case of the species of sins (*species peccatorum*) there is a process *ad infinitum* concerning the *diminution of the importability*.

This mathematical background is not abandoned once Regis and Eltville debate about the nature of sensitive and intellectual species.²¹ Regis introduces Eltville by saying that in his first article of the second conclusion [1]²² the Cistercian defends the idea that intellectual and sensitive knowledge are not based on individual sensitive or intellective species corresponding to each singular object of knowledge. According to Eltville, knowledge is produced *via* a general type of species that incorporates all the properties that can be found in different singular objects. Intelligible or sensitive species are not infinite; there is not an individual species corresponding in our mind to each singular object of knowledge that can cause our cognitive power. In fact, a concept or the mental representation of a real object incorporates all the properties (*conditiones individuales*) of singular objects of a class to which it corresponds. Thus, Eltville maintains that the representation of a singular object is not assured by a singular species. On the level of intellect or of the senses we do not have a multiplicity of species generated by the multiplicity of external singular objects of our knowledge, since a species can correspond to other individuals similar to the first one. Eltville demonstrates his corollary by defending the idea that in a natural way a concept gathers together all the properties of an object and, based on this mix, it can correspond to each individual object of that type.

Eltville's *corollarium* is attacked by Regis in four counter-arguments. The first [2] states that if the representative species is not individual, then we can have a sensation (*possemus naturaliter sentire*) of a sensitive object from any distance between us and the object. Without explicitly naming them, Regis here alludes to the main conditions allowing the production of a sensation: the organ has to be *bene dispositus*, the object positioned in the right distance, and the *medium* beneficial for the apparition of the sensation.²³

(Synthese Library, 76), Dordrecht-Boston 1975, pp. 271-339. Outside theology, the mathematical discussion on the *latitudo difformis* became intense among students in the Arts Faculty. For new evidence, see D.A. DI LISCIA, « *Excerpta de uniformitate et difformitate: una compilacion fisico-matematica en ms. Paris, Bl. de l' Arsenal, lat. 522 hasta ahora desconocida* », in *Patristica et Mediaevalia* 28 (2007), pp. 25-53.

²¹ For the theory of species during the Middle Ages and its importance for understanding cognitive representations, see F. PREZIOSO, *La 'species' medievale e i prodomi del fenomenismo moderno*, Padua 1963, pp. 7-28; K. H. TACHAU, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345*, Leiden 1988, pp. 28-34. J. SPRUIT, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, 2 vols., Leiden 1994, vol. 1, pp. 205-212. A useful survey on this literature can be found in H. THOMAS ADRIAENSSSEN, *Representation and Scepticism from Aquinas to Descartes*, Cambridge 2017; none of those interpretations includes authors like Regis or Eltville.

²² The numbers in square brackets refer to the first Appendix, which contains the latin texts. When the same argument is verbatim repeated in the 'Eltville folder' from f. 47r-v, I number it as *x*bis.

²³ Zenon Kaluza identifies the *De anima* of Themistius as a possible source for the conditions of the visual acts circulating during the fourteenth century: Z. KALUZA, « Voir: la clarté de la connaissance chez Nicolas d'Autrécourt », in *Micrologus* 5 (1997), pp. 89-105, here p. 101. For other examples of the use of these criteria in an epistemological context in the fourteenth century, see M. CALMA, « Jean de Mirecourt et les échos de la philosophie anglaise à l'Université de Paris au XIV^e siècle », in *Universalité de la raison: pluralité des philosophies au Moyen Ages. Actes du XII^e Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Palerme, 17 septembre 2007*, vol. 2, Palermo 2012, pp. 471-480, here pp. 476-477. The connection between Regis and Autrecourt is not completely imaginary, since Regis seems to be quite familiar with the philosopher from Lorraine. Other links to Autrecourt can be established in the Regis' Prologue: M. BRINZEI, « *Epilogue* », in

The second objection [3] claims that if the species is not individual, then we lose all trust in our knowledge, since we cannot be sure that any object exists in reality as it is in our mind. Here Regis is attacking Eltville by introducing the sceptic's thesis that when we cognize two different objects via the same species we have no certitude about the object of our knowledge.

Third, Regis objects [4bis; absent in 4] that judgment (*iudicia*) is a representative and apprehensive process, and for this reason we cannot have the same species in the intellect for all objects of knowledge. If we had a unique type of species for a diversity of singular objects from the same class, it would eliminate the representative and apprehensive nature of our intellection, since always *similes species in intellectu similiter iudicare*. It seems that Regis is familiar with Eltville's epistemology and tries to it, for in the Eltville's Prologue he actually presents in detail his conception, originating in Chatton's *Sentences* commentary, of knowledge²⁴ as an apprehensive and representative operation.²⁵

In this fourth objection Regis becomes more radical, saying [5 and 5bis] that the way Eltville understands the nature of cognition via species is not *essentialiter cognitio*, since such a species cannot produce any change in our human cognition affecting the *potentia receptiva* or resulting in a vital change on the level of the senses or the intellect. Regis' objection employs Ripian jargon when he talks of *non est essentialiter cognitio nec immutaret vitaliter*, since the *vitalis immutatio* is one of John of Ripa's lasting contributions to the philosophical vocabulary in the epistemology of the second half of the fourteenth century.²⁶

After the fourth objection, on f. 38r, ll. 19-20 we find a *Solutio* [6] that is actually Regis' final response to Eltville, rejecting once again the universal nature of a species. The same answer, but in more detail, is on f. 46v, ll. 25-28 [6bis], where Regis gives the example of two candles that produce two shadows and not just one in the same *medium*. For Regis, contrary to Eltville, to the variety of singular objects corresponds a variety of species. Each object is cognized via an individual species. On the contrary, Eltville asserts the universality of the species connected to all individuals of that species. We do not have a different species for each chair we can see, but rather one species of chair that includes all possible qualities of all chairs, and this variety of attributes presented in the same species helps the cognizer to recognize/represent/know that the object in front of her is a chair.

Philosophical Psychology in Late Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Actes of the XIVth Annual Symposium of the S.I.E.P.M., Nijmegen 28-30 Octobre 2009, ed. M. BRINZEI, C. SCHABEL, Brepols 2018 (forthcoming), JEAN DE REGIS, *Le prologue de Jean of Regis aux Sentences de Pierre Lombard*, édition critique et traduction par C. GRELLARD A. MARINCA, Paris (forthcoming).

²⁴ See the paper of A. Anisie and A. Baumgarten in this volume.

²⁵ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *In I Sententiarum, Prologus*, q. 1, a. 1, concl. 1, Erfurt, UB CA F 2°, F. 118, ff. 1rb-va: *Secunda propositio principalis, scilicet quod actus fidei seu scientie theologice est iudicativus seu assertivus, patet, nam omnis actus intellectus vel est apprehensivus vel est cum hoc iudicativus seu adhesivus; sed ad actum scientie et fidei non sufficit sola apprehensio, quia ista stat de aliquo complexo cum dubietate, errore et scientie, et ita ante demonstrationem et credulitatem sicut post; igitur hec superaddunt adhesionem. Et patet hoc per communem modum loquendi. Non enim diceretur aliquam conclusionem scire qui solum eam intelligeret, sed qui per demonstrationem firmiter ei adheret. Similiter nec philosophus aut infidelis articulos fidei solum legens et intelligens diceretur credere nisi ipsis adhereret.* The implicit source for Eltville's passage is WALTER CHATTON, *Reportatio super Sententias: Liber I, distinctiones 1-9*, q. 1, a. 1, ed. J.C. WEY, G.J. ETZKORN (*Studies and Texts*, 141), Toronto 2002, p. 34, l. 473.

