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# Towards a More Reliable and Reproducible Protocol of Source Camera Recognition

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**Keywords:** Digital Image Forensics, Camera Recognition, Verification Protocol, Deep Learning, Convolutional Neural Network, Siamese Neural Network, Dresden Image Database, SOCRatES.

**Abstract:** Source digital camera recognition is an important branch of digital image forensics, which aims at authenticating cameras from the captured images. By analysing the noise artifacts left on the images, it is possible to recognize the label: brand, model and device of the camera (e.g. Nikon - NikonD70 - NikonD70 of Alice). Camera recognition is increasingly difficult as the label become more precise. In the specific case of source camera recognition based on deep learning, literature has widely addressed recognition of the camera model, while the recognition of the instance of the camera (i.e. device) is currently under-studied. Moreover, we have identified a lack of protocols for performance assessment: state-of-the-art methods are usually assessed on databases that have specific compositions, such as the Dresden Image database (74 cameras of 27 models). However, using only one database for evaluation does not reflect reality, where it may be necessary to analyse different sets of devices that are more or less difficult to classify. Also, for some scenarios, verification (1-to-1) is better suited to camera recognition than identification (1-to-N). Based on these elements, we propose a more reliable and reproducible protocol for verification of the source camera made of three different levels (*basic*, *intermediate* and *advanced*) of increasing difficulty, based on camera labels (brand, model and device). State-of-the-art methods are tested with the proposed protocol on the Dresden Image Database and on SOCRatES. The obtained results prove our assumptions, with a relative drop in performance, up to 49.08% between the *basic* and *advanced* difficulty levels. Our protocol is able to assess the robustness of methods for source camera recognition, as it tests whether they are really able to correctly classify cameras in realistic contexts.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

With the rise of digital technologies and social networks, images have become a predominant way of communication. In fact, improvements in digital camera technology, especially for those embedded in smartphones, have had a significant impact on the digital world. In 2020, more than 1.12 trillion photos were taken worldwide<sup>1</sup>. The rise of images as a communication media has also led to the misuse of cameras and smartphones for collecting covert videos and illegal contents. In the latter case, it is extremely important to have tools to reliably associate an image with illegal content to the correct source camera. This research field is referred to as *source digital camera recognition*. Source camera recognition (SCR) provides tools to analyse images in order to authen-

ticate their origin. In this field, cameras are defined and classified according to three labels: brand, model, and device. Recognition is achieved by analysing the camera's *artifacts*, which correspond to the traces left by the camera hardware and software when a digital image is created (Fig. 1).




Figure 1: **Diagram of artifacts coming from the image creation pipeline that can be used for source camera recognition.** <sup>1</sup>Color Filter Array; <sup>2</sup>Photo Response Non-Uniformity.

<sup>1</sup><https://blog.mylio.com/how-many-photos-will-be-taken-in-2021-stats>

The ensemble of such artifacts is often referred to as *camera fingerprint*, as for the human fingerprint, which allows identifying a person. The camera fingerprint is composed of different elements, such as the features created by the color filter array (CFA) (Celiktutan et al., 2006; Long and Huang, 2006), or the chromatic aberration, due to imperfections in the lens (Choi et al., 2006; Van et al., 2007). Another important component of the camera fingerprint is the so-called "sensor noise" (Geradts et al., 2001) or the "photo response non-uniformity" (PRNU) (Lukas et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008), which is due to imperfections in the silicon wafer during the sensor manufacturing. Such imperfections cause a different pixel sensibility to light, generating a distinctive pattern unique for each camera. Finally, traces resulting from image enhancement (Tsai and Wu, 2006; Kharrazi et al., 2004) or JPEG quantization (Farid, 2006), are also used for camera recognition. With the development of deep learning (DL) in the last decades, deep architectures have been adopted in the state of the art (SOTA), such as convolutional neural networks (CNNs) (Krizhevsky et al., 2017) or two-stream networks (Berthet et al., 2021) and Siamese Neural Networks (SNNs) (Mayer and Stamm, 2018; Mayer and Stamm, 2020), which are particularly known for their robustness. Several articles (Bayar and Stamm, 2017a; Bayar and Stamm, 2017b; Bayar and Stamm, 2018) have been released on the use of constrained CNNs for source camera recognition, which integrate a layer specifically designed to extract the camera fingerprint. In fact, DL methods for digital image forensics require a preprocessing module to extract relevant artifacts that are overshadowed by the image content (Berthet and Dugelay, 2020).

Most of these DL-based approaches recognize the source camera based on its model - a task referred to as *camera model recognition* in the literature. However, this task is not sufficient in most scenarios where the set of cameras under consideration contains at least two cameras of the same model. In this case, the recognition of the source camera must be based on the specific features associated with the device - which we will refer to as *camera device recognition*. The literature on SCR shows the increasing difficulty of classifying the camera according to the labels: *brand*, *model*, and *device* - where the brand is the easiest and the device the most difficult to classify. This problem comes from camera fingerprints, which are more likely to be close to one another for cameras of the same brand and model. In the literature, DL-based methods have widely addressed camera *model* recognition, while camera *device* recognition is still under-studied. The few papers addressing camera

device recognition, however, do not fully address the problem of close camera fingerprints. Furthermore, the evaluation protocol adopted by these methods is that of identification (1-to-N) and the database mostly used in their experiments is the Dresden image database (Gloe and Böhme, 2010). The following problems in this respect are identified: (i) the 1-to-1 verification protocol might be more appropriate in some cases. When we want to know if an illegal picture has been captured by a certain device, we will compare it with the fingerprint of that device; (ii) the distribution of cameras in the database (e.g. number of cameras for each model) is not controlled. Therefore, the different levels of difficulty of classification are not highlighted because they depend on the distribution of cameras; (iii) using only one database for testing means having always the same exact composition of cameras, which is not representative of real life since, for example, more than 1.6 billion capturing devices were sold in 2020 (cameras<sup>2</sup> and smartphones<sup>3</sup>). Thus, many possible combinations of devices should be taken into account by using a protocol that includes a mechanism for randomising the selection of devices.

Based on these elements, we decided to focus our work on the verification protocol (1-to-1) and on a controlled selection of cameras, so that the distribution is not dependent on the selected database distribution. We propose a reliable and reproducible protocol to fully evaluate state-of-the-art methods. This protocol consists of three levels of difficulty, namely *basic*, *intermediate* and *difficult*, that correspond respectively to the selection of cameras according to three camera characteristics: brand, model and device. To the best of our knowledge, this article proposes the first protocol for verification to comprehensively assess SCR methods. The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents relevant methods from the SOTA dealing with camera device recognition. In Section 3, we explain the motivation for our article as well as the proposed protocol. The experimental evaluation is described in Section 4 with a special metric specifically designed to assess the impact of difficulty levels. Finally, we provide our conclusions in Section 5.

## 2 RELATED WORK

Regarding traditional approaches for source digital camera recognition (i.e. not based on DL), the most

<sup>2</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/1172711/forecast-of-digital-camera-sales-volume/>

<sup>3</sup><https://www.statista.com/statistics/263437/global-smartphone-sales-to-end-users-since-2007/>

Table 1: **Confusion matrix for camera identification according to their model.** Performances in the original papers are assessed over 27 models in total. Here, only the performances for some selected models that share the same brand are reported.

Method	Chen17		Ding19		Zhao20	
<b>Camera model</b>	<i>CI55</i>	<i>CI70</i>	<i>CI55</i>	<i>CI70</i>	<i>CI55</i>	<i>CI70</i>
<i>Canon Ixus 55</i>	<b>56%</b>	38%	<b>76.5%</b>	23.5%	90%	9%
<i>Canon Ixus 70</i>	6%	87%	0.6%	99.4%	4%	96%
<b>Camera model</b>	<i>ND70</i>	<i>ND70s</i>	<i>ND70</i>	<i>ND70s</i>	<i>ND70</i>	<i>ND70s</i>
<i>Nikon D70</i>	<b>58%</b>	39%	<b>69.6%</b>	29.5%	<b>64%</b>	35%
<i>Nikon D70s</i>	42%	<b>56%</b>	53.2%	<b>44.1%</b>	41%	<b>58%</b>
<b>Overall Accuracy</b>	94.73%		97.1%		96.1%	

used and efficient ones are based on sensor pattern noise (SPN) analysis, first introduced by Lukas *et al.* in 2006 (Lukas *et al.*, 2006), and improved by several works in the following years. This method is based on the analysis of noise residuals. The challenge today is thus to further improve the camera device recognition performance by using DL, which has greatly improved the performance of many image processing tasks so far. In the following, we present the literature on camera device recognition with DL, analysing their architecture and evaluation protocol, which is based on identification (1-to-N).

The work presented in (Chen *et al.*, 2017), addresses multiple classification along three experiments to provide performance for each label: brand, model, and device. Their method is based on the residual neural network (ResNet) (He *et al.*, 2016), which is a network that incorporates skipping connections in its layers. The idea is to keep low-level features while convolutional layers process the images to obtain high-level features. By combining both, the final output is more comprehensive and includes more information to recognize camera fingerprints. They achieved an identification accuracy of 99.12%, 94.73%, and 45.81% for brands, models, and devices, respectively.

In the two following works, multiple classification is also addressed with a very similar protocol, as they produce predictions for the three labels (brand, model and device) with only one experiment. In (Ding *et al.*, 2019), a preprocessing module is used, which exploits a concatenation of three high-pass filters and of the original image to obtain more diversity in the features. The network is made of three parts that are built with three ResNet blocks followed by a classification layer to identify a single label: first the brand, then the model, and finally the device. The ResNet blocks are made of two consecutive convolutional layers in parallel with a single convolutional layer, for the extraction of high- and low-level features. They obtained an accuracy of 99.6%, 97.1%, and 52.4% for the identification of brands, models, and devices, respectively.

Table 2: **Confusion matrix for camera device identification.** Performances in the original papers are assessed over 74 devices. Here, only the values for some selected devices are reported. Accuracy is averaged over three devices per model. Bold font indicates performance values that are larger or smaller than the overall accuracy.

Camera model	Chen17	Ding19	Zhao20
<i>FujiFilm FinePixJ50</i>	48.14%	49%	-
<i>Olympus Mju-1050SW</i>	-	<b>43.33%</b>	-
<i>Sony DSC-T77</i>	-	<b>77.67%</b>	<b>64%</b>
<i>Samsung NV15</i>	-	-	47%
<i>Casio EX-Z150</i>	-	-	<b>35%</b>
<b>Overall Accuracy</b>	45.81%	52.4%	47.5%

The authors of (Zhao *et al.*, 2020) propose a method based on the combination of a ResNet in parallel with a set of convolution layers, which extract camera attributes and the relevant information of the image neighborhoods, respectively. They use a recursive method with a classification in cascade: the predictions are given with consecutive sub-classifiers (first brand, then model, and finally device). The sub-classifier can affect the parent-classifier to drop some features that are invalid for sub-classification. They achieved an identification accuracy of 99.4%, 96.1%, and 47.5% for brands, models, and devices, respectively.

In these state-of-the-art articles, evaluations have been conducted by identification (1-to-N) and have shown that recognition is increasingly difficult for devices sharing the same brand and the same model, making camera device recognition the most challenging task (note the drop in performance even up to half when classifying brands or models vs. devices). Regarding recognition of devices sharing the same brand, the difficulty in classifying them is confirmed by observing Tab. 1, which reports a part of the confusion matrices from state-of-the-art methods (Chen *et al.*, 2017; Ding *et al.*, 2019; Zhao *et al.*, 2020) (presented in section 2) for some camera models. In fact, the performance of camera model recognition is lower for cameras of the same brand. Regarding the difficulty of performing camera device recognition compared to camera model recognition, Tab. 2 reports the results from the same SOTA methods as before, but this time used for device classification. The table shows the mean accuracy for some camera models, which has been computed over three devices per model. The table also reports the overall classification accuracy that is much lower than for model classification (see Tab. 1 overall accuracy for comparison).

The drop in performance between the two tasks (model and device identification) is surely due in part to the number of classes on which to classify the cameras, which is usually higher for device than model

(i.e. usually in a dataset there are more different camera devices than different camera models). It is known that in DL, the accuracy and the number of classes are inversely correlated. This drop is also due to the fact that cameras of the same brand and model have close camera fingerprints, which is further analysed in the next section.

### 3 PROPOSED PROTOCOL

#### 3.1 Close Camera Fingerprints

The literature has shown that camera recognition is increasingly difficult, as cameras of the same brand or model have close digital features. The problem of close camera fingerprints is well illustrated in (Ding et al., 2019) by a visualization plot of the features extracted with t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) (Fig. 2). This visualization highlights the similarity of camera features based on their brand and model. For example, the cameras *Olympus mju 1050SW* are quite difficult to group together. This chart also shows that cameras of the same model can still be differentiated, such as the *Sony DSC-T77*, whose features can be grouped for each camera of that model. Although this issue of close camera fingerprints has been mentioned in the literature of DL based SCR methods, especially via the confusion matrix analysis, it has never been fully addressed. In particular, SOTA methods are always evaluated by identification (1-to-N) on an entire database, which does not showcase the challenge of camera fingerprint similarity. In fact, in such type of evaluation the distribution of cameras is often, if not all the time, not controlled. Therefore, cameras of the same model (or brand) are mixed with many other models (brands) and the difficulty of classification may differ from one database to another. To overcome this problem, we propose to adopt a protocol that uses camera selection to create sets with a control distribution of cameras. The camera selection allows controlling the presence of cameras with close digital fingerprints, and thus controlling the difficulty of classification. Moreover, the protocol that we propose in the following subsections is based on 1-to-1 verification, as we believe that verification is more likely to be used in future applications (e.g. in police investigation). That is, to distinguish Bob's iPhone 11 from Alice's iPhone 11 rather than recognizing it within a random group of smartphones.




Figure 2: Visualization of the similarity of different cameras in the feature space t-SNE (Ding et al., 2019). (stars) Olympus; (circles) Sony; (asterisk) Canon; (cross) Fuji; (square) Agfa.

#### 3.2 Verification Protocol

Verification has been already adopted in some works on SCR. For example, the authors of (Mandelli et al., 2020) use a Siamese neural network (SNN) for device recognition, by evaluating camera fingerprint similarity between pairs of images. SNN is an architecture that has been quite used for SCR and particularly in model classification. The network is composed of two twin sub-networks whose weights are updated identically. They have trained one part of the network with coherent pairs and the other with non-coherent pairs. The noise residual of an image associated with a device  $d_i$  is combined with PRNUs from the same device  $d_i$  and a dissimilar device  $d_j$  to create coherent and non-coherent pairs, respectively. The PRNU is obtained from a large set of images from each device to obtain a more robust and reliable pattern. The idea is to extract and then compare the PRNU using the two streams of the network, which output each an encoding of the input image (e.g. a vector of size 1024). The network works in tandem on two different input images to compute comparable output vectors. Instead of “which class does the image come from”, SNNs answer the question “Are the two images from the same class?”. We can draw a parallel with biometric recognition saying that single-stream networks perform 1-to-N comparison, and thus *identification*, while two-stream networks, such as SNNs, perform 1-to-1 comparison, and thus *verification*. In fact, source camera recognition is even sometimes referred to as *hardwaremetry* (Galdi et al., 2015). One major advantage of using SNN is that, once trained, they are able to establish if two images come from the same class, even for unseen classes. The purpose is to deter-

mine if two images are coming from the same camera or not. One of the SOTA methods that we analyse in the following is based on SNN, and thus naturally entails assessment by means of verification. In addition, we propose to evaluate single-stream SOTA methods with a protocol for verification. To do this, the encoding of an image calculated by the neural network is extracted before the network performs classification and compared with other encodings in a 1-to-1 comparison by Euclidean distance.

### 3.3 Cameras Selection

Traditionally, the evaluation of SCR methods is performed on the entire database without any particular camera selection strategy. However, using the whole database as it is does not take into account the problem of close camera fingerprints. Ideally, the databases for camera recognition should contain a large and balanced number of cameras of the same model, otherwise it would not be clear whether a method is actually classifying the camera according to camera model recognition or camera device recognition. As a parallel with biometric recognition, it would be like having a database made of only young women and elderly men, how to establish if the model indeed recognizes the gender rather than the age? In practice, the currently available databases have a very limited number of cameras sharing the same model. The protocol that we proposed is based on a selection of cameras that allows defining subsets of the existing datasets to test SOTA methods according to different levels of difficulty. The selection strategy aims at selecting pairs of cameras for the 1-to-1 comparison. We have to ensure that when the pairs are created, they reflect the need to test the network against different levels of difficulty, which increase with the amount of cameras with close camera fingerprints. To confirm the problem of increasing difficulty of classification from brand to device, we propose to create three levels: i) with only cameras of different brands (*basic*); ii) with only cameras of the same brand and different models (*intermediate*); iii) with only cameras of the same brand and model (*advanced*). Even among these difficulty levels, some cameras could be easier to classify than others, as the confusion matrices showed in the section 2: the method of (Zhao et al., 2020) was able to well distinguish *Canon Ixus 55* from *Canon Ixus 70*, whereas it was not the case for *Nikon D70* and *Nikon D70s*. As verification is performed with pairs of images, these difficulty levels will represent the different dissimilar pairs (see Fig. 3). The problem of database distribution is fixed thanks to the controlled selection of pairs of images according to the three difficulty levels.




Figure 3: **Diagram illustrating difficult and classical dissimilar pairs.** (Red) Advanced; (Blue) Intermediate; (Green) Basic.

## 4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The protocol with our proposed selection of cameras is applied to four different SOTA methods to have a comprehensive analysis of SCR that suffer from the problem of classifying devices with close camera fingerprints. From the camera device recognition methods described in Section 2, we selected the most efficient one (Ding et al., 2019). We also chose two methods for camera model recognition, which were re-trained to perform camera device recognition instead, to test other architectures as well. Both methods are based on constrained CNNs (Bayar and Stamm, 2017a; Bayar and Stamm, 2018): the first one is the basic constrained CNN, introduced by Bayar *et al.*, and the second one integrates enhanced preprocessing. Finally, a method based on SNN (Mayer and Stamm, 2020) is also selected in order to test the possible higher robustness of SNNs. The study is conducted on two databases, chosen for their different features: SOCRatES and the Dresden Image database. In the case of methods originally designed for identification, the architecture is adapted to verification by removing the classification layer and comparing the output feature vectors (or encodings) with Euclidean distance.

### 4.1 Databases

SOCRatES: SOURCE Camera REcognition on Smartphones, is an image and video database especially designed for source camera recognition on mobile devices. SOCRatES is currently one of the databases for source digital camera recognition with the largest number of different cameras. It is made up of about 9,700 images and 1000 videos captured with 101 different smartphones of 15 different makes and about

Table 3: **Details of the databases:** the brand, model and the number of devices; Some devices are on the same line (e.g. S3 and S3 Neo).

Dresden Image Database					
<b>AgfaPhoto</b>		<b>Canon</b>		<b>Nikon</b>	
DC-504	1	IXUS 55	1	Coolpix S710	5
DC-733s	1	IXUS 70	3	D70/D70s	2/2
DC-830i	1	PS A640	1	D200	2
Sensor 505-X/530s	1/1	<b>Casio</b>		<b>FujiFilm</b>	
<b>Sony</b>		EX-Z150	5	FinePix J50	3
DSC-H50	2	<b>Pentax</b>		<b>Samsung</b>	
DSC-T77	4	Optio A40	4	L74wide	3
DSC-W170	2	Optio W60	1	NV15	3
<b>Kodak</b>		<b>Panasonic</b>		<b>Rollei</b>	
M1063	5	DMC-FZ50	3	RCP-7325XS	3
<b>Ricoh</b>		<b>Olympus</b>		<b>Praktica</b>	
Capilo GX100	5	1050SW	5	DCZ 5.9	5
<b>Total brand</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>Total model</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>Total device</b>	<b>74</b>
SOCRAtes					
<b>Apple</b>		<b>Asus</b>		<b>HTC</b>	
iPhone 4s	3	Zenfone 2/3	3/1	One M8	1
iPhone 5/5s	1/2	<b>Huawei</b>		<b>Lenovo</b>	
iPhone 5c	6	P7/P8 Lite	1	S60	1
iPhone 6/6s/6s plus	8/3/1	<b>Motorola</b>		<b>Acer</b>	
iPhone 7	3	Moto G/G3	3/2	Liquid E700	1
iPhone SE	1	Moto X-Style	1	<b>OnePlus</b>	
iPad Mini 2	1	X Play	1	X/One	1/1
<b>Samsung</b>		<b>LG</b>		<b>Nokia</b>	
S3/S3 Neo	1/2	G3/G4	4/2	Lumia 635/930	1/1
S4/S4 mini	2/1	Nexus 5X/5	2/1	<b>Wiko</b>	
S5/S5 mini	4/1	Spirit LTE	1	Rainbow 4G/Up 4G	1/1
S6/S6 Edge	1/1	K10 4G	1	Highway 4G	1
S7 Edge	2	<b>Sony</b>		Birdy 4G	1
Core Max/Prime	1/2	Xperia Z/Z1	1/1	<b>Vernee</b>	
Grand Plus/Prime	1/1	Xperia Z3/Z5	3/1	Thor	1
A3/A510	2/1	Xperia T3/E3/M4	1/1/1	<b>Meizu</b>	
J7/Note 4	2/1	NEX-VG20	1	M3 Note	1
<b>Total brand</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>Total model</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>Total device</b>	<b>101</b>

60 different models. The acquisition has been performed in uncontrolled conditions (Galdi et al., 2019). The Dresden Image database (Gloe and Böhme, 2010) is perhaps the most popular database in the field of digital image forensics. It is composed of more than 14,000 images of various indoor and outdoor scenes that were captured by 74 cameras of 27 different models. Tab. 3 gives an overview of the distribution of both databases. A difference can already be made in terms of models per brand: there is an over-presence of Apple and Samsung cameras in SOCRAtes compared to other brands, while in Dresden the distribution is more uniform. Moreover, there is another specificity at the device level: most of the cameras have a single device in SOCRAtes whereas in Dresden only few cameras are represented with only one device. Thus, these two databases have really different compositions of cameras, which highlights the problem of using only one database for evaluation. Moreover, this specificity of composition will probably have consequences on the results.

## 4.2 Evaluation

For the evaluation with the protocol presented in 3, the creation of the datasets has required two steps: to establish a dataset of patches and then of pairs of patches. First, we cropped each image from both databases by a window of size  $128 \times 128$  pixels.

Table 4: **Results of camera device verification on Dresden and SOCRAtes for four SOTA methods.** The reported metric is the area under the curve of the receiver operating characteristic in percentage:  $AuC^*100$ . **Drop** measures the relative drop in performance between the basic and the advanced levels of difficulty.

Methods	Ding19	Bayar18	Bayar17	Mayer20
Selection	SOCRAtes			
Basic	67.5%	81.4%	82.4%	97.4%
Intermediate	66.6%	77%	78%	92.5%
Advanced	62.5%	69.5%	68.5%	76.2%
<b>Drop (%)</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>14.62</b>	<b>16.87</b>	<b>22.39</b>
Selection	Dresden			
Basic	59.9%	87.8%	89.9%	97.8%
Intermediate	58.9%	71.1%	74.9%	75.2%
Advanced	50.5%	50.3%	50.3%	49.8%
<b>Drop (%)</b>	<b>15.69</b>	<b>42.71</b>	<b>44.05</b>	<b>49.08</b>

Then, we picked these patches according to their brightness, as dark and saturated areas are not optimal for the extraction of sensor noise. We selected 2.7M and 630K patches from the Dresden and SOCRAtes databases, respectively. We split both datasets in three subsets (60:20:20), corresponding to training, validation, and testing, respectively. Training and validation sets are used to train the SOTA networks following their original protocols, as indicated in the corresponding papers. The datasets for each difficulty level are created with the testing subset according to their respective selection of pairs. The code used for generating the image patches and the different selection of pairs of images is made available online<sup>4</sup> for reproducibility.

The performances of the SOTA methods are reported in terms of area under the curve of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC  $AuC$ ), which plots the true positive rate ( $TPR = \frac{TP}{TP+FN}$ ) against the false positive rate ( $FPR = \frac{FP}{FP+TN}$ ), where  $TP$  = True Positives,  $TN$  = True Negatives,  $FP$  = False Positives, and  $FN$  = False Negatives. An additional metric is used to show the relative drop in performance between the basic and the advanced levels of difficulty. This metric is defined as:

$$drop = \frac{(AuC_{BASIC} - AuC_{ADVANCED})}{AuC_{BASIC}} * 100 \quad (1)$$

The higher the  $AuC$  value, the better the classification capability of the method. The lower the drop value, the more robust the classification method.

As our camera selection strategy has a part of randomness, the Monte Carlo method (Kroese et al., 2014) for random sampling is adopted. Therefore,

<sup>4</sup>[https://gitlab.eurecom.fr/imagingsecuritypublic/eurecom\\_difficultdeviceevaluationprotocol](https://gitlab.eurecom.fr/imagingsecuritypublic/eurecom_difficultdeviceevaluationprotocol)




Figure 4: **Visualization of the similarity of different cell-phones in the feature space t-SNE (Ding et al., 2019).** (circle) iPhone; (square) Xiaomi; (asterik) Samsung; (star) Huawei.

over 50 repetitions of our protocol are performed, and the average scores are compute. The results are presented in Tab. 4. The method of (Ding et al., 2019) presents the best results in terms of relative drop, meaning that the results are more stable over the three difficulty levels, whatever database is used for evaluation. The robustness of this method probably comes from its architecture as (Ding et al., 2019) is designed to perform multiple classification (i.e. brand, model, and device). On the contrary, the other SOTA methods have better performances for the basic and intermediate levels, but the drop for the advanced level is larger. Meaning that they fail the test to see if they can really distinguish between individual devices. The method of (Bayar and Stamm, 2018), with enhanced processing, shows more robustness compared to (Bayar and Stamm, 2017a) (without enhancement). Overall, the results obtained for the advanced experiments, in particular on the Dresden dataset, are far from what one should expect. In fact, for verification (1-to-1), a score of 50% correspond to a random classifier. Our protocol shows that the current SOTA methods are not able to perform verification for cameras with close digital fingerprints.

Overall, the SOTA methods are more robust when camera device verification is conducted on SOCRatES than on Dresden: relative drop twice less. This is due to their different characteristics: SOCRatES is really diverse with a camera/model ratio of 1,63 while Dresden has a ratio of 2,74. Moreover, the graph in Fig. 4, which presents the feature space t-SNE for some smartphones in SOCRatES, shows that clusters can be more easily established for each camera compared to the ones from Dresden. This can explain the different decrease in performance

between Dresden and SOCRatES. However, even if smaller, the drop of performances on SOCRatES is detected too thanks to the protocol with our selection of cameras. This selection highlights close camera fingerprints, providing a more reliable assessment of source camera verification. Especially, if the performance decreases too much from one difficulty level to another, it means that the method is not able to classify according to the valid characteristic (e.g. model for *intermediate* and device for *advanced*). Therefore, efficient methods should obtain stable performance in each level of difficulty. Moreover, the higher the performance, the better (N.B. 50% means random classification.)

## 5 CONCLUSION

This article addresses source camera verification, and particularly the issue of correctly classifying cameras according to different difficulty levels. Four selected SOTA methods are tested on the Dresden Image Database and on SOCRatES. These datasets are selected because very different from each other in both the devices used for image acquisition, cameras for the Dresden database and smartphones for SOCRatES, and their different number of classes per label (brand, model, and device). The protocol of evaluation uses three different strategies for selection of cameras to showcase the increasing difficulty of classifying cameras: (i) only different brands; (ii) same brand and different models; (iii) same brand and same model. The results reveal a drop of performances for the tested SOTA methods in the advanced scenario (i.e. cameras of the same model), particularly on the Dresden database. Moreover, thanks to this protocol, the gap between the *basic* and the *advanced* levels confirms the problem of robustness of the SOTA methods over different distributions of cameras in the dataset. Therefore, the contributions of this article are the definition of a new reliable and reproducible evaluation protocol to assess source camera recognition methods, the analysis and explanation of the problems related to the evaluation protocols used in the literature, and the proposal of solutions to fix them. Future works on this subject could include the definition of a standard acquisition protocol to create databases that allow to reliably assess methods for source camera recognition that takes into account the issue of close camera fingerprints.



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