




European Parliament  
DG Internal Policies of the Union

Presentation - 7 October 2008



# **Shrinking Regions: A paradigm shift in demography and territorial development**

**Claude Grasland**

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## AUTHORS

*This report is  
dedicated  
to the memory of our  
colleague :*



***Pasquale Coppola***

***(1945 - May 2008)***





# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Classical theory: stabilisation and equilibrium level





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## Easterling theory: cyclic evolution around equilibrium





# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Theory of second transition: non equilibrium



# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA


## Fertility rates 1950-2005 in Northern and Western Europe



- very high
- high
- medium
- low
- very low
- - Equilibrium

# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Fertility rates 1950-2005 in Southern Europe





- very high
- high
- medium
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- Equilibrium





# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Fertility rates 1950-2005 in Eastern Europe





# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Life expectancy 1950-2005 in Old Member States




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


# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## Migratory potential in European neighbourhood




# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA




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
Type WEST - Old




Type EAST - Old



Type WEST - Young





Type EAST - Young



# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## ORIGINE OF FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN BASILICATE (Italy)



# 1. THE LONG TIME-SPAN OF DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA

## MAIN CONCLUSIONS


- ❖ Without immigration EU27 population could decline quickly.
- ❖ The share of EU in world population has remained stable since 1960 only because of enlargement.
- ❖ Fertility and mortality has followed different paths in Old and New member states during the last 50 years
- ❖ Ageing and depopulation will be especially strong in east and central Europe after 2030.





## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EXPECTED SITUATION IN 2030 OF EU27 REGIONS




Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
with central scenario of Eurostat or national institutes (FR & UK)

-1.70%  Certainly Decreasing  
-0.44%

Case studies

## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EXPECTED SITUATION IN 2030 OF EU27 REGIONS



Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
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
-1.70%  Certainly Decreasing  
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Case studies

④ Basilicata




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EVOLUTION OF POPULATION 1980 – 2000 AND PROJECTIONS IN BASILICATE (Italy)




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
-0.44%  
0.00%

Probably Decreasing


Case studies

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Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
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
-0.44%  
0.00%  Probably Decreasing

Case studies

③ Moldova




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### EVOLUTION OF POPULATION 1980 – 2000 AND PROJECTIONS IN MOLDOVA (Romania)



## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS


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
Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
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Case studies

0.00%  
+0.31%  Probably Increasing

## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EXPECTED SITUATION IN 2030 OF EU27 REGIONS



Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
with central scenario of Eurostat or national institutes (FR & UK)

0.00%  
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
Probably Increasing

Case studies

② Norrland




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EVOLUTION OF POPULATION 1980 – 2000 AND PROJECTIONS IN UPPER NORRLAND (Sweden)




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
Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
with central scenario of Eurostat or national institutes (FR & UK)

Case studies

+0.31%  Certainly Increasing  
+4.00% 

## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EXPECTED SITUATION IN 2030 OF EU27 REGIONS



Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
with central scenario of Eurostat or national institutes (FR & UK)

+0.31%  
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
Certainly Increasing

Case studies

① Bretagne




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EVOLUTION OF POPULATION 1980 – 2000 AND PROJECTIONS IN BRITTANY (France)



## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS


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


## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### EXPECTED SITUATION IN 2030 OF EU27 REGIONS



Expected annual growth rate 2005-2030  
with central scenario of Eurostat or national institutes (FR & UK)