²⁶ L. KACZMAREK, «*Vitalis immutatio*. Erkundungen zur erkenntnispsychologischen Terminologie der Spätscholastik», in *Mathesis rationis. Festschrift für Heinrich Schepers*, ed. A. HEINEKAMP, W. LENZEN, M. SCHNEIDER, Münster 1990, pp. 189-206; S. MEIER-OESER, *Die Spur des Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit* (Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, 44) Berlin 1997, pp. 120-122; C. RODE, *Zugänge zum Selbst. Innere Erfahrung in Spätmittelalter und früher Neuzeit* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters Neue Folge, 79), Münster 2015, p. 301.

The next step of the discussion focuses on the nature of the species. With some difficulties in comprehension, generated by the incomplete form of the text, one can discern from Eltville's and Regis' exchange that a species is characterized by what can be called 'scales of perfection.'²⁷ First, the essential perfection of a species is given by its being and in an intrinsic way this specific perfection gathers all the properties of the singulars that one species can represent (*individua unius gradus eiusdem species*). According to Eltville, a species is endowed with an infinite degree of possibilities (*latitudo*).

In the sixth *corollarium*²⁸ of the fifth conclusion of the third article [7 and 7bis], Eltville maintains that a specific perfection (*aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece*) has a uniformly uniform variation of infinite and different degrees that cannot be united (*communico*) in a real way (*latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum*). He adds that this specificity of a specific perfection does not apply to *unam perfectionem*. This mysterious *perfectio* should be understood here as an elliptical mention of the *specifica essentialis perfectio*. In other words, the perfection in a species is the *essentialis* perfection, which must be understood as its mode of being, and this does not undergo any variation. For example, a human being cannot be more or less rational or mortal. But the perfection which is not *essentialis* can admit all sorts of intension, and includes variation. We recognize here the same description as in Q. 10 of John of Mirecourt's conception of the nature of species perfection.²⁹

Regis rejects any possibility of variation of degrees of perfection in relation to a species. He gives the example of a numerical species that cannot have a latitude intrinsically. Regis reinforces his statement by trying to show that Eltville contradicts himself when he claims that a perfection includes variation, and he quotes Eltville's explanation that the *perfectio essentialis* does not involve any variation of degrees (*contra ista supponendo ex dictis eius*). In this our Cistercian probably agrees with Ripa on the very general claim that the essential perfection does not vary (*non potest minui vel augeri*).

All four objections formulated against the sixth *corollarium* continue the discussion of this aspect of the nature of species. According to Regis and against Eltville, the *specifica perfectio* of a species does not include any intensity of degrees in its perfection (*non includit latitudinem*) [8 and 8 bis], it is not indivisible [9 and 9bis], it is finite and cannot be expended (*excederet*) [10 and 10bis] and the variation of degrees does not change the essential specific perfection [11 and 11bis].

To Regis' objection that the *perfectio specifica* is not indivisible, Eltville responds that there is an *esse naturale* and an *esse specificum* for a species: while the *specificum esse* admits variation, the *esse naturale* mode of a species does not allow any addition or subtraction (*non patitur... additionem vel subtractionem manens in sua specie*). In fact, a white thing cannot be more or less white than any other white thing, but it can be more or less white than before or than another white thing; what changes is not the fact that an object is white, but its way of being white. Here Eltville is in line with Giles of Rome's theory of *esse*, which was criticized by Gregory of Rimini in his distinction 17 of book I of the *Sentences*,

²⁷ See here J.E. MURDOCH, "Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta: The Rise and Development of the Application of Mathematics in Fourteenth Century Philosophy and Theology", in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge*, Montreal 1969, pp. 215-254, here p. 238.

²⁸ It is the sixth or the second corollary, since at f. 37 Regis mentions the sixth and at f. 47v refers to the same argument as the second.

²⁹ IOHANNES DE MIRICURIA, *Lectura super Sententias*, I, Q. 10: *Utrum cognitions excedant se perfectionaliter proportionaliter secundum excessum obiectorum*. The electronic edition of this text can be consulted at: <<http://filosofia.dipafilo.unimi.it/~mparodi/mirecourt/info/gestione/indiquet.htm>> (last accessed 5 April 2018). Cfr. A. NANINI, *La metafisica di Giovanni da Ripa. Le distinziones 2, 3 et 8 del Commento Sentenziario: edizione del testo e studio dottrinale*, vol. I Studio dottrinale, Unpublished PhD Salerno 2013, p. XXIV.

which Can Loewe explains very clearly: “Simply put, Giles holds that, e.g., heat itself has no degrees, but that heat may exist to a higher or lower degree in a given bearer”.³⁰

The third round of the dispute [10, 10bis] gives us an indication of how the confrontation between Eltville and Regis probably sounded in the classroom: “To my third argument, my father denies the consequence, and the reason for the denial is clear from his premise, in which he states that a gradual conjunction does not increase an essential perfection, although it does increase a qualitative intension, as was clear, ergo”. Regis’ rebuttal [ad 10, 10bis] briefly reformulates Eltville’ argument (*reduco sic argumentum*) and simplifies: “a specific perfection is finite and includes an intensity in specific being, therefore in specific being there could be a middle degree of that intensity”. Eltville adds that the intensity is a continuous property, not *discrete*,³¹ and any intermediary degrees are included in its nature.

Paragraph [12], which we can identify as Eltville’s reaction to Regis, should be taken into consideration here, because it seems to provide a definition that we can use when we try to understand the technical terminology of their confrontation. In fact, we read that the individuals of a species provide the intrinsic specific perfection of that species. It is comforting for the reader, after struggling to understand what the *perfectio specifica intrinseca* is, to finally arrive at a clear definition from Eltville’s part.

The last four arguments edited at the end of the Appendix are difficult to place within the dialogue between Eltville and Regis. Fragments [15], [16] and [17] must be connected with Regis’ objections [8]-[11], since they add to that discussion. Concerning paragraph [14], I propose to attribute it to Eltville, since it repeats his initial position that the intrinsic specific perfection includes an intensity of infinites degrees. This fragment also attracts our attention because, while dealing with the example of the color white, it presents two new concepts never used before either by Regis or by Eltville. The color white is defined as divided in intensive and extensive proportional parts (*partes proportionales intensivas vel etiam extensivas*). The intensional and the extensional nature of this type of proportion should probably be understood here as proportion in relation or independent of the mass, but nothing else is added to help the reader to follow the development of the position presented in [14].

Before giving the Latin text of this confrontation, it is time for some general conclusions. We can deduce from Regis’ and Eltville’s debate that the both of them seem to be well acquainted with John of Ripa’s theory of the intension of forms. It is also true that a focus on this topic was a general trend among the *socii* during principal confrontations, and another relevant example is found among the *socii* in 1348-1349 as reported by Pierre Ceffons and Hugolino of Orvieto.³² It should be added that in 1369-1370 the dispute concerning the problem of the perfection of species is not developed in order to test the relation between species or the relation between species and the creator,³³ as was the case with Ripa. Rather Regis’ and Eltville’s confrontation is encapsulated inside an epistemological discussion on the nature of species. Thus the theory of intensity moves on by abandoning the metaphysical and

³⁰ C.L. LOEWE, “Gregory of Rimini on the Intension and Remission of Corporeal Forms”, in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 81/2 (2014), pp. 273-330, here p. 293.

³¹ Gregory of Rimini uses the term ‘discrete quantity’, which, according to Loewe, “denotes any multitude constituting a non-continuous unity (not just a non-continuous multitude lacking per se unity)”: LOEWE, «Gregory of Rimini on the Intension and Remission», p. 288, n. 58 for the Latin text of Rimini.

³² SCHABEL, “The Genre Mature. Parisian *Principia* in the 1340s”; MURDOCH “*Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta*”, pp. 238, 244-246 (references to the Prologue of the *Sentences*).

³³ Murdoch identifies those tendencies as the main motivation for the analysis of the *latitudo formarum*: MURDOCH, “*Mathesis in philosophiam scholasticam introducta*”, p. 238. See also J. COLEMAN, “Jean de Ripa O.F.M. and the Oxford Calculators”, in *Mediaeval Studies* 37 (1975), pp. 130-189.

mathematical approaches that preoccupied Ripa. We recognize Ripa's vocabulary, but not his solutions or his theory.

Some of the difficulties in understanding and depicting the debate between Eltville and Regis certainly derive from the *status fragmentarius* of our records.³⁴ The discussion is incomplete. Even worse, the terminology is never explained and sometimes it is more sophisticated than what we find in their predecessors. Technical terms like *perfectio intrinseca specifica*, *perfectio essentialis*, *gradus*, *latitudo uniformiter uniformis infinitorum graduum*, *esse essenziale quidditativum*, *perfectio infinita* are simply used without any explanation or support for the reader. In order to clarify their meaning, it is necessary to contextualize the nature of this philosophical discussion between the two theologians. Generally speaking, their terminology, popular in the first part of the fourteenth century, is rooted in the doctrine of the Oxford Calculators, mainly Richard Swineshead, Thomas Bradwardine and Walter Burley. The theologians of the fourteenth century were quite familiar with the complexity of the new philosophical perspective on finite and infinite being. The core of this theory, the concept of *latitudo entium*,³⁵ in the context of *Sentences* commentaries is connected to the analysis of the concept of charity or grace, since theologians sought solutions to this question: how can *caritas* increase or decrease? Distinction 17 of book I of the *Sentences* was the *locus classicus* for testing the potential of the infinities of qualities and form.³⁶ Gregory of Rimini marked an important turn in the reception of the theory of *latitudo* with the corpus of *Sentences* commentaries.³⁷ After Rimini, another important development is linked to the name of John of Ripa,³⁸ who also analyses the idea that the attribute of perfection rhymes with the intensity of an infinite degrees of participation to the being. Besides Ripa, in our case it is possible that Regis and Eltville were also aware of ideas from Thomas Wylton's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, and the discussion on different types of perfection may be connected with Wylton.³⁹

A final remark: these fragments of Eltville's *Principia* mark a difference between the Cistercian's philosophical attitude during his *Principia* and the rest of his commentary on *Sentences*. We encounter two very distinct styles: while in the *Principia* it appears that he was developing a complex philosophical reflection based on a sophisticated vocabulary, fancy theories and difficult arguments, in the rest of his commentary it looks as if he followed a more traditional path with the goal of stripping the academic theological speech of any philosophical decoration,⁴⁰ even when he treated the intension and remission of form.⁴¹ Some questions still remain open: was Eltville a partisan of an epistemological position sustaining

³⁴ For example, we can see that some arguments are not reproduced extensively by Regis. When in [8] Regis said *patet per probationem corollarii sui in qua exemplum ponit de albedine*, this example cannot be found in Regis' report in Paris, BnF 15115.

³⁵ An extremely useful tool for understanding the terminology of the doctrine of latitudes is the pioneering article of E. SYLLA, "Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators", in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 40 (1973), pp. 223-283, pp. 226-227 for terminological explanation.

³⁶ J.E. MURDOCH, "Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons", in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 314/1 (1978), pp. 51-86, here p. 56.

³⁷ See the recent and clear presentation in LOEWE, "Gregory of Rimini on the Intension and Remission".

³⁸ The same distinction 17 of book I is studied by COLEMAN, "Jean de Ripa O.F. M. and the Oxford Calculators". Another case-study is A. LAMY, «L'accroissement et l'altération dans le *Commentaire des sentences* de François de la Marche», in *Picenum Seraphicum. Rivista di studi storici e francescani* 30 (2015-2016), pp. 47-68.

³⁹ The introduction and the edition of Wylton's commentary helps us understand Regis' jargon about the two types of species. See A. TABARRONI, "Thomas Wylton on the Metaphysics: Some New Evidence", in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 16 (2005), pp. 119-178.

⁴⁰ See the conclusions of Luciana Cioca in this volume about his limitation in using Aristotle inside a theological discussion.

⁴¹ See on this topic Andrei Marinca's paper in this volume. Also Ioana Curut.

the unicity of intelligent or sensitive species in relation to the multiplicity of singulars, a unique species but with an infinity of possibilities and degrees to represent singulars? Do singulars add degrees of perfection to a general species? Does an essential specific perfection designate the being, while an intrinsic special perfection is defined by degrees of qualities and their intensities? The Cistercian James of Eltville's position is not always very clearly understandable,⁴² mainly because our only access is *via* the Franciscan Regis' glasses. What we should not forget is that one of the Minorite's goals was to highlight the weaknesses of the ideas of his colleague. It was part of the game during the principal debate.

Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47, ff. 215va-221va

In 1963, Damasus Trapp published his pioneering paper on the *Sentences*'s commentary of Angelus Dobelin,⁴³ quoting the explicit from f. 124r of codex Jena, Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, El. f. 47.⁴⁴ Since Dobelin was Trapp's focus in the paper, he remained silent about the remainder of the material transmitted in the Jena manuscript. As a result, little in his article aroused the curiosity of modern scholarship on the late 14th century concerning the rest of the codex. Zumkeller revisited Dobelin's commentary in 1984,⁴⁵ and adopting Trapp's assumption⁴⁶ that the manuscript is Dobelin's autograph, he tried to explain how Dobelin could confuse Henry Totting of Oyta with Henry of Langenstein (Hassia), since on f. 129r in red ink the codex wrongly attributes the following questions to Henry of Hassia.⁴⁷ Indeed, according to the new catalogue of the Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, some of the titles of the *Quaestiones theologicae* on ff. 125ra-228vb are not on the list of Oyta's questions published by A. Lang.⁴⁸ Let us consider more carefully the question from ff. 215va-221vb, which is definitely not by Oyta.

One's first impression of this material is that it derives from a principal debate. In fact, five of the *socii* mentioned in Regis *Principia* are cited in the Jena question. At first glance one might think that this codex is just another copy of Regis's *Principia*, but when we compare the text with the one in Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, we notice that the debate is reported from another perspective and in different terms. Since Regis can thus be eliminated from the candidates for authorship, I propose that this question is a (second) fragment of James of

⁴² Duba points to a similar situation with complex difficulties of comprehension of the text in the case of excerpts from 1319. DUBA, "Master and Bachelors at Paris in 1319", p. 342.

⁴³ D. TRAPP, "Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura", in *Augustinianum* 3 (1963), pp. 389-413. An updated bibliography on Lectura of Angelus Dobelin can be found on the website of our project THESIS: <http://angelusdobelinus.thesis-project.ro/>

⁴⁴ A modern description of this codex in B. TÖNNIES, *Die Handschriften der Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Jena. Band 1, Die mittelalterlichen lateinischen Handschriften der Electoralis-Gruppe*, Wiesbaden 2002, pp. 124-126.

⁴⁵ It is the second chapter entitled *Angelus Dobelinus (+ nach 1420)* in A. ZUMKELLER OSA, *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters* (Cassiacum, 35), Würzburg 1984, pp. 136-141.

⁴⁶ There is no evidence that the manuscript is an autograph of Dobelin and another argument based on a codicological analyse of the codex reveals that there are at list two if not three different hands coping all the questions from the manucrips. I am actually preparing an article on this topic for the *Bulleting codicological* of the next issue of Choras's review.

⁴⁷ We can note this manuscrit as another example of a mistake attribution of *Sentences* questions to Langestein, as was the case with some manuscripts of Eltville. Although in the manuscript those *Questiones* are attributed to Langenstein, Stegmüller listed this codex under Oyta's entry in his *Sentences*'s catalogue.

⁴⁸ TÖNNIES, *Die Handschriften der Thüringer Universitäts*, pp. 125-126: "Initium zunächst übereinstimmend, dann aber abweichend; Questionen der Handschrift nicht identisch mit den von A. LANG, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta* (Beiträge zue Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 33, H. 4/7), Münster 1937, s. 70-72, aufgeführten".

Eltville's lost *Principia*. I base my attribution on Regis's *Principia*, discussed in the first part of this paper. What helps to establish Eltville as an author is mainly Regis's reference to the 6th *corollarium* of the 5th conclusion of his *socius* James of Eltville, which we read in identical terms in Jena, El. F. 47:

Johannis Regis, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 38r, ll. 20-25.	Johannis Regis, Paris, BnF, lat. 15156, f. 46v, ll. 28-32.	Jacobus de Altavilla, Jena, El. F. 47, f. 217ra-b.
<p>[7] Sextum corollarium 5 conclusionis articuli tertii sui: aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum. Ex quo sequitur quod hec consequentia non valet: 'A includit infinitos gradus equales non communicantes et unam perfectionem integrantes, igitur A est infinitum in esse perfectionis illius'. Probavit sextum correlarium, quia individua unius speciei eiusdem gradus sunt specificè intrinsece perfectionis.</p>	<p>[7bis] Item dicit in secundo corollario 5 conclusionis articuli sui tertii quod aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum. Ex quo intulit quod hec consequentia non valet: 'A includit infinitos gradus equales non communicantes et unam perfectionem integrantes, ergo A est infinitum in esse perfectionis illius'.</p>	<p>Corollarium sextum: aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum. Patet ex secunda parte corollarii precedentis. Etiam quia individua unius speciei eiusdem gradus sunt gradus specificè intrinsece perfectionis, igitur. Ex istis sequitur primo /217rb/ hanc consequentiam non valere: 'A includit infinitos gradus equales perfectionaliter non communicantes et unam perfectionem integrantes, igitur A est infinitum in esse perfectionis illius'. Patet, quia expressa instantia habetur ex corollario precedenti.</p>

One might object that this is just a coincidence, given that the technique of *bricolage textuel* is so widespread and advanced in the latter half of the 14th century. But a closer analysis of this fragment reveal a doctrinal coherence and stylistic elements that reinforces the hypothesis that Eltville is responsible. In addition, there is a self-reference in the second article, where the author introduces an illustrative whereby God, unbeknownst to everyone in "these schools," annihilates him and immediately replaces him with someone else completely similar in all ways with the name Jacob⁴⁹.

The fragment from the Jena manuscript consists of a question that reports the confrontation of *socii* from 1369 but from the perspective of an author other than Regis. The topic of the discussion is similar so the debate between Regis and Eltville, and one can easily recognize the philosophical profile of Eltville as it appears from the exchange with Regis. One element concerning the composition of the text, i.e., the division of the articles into conclusions and the development of each conclusion by series of corollaries, is echoes Eltville's style, which omnipresent throughout his *Sentences* commentary. The question, *Utrum Deus ad quamlibet entis speciem creabilis se habens distanter infinite in aliqua specie intellectuali a nobis nominari possit quidditative*, is divided into two articles (ff. 215vb-217vb, and ff. 217vb-222vb).⁵⁰ As the title suggests, in this fragment, which might be his first

⁴⁹ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 219ra: (...) *si Deus imperceptibilis omnibus in istis scolis annihilaret me hic sedentem et immediate post hoc recrearet unum alium omnino similem michi et similiter facientem sicut ego facio et facturus sum illud nomen Jacobus (...)*.

⁵⁰ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 215va: *In ista questione erunt articuli 2: Primus erit de habitudinibus specierum totius creabilis entis in esse rationali sub Ipso essentialis perfectionis*

Principium, Eltville deals with whether God can be named quidditatively via an intellectual species such that God, who is infinitely far away from any species of created being, can be defined with a name by this species. The first article opens with a list of four *suppositiones*,⁵¹ philosophical principles that will be invoked often within the demonstrations as tools to prove the veracity of his position. This type of supposition recalls Eltville's preoccupation with defining his terms at the beginning of his questions in his *Sentences* commentary.

The first article is divided into seven conclusions and to each conclusion corresponds a set of corollaries with arguments reinforcing the the conclusion. The core of the discussion is the perfection of a species. Eltville again plays philosopher, beginning with the assertion that there cannot naturally be an infinite number of species in any genus (conc. 1), that the human species is not in the middle of the latitude of vital species (concl. 2), that between the human and angelic species there is no middle species (concl. 3), the specific perfection is not intensified according to its participation in the divine unity (concl. 4), a created species is indivisible (concl. 5), it is impossible for two individuals of the same species to be different merely by their accidental differences (concl. 6), God cannot produce any effect without being far away from it (concl. 7). As we can see already just from the titles of these conclusions, they provide the framework for a debate focusing on the perfection of the species. The technical vocabulary is parallel with that in the dialogue with Regis, and many times we find the same ideas or solutions.

Conclusio prima: in nullo genere secundum nature cursum generabilium et corruptibilium infinite species naturaliter sunt producibiles. (f. 215vb)

Secunda conclusio: humana species in tota latitudine specierum vitalis nature existentium sub esse non est media. (f. 216ra)

Conclusio tertia: inter hominem et angelum mediam animalis speciem poni naturali ratione est negandum. (f. 216ra)

Conclusio quarta: secundum numerum multiplicationum divine unitatis participatarum a diversis speciebus ipsarum specifica perfectio non quantificatur. (f. 216rb)

Conclusio quinta: cuilibet specie creabili species ab ea omnino indivisibiliter distans a divina essentia potest dirivari contra ipsum. (f. 216va)

Conclusio sexta: quecumque duo individua sub eadem specie solum differentiis accidentalibus ab invicem distanter se habere est impossibile. (f. 217rb)

Conclusio septima et responsalis ad primam partem tituli questionis: quamvis Deus non possit ad extra propinquius quam infinite distanter a se agere. Nichilomus, si distantia est distans creabilis est aliqua species, nunc a Deo distans. (f. 217ra)

Hermeneutically speaking, the debate with his *socii* allows us to better understand Eltville's philosophical profile. In the first article, we can map out the confrontation as follows: John of Diodona⁵² is the first to enter in scene in the 6th corollary of the 4th conclusion, and then again in the 5th conclusion, which seems to be formulated against him. The point of disagreement concerns how they understand the participation of the divine essence in the process of creation. Eltville argues against Diadona that on the level of created

latitudinem gradualiter constituentium. Secundus erit de immutationibus specierum et reluctentia obiectorum in Ipsis in esse cognitivas potentias obiectaliter moventium.

⁵¹ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 215va: *Suppositio prima: omnes species in quibus secundum institutum nature est ordo, perfectio, et decor universi solum sunt finite in natura. (...) Suppositio secunda: tota latitudo talium specierum maxima et minima specie inclusive terminator. (...) Suppositio tertia: quelibet creabilis species solum finitas numero participat divine unitatis replicationes essentielles. (...). Suppositio quarta: non omnem denominationem essentialiter differentialem gradum specificae perfectionis oportet superaddere.*

⁵² About John of Diodona, see GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », pp. 133-134; T. SULLIVAN, *Parisian Licentiate in Theology, A.D. 1373-1500. A Biographical Register, vol. 2: The Secular Clergy* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 37), Leiden-Boston 2011, pp. 519-520 and the compiled data of those sources in Courtenay's paper in this volume, p. 15.

species they can produce other created species and it is not necessary for them to be produced directly by the divine essence⁵³. Diodona claims that the *immensum Dei* cannot produce *in actu* an infinite number of species between two species, but only a medium species⁵⁴. The climax of their exchange is in the 4th corollary of the 7th conclusion,⁵⁵ where a list of twelve propositions is formulated against Diodona. This is also an occasion for Eltville *gratia collationis* to express again his conception regarding the perfection of the latitude that *per modum latitudinis uniformiter difformis ascendit a non gradu essendi usque ad suum gradum exclusivum qui Deus est* (f. 217va). Inside this intensity, if we are looking to find the *huiusmodi gradus summus*, Eltville adds that is the double of its middle point and four times bigger than the degrees that are between the middle and the point of non-being.

