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‘EUROPE GETS MORE GAME EVERYDAY’:  
PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL, TRANSATLANTIC SPORTS MODELS AND  
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE THE 1950s

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SAVOIRS DANS L’ESPACE ANGLOPHONE : REPRESENTATIONS, CULTURE, HISTOIRE (UR 2325)

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In Western Europe, modern sport emerged within private groups, often associative and non-market. Sporting federations have held a monopoly on the organization of most athletic competitions since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: from the bottom (clubs) to the top (federations), the associative sports movement manages and monitors competitions by setting the rules and planning sporting events. Top-level team sports clubs have long been interested in developing an organization that could allow for both sporting and economic expansion. The French Football Federation (FFF), for example, adopted professionalism in 1931, despite the troubled economic situation of the time. As elsewhere, the contrast between amateurism and professionalism became more and more striking after the Second World War. Indeed, the supporters of liberalism – who wished to align football practices with the principles of civil society and defend entrepreneurial freedom for club managers – were increasingly opposed to those nostalgic for the golden age of disinterested soccer practice. This issue remained salient over the years, especially in Europe. Despite the clubs’ professionalisation and the growing appeal of the North American model, a few team sports strengthened ties to enhance cooperation, while remaining under the control of sporting federations throughout the Cold War.

Most European federations were born in the late 1940s, when some political leaders – such as Jean Monnet – aspired to create a “United States of Europe”. European sports competitions allowed countries to challenge each other on and off the field. The Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), which took control of several football competitions between clubs and countries in Europe, remains the most popular example today.<sup>1</sup> Yet, in a context of growing political and diplomatic tensions across the continent, basketball remains an exception. Its development echoes both the internationalist watershed of the 1920s in the

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<sup>1</sup> P. VONNARD, *From Mitropa Cup to UEFA Cup: The Role of UEFA in the Establishment of a European Scale in Football, 1927–1972*, in: *Soccer & Society*, 7-8(2019), pp. 1025-1040.

United States and the heavy politicisation of the interwar period in Europe, at a time when the creation of a pan-European Union received considerable attention from the liberal-conservative movement across the continent.<sup>2</sup> But basketball was not yet organised at the European level: the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) envisioned a European competition as early as the 1930s, which only came to maturity during the Cold War.<sup>3</sup> From then on, FIBA ventured beyond the political perimeter of Europe to include teams from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as parts of the Near East. In the late 1980s, professional basketball became an entertainment business and began to walk in the footsteps of the US National Basketball Association (NBA). Although affiliated with national sports federations, professional clubs were increasingly troubled by the changing European model after the Cold War.

This article examines the transformation of European basketball since the creation of the Common Market established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. It aims to show that the acceleration of European integration sparked a debate on the issue of a European model of sport, particularly in post-Cold War professional basketball. Indeed, an ideological dichotomy emerged between the supporters of a meritocratic system (traditional open sports leagues run by associative organisations) and the proponents of a neoliberal system (closed sports leagues run by corporate shareholders). Concurrently, basketball evolved from a nationalised and associative sport to a globalised product of modern consumer culture and entertainment. The recent conflict between the two main promoters of European basketball – FIBA Europe and Euroleague Basketball –, both convinced of the transnational importance of professional basketball, is a milestone in the coming of age of “sports entrepreneurs of Europe”.

## 1) A EUROPEAN MODEL OF SPORT

Interest in professional sport was slow to emerge among actors of the European Economic Community (EEC) and later the European Union (EU). Professional sport was not considered part of the market economy until the 1980s. The Bosman ruling of 1995 marks the first formal intervention of the EU through Community law.<sup>4</sup> It was rendered by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 1995 and challenged UEFA's rule limiting the number of non-national professional players to three per team. Thus, sport falls under the terms of Community law, which prevails over the European sports movement and the sovereignty of States.<sup>5</sup> Originating

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<sup>2</sup> B.J. KEYS, *Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca-Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s*, in: *Diplomatic History*, 2(2004), pp. 165-196; P. WIEDEMER, *The Idea Behind Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-European Union*, in: *History of European Ideas*, 1(1993), pp. 827-833.

<sup>3</sup> FIBA stands for “Fédération Internationale de Basket Amateur” in French; it relinquished the use of “amateur” in 1986, the last two letters now standing for “Basketball”. FIBA allowed Egypt to participate in the 1937 European Championship held in Latvia, alongside Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Turkey. In the early 1960s, only Israel and Turkey remained in the championship.

<sup>4</sup> CJEC, Judgment of the Court of 15 December 1995 – Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, Royal club liégeois SA v Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA) v Jean-Marc Bosman, Case C-415/93, Rec. 1995, p. 5040.

<sup>5</sup> On the Bosman ruling, see: A. HUSTING, *L'Union européenne et le sport. L'impact de la construction européenne sur l'activité sportive*, Juris-Service, Lyon, 2008; A. MANZELLA, *La dérégulation du football*, in: *Pouvoirs*, 101(2002), pp. 40-48; B. GARCIA, *UEFA and the European Union: From confrontation to cooperation?*, in: *Journal of Contemporary European Research*, 3(2007), pp. 203-223.

in football, it has affected most professional sports by regulating the number of foreign players in professional teams, ensuring the free movement of athletes and prohibiting public authorities from financially supporting professional clubs. The period during which professionalisation took place corresponded to a significant influence of the United States on various aspects of European life and culture. In the two decades following the end of the Cold War, it led to the undisputed acceptance of a process of commodification of basketball, embodied by the NBA.<sup>6</sup> Professional basketball in Europe has struggled to stay out of the clutches of entrepreneurs of sports entertainment, revealing antagonistic views on the issue of a European sports model. The latter has developed its theoretical foundations over time, in parallel with the process of European integration, which has resulted in easier movement of goods and people across the continent.

According to the principle of the autonomy of the sports movement, the organisation of sports competitions is the responsibility of the federations, while sports policies are the responsibility of the European nation states. The latter are free to determine their priorities and budgetary choices in the field of non-economic sports activities, such as elite sport, educational sport and physical education in schools, or the development of sport on national territory. In fact, sport was absent from European treaties until the 1990s, but it was taken up by the Council of Europe in the framework of the European Cultural Convention of 1954; two decades later, in 1975, the European Sports Charter allowed a first European model to circulate and served as a basis to draft governmental policies.<sup>7</sup> Although there is no uniform sports policy among member states, European institutions – the EU and the Council of Europe – encourage voluntary and often ambitious actions to ensure alignment with European values and identity. In the midst of complex political discussions between partner countries defending their national sovereignty, this European dimension of sport attracts a remarkable amount of critical scrutiny from institutional actors. Some of them attempt to use sport for political purposes, pushing for a European model of sport. A staple of the influence of these “entrepreneurs of Europe”, sport appears in the texts and reports of the European institutions since the end of the 1980s.

Indeed, the European Commission introduced the idea of a European sports model in 1998 to illustrate Europe's singularity.<sup>8</sup> In institutional terms, this model is characterised by a pyramidal and hierarchical structure, with associations at the base and national, European and international federations at the top. This structure makes it possible to organise sports competitions according to a system of promotion and relegation, another specific feature of the European model. Unlike the closed league model in North America and the one in use where US influence is prevalent, especially in East Asia, European professional leagues are open. Because of evident historical ties with Europe and areas of European influence, other countries adopted the open league model, notably on the African continent. However, some countries in Latin America attempted to reconcile the US and European sports models. For example, the

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<sup>6</sup> D.L. ANDREWS, *Whither the NBA, Whither America?*, in: *Peace Review*, 4(1999), pp. 505-510. On the commodification of basketball, see: D. FOX, *The Jordan Era: The NBA in the 1990s*, in: B. BATCHELOR (eds), *Basketball in America: From the Playgrounds to Jordan's Game and Beyond*, Routledge, New York, 2013, pp. 259-280.

<sup>7</sup> W. GASPARINI, *Un sport européen? Genèse et enjeux d'une catégorie européenne*, in: *Savoir/Agir*, 15(2011), pp. 49-59.

<sup>8</sup> European Commission [hereafter: EC], *The European Model of Sport*, Consultation Document of DG X, 1998.

Brazilian national football championship has been a hybrid of an open and closed league since 1971. In Argentina, clubs have been playing *apertura* and *clausura* tournaments since 1985.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, amateur sport plays a major role in the European sports model, with clubs deeply rooted at the local level. Sports federations hold a monopoly, since there is only one international federation for each sport, itself represented in each European country by a single national federation. It was not until 2007 that a legal basis for sport appeared, established in Community law with the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon: according to Article 149/165,

“the Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking into account the specific nature of sport, its structures based on volunteer activity and its social and educational function”.<sup>10</sup>

Sport is thus an official supporting competence for the EU that complements the national initiatives of the member states. It is also revelatory of the underlying political, economic and cultural competing interests in the transatlantic world, a consequence of the “victory” of the post-Cold War liberal international order, perceived as too invasive or almost hegemonic, on the Old Continent.

In fact, the influence of the North American model has been prevalent in Europe since the advent of the “second globalisation”. For Andrei Markovits and Lars Rensmann, it is “an age of global capitalism and trade, new transnational migration, global communications networks, and cosmopolitan norms and institutions never previously imagined”, resulting in “a global culture wherein sports assume pride of place”.<sup>11</sup> Sport thus serves as a catalyst for current and future European debates, prompting MEPs, politicians or sports industry leaders to promote the idea of a “European sports model” and project the European identity at large. The issue was first raised by Portuguese MEP José Luís Arnaut (EPP) at the Council of Europe in 2007:

“The European sports model is characterised by an open structure. The principle of openness operates in a variety of different ways. For example, the shared philosophy of team sports in Europe is that clubs from all national associations should have an opportunity to compete at the highest level in European competition. In other words, the door should remain open to clubs from even the smaller or less wealthy countries. If not, competitions cannot truly be called “European” in the first place”.<sup>12</sup>

A decade later, Bulgaria's Minister of Youth and Sports, Krasen Krlev, reignited the debate by highlighting the growing economic development of sport. Finally, the head of the European Olympic Committee (EOC), Janez Kocijančič, drove the point home by stating that

“one of the greatest challenges that European sport faces is how to preserve the unique nature of our national championships, while at the same time keeping pace with the evolution of sports from overseas, in particular America”.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> F. ARCHAMBAULT, *Le continent du football*, in: *Cahiers des Amériques latines*, 74(2013), online.

<sup>10</sup> EC, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Part Three – Union Policies and Internal Actions, Title XII – Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport – Article 165 (ex Article 149 TEC), in: *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 326, 2012, pp. 120-121.

<sup>11</sup> A.S. MARKOVITS, L. RENSMANN, *Gaming the World: How Sports are Reshaping Global Politics and Culture*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010, pp. 24-25.

<sup>12</sup> J.L. ARNAUT, *The Need to Preserve the European Sports Model (report 11467, 18 December 2007)*, in: *Parliamentary Assembly – Working Papers*, Council of Europe Publishing, 2008, p. 261.

<sup>13</sup> European Olympic Committees, “EOC Newsletter n°182,” 2018.

In addition, the year 2007 was also marked by the publication of a White Paper, which underlines the need to develop the European dimension of sport through its societal, economic and organisational role in Europe.<sup>14</sup> In the context of associative sport, the European sports model is an example of an “invented tradition”, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, inherited from the first era of mass production; in other words, it seeks to acquire some form of legitimacy and autonomy by referring to the past.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, modern sport has been Europeanised by British economic and transnational elites since the 19<sup>th</sup> century, who not only contributed to the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon sports practices throughout Europe, but also to the circulation of an organisational model based on a pyramidal scheme that links the base to the top. In this case, the system of promotion and relegation operates through competitions governed by operating rules established by non-governmental sports organisations. This historical associative model of European sport, run by volunteers, is increasingly confronted with the antagonistic visions of European economic and political actors, who favour the deregulation and liberalisation of professional sport. Nevertheless, most team sports are aligned with the traditional European sports model; this is the case for professional football competitions, which are managed by UEFA, and organised in two club championships, the Champions League and the Europa League.

