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Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2021

Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design

Résumé

Mechanism Design aims at defining mechanisms that satisfy a predefined set of properties, and Auction Mechanisms are of foremost importance. Core properties of mechanisms, such as strategy-proofness or budget-balance, involve: (i) complex strategic concepts such as Nash equilibria, (ii) quantitative aspects such as utilities, and often (iii) imperfect information,with agents’ private valuations. We demonstrate that Strategy Logic provides a formal framework fit to model mechanisms, express such properties, and verify them. To do so, we consider a quantitative and epistemic variant of Strategy Logic. We first show how to express the implementation of social choice functions. Second, we show how fundamental mechanism properties can be expressed as logical formulas,and thus evaluated by model checking. Finally, we prove that model checking for this particular variant of Strategy Logic can be done in polynomial space.

Dates et versions

hal-03594785 , version 1 (02-03-2022)

Identifiants

Citer

Bastien Maubert, Munyque Mittelmann, Aniello Murano, Laurent Perrussel. Strategic Reasoning in Automated Mechanism Design. 18th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2021), Nov 2021, Hanoii, Vietnam. pp.487-496, ⟨10.24963/kr.2021/46⟩. ⟨hal-03594785⟩
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