Case studies

- ① *Bretagne*
- ② *Norriand*
- ③ *Moldova*
- ④ *Basilicata*

## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

Types de région		Nombre de NUTS2					Population en 2005 (Millions)				
		1	2	3	4	Total	1	2	3	4	Total
<b>non socialistes en 1989</b>											
AT	Autriche	4	3	2		9	4.2	2.2	1.7		8.1
BE	Belgique	3	8			11	1.1	9.4			10.4
CY	Chypre	1				1	0.7				0.7
DE	Allemagne (ouest)	1	17	12	1	31	4.2	38.2	23.4	1.2	66.9
DK	Danemark		1			1		5.4			5.4
ES	Espagne	6	5	6	2	19	18.2	14.0	7.3	3.5	42.9
FI	Finlande	1	3	1		5	0.0	4.5	0.7		5.2
FR	France	14	8	4		26	41.7	13.8	6.6		62.1
GR	Grèce	2	5	5	1	13	0.8	7.5	2.5	0.2	11.1
IE	Irlande	2				2	4.1				4.1
IT	Italie	1	7	11	2	21	0.5	21.1	34.4	2.2	58.2
LU	Luxembourg	1				1	0.5				0.5
MT	Malte	1				1	0.4				0.4
NL	Pays-Bas	6	5	1		12	6.5	8.7	1.1		16.3
PT	Portugal	1	3	3		7	0.4	6.7	3.4		10.5
SE	Suède	4	2	2		8	6.5	1.3	1.2		9.0
UK	Royaume-Uni	24	8	5		37	42.4	11.6	5.9		59.9
<b>Total</b>		<b>72</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>132.2</b>	<b>144.5</b>	<b>88.2</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>371.9</b>
<b>socialistes en 1989</b>											
BG	Bulgarie				6	6				7.7	7.7
CZ	Rep. Tchèque		1	7		8		1.1	9.1		10.2
DE	Allemagne (est)			2	8	10			4.6	11.1	15.7
EE	Estonie				1	1				1.3	1.3
HU	Hongrie		1	4	2	7		2.8	5.0	2.3	10.1
LT	Lithuanie			1		1			3.4		3.4
LV	Lettonie				1	1				2.3	2.3
PL	Pologne	1	3	10	2	16	3.3	10.7	18.4	5.7	38.1
RO	Roumanie			2	6	8			6.5	15.2	21.7
SI	Slovénie		1			1		2.0			2.0
SK	Slovaquie		1	3		4		1.6			5.4
<b>Total</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>3.3</b>	<b>18.2</b>	<b>50.8</b>	<b>45.6</b>	<b>117.9</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>73</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>135.4</b>	<b>162.7</b>	<b>139.0</b>	<b>52.7</b>	<b>489.8</b>


### SHRINKING REGIONS (type 3 and 4)

**42%** of regions are concerned  
(113 /268)

**39%** of population is located in  
shrinking regions



## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

ESTIMATION OF THE AGENDA OF DECLINE (e.g. Region of Navarra – Spain)




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

### SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

POPULATION DENSITY IS NOT RELATED TO POPULATION GROWTH AT REGIONAL LEVEL ...




## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

... BUT THE RELATION IS GENERALLY TRUE AT LOCAL LEVEL



## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS

SHRINKING REGIONS CAN DISPLAY VERY DIFFERENT ECONOMIC PROFILES



## 2. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS


### MAIN CONCLUSIONS

- ❖ 40 % of EU regions will experiment population decline between 2005 and 2030
- ❖ 70 to 80% of regions will start do decline before 2040
- ❖ Shrinking regions are not necessary peripheral regions with rural orientation and low density.
- ❖ Case studies indicates that all regions are concerned by population decline at local level, in particular in rural areas.
- ❖ The regional (NUTS2) level is not sufficient to catch the impact of population decline on EU territory.






### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS



#### Potential of active population in 2030 (% of 20-64 years)

- **Old member states** : Low proportion of active population, in particular in shrinking regions
- **New member states** : High proportion of active population. No differences between shrinking regions and the others

### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS



**Potential pressure on pension in 2030 (% of 65-80 years)**

- **Old member states** : High proportion of old people at pension age, especially in shrinking regions
- **New member states** : Low proportion of old people at pension age. No differences between shrinking regions and the others




### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS


THIS CLASSICAL INDICATORS OF LISBON STRATEGY ARE QUESTIONNABLE BECAUSE :

- (1) They do not take into account the internal differences of regions at local level.
- (2) They are based on a normative approach of life cycle that is mainly oriented to economic productivity without any consideration of social welfare.

### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS




### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS




### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS



#### AGEING IN LOCAL SCALE



#### TYPE OF AGE STRUCTURE IN 2000




### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS



### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

■ MEAN AGE OF POPULATION IN 2005 (Both Sexes)




Source for administrative boundaries: UMS 2414 RIATE

EU Parliament study - Shrinking regions - a paradigm shift in demography and territorial development

*Ile de France* (FR) and *Moldova* (RO) are both regions with « Young » population (37 years)

*Severozapaden* (BU) and *Lombardia* (IT) are both regions with « Old » population (43-44 years)


Mean age of population (years)






### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

■ HEALTHY LIFE EXPECTANCY IN 2005 (Both Sexes)



Estimated duration of life in good health (years)




The level of healthy life expectancy is low and equal to 65 years in *Moldova (RO)* and *Severozapaden (BU)*


The level of healthy life expectancy is high and equal to 74 years in *Piemonte(IT)* and *Ile de France (FR)*.

### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

■ INDEX OF DEMOGRAPHIC SUSTAINABILITY 2005 (Both Sexes)




Potential of healthy life (%)



- Medium level of sustainability in *Ile de France* (50 %)
- Low level of sustainability in *Lombardia* (42%) and *Moldova* (43%)
- Very low level of sustainability in *Severozapaden* (32%)


### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

#### SYNTHETIC INDEX OF AGEING IN 2005 AND 2030



### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

#### SYNTHETIC INDEX OF AGEING AND TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS IN 2005



Shrinking regions are always characterised by a stronger level of ageing. When it is measured by a correct index, there are no differences between old and new member states.


### 3. THE AMBIGUITY OF AGEING INDICATORS

#### MAIN CONCLUSIONS



- ❖ Classical indicators of ageing are based on a normative vision of life oriented by economic assumptions.
- ❖ According to this classical indicators, demographic situation is better in New Member States than in Old member states.
- ❖ Better measure of social ageing are obtained by a combination of mean age and life expectancy.
- ❖ According to this new indicator, the situation of shrinking regions appears equally difficult in old and new member states.



## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING



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

## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING

MOLDOVA 1990-2006

DECREASE OF NUMBER OF STUDENTS




...

AND REDUCTION OF SCHOOLS






## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING



## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING

		PIB/hab en PPA. EU 27 =100	Revenu régionaux selon Behrens. EU25=100	PIB/hab. Moyennes nationales = 100	Taux de chômage. EU 27 = 100	Taux de chômage. Moyennes nationales = 100
		2005	2002	2005	2005	2005
UE27	Type 1	120	115	103	82	100
	Type 2	112	108	108	87	86
	Type 3	82	86	86	121	109
	Type 4	56	69	90	138	116
UE15	Type 1	123	117	104	80	101
	Type 2	118	113	106	79	85
	Type 3	98	103	88	112	118
	Type 4	87	96	78	179	147
NMS12	Types 1 et 2	54		114	142	90
	Type 3	71		83	147	92
	Type 4	50		96	138	100
EU 27		100	100		100	

## 4. TYPOLOGY OF SHRINKING REGIONS AND AGEING




## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING

❖ The shrinking regions are losing their young active ...

❖... but they are not necessary able to develop a « grey economy » ...

❖... and can also lose their richest citizen and the related economic transfers (pensions, health system).




## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING

### MOLDOVA 1990-2006

DECREASE OF PUBLIC HOSPITAL BEDS

...

AND INCREASE OF % OF OLD PEOPLE



## 4. VICIOUS CIRCLES : ECONOMY, MIGRATION AND AGEING

### MAIN CONCLUSIONS


- ❖ Population decline is correlated with lower economic performance at national and EU level.
- ❖ Shrinking regions are losing their young active that increase population decline
- ❖ Social transfer are not able to break the vicious circle that links population decline, emigration and ageing
- ❖
- ❖ The assumption of « grey economy » are questionable as old and rich people are generally not attracted by shrinking regions.



## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE Europe in the World




Evolution of population 1995-2005



## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE Europe in the World

### KEY-PROPOSAL :


- Opening or closing borders to external migrations ?
- Benchmarking with Japan (closed borders)
- Benchmarking with USA (open borders)






## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE

### Neighbourhood policy



Evolution of population 1995-2005




## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE


### Neighbourhood policy

#### KEY-PROPOSAL :


- Further enlargement or stronger neighbourhood policy ?
- Migrations from South to North ?
- Economic relocations from North to South ?



## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE European Cohesion policy



Evolution of population 1995-2005




# 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE ?

## European cohesion policy

### COHESION POLICY AND SHRINKING REGIONS

Convergence and phasing out regions  
(period 2007-2013)

European program for rural development in  
Brittany (ex objective 5b, period 1994-1999)




Demographic trends and Structural Funds of EU regional policy

	Eligible	Not Eligible
Shrinking regions*		
Growing regions*		

## 5. MULTISCALAR GOUVERNANCE European cohesion policy


### KEY-PROPOSAL :

- Territorial cohesion is recognised as a political priority ?
- Demographic criteria are used as complement to GDP for allocation of structural funds ?




## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE

### Regional and local access to services of general interest



Evolution of population 1995-2005




## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE

### Regional and local access to services of general interest

#### KEY-PROPOSAL :

- Reduction of regional inequalities by welfare state ?
- Strategic planification of services at regional and local levels ?




## 5. MULTISCALAR GOVERNANCE

GLOBAL  
CONTEXT




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NEIGHBOURHOOD  
CONTEXT




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EUROPEAN  
CONTEXT



+

NATIONAL/ REGIONAL  
CONTEXT



=

**NEED TO COMBINE POLITICAL ANSWERS TO  
DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS**





**Shrinking Regions: A paradigm shift in demography and territorial development**

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION !**