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Journal Articles The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics Year : 2023

Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions


We consider a private-value auction with one-sided incomplete information in which two objects are sold in a sequence of two second-price auctions. The buyers have multiunit demand and are asymmetrically informed at the ex ante stage of the game. One buyer perfectly knows his type, and the other buyer is uninformed about her own type. We consider interim information acquisition by the uninformed buyer and derive an asymmetric equilibrium that is shown to produce a declining price sequence across both sales. The supermartingale property of the price sequence stems from the uninformed buyer’s incentives to gather private information, which leads to aggressive bidding in the first-stage auction.
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hal-03558786 , version 1 (04-02-2022)



Emmanuel Lorenzon. Uninformed Bidding in Sequential Auctions. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2023, 23 (1), pp.155-179. ⟨10.1515/bejte-2021-0009⟩. ⟨hal-03558786⟩
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