The discussion continues in the 7th conclusion with the 5th corollary, where we meet the Carmelite *socius*⁵⁶ introduced as *reverendus meus bachalareus de ordine fratrum beate Marie de carmelo*. According to Eltville's 5th corollary, a thing's essential perfection is not measured by the degree of participation in the highest being⁵⁷. Eltville formulates a set of six arguments, aiming for a more exhaustive discussion of the topic with his *socius* (*ad plenius tractatum materiam istam cum patre meo reverendi*) to demonstrate more clearly that participation in the highest being is not the cause of a thing's essential perfection.⁵⁸

The second article also begins with a list of suppositions, five in this case, followed by six conclusions dealing with the problem of the denomination of God, or more precisely with how a non-infinite species can formulate a concept defining an infinite being like God. As in the case of the first article, the *socii* are introduced at the end of the article. John Textoris is the first *socius* quoted, in the first corollary of the 5th conclusion (f. 219vb). According to Eltville, the knowledge of the existence of an effect precedes the knowledge of the existence of its cause. From Eltville's objection to Textoris we can deduce that Textoris would not

⁵³ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 216va: *Conclusio quinta: cuilibet specie creabili species ab ea omnino indivisibiliter distans a divina essentia potest derivari.*

⁵⁴ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 216va: *Contra magistrum Johannem de Deodona qui ponit in corollario secundo secunde conclusionis secundi argumenti sui principii quod non est possibile immensum Dei posse inter quaslibet duas species actu producere species infinitas, tamen mediam, aut plures inter quaslibet producere est sibi posse.*

⁵⁵ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 217rb-217va: *Corollarium quartum: non omnia specificae differentia equaliter ab immenso posse ut possunt esse sunt distantia. Patet ex precedentibus. Oppositum tam huius positionis magister Johannes de Deodona et ideo gratia collationis habende cum esse volo probare corollarium istud aliquibus rationibus contra eum. Et arguo primo sic: totalis ymaginabilis latitudo essentialis perfectionis per modum latitudinis uniformiter difformis ascendit a non gradu essendi usque ad suum gradum exclusivum qui Deus est, sed in omni latitudine huiusmodi gradus summus est precise duplus ad gradum eius medium et quadruplus ad gradum qui est inter medium et non gradum ut demonstratur ex secunda 6 Euclidis⁵⁵ que demonstratio generaliter se extendit et indifferenter ad finitum et infinitum modo secundum omnem ymaginationem sub quadruplum plus distat ab eo respectu cuius est quam subduplum ab eodem, igitur.*

⁵⁶ Glorieux precise that this Carmelite can not be Jean Golin, Michael of Bologna or Jean Brammart since all of them were already masters in 1369. Cf. GLORIEUX, « Le commentaire sur les *Sentences* », p. 134. For other data about him see Courtenay's paper in this volume, p. 17.

⁵⁷ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 217vb: *Corollarium quintum: perfectio essentialis rerum non mensuratur penes accessum ad summum. Cuius oppositum ponit reverendus magister meus bachalareus de ordine fratrum beate marie de carmelo in secunda conclusione sui secundi articuli. Patet istud corollarium ex precedentibus quia Deus immense distat a rebus ex corollario secundo, igitur terminus ad quem illius distantie est indeterminatissime nobis cognitius, igitur non possumus aliquid penes illum accessum quantificare. Item peto a patre meo quid sit ille accessus si sit intrinsecus specificus gradus, igitur tantum est dicere ac si diceretur quod attenderetur penes se ipsum. Si autem sit aliquid aliud peto quod det illud ut materiam arguendi secum habeam.*

⁵⁸ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 218ra: *Ex istis propositionibus probando quod perfectio essentialis rerum non attenditur penes accessum ad summum.*

accept that the Lord of all things cannot be completely unknown⁵⁹. Eltville's response to Textoris contains twelve arguments (*sententias*) demonstrating that it is possible for the human intellect not to know the existence of a God as the cause of all things. Among his various proofs he also introduces the Aristotelian example, from the *Metaphysics*, of the ignorance of the first principle. The natural *viatrix* creature can be unaware of the existence of God, and it is not necessary for a human to have knowledge of God. Eltville also attacks Textoris' methodology, asserting that none of the authorities that he invoked in his argumentation is pertinent⁶⁰ for proving his position.

The 7th conclusion deals with the problem of the representativity of a species. Eltville declares that an intellectual species of a diversity of different objects it is by its nature formerly representative⁶¹. The 3th corollary of this conclusion introduces to the scene the Sorbonne bachelor Francis Christofori of Tortosa,⁶² whom Eltville calls *magister Franciscus de Sorbona*. Their point of contention surrounds their differing opinions on the beatific vision. According to Eltville, an *anima beata* can see the divine essence an intermediary species that represents this essence⁶³. As in the case of the debate with John Textoris, Eltville lists a dozen arguments in favor of his position. The 12th argument also offers a more detailed summary of Francis' position defending the impossibility of seeing *clare, nude et aperta* the divine essence via a created species.⁶⁴

The last *socius* in this debate seems to be the most famous figure of the generation, since at the time of the confrontation he was already the secretary of Queen Joanna. Both Regis and Eltville make explicit mention of this detail, and in the Jena manuscript the subtitle of the paragraph where our Cistercian introduces him reads *contra magistrum Richardum de Bellomonte secretarium regine Francie* (f. 221rb). Eltville adds that Richard was the second bachelor to deliver his first *principium* (*qui secundo loco incepit*). The reason for their disagreement pertains to the theory of latitudes. There is an infinite degree of species' perfection and Eltville accepts the possibility of a highest species below God but immediately

⁵⁹ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 219vb: *Contra magistrum Iohannem Textoris, licet omnium dominum esse non possit totaliter ignorari, tamen ipsum esse est a viatore demonstrative*. Eltville repeats Textoris position again on f. 220ra: *Nono ex istis arguo contra primam partem conclusionis magistri mei sic: omnium dominus etc. Ex istis patet quod omnium dominum ab humano intellectu totaliter ignorari absolute est possibile, cuius oppositum dicit magister meus in prima parte dicte conclusionis*.

⁶⁰ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 220rb: *Ad auctoritates dico quod non volunt aliud dicere nisi quod homo ex sua naturali inclinatione potens est si rectitudinem instructus sue nature prosequatur Deum totaliter non posse ignorare, ex hoc tamen non sequitur impossibilitas ignorandi et nullam notitiam habendi de Deo in quocumque homine*.

⁶¹ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 220va: *Conclusio septima: aliqua intellectualis species simplex plurium obiectorum distincte ex sue nature proprietate formaliter est representativa. Patet ex corollario primo conclusionis prime huius articuli. Et probatur, quia conceptus simplex concretus representat naturaliter substantia et accidens, igitur*.

⁶² GLORIEUX, "Le commentaire sur les *Sentences*", p. 133 and Courtenay's paper in this volume p. 14.

