Remote attestation of bare-metal microprocessor software: a formally verified security monitor - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Book Sections Year : 2021

Remote attestation of bare-metal microprocessor software: a formally verified security monitor

Abstract

Remote attestation is a protocol to verify that a remote algorithm satisfies security properties, allowing to establish dynamic root of trust. Modern architectures for remote attestation combine signature or MAC primitives with hardware monitors to enforce secret confidentiality. Our works are based on a verified hardware/software co-design for remote attestation, VRASED. Its proof is established using formal methods and its implementation is conducted on a simple embedded device based on a single core microcontroller. A heavy modification of the core, along with a hardware monitor, enforces security properties. We propose to extend this method to microprocessors where cores cannot be modified. In this paper, we tackle this problem with support from the microprocessor's debug interface and demonstrate that the same security properties also hold.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
article.pdf (453.11 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03576711 , version 1 (16-02-2022)

Identifiers

Cite

Jonathan Certes, Benoît Morgan. Remote attestation of bare-metal microprocessor software: a formally verified security monitor. Database and Expert Systems Applications - DEXA 2021 Workshops: BIOKDD, IWCFS, MLKgraphs, AI-CARES, ProTime, AISys 2021, Virtual Event, September 27–30, 2021, Proceedings, 1479, Springer International Publishing, pp.42-51, 2021, Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS), 978-3-030-87100-0. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-87101-7_5⟩. ⟨hal-03576711⟩
156 View
121 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More