Automatic Balancing Mechanism and Discount Rate: Towards an Optimal Transition to Balance Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme Without Intertemporal Dictatorship? - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Chapitre D'ouvrage Année : 2021

Automatic Balancing Mechanism and Discount Rate: Towards an Optimal Transition to Balance Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme Without Intertemporal Dictatorship?

Résumé

The paper deals with the choice of the public discount rate in the framework of dynamic control applied to a specific pension scheme’s automatic balancing mechanism. We introduce a declining discount rate to address the issue of “intertemporal dictatorship”. Assuming such a time-dependent discount rate permits to solve the conflict between present and political needs to procrastinate and the long-run objective of no dictatorship of the present. We use a smooth-ABM and we detail the theoretical properties of this dynamic control problem to tackle properly this issue. Finally, we apply this ABM to the US Social Security and discuss about the sensitivity of the simulated results to the speed of declining of the public discount rate.
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Dates et versions

hal-03498096 , version 1 (20-12-2021)

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Citer

Frédéric Gannon, Florence Legros, Vincent Touzé. Automatic Balancing Mechanism and Discount Rate: Towards an Optimal Transition to Balance Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme Without Intertemporal Dictatorship?. Corazza Marco; Gilli Manfred; Perna Cira; Pizzi Claudio; Sibillo Marilena. Mathematical and Statistical Methods for Actuarial Sciences and Finance, Springer, pp.223-228, 2021, 9783030789640. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-78965-7_33⟩. ⟨hal-03498096⟩
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