⁶³ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 220vb: *Ex isto corollario arguitur possibile est animam beatam videre divinam essentiam per speciem mediam divinam essentiam representantem. Contra reverendum magistrum meum magistrum Franciscum de Sarbona, quia si non hoc maxime esset ratione finitatis illius speciei in eius esse naturali, sed hoc non impedit ex corollario; igitur*.

⁶⁴ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 221ra: *Verum est quod pater meus et magister reverendus probat corollarium suum sic: impossibile est quod per speciem unius creature specificae ab alia distincte essentia alterius creature. Videatur igitur impossibilis est quod essentia divina per speciem aliquam creatam vel alias qualitercumque productam clare, nude et aperte videatur*.

next to Him, which might then be necessarily independent of God.⁶⁵ According to Richard, on the contrary, if a such species is not the first being, then necessarily depends on God.⁶⁶

Conclusion

The bachelors of theology defending their theses in the principal debates before their *Sentences* lectures in Paris in 1369 were not simply playing philosopher, but also innovating in philosophy, exgaging in serious debate with passion, rhetorical eloquence, curiosity, and intellectual skills that cut across disciplines from mathematics to metaphysics. The Cistercian bachelor, James of Eltville, was particularly interested in the intensity of qualities, the perfection of species, the nature of representation, causality the relation between finite effects and an infinite cause, the distance between a created being and non-being, the beatific vision, and so on. These topics are encountered here and there in his *Sentences* commentary, but they are presented in a more temperate manner; the tension of the *Principia* and the viva-voce encounter with his *socii* is missing.

⁶⁵ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 221rb: (...) *siqua suprema species esset Deo omnino indivisibiliter immediata ipsa necessario esset independens (...)*.

⁶⁶ IACOBUS DE ALTAVILLA, *Principium*, a. 1, ms. Jena, El. F. 47, f. 221vb: *Magister meus probat conclusionem suam sic: quia talis species non esset primum ens, igitur a Deo dependeret. Item non esset ens per plenitudinem nec a se, igitur ab alio igitur dependeret.*

Appendix

This Appendix contains all the fragments that I could identify in John of Regis' *Principia* as connected with James of Eltville. The structure of the text transmitted by manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 15156 is very confusing, since the same arguments are sometimes found twice, either with small variations or simply *verbatim*. For this reason, I reproduce the text in two columns, numbering each thesis as *n*, and when the same fragment is repeated I note it as *nbis*. I have also numbered the lines from the manuscript; they are listed after the number of the argument. For the responses to the arguments the same notation is employed: *ad n* et *ad nbis*. As I tried to show on the plan of the four *Principia* of Regis (see pp. 3-4), Eltville's text can be read once inside *Principium* I and again in what I call the 'Eltville folder' (ff. 46v-47r), introduced in the manuscript with the rubric *Frater Jacobus*.

When we find on f. 47v references such as *pater meus*, *dicit pater meus*, *argumentum eius* (at least ten mentions in 27 lines in the manuscripts), which I have marked in bold characters in the transcription, the reader should be aware that they are confusing and we never know for sure when it refers to Eltville and when to Regis. These denominations are traces of the dialogue between the two *socii*. The whole chapter from f. 47 summarizes the material that was probably presented orally, giving the gist of their confrontation. In order to put together the pieces of the puzzle that provide us some fragments of Eltville's *Principia*, we have to read the text as follows: first read the argument from f. 37v, compared with the same argument rewritten that we find on f. 47v, and then read Eltville's answer on f. 47r.⁶⁷

The text of the first *corollarium* is gathered in the same table as a continuous fragment: on one side we have fragments as found on f. 38r and on the other as found on ff. 46v-47r with some variation and in a more complete form. For the second *corollarium* I have chosen a different format, since the text is more confusing. Each argument is divided into three parts: Regis' objection to Eltville's argument (notes as *x* and *xbis*), Eltville's answer (noted as *responsio ad x* and *xbis*) and Regis' response to Eltville's answer (*responsio ad responsionem*). I have also marked this division by splitting each of the four steps of this dialogue into two tables, one with the objection and one with the response to objection. In this way, the reader is can follow and locate each moment of the confrontation between Regis and Eltville. At the same time, we can better understand the scene of the confrontation of two *socii* during their *principial* debate.

At the end of the second table, I have transcribed what we can read in the manuscript at the end of f. 47r and the beginning of f. 47v, which probably should be identified as some final conclusions of Ripa about the confrontation with Eltville, some further disagreements about the possibility of degrees of intensity in the intrinsic specific perfection.

⁶⁷ See the following Appendix, where I establish the correspondance for each argument with an indication of its sources.

Frater Jacobus apud Johannem Regis

Paris, BnF lat. 15156, f. 38r et ff. 46v-47r

Articulus I, conclusio I, corollarium 1:

Paris, BnF 15156, f. 38r (<i>Principium I</i>)	Paris, BnF 15156, ff. 46v-47r: <i>Frater Jacobus</i>
[1] /f. 38r, ll. 7-13/ Sextus bachalarius Bernardista ⁶⁸ . Primum corollarium conclusionis secunde articuli primi: nulla species in sensu seu intellectu sic unius obiecti singulariter est representativa quod nullius alterius etiam quantumcumque ei similis. Probatur ex conclusione et eius probationibus. Confirmatur, quia manifestum est quod omnis conceptus naturaliter concernens quotcumque condiciones individuales inesse alicui esset communis, ad omnem imaginabilem rem simpliciter omnino individualiter determinatam, si esset per possibile vel impossibile; igitur nullus conceptus taliter representative se habet seu potest se habere respectu alicuius obiectorum eius quod nullius alterius ei similis.	[1bis] /f. 46v, ll. 16-18/ Sextus bachalarius Bernardista ponit in primo correlario secunde conclusionis articuli sui primi quod nulla species in sensu seu intellectu sic unius obiecti singulariter est representativa quod nullius alterius etiam quantumcumque ei similis.
[2] /f. 38r, ll. 13-15/ Contra corollarium: ad hoc sequitur quod possemus naturaliter sentire aliquod obiectum sensibile a quantacumque distantia. Probatur, quia species representativa unius obiecti est representativa cuiuslibet alterius sibi similis per corellarium.	[2bis] /f. 46v, ll. 18-19/ Contra: ad hoc sequitur quod possemus naturaliter sentire aliquod obiectum sensibile a quantacumque distantia. Probatur, quia species representativa unius obiecti est representativa cuiuslibet alterius obiecti sibi similis, per corellarium.
[3] /f. 38r, ll. 15-16/ Item sequitur quod de nullo obiecto possemus naturaliter esse certi. Probatur, quia per eandem speciem representantur A et B obiecta distincta, licet similia.	[3bis] /f. 46v, ll. 20-21/ Secundo sequitur quod de nullo obiecto possemus naturaliter esse certi. Probatur, quia per eandem speciem representantur A et B obiecta distincta, licet similia.
[4] /f. 38r, ll. 16-17/ Tertio sequitur quod semper habentes similes species in intellectu similiter iudicarent, quod patet falsum in disputantibus.	[4bis] /f. 46v, ll. 21-23/ Tertio sequitur quod semper habentes similes species in intellectu similiter indicarent, quod patet falsum in disputantibus. Probatur consequentia, quia iudicia naturaliter sequuntur representationes et apprehensiones.
[5] /f. 38r, ll. 17-19/ Quarto talis species non est realiter cognitio, nec immutaret vitaliter et indifferenter quamlibet potentiam receptivam, igitur.	[5bis] /f. 46v, ll. 23-25/ Quarto talis species non est essentialiter cognitio, nec immutaret vitaliter et indifferenter quamlibet potentiam receptivam, ergo per eam iudicaret unus vel apprehenderet obiectum, non tamen alius ⁷⁰ idem obiectum vel simile.
[6] /f. 38r, ll. 19-20/ Solutio: ad rationem eius	[6bis] /f. 46v, ll. 25-28/ Ad rationem in