The 2007 White Paper is the first reference document published by the European Commission on sport. It offers a valuable perspective on the societal role of sport, as well as on its economic and cultural issues. While it argues that “it is unrealistic to try to define a unified model of the organisation of sport in Europe”, it also recognises that

“the emergence of new stakeholders (participants outside the organised disciplines, professional sports clubs, etc.) is posing new questions as regards governance, democracy and representation of interests within the sport movement”.<sup>16</sup>

It also sets the stage for two reports published in 2011, that argue that sport provides a vehicle for European identity. The first one deals with the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the organisation of sport.<sup>17</sup> The second, drawn up by the Committee on Culture and Education, under the leadership of Spanish MEP Santiago Fisas Aixelà (European People's Party, EPP), stresses that “the fairness and openness of sport competitions is vital, in order to protect the integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen”. Incorporating the idea that “sport does not behave like a typical economic activity because of its specific characteristics and its organisational structures, underpinned by federations, which do not operate as commercial companies”, it validates the principle that “a distinction must be made between sporting and commercial interests” in European sports competitions, as advocated by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON).<sup>18</sup> In the end, a resolution was passed in 2012, outlining the contours of a European sports model, which seems to be defined in opposition to the system of closed championships in force in the United States.

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<sup>14</sup> EC, White Paper on Sport – COM/2007/0391 final, 11.07.2007.

<sup>15</sup> E. HOBSBAWM, T. RANGER, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 263-307.

<sup>16</sup> EC, White Paper on Sport – COM/2007/0391 final, op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> EC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Developing the European Dimension in Sport, 18.01.2011.

<sup>18</sup> EC, Report on the European Dimension in Sport – 2011/2087(INI), 2011.

Led by various actors in national and European sports organisations, federations have remodelled the continent into a structured competitive space. The European sports movement is the result of a multitude of initiatives in which the States were not initially involved. Characterised by the pyramid system, which leads to an end-of-season promotion-relegation, the European sports model offers clubs from all national associations the possibility to compete at the highest level in European competitions. This traditional organisation corresponds to the “open league” model, which includes, in principle, a constant number of clubs from one championship season to the next. In this system, the role of the club is to achieve victories in order to be promoted. Most team sports have therefore developed structures to ensure proper representation of the different partner groups. In the case of football, leagues, clubs and players benefit from an important institutional recognition, whose interests are defended by the European Professional Football League (EPFL) since 2005. Similarly, the International Federation of Professional Footballers' Associations (FIFPro) defends the interests of players throughout Europe. All of these institutions are recognised and integrated into the policy and decision-making processes of European governance.

However, other more restrictive competition systems, called “closed leagues”, are emerging throughout Europe. This is the case of professional basketball, which has departed from the preferred pyramid model to offer a new standard of competition organisation. The first attempt to create a closed European league goes back to 1974. Pushed by the American Basketball Association (ABA), it aimed to create a European Professional Basketball League (EPBL) on US funds. The EPBL got neither the support of FIBA, nor of the public:

“FIBA is opposed by all means to the installation of such a league in Europe. In particular, it confirms the immediate and irrevocable disqualification of any person (manager, referee or player), who would give any help to the installation of this league. It is also prohibited to lend sporting facilities used by amateur clubs during the meetings of national championships, as well as international meetings (European cups, championships, etc.).<sup>19</sup>

Less than a year later, the headline of the French newspaper *L'Équipe basket* was “European Professionalism, Go Home!”, unequivocally referring to another well-known theme of Cold War France.<sup>20</sup> Yet, professional basketball is torn between preserving the competitive aspect of the sport and the need to develop its visibility, in order to reach a wider audience through private television networks and thus generate profit. This dilemma is at the heart of a long-standing disagreement between FIBA Europe and Euroleague Basketball, the two main players in the organisation of basketball competitions since 2000. The traditional model of sport organisation is increasingly undermined and, in the words of Colin Miège, threatens to

“collapse under the pressure exerted by economic groups seeking to employ well-tested formulas from the United States in high-level professional sport in particular, which could endanger foundational associative structures”.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *France basket hebdo*, 29.08.1974, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup> *L'Équipe basket hebdomadaire*, 16.04.1975, p. 8.

<sup>21</sup> C. MIÈGE, *Les organisations sportives et l'Europe*, INSEP-Editions, Paris, 2009, p. 143.

The attempt to create a closed league was seen as a consequence of a certain form of “Americanisation” of Europe.<sup>22</sup> The creation of a semi-closed basketball competition run by a private company marked a neoliberal turn in European sport and reinforced its commodified Europeanisation.

The European model is thus positioned as an alternative to the North American model, which is based on independent franchises specific to each sport. In the United States, sports leagues are an oligopoly of a few clubs that pay an entry fee to participate in championships, thus eliminating any chance of promotion or relegation. This business model of sport corresponds to the closed league model, which aims to maximise the collective profits of the franchised companies. Such a system is used in the five major North American sports leagues: the National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball (MLB), Major League Soccer (MLS) and the National Basketball Association (NBA). The minor leagues are less popular but equally important, as they support the major leagues and operate in a similar manner. In addition, the sports labour market is subject to collective bargaining between club owners and players’ associations; each agreement sets out rules and procedures for players’ salaries, the nature of their contracts, transfer arrangements, national team selection and representation procedures. Between Europe and the US, Wladimir Andreff and Paul D. Staudohar write, “numerous similarities in the nature of leagues, labour relations, finance, marketing and government regulation” appear “at the top or major league level”. In the early decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the closed league model also opened the possibility for closed leagues to develop *ex nihilo* around the world. As we shall see, European basketball remains an exception to the rule, because of an identity closely associated with the process of European integration.

## 2) THE COLD WAR IDENTITY OF EUROPEAN BASKETBALL

As recent historiography has shown, Cold War basketball served a variety of purposes that went beyond traditional recreation or wartime physical training for soldiers. Holding a special place in the transatlantic relationship, basketball helped project some of the power and prestige of the United States in Europe – broadly speaking – for both foreign relations and nation-building efforts. On the other hand, Europe has claimed to be a “basketball continent” since the interwar years, although, according to Fabien Archambault, this label did not appear until later in the century.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the idea of asserting a European identity through basketball emerged when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) pursued the integration of the Common Market in the 1950s. Influenced by the Cold War feud, basketball underwent profound transformations that led to the popularisation of distinct identities on each side of the Atlantic. After a long decade in the doldrums, US professional basketball underwent dramatic

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<sup>22</sup> D. SUDRE, H. JONCHERAY, A. LECH, ‘Let Go of Your Ball, This Is Not the NBA!’: *The Influence of Hip-Hop Ball on Institutional Basketball Around Paris (France): Cultural Antagonisms and Difficult Cohabitation*, in: *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 3(2019), pp. 147-166.

<sup>23</sup> F. ARCHAMBAULT, *L’Europe au rebond*, in: F. ARCHAMBAULT, L. ARTIAGA, G. BOSCH (eds), *Le Continent basket: L’Europe et le basketball au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2015, p. 26.



transformations and turned the game into an entertainment product in the 1980s. Meanwhile, European basketball accelerated its professionalisation efforts and revealed the underlying debate over sports identity that had begun at the turn of the century.

In the interwar period, basketball communities reflected the many European identities present on the continent. International competitions were an opportunity to showcase nations, making basketball a major site of symbolic struggle against the competitive supremacy of foreign powers. Athletes helped to convey values and, in Pierre Bourdieu's words, to promote “a culture that unites”.<sup>24</sup> In this quest for symbolic power, the United States had a head start, as it had already used sport as a tool to assimilate foreign-born populations and project an image of its nation abroad. Frank Lubin, a California-born US national team star of Lithuanian descent, became a “basketball ambassador” for the United States; after winning a gold medal with the US at the 1936 Berlin Olympics, he defended Lithuania's colours at the 1939 FIBA EuroBasket, which was held in the city of Kaunas. This not only illustrates the attempt to assimilate the Lithuanian population into the social fabric of the United States, but also explains why, according to Chad Carlson, Lithuania was “ripe for basketball when hoops entered its borders”.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, basketball became a diplomatic tool after World War II. This time, basketball helped spread liberalism and facilitate the opening of the European market to US investments. Oscillating between the North American and European identities, basketball undoubtedly contributed to the symbolic, political and social construction of Europe.

Indeed, the development of basketball competitions is closely linked to European integration. A highly nationalised sport, it took part in the intractable conflict over the expansion of the US public diplomacy network around the world and triggered resistance in European political circles. The United States had a “limitationist approach located in the use of entertainers during the Cold War era”, Andrew F. Cooper writes, which allowed public diplomats to display a somewhat distorted image of life in the United States.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, in the Cold War context of the Euro-Atlantic alliance, Western economies joined forces against Soviet influence, but were still struggling to balance competing national interests. In a general remark, Penelope Kissoudi noted that

“sport is not only a transnational activity; it can also be an instrument of government policy, for it encompasses so many dimensions of experience involving politics that states sometimes utilise sport as part of their internal and external policies”.<sup>27</sup>

It is no coincidence, then, that the idea of a European Champions Cup emerged in 1957, just as 16 national teams were beginning to compete in the FIBA European Championship in Bulgaria: as the US and the Soviet Union continued to dominate international sports competitions, basketball allowed for an interpenetration of national and European concerns in the early years of the Common Market.

<sup>24</sup> P. BOURDIEU, *Sur le pouvoir symbolique*, in: *Annales. Économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 3(1977), p. 408.

<sup>25</sup> C. CARLSON, *The Motherland, the Godfather, and the Birth of a Basketball Dynasty: American Efforts to Promote Basketball in Lithuania*, in: *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 11(2011), p. 1481.

<sup>26</sup> A.F. COOPER, *U.S. Public Diplomacy and Sports Stars: Mobilizing African-American Athletes as Goodwill Ambassadors from the Cold War to an Uncertain Future*, in: *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 15(2019), pp. 167-168.

<sup>27</sup> P. KISSOUDI, *Antidote to War: The Balkan Games*, in: J.A. MANGAN (ed.), *Militarism, Sport, Europe: War Without Weapons*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004, p. 145.

However, the link between European integration and the creation of the Champions Cup is not straightforward, because European political circles were not yet connected with the promoters of European basketball. While the prosopography remains inconclusive, it is necessary to recall that at this time, it was the entire sporting context which was being Europeanised. Each federation aimed to promote basketball at the national level, as Yannick Deschamps explains in the case of France.<sup>28</sup> In June 1957, five national representatives of FIBA met at the request of FIBA Secretary General R. William Jones, in a commission headed by Raimundo Saporta Namías (Spain); it was composed of Robert Busnel (France), Miloslav Kříž (Czechoslovakia), Nikolai V. Semashko (Soviet Union) and Borislav Stanković (Yugoslavia). In its monthly bulletin, the French Basketball Federation (FFBB) praises the “good start” made by “the permanent conference of European and Mediterranean federations, which finalised the rules of the first European Cup” in 1958.<sup>29</sup> These infra-European political rapprochements were viewed favourably at a time when mistrust of the German economic recovery continued to hold back European integration.<sup>30</sup> In other words, the actors of basketball and European integration were brought together by the idea of Europe as a borderless territory, an idea shared by transnational elites across the continent. This is why European basketball fit the framework of the EEC and formed a “sporting corollary” to the Treaty of Rome, as it helped promote continental economic exchanges to counter the domination of foreign economic presence in Europe and maintain peace through the ideal of continental prosperity.

While North American influence cannot be ignored in the development of basketball, it must be made clear that the enthusiasm of European nations with the sport lies elsewhere than in its entertainment value or in a diplomacy of “hoops fascination”. Archambault further stipulates that European basketball was part of an “antagonistic scheme” forged in the rise of the interwar Olympics: what better way to build a sense of European belonging than to compete with those who imported basketball in Europe at the end of the Great War?<sup>31</sup> Endowed with scientific and moral attributes by James Naismith, a professor of physical education and doctor of theology, it appealed to the European middle class; from the 1910s to the 1970s, basketball became particularly popular in parishes and educational circles, mainly for its power of attraction on young people and to convey the values advocated by their organisations. Basketball provided a bridge between institutions and contributed to the “Europeanisation” of citizens, which soon led to a Cold War-like confrontation between what Gérard Bossuat described as an “illusory” US zone of influence and the “reality” of the European community.<sup>32</sup> A dogmatic opposition to the symbolic and sporting grip of the United States on world basketball developed, with the process of Europeanisation as a counterpoint.

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<sup>28</sup> Y. DESCHAMPS, *La réception des basketteurs soviétiques en France. Une approche politico-culturelle des perceptions et des représentations, 1956-1964*, in: *Les Cahiers Sirice*, 2(2016), pp. 101-118.

<sup>29</sup> R. LESCARET, *La Coupe d'Europe des Clubs champions a pris un bon départ*, in: *Basket-ball*, 311(1958), p. 16.

<sup>30</sup> W. HITCHCOCK, *The Struggle for Europe. The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present*, Anchor Books, New York, 2003, pp. 149-155.

<sup>31</sup> F. ARCHAMBAULT, *Faire une histoire européenne du basket-ball*, in: *Le Continent basket*, op. cit., pp. 268-269.

<sup>32</sup> G. BOSSUAT, *Le mythe de la Communauté atlantique et la réalité de la Communauté européenne*, in: V. AUBOURG, G. SCOTT-SMITH (eds), *European Community, Atlantic Community? Atlantic Community and Europe*, Soleb, Paris, 2008, pp. 520-524.

European basketball won a sporting victory when the Soviet Union ended the domination of the US on Olympic basketball in the 1972 Munich Games finals. The images broadcast around the world unsettled and upset many sports fans in the United States, so much so that the Olympics were seen as “a political forum for anti-US sentiment”.<sup>33</sup> The State Department took over and organised a rematch, but the US seemed to have lost its grip on world basketball. In 1976, the Montreal Summer Olympics saw the rise of Yugoslavia, who challenged the then uncontested leadership of Soviet basketball in Europe. Their dominance opened a new chapter in international basketball, but was put to a test by the dislocation of the territories of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. As the NBA developed a global branding strategy, it is worth noting that “the league drafted its first international player in 1970, but none wore an NBA uniform until Bulgarian Georgi Glouchkov joined the Phoenix Suns in 1985”.<sup>34</sup> A few NBA teams attempted to recruit Soviet stars throughout the 1980s, leading European basketball to suffer an important setback as US basketball sought to firmly establish itself in Europe in the 1990s.

The European model of basketball developed in contrast to the US model, which had lost its most emblematic adversary – the Soviet Union. The last years of the Cold War revealed the hitherto latent professionalisation of European basketball, which began with the creation of several national leagues in the 1980s. This new space of European professional sport has allowed a growing number of elite players who, after a long time playing exclusively in the USSR, joined the Italian and Spanish leagues: the Ukrainian forward Alexander Volkov returned from an ineffective stint with the Atlanta Hawks in the US to play with Reggio Calabria in Italy, just as the Lithuanian centre Arvydas Sabonis left his hometown of Kaunas for Valladolid and then Madrid in Spain. This movement was similar for staff members, of which the Serbian coach Božidar Maljković became a symbol in 1993. Indeed, the toughness he brought to Limoges, a runner-up in the French national championship, allowed him to win the coveted Euroleague title that season. Treviso's hapless Croatian coach, Petar Skansi, said Maljković's coaching style was slow and tactical, but closer to “a game of catch rather than basketball”.<sup>35</sup> However, as the weight of the Serbian-Croatian war shows through Skansi's reaction, the role played by the post-Cold War race for European liberalisation should not be underestimated. In 1991, this took shape with the creation of the Union of European Basketball Leagues (ULEB), spearheaded by the Italian, Spanish and French professional leagues. After all, the goal of European basketball was elsewhere.

Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cold War, European basketball struggled to maintain its recently acquired dominance in the competition between basketball models. Destabilised by civil and ethnic wars, as well as the breakup of a few states and territories, the geography of European basketball evolved dramatically. The Serbo-Croatian war led to a considerable migration of players. For example, the Croatian centre Stojan Vranković turned to Greece, whose elite championship benefited from the prestige of Yugoslav players; others, such as guards Pedrag Danilović or Aleksandar Djordjevic, crossed the Adriatic to compete in the

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<sup>33</sup> D.C. LARGE, *Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2012, p. 271.

<sup>34</sup> *Wall Street Journal*, 07.11.1997, p. 11.

<sup>35</sup> *L'Humanité*, 17.04.1993, p. 8.

Italian championship. At the same time, a few had been selected in the NBA draft lottery and turned their backs on Europe to play for teams in the United States: Vlade Divac began his career with the Los Angeles Lakers, where he played alongside Earvin (Magic) Johnson, while Dražen Petrović, after a lacklustre debut with the Portland Trailblazers, became the leading player of the New Jersey Nets. Both paved the way for Toni Kukoč who, unlike a few of the aforementioned players who never really adapted to the US basketball culture, successfully joined the NBA later in his career. The war also had an unexpected influence on the style of play, as shown in the press when discussing the Boston Celtics centre Dino Radja:

“He plays hard. He dives on the floor. He chases guards down and blocks shots. [...] Petrović is dead. Radja’s homeland is a mess. He still has the nightmares. Can’t shake that. Any this is why Dino Radja plays so hard and so well: playing basketball, and playing it hard and well, can be such a wonderful diversion. ‘When I’m on the court’ he says, ‘there is just the basketball. Nothing else. I am so at peace on a basketball court’”.<sup>36</sup>

Through the symbolic power of their success, these forerunners of European basketball in the US conveyed a specific image of the European sport: solid, determined and sometimes rough, quite different from the more modern, dynamic and aerial US style of play.

Ironically, the US style of play became globally dominant when the United States was at its lowest point in international competitions. In the late 1980s, FIBA allowed professional players to be included on national team rosters; USA Basketball founded the unprecedented “Dream Team” of NBA stars that would go on to compete in the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona. Contrary to what the subsequent popular enthusiasm suggests, this decision was not an uncontested consensus. Indeed, some US sports fans expressed their displeasure, arguing that

“the decision to send NBA players was not made because our amateurs cannot win, but because selecting a team of professionals a year in advance would open the door to marketing revenue”.

Of course, “college players cannot be marketed”, they further added.<sup>37</sup> A new decade began, during which US culture was successfully exported to Europe, revealing tensions that emerged from a gap between the promotion of economic liberalism and the expectations of actors in the meritocratic model of basketball. In other words, commercial basketball would coexist with national basketball until the 2000s. As the Maastricht Treaty was about to come into effect, the European basketball diaspora allowed for new geographic and economic boundaries rather than national partnerships within the European community. In the United States, it reinforced the concept of “imagined community” developed by Anderson.<sup>38</sup> Regardless of the outcome, “the basketball team will stay together even if the country doesn’t”, Slovenian guard Jurij Zdovc is quoted to have said.<sup>39</sup> Thus, having won the European Championships in 1989 and 1991, Yugoslavia became a universal point of reference for all imagined communities.

As it appeared, FIBA had lost part of the control it had over its sport at a moment observers conceded that “Europe gets more game every day”.<sup>40</sup> A private company was created

<sup>36</sup> *The Sporting News*, 03.01.1994, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup> *The Sporting News*, 20.07.1992, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> B. ANDERSON, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London, 1983.

<sup>39</sup> *Sports Illustrated*, 08.07.1991, p. 28.

<sup>40</sup> *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 03.02.2002.

under the name of Euroleague Basketball in 1999 to promote the interests of the most powerful multi-sport clubs in Europe. This trademark registration created an inevitable confusion in the nomenclature of European basketball. Following an initial feud between Euroleague Basketball and FIBA Europe, two parallel competitions were organised in the 2000-2001 season: the Euroleague and the FIBA-Suproleague. The totemic attractiveness of the US model of basketball led several team owners to join Euroleague Basketball, wary of the strength of the partnership between FIBA and the sports marketing company ISL Worldwide.<sup>41</sup> As of 2004, FIBA Europe entrusted the administration of the two main European cups to its future rival organisation: the Euroleague (C1) and the Eurocup (C2).<sup>42</sup> European basketball contended with the NBA for more than a decade and chose to adopt a market approach facilitated by the accelerating deregulation policies in Europe. To that end, Euroleague Basketball created two commercial subsidiaries: Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA) is the governing body and representative of the clubs, while Euroleague Properties (EP) is responsible for organising the C1 and C2 competitions and ensuring the profitability of the parent company. From there, Euroleague Basketball evolved toward a closed league system similar to the North American model of franchised clubs, until FIBA Europe sought to regain control of the organisation of European basketball in 2014.

### 3) BASKETBALL AND THE COMING OF AGE OF “SPORTS ENTREPRENEURS OF EUROPE”

Relations between the two major players in European basketball deteriorated when FIBA Europe committed to creating a rival competition to Euroleague in 2015. This decision had its roots in the early years before Euroleague took over the organisation of the two main professional basketball competitions in Europe, at a time when the NBA had achieved “universal popularity for both the sport and the players”.<sup>43</sup> In those years, the closed league model was generally associated with the NBA, which circulated “through concerted and aggressive processes of media[ted] entertainment-based spectacularisation”, David L. Andrews writes, implying that basketball had become a cultural commodity.<sup>44</sup> As the European meritocratic model of sport steadily lost ground to a market-based model that promoted individual economic, cultural, and athletic interests, the media projection of US professional basketball raised fears of cultural homogenisation. This paradox highlights the influence of sports entrepreneurs of Europe, whose work as unofficial ambassadors has helped transform

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<sup>41</sup> *Sports Marketing*, 1(2000).

<sup>42</sup> Since 2010, the ‘C1’ is called ‘Turkish Airlines Euroleague’, while the ‘C2’ is called ‘7-DAYS Eurocup’ since 2016.

<sup>43</sup> *Variety*, 24.07.2000, p. 4.

<sup>44</sup> D.L. ANDREWS, *Disneyization, Debord, and the Integrated NBA Spectacle*, in: *Social Semiotics*, 1(2006), p. 97.

the identity of European institutional basketball. This situation triggered a debate all the way to the European Parliament.<sup>45</sup>

The transformation of professional basketball caused great tension when FIBA Europe joined forces with 10 European national leagues to create a new competition in 2015 – the Basketball Champions League (BCL). It aimed to become the main European cup (C1) in place of the Euroleague championship. In keeping with the statutes of the international organisation, FIBA Europe also imposed sanctions on leagues or federations that entered clubs in competitions not recognised by FIBA; clubs from the Spanish, Serbian and Greek federations that had placed high hopes on the closed league model of the Euroleague became the main targets of this decision. The large publicity and public debate led the EU Parliament’s Sport Intergroup to comment on the legitimacy of such sanctions in the light of European competition law. Representing most of the Parliament’s political groups and committees on sport-related issues, the Sport Intergroup sent a first question to the European Commission on 27 April 2016:

“According to several recent news reports, the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) is penalising, or threatening to penalise, some national federations by excluding their national teams from international competitions such as the European Championship and the Olympic Games, because some of their member clubs have chosen to play in international club competitions, such as the Euroleague and Eurocup, which are alternative sports events to those organised by FIBA itself. What urgent steps or measures does the Commission plan to take to put a stop to those FIBA practices which appear to be of the restrictive and abusive type that Parliament urged the Commission to look into”<sup>46</sup>

Co-chaired by Fisas Aixelà (EPP) and Belgian MEP Marc Tarabella (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, S&D), the Sport Intergroup remained cautious and uninvolved at first, its mission being “simply to draw attention to the respective demands”.<sup>47</sup>

The situation quickly escalated. Convinced that FIBA Europe’s coercive measures violated European competition law, ECA took the case to a regional court in Munich, Germany, where the federation’s headquarters are located. On 2 June 2016, the court announced that FIBA Europe was guilty of abuse of a dominant position, a ruling that would be overturned a few weeks later, as the court observed that the dispute should be brought to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and not to a national court. A second appeal was filed with the EU, whose lack of responsiveness seemed to act as tacit consent. In 2017, the conflict escalated when ECA chose to ignore the international tournament schedule issued by FIBA on the grounds that it was the practice of the NBA; this schedule allows for the release of a player called up to the national team by clearing international windows during which leagues suspend league games. FIBA Europe released a statement arguing that “a golden opportunity ha[d] been missed to resolve the scheduling issue in a positive way for players, clubs, national teams and, of course, fans”; it also pointed out that

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<sup>45</sup> Interviews for this article were conducted in Strasbourg in 2018, in the presence of each MEP’s parliamentary assistant: Marc Tarabella was assisted by G. Bubbe, Virginie Rozière by E. Thirion, and Santiago Fisas Aixelà by P. Albert Sánchez.

<sup>46</sup> EU Parliamentary Question, International basketball federation, Question for written answer, E-003365/2016, 27.04.2016.

<sup>47</sup> Tarabella [hereafter: MT], Interview with authors, EU parliament in Strasbourg, 29.05.2018.

“this decision once again confirm[ed] that ECA focuses on the interests of a small group of clubs, neglects both the wider basketball family and the development of the sport in Europe, as well as attacks national teams”.<sup>48</sup>

This last point was a negotiating tactic to launch a renewed European political debate.

In the absence of a body with authority to settle the dispute, the two parties remained committed to their respective positions and waited out the clock. On the one hand, FIBA Europe aimed to maintain sporting meritocracy by allowing the winners of each national championship to participate in European competitions; on the other hand, ECA favoured a logic of economic profitability. Aware that a “historic transformation of professional sport” was underway, the Sport Intergroup sent a second parliamentary question to the European Commission on 28 August 2017.<sup>49</sup> It urged to outline,

“considering the fundamental right of athletes to play for their national teams as recognised by binding national law, what urgent steps or measures [it plans] to take to put a stop to actions such as this which, if they materialise, will adversely impact the development of national teams across Europe”.<sup>50</sup>

In her response, Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager regretted “the overlap between certain matches of the basketball World Cup qualifiers and certain matches of the Turkish Airlines Euroleague” and pressed “the International Basketball Federation (FIBA) and Euroleague Commercial Assets (ECA) to find a solution for the good of the athletes and the entire sport”.<sup>51</sup> This neutral stance reinforced the disagreement and emphasised the growing incompatibility of the two basketball models. The debate shows the evolution on the issue of the European sport model and exposes the growing role of sports entrepreneurs of Europe, who promote the meritocratic system.

By and large, basketball is increasingly part of Europe's cultural identity and lifestyle. In Leonard's words, it has become “a product of people's ability to experience Europe directly – unmediated by national governments and European institutions”.<sup>52</sup> In the post-Cold War era, sports entrepreneurs of Europe are public and private actors who support the use of sport to promote a European identity in keeping with the meritocratic system. They work to determine the appropriate boundaries to maintain the status quo and defend the interests of the single market. The dispute between FIBA and ECA bring to light how sports entrepreneurs of Europe participate in – and even accelerate – the consolidation of the European model of sport. First, under the Bosman ruling of 1995, professional athletes became legitimate workers, gaining equality in contractual rights and duties, but also in the fundamental right to represent their nation.<sup>53</sup> Yet, in 2017, the French Basketball Players' Union (SNB) denounced the fact that “a Euroleague player or selected to play with [his] national team has to choose between [his] club

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<sup>48</sup> FIBA Communication Service (@FIBA\_media), *FIBA statement*, 06.10.2017, 9.45 a.m. Tweet.

<sup>49</sup> Fisas Ayxelà [hereafter: SFA], Interview with authors, EU parliament in Strasbourg, 03.07.2018.

<sup>50</sup> EU Parliamentary Question, The FIBA Europe basketball organisation and the basketball Euroleague schedule, Question for written answer, E-005288-17, 27.08.2017.

<sup>51</sup> EU Parliamentary Question, Answer given by Ms. Vestager on behalf of the Commission, E-005288/2017, 09.11.2017.

<sup>52</sup> M. LEONARD, *Rediscovering Europe*, Demos, London, 1998, p. 10.

<sup>53</sup> A. BRAND, A. NIEMANN, G. SPITALER, *The Two-Track Europeanization of Football: E.U.-Level Pressures, Transnational Dynamics and their Repercussions Within Different National Contexts*, in: *International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics*, 1(2013), pp. 95-112.

and a national federation”, with the possibility that the club “may decide to terminate [his] contract for breaching [the] contractual obligations”.<sup>54</sup> A few months later, Euroleague Basketball came under heavy criticism from Serbian forward Nikola Kalinić and US point guard Aaron Jackson, who publicly condemned the harsh working conditions imposed on athletes by coaches and club owners. CSKA Moscow forward Kyle Hines also pleaded for active players to have the “opportunity to voice their opinions and [...] have some involvement on issues and policies that directly affect them”, illustrating the crisis facing the commodified model of basketball.<sup>55</sup>

Secondly, at a time of market globalisation, European basketball developed an identity that rested on a process of glocalisation, that is to say playing on both local and global scales, similarly to the NBA.<sup>56</sup> In less than two decades, the basketball industry underwent changes in its transnational development, marked by the emergence of social media and online community tools, both developing fandom and creating virtual “imagined communities”. This shift raised two issues: the quest for new markets (in Asia and more recently in Africa) and the need for Euroleague Basketball to free itself from the authority of FIBA Europe – an institution taking part in the liberal internationalist order heralded by the United States since the 1920s. Both economic models may seem similar, but the evolution of Euroleague Basketball toward a closed league model calls into question what European identity such clubs would convey. When a conflict broke out between Panathinaikos BC owner Dimitris Giannakopoulos and Euroleague general manager Jordi Bertomeu over alleged arbitrary financial sanctions in 2018, the Greek club consulted with the fans about the possibility of leaving Euroleague to join the Basketball Champions’ League.<sup>57</sup> As a number of messages on social media platforms attest, supporters backed the club’s decision, showing that strong local roots are essential for a large continental outreach, but can still fail to rally the support of the EU.

Indeed, French MEP Virginie Rozière (S&D) said that, while “supporters are crucial, we must be wary not to exploit their intentions”.<sup>58</sup> Fisas Ayxelà (EPP) expressed the same fear of exploiting fans and emphasised that “we should *not* give the floor to all supporters, [as] it has nothing to do with the organisation of sport”.<sup>59</sup> Reflecting on “the social value of sport in Europe, [and] not only in its economic and entertainment value”, Rozière revealed that the politicisation of fans and athletes is a fault line in the conflict between FIBA Europe and Euroleague Basketball. This divide may explain the Parliament’s distance on the issue of the European basketball model. It also shows a third limit to the deregulation of basketball, in that the meritocratic model forms a basis for national representation. But the media coverage of the conflict presented fans with a European version of the North American model, placing private interests above national teams and creating a discourse that frames basketball within the

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<sup>54</sup> Syndicat National des Basketteurs, *What Can Happen if you Decide not to Go with your National Team during the International Windows*, 21.11.2017, online.

<sup>55</sup> Kyle Hines (@SirHines), *Active Players Need the Opportunity to Voice their Opinions and Should Have Some Involvement on Issues & Policies that Directly Affect Them*, 15.06.2017, 8:38, Tweet

<sup>56</sup> F. HUANG, *Glocalisation of Sport: The NBA’s Diffusion in China*, in: *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 3(2013), pp. 267–284; M. FALCOUS, J. MAGUIRE, *Imagining ‘America:’ The NBA and local-global mediascapes*, in: *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 1(2006), pp. 59-78.

<sup>57</sup> *Mundo Deportivo*, 03.05.2018, online.

<sup>58</sup> Rozière [hereafter: VR], Interview with authors, EU parliament in Strasbourg, 29.05.2018.

<sup>59</sup> SFA, op. cit.



neoliberal process supported by EU policies. A year later, the director of operations of Euroleague Basketball Eduard J. Scott said that ECA had for some time favoured the

“pyramid model that has historically existed in Europe at the national level, which ha[d] been shown as a vision to be implemented at the European level, with the Euroleague linked to the Eurocup and the Eurocup linked to the national leagues”.<sup>60</sup>

But this approach challenged the sovereignty of competing nations in the face of the market economy, and led Rozière to reject it on the grounds that it is incompatible with the sporting interests of national teams.

Finally, the last limit to post-Cold War deregulation can be traced back to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The liberal internationalist tradition led the United States to pursue the global development of the NBA, making Europe a partner rather than an area for economic covetousness. This strengthened the foundations of the sporting corollary of the Treaty of Rome signed some sixty years earlier. However, Rozière recognised that the question of national sovereignty was strongly shaken as some observed that “national rules had been broken by the European framework”. This is also the reason why Fisas Aixelà, former Minister of Sport and Culture and “long-time supporter of the Euroleague”, was in fact “caught between a rock and a hard place, mainly because he did not want to penalise the Spanish national team”.<sup>61</sup> When asked about his role as an intermediary between FIBA Europe and Euroleague Basketball, Aixelà emphasises how much he believes “the European model needs to evolve”. Surprisingly, he later claimed he was “in opposition to the position of the Euroleague”. He underlined the inconsistencies in the European deregulation policies of the 2000s, considering that “the Federation has let things go and now it is up to us to take everything up again”; in the end, he stated, “that’s kind of the root of the problem”.<sup>62</sup> Rozière shared this view.

As the debate spilled over into transatlantic territory, NBA commissioner Adam Silver paid lip service to FIBA in 2018, showing moderate but influential support by stating that “FIBA can truly make basketball grow around the world”.<sup>63</sup> At a time when the NBA has begun to look to expand in Africa, where a few European countries still have tremendous influence, this position was self-serving, pushing Euroleague Basketball to the brink. In 2019, Bertomeu finally revealed the power of the status quo, when he confided that he was well aware and had no choice but to approve the fact that “the NBA is the one which decides for [international] basketball – which is good”!<sup>64</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Basketball opens up perspectives on a new and insufficiently explored playing field for European integration. To grasp its full significance as a cultural, social, and historical artefact, the debate over a “legitimate” model of professional basketball must be understood in the

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<sup>60</sup> *TalkBasket*, 17.10.2019, online.

<sup>61</sup> VR, op. cit.

<sup>62</sup> SFA, op. cit.

<sup>63</sup> FIBA YouTube, “Patrick Baumann and Adam Silver talk FIBA Basketball World Cup Qualifiers”, 01.10.2018, 2’53 min.

<sup>64</sup> Buzzer Time, *RMC Sport*, 11.02.2019.

context of political manoeuvrings over European integration. Since the mid-1940s, international organisations have been key to conduct all sorts of diplomatic negotiations. Influenced by the public diplomacy slogan of the “American century”, Western countries have sought the leadership of the US and appropriated some of its methods. As stated, the Treaty of Rome had an unexpected influence on the way European basketball asserted its difference from US and Soviet practices; in other words, basketball was an essential component of the “sporting corollary” that sought to achieve continental security and prosperity.

European integration is the result of a mostly unplanned process driven by three trends: the strategies of the member States, the dynamics of the institutions and the organisation of the interests of European entrepreneurs.<sup>65</sup> Sport lies at the confluence of these three logics. In modern times, treaties recognise the social and educational specificity of sport, but its economic dimension contributes to its deregulation. In their institutional communication, the European Commission and the Parliament commit to the preservation of the European model of sport, but it can be concluded that the debate over the shift that has taken place notably in basketball has yet to be resolved. Basketball acts as the spearhead of the process of commercialisation of sport under the influence of the US model of private entrepreneurs of sports entertainment – a pioneer trend that has given considerable arguments to the recent Super League project in European football.

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<sup>65</sup> G. COURTY, G. DEVIN, *La construction européenne*, La Découverte, Paris, 2018.