⁶⁸ [6tus bachalarius bernardi] *add. in marg.*

⁷⁰ [alius] aliud *post corr. et del.*

negatur antecedens illud universaliter positum; patet per instantiam de duabus luminibus in medio foramine concurrentibus causantibus duas ⁶⁹ umbras.	oppositum negatur antecedens universaliter sumptum, et patet instantia de duobus luminibus in medio foramine concurrentibus causantibus duas umbras; sic in proposito species non est nata representare naturaliter nisi illud obiectum a quo causatur et etiam illi potentie que ibidem concurrunt ⁷¹ vitaliter et receptive.
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Articulus III, conclusio 5, corollarium 5⁷² (2 or 5 copy paste from the ms)

[7] /f. 38r, ll. 20-25/ Sextum corollarium 5 conclusionis articuli tertii sui: aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum. Ex quo sequitur quod hec consequentia non valet: 'A includit infinitos gradus equales non communicantes et unam perfectionem integrantes, igitur A est infinitum in esse perfectionis illius'. Probavit sextum corollarium, quia individua unius speciei eiusdem gradus sunt specificice intrinsece perfectionis.	[7bis] /f. 46v, ll. 28-32/ Item dicit in secundo corollario 5 conclusionis articuli tertii quod aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum. Ex quo intulit quod hec consequentia non valet: 'A includit infinitos gradus equales non communicantes ⁷³ et unam perfectionem integrantes, ergo A est infinitum in esse perfectionis illius'.
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[8] **Primo**

Primo: Regis contra Eltville	[8bis] Primo bis: Regis contra Eltville
[8] /f. 38r, ll. 25-26/ Contra corollarium: nullum simile specie numerali includit intrinsece latitudinem uniformiter uniformem; sed quelibet specifica perfectio est huiusmodi; igitur.	[8bis] /f. 46v, ll. 32-35/ Contra corollarium primo sic: nullum simile specie numerali includit intrinsece latitudinem uniformiter uniformem; sed quelibet specifica perfectio est huiusmodi; ergo. Maior patet, quia omnes replicantes numerabiles inferiores concurrunt in supremam speciem numerabilem. Minor patet, quia species sunt sicut numeri.

Eltville's answer to [8]	Regis' answer to Eltville's answer to [8]
[Responsio ad 8 et 8bis] /f. 47r, ll. 2-7/ Ad primum negat antecedens, quia aliqua formabilis species numeri includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem, ut species numeri duodenarii. Ad probationem negat propositionem quam assumo, quia nulla est suprema ⁷⁴ species numeralis. Aliter dicit quod licet omnes huiusmodi implicationes concurrant in speciem numeri superiorem, tamen exinde non sequitur, 'ergo nulla species includit realiter latitudinem uniformiter uniformium graduum realiter	[Responsio ad responsionem ad 8 et 8bis] /f. 47r, ll. 7-20/ Contra ista, supponendo ex dictis eius quod essentialis perfectio specifica non potest minui vel augeri formaliter, probo quod nulla species numeri includit formaliter latitudinem uniformiter uniformem. Arguo sic: nulla per se latitudo includit formaliter duos gradus equales, ergo nulla latitudo numeralis specifica includit formaliter latitudinem uniformiter uniformem. Consequentia tenet a superiori ad inferius negative. Antecedens

⁶⁹ duas] *post corr.*

⁷¹ concurrunt] contingit ms.

⁷² Here is a confusion in the manuscript since we find corollarium 5 on f. 38r and under the same content corollarium 2 on f. 46v.

⁷³ non communicantes] *rep. et del.*

⁷⁴ est] *add. et exp. ms.*

distinctorum’.	<p>probatur, quia claudere videtur contradictionem quod in eadem per se latitudine sint 2 gradus dupli respectu eiusdem subdupli et gradus equaliter distantes a non gradu, quia iam non esset per se latitudo, cum non esset ibi ordo. Confirmatur antecedens, quia sicut servatur ordo⁷⁵ divisionis proportionalis inter partes extensivas, ita inter partes intensivas alicuius latitudinis – ista patet per probationem corellarii sui in qua exemplum ponit de albedine; sed non est possibile plures equales gradus eiusdem per se latitudinis extensive equaliter distare a non gradu magnitudinis; ergo similiter de intensive dicendum est. Minor probatur, quia aliter esset dare duo puncta in eadem linea equaliter distantia ab extremo illius lineae, et dua instantia eiusdem temporis equaliter distantia ab extremo eiusdem temporis, et duas lineas secundum eandem differentiam dividentes aliquod continuum in duas partes equales. Hec autem videntur inconvenientia, ergo.</p>
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[9] *Secundo*

[9] Secundo: Regis contra Eltville:	[9bis] Secundo bis: Regis contra Eltville:
/f. 38r, ll. 26-28/ Secundo: quelibet specifica perfectio est indivisibiliter specifica perfectio, igitur in esse specifico non includit latitudinem. Antecedens patet, quia aliter in esse specifico posset ab individuis suis varie participari.	/f. 46v, ll. 35-37/ Secundo: quelibet specifica perfectio est indivisibiliter specifica perfectio, igitur ⁷⁶ in esse specifico non includit latitudinem. Antecedens patet, quia aliter in esse specifico posset ab individuis suis ⁷⁷ varie participari, secundum quod individua inter se gradualiter variantur.

Eltville’s answer to [9]:	Regis’ answer to Eltville’s answer to [9 et 9bis]:
/f. 47r, ll. 20-24/ Ad secundum negat antecedens, si intelligitur sic quod quelibet talis perfectio specifica sit indivisibilis. Si autem intelligitur sic quod non patitur cuiuscumque essentialis denominationis additionem vel subtractionem manens in sua specie, tunc consequentia non valet, quia ipsa perfectio specifica in esse naturali includit huiusmodi latitudinem, et idem est ipsa in esse naturali et in esse specifico, ergo ipsa in esse specifico includit latitudinem.	/f. 47r, ll. 24-32/ Ex istis positis et concessis arguo sic: perfectio specifica idem est ipsa in esse naturali et specifico et in esse essentiali quidditativo ⁷⁸ . Et ipsa in esse naturali et specifico includit latitudinem, igitur ipsa in esse essentiali quidditativo includit latitudinem, quod negat pater meus ⁷⁹ . Consequentia est nota per modum suum arguendi. Secunda pars antecedentis est dictum patris mei . Primam partem probo, quia si esse essentialis quidditativum specificum esset aliud ab esse naturali specifico, illud esse esset mathematicum fictum, nec diceret aliquem perfectionis gradum,

⁷⁵ confirmatur antecedens, quia diservatur/observatur ordo] *add. in marg.*

⁷⁶ igitur] *add. supra lin.*

⁷⁷ suis] *add. in marg.*

⁷⁸ quidditativo] *post corr.* quod bono *in ms.*

⁷⁹ pater meus] *id est Eltville*

	cuius oppositum ponit pater meus . Confirmatur, quia ab esse naturali specifico sumitur et mensuratur esse diffinitivum; si esse naturale specificum includit latitudinem esse, diffinitivum includit latitudinem. Per consequens unus homo erit magis rationalis, mortalis quam alius.
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[10] *Tertio*

[10] Tertio: Regis contra Eltville: /f. 38r, ll. 28-30/ Tertio: perfectio specifica est finita, igitur si includeret latitudinem posset dari medius gradus illius latitudinis et tota latitudo excederet in perfectione specifica etiam partem suam.	[10bis] Tertio bis: Regis contra Eltville: /f. 46v, ll. 37-39/ Tertio: perfectio specifica est finita, igitur si ⁸⁰ includeret latitudinem posset dari ⁸¹ gradus medius illius latitudinis. Et per consequens tota latitudo excederet in illa perfectione specifica gradum illum.
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Eltville's answer to [10 et 10bis] /f. 47r, ll. 32-34/ Ad tertium argumentum meum (Eltville) , pater meus (Regis) negat consequentiam, et causa negationis patet ex propositione sua premissa, in qua dicit quod gradualis concursus non est auctivus essentialis perfectionis, licet qualitative intensionis, ut patuit, ergo.	Regis' answer to Eltville's answer to [10 et 10bis] /f. 47r, ll. 34-42/ Reduco sic argumentum: perfectio specifica est finita et in esse specifico includit latitudinem, igitur in esse specifico posset dari gradus medius illius latitudinis. Antecedens est concessum, consequens est negatum. Consequentiam probo, quia vel huiusmodi latitudo est continua, et per consequens sibi gradus medius correspondet. Si sit discreta resultans ex gradibus paribus et equalibus, habet duas medietates equales. Si resultat ex inequalibus, igitur est ibi gradus medius positivus distans equaliter ab extremis, et propositum. Secundo, pater meus dicit quod gradualis concursus non est auctivus essentialis perfectionis, licet qualitative intensionis. Quero de hac qualitative intensione utrum sit mere accidentalis vel non. Si sic, igitur nullus gradus illius intensionis recipit nomen et diffinitionem speciei quod nomen est esse falsum. Si non sit accidentalis, igitur convenit differentie essentiali et propositum.
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[11] *Quarto*:

[11] Quarto: Regis contra Eltville: [11] /f. 38r, ll. 30-33/ Quarto quero utrum gradus unus additus sibi simili reddat maius specificum quam alter solum. Si sic, igitur infiniti gradus reddent perfectionem infinitam. Si non, igitur plures individuales non arguunt latitudinem specificam.	[11] Quarto: Regis contra Eltville bis: [11bis] /f. 46v, ll. 39-43/ Quarto quero utrum unus gradus individualiter additus sibi simili reddat maius specificum quam alter solum vel non. Si sic, igitur infiniti gradus equales alicui certo dato non communicantes et realiter distincti reddant perfectionem infinitam in esse
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⁸⁰ non] *add. et exp.*

⁸¹ dari] *add. in marg.*

	talis denominationis. Si non, igitur plures gradus individuales non arguunt latitudinem specificam in esse specifico.
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Eltville' answer to [11] and [11bis]	Regis answer to Eltville' answer to [11] and [11bis]
/f. 47r, ll. 42-44 / Ad quartum argumentum, quando quero utrum unus gradus etc., dicit quod non, propter conclusionem et eius propositionem.	/f. 47r, ll. 44-46; f. 47v, ll. 1-3/ Ex hoc concludo propositum principale sic: ubi non invenitur maius et minus nec equale ⁸² , ibi nulla est latitudo; sed in perfectione specifica non invenitur maius, nec minus, nec equale; ergo. Maior nota. Minor probatur, quia variatio gradualis non variat perfectionem essentialem specificam, nec etiam additio /47v/ vel subtractio denominationis essentialis, quia iam non maneret eadem species, ut dicit pater meus; ergo perfectio specifica nullo modo includit latitudinem, quia semper invariabiliter stat gradibus variatis, et illud fuit propositum quod a principio volui probare.

[12] *Solutio*

Eltville	Regis	Regis
[12] f. 46v, ll. 43-45 Ad probationem corollarii, cum dicit quod individua unius speciei eiusdem gradus sunt specificice intrinsece perfectionis, ergo corollarium verum.	[13] /f. 38r, ll. 33-36/ Solutio: ad rationem eius dicitur quod consequentia non valet, tum quia multitudo gradualis perfectionem specificam in esse specifico non intendit, tum etiam quia nature limes non patitur de facto multitudinem infinitam graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum equalium alicui certo dato, quia eadem ratione essent infiniti homines actu.	[13bis] /f. 46v, ll. 43-45; f. 47r, ll. 1-2/ Cum reverentia nego consequentiam, tum ⁸³ quia multitudo gradualis perfectionem specificam in esse specifico non intendit, tum etiam quia nature limes non patitur /47r/ de facto multitudinem infinitam graduum non communicantium realiter ⁸⁴ distinctorum equalium alicui certo dato, quia eadem ratione essent infiniti homines nunc in actu et infiniti equi, et sic de aliis.

Regis' final consideration (ff. 47v, ll. 3-27)

[14] **Eltville's position:** Pater meus probavit noviter corollarium suum, ponendo tantum⁸⁵ quod A, gratia exempli, sit una albedo totalis que sit divisa in partes proportionales intensivas vel etiam extensivas, et medietas primi sit A, secunda B, tertia C et sic in infinitum. Tunc etiam dicit **ipse**: certum est quod A, B, C non communicant eo quod hoc est de ratione partium proportionalium. Tunc arguit sic: ex positione hec A vel hoc A albedo infinitorum graduum, scilicet A, B, C etc., includit latitudinem; et hec A vel hoc A est sua essentialis perfectio, alias essentie specificice rerum essent realiter distincte ab existentibus eorum singularibus, quod est per eum, ut dicit superius, improbatum;

⁸² equale] *in marg. ms.*

⁸³ tamen] *add. inter lin. ms.*

⁸⁴ realiter] *post corr.*

⁸⁵ tamen] *causam post corr.*

igitur, cum quilibet illorum graduum sit alteri equalis in perfectione essentiali, patet corollarium⁸⁶ verum, scilicet *quod aliqua specifica perfectio intrinsece includit latitudinem uniformiter uniformem infinitorum graduum non communicantium realiter distinctorum.*

[15] **Regis' position:** (ad. 11) Primo ex hoc sillogismo expository arguo propositum principale, scilicet: unus gradus individualis additus alteri reddit maius specificum. Arguo sic: hec albedo includit latitudinem; hec albedo est sua essentialis perfectio specifica; ergo sua essentialis perfectio specifica includit latitudinem. Totum argumentum est **suum** in materia et in forma, et conclusio describit **positionem suam**, quia iam species non essent ad modum numeri essentialiter ordinate nec se haberent in linea perfectionali sicut puncta, cuius oppositum apparet **ex dictis patris mei.**

[16] Ad rationem **suam** igitur, dico quod casus est impossibilis physice, scilicet quod albedo sit divisa in omnes partes suas proportionales. Concedo tamen quod⁸⁷ albedo habet infinitas partes proportionales⁸⁸ distinctas, tamen impossibile⁸⁹ est illas esse equales in quantitate, ymmo quilibet erit subdupla ad sibi immediate precedentem. Si vero equalitas referatur ad perfectionem specificam, illud est **pro me**, scilicet quod perfectio specifica essentialis non habet latitudinem, quia quantumcumque sit gradualis variatio, tamen specificus <gradus> nullatenus variatur.

[17] Similiter dicit **pater meus**, respondendo ad argumentum secundum, quod ideo gradus specificus dicitur indivisibilis quia non patitur cuiuscumque essentialis denominationis, ymmo nec gradus sibi similis additionem vel subtractionem manens in sua specie. Sed hoc non valet, quia⁹⁰ per idem medium omnino sequitur quod quilibet gradus individualis infra quocumque speciem est individualis, quia non patitur etc. manens in suo esse individuali.

⁸⁶ corollarium] scilicet quod *add. et exp. ms.*

⁸⁷ quod] *add. supra lin.*

⁸⁸ proportionales] *id est add. et del.*

⁸⁹ impossibile] *in marg.*

⁹⁰ quia] quemcumque *ms.*