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## Too Much Finance or Too Many Weak Instruments?

Maxime Fajeau

October 22, 2020

**Abstract** Since the global financial crisis of 2008, a strand of the literature has documented a threshold beyond which financial development tends to affect growth adversely. The evidence, however, rests heavily on internal instrument identification strategies, whose reliability has received surprisingly little attention so far in the finance-growth literature. Therefore, the present paper conducts a reappraisal of the non-linear conclusion twofold. First, in light of new data, second, by a thorough assessment of the identification strategy. Evidence points out that a series of unaddressed issues affecting the system-GMM setup results in spurious threshold regressions and overfitting of outliers.

**Keywords** Finance · Growth · Non-linearity · System GMM · Panel Data

**JEL classification** C52 · E44 · G1 · O11 · O16

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## 1 Introduction

Financial development as a source of growth has been the subject of renewed interest since the wake of the 2007/8 crisis. A decade after the financial crisis, this paper intends to contribute to the debate in light of new data and advances in econometric techniques.

Is financial development a leading factor for growth, and if so, should we stimulate its deepening? No straight answer has emerged. The absence of a consensus is already a defining characteristic of the finance-growth literature, notably on the direction of causality.<sup>1</sup>

The finance-growth literature and the banking crises literature have left many researchers with conflicting and contradictory findings. Up to the financial crisis, the literature has been quite confident regarding the growth-enhancing properties of financial sector's expansion (King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al, 2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004; Demetriades and Law, 2006). However, considering more recent data, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) show that the positive relationship between finance and growth is not as strong as it was in previous studies using data prior to 1990. Focusing on an alternative proxy for financial development, Capelle-Blancard and Labonne (2016) show that there is no positive relationship between finance and growth for OECD countries over the past 40 years. Demetriades and Rousseau (2016) also find that financial depth is no longer a significant growth determinant. Together with the evident damaging impact of the financial crisis on subsequent economic growth (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Jordà et al, 2016; Grjebine and Tripier, 2017), these findings have led several studies to reconsider prior conclusions and investigate potential non-linearities.


To provide a convincing reading through these puzzling conclusions, a strand of the literature has investigated whether there is evidence of a threshold in the finance-growth relationship (see, for instance, the contribution of Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al, 2015; Benczur et al, 2019; Swamy and Dharani, 2020). The later studies conclude that financial deepening starts harming output growth when credit to the private sector roughly reaches a certain threshold somewhere around 100% of GDP. In other words, the non-linear conclusion implies that the financial sector can grow too large for society's benefits. Such a finding has tremendous policy implications. If financial expansion can still offer additional growth for developing countries, the level of credit to the private sector of most developed economies is often well beyond this estimated limit (see Figure 1). Therefore, a decade of expansionist monetary policy, easing private credit, could have an ambivalent outcome.

Far from gaining the full support of the entire economic community, several recent contributions have shed doubt on the robustness of a monotonically positive link between finance and growth. Karagiannis and Kvedaras (2016) challenge earlier results and find that the non-linear conclusion is no longer present when restricting the panel to the OECD or the EU countries. Such evidence emphasizes that the threshold estimates could be a byproduct of unaccounted heterogeneity. Based on various dynamic threshold estimates, Botev, Égert, and Jawadi (2019) also fail to find a non-linear association between finance and growth. It further suggests that the threshold estimates are likewise sensitive to the estimation technique.

In line with this inconclusive literature, the present paper seeks to understand why prior evidence relying on large panels led to non-linear conclusions. The core contribution of this paper is an in-depth reassessment of the mainstream empirical

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed literature review, see Levine (2005) or Popov (2018).



**Fig. 1** Evolution of the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP as a proxy of financial depth, based on the new expanded dataset for 140 countries over 1970-2015. The left panel plots the mean and median values of private credit. The right panel plots the share of observations for which private credit is above 90% (solid line) and 120% (dashed line).

methodology. The present study reassesses the non-linear evidence twofold. Firstly, by using more data. The new dataset results in additional countries and observations. It extends the scope of the study up to 2015, thereby including additional post-crisis observations. Second, in reexamining the non-linear conclusion in its original methodological environment, this study also sets the focus on the soundness of the econometric methodology.

The finance-growth nexus is no exception to the well known empirical struggle to identify a causal impact. Moving beyond mere statistical association is commonly achieved based on instrumental variables techniques to extract the exogenous component of financial development in a macroeconomic setup. The recent non-linear finance-growth literature heavily relies on internal instrument identification strategies in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).<sup>2</sup> However, only limited attention is drawn to the potential fragility of such System GMM identification strategies (for recent examples, see Cheng et al, 2020; Swamy and Dharani, 2020).

Following advances in econometric research, this study takes a look under the hood of the System GMM estimator. To do so, it focuses on alternative specifications to avoid the default implementation pitfalls and provides tests to assess the instruments' strength. This paper discusses the assumptions underlying the validity of the identification strategy, and thereby the reliability of the threshold estimates. The present paper is, therefore, the first to provide a thorough appraisal of the internal instrument identification strategies in the non-linear finance-growth literature.

This study provides a body of evidence reducing the confidence one can have in the thresholds estimates based on the financial depth level. It shows that uncontrolled

<sup>2</sup> The influential contribution of La Porta et al (1997, 1998) suggested the predetermined legal origin of a country as an external instrument for identifying the causal impact of finance on growth. The "legal origin" instrument, while widely used for a time, has been recast by Bazzi and Clemens (2013) because its widespread use to instrument a variety of endogenous variables could only lead to valid instrumentation in at most one of the study. And at worst none.

country-specific factors and a few outliers are driving former hump-shaped conclusions. This paper presents evidence calling into question the soundness of the various identification strategies. It demonstrates that the conclusion of a non-monotonic causal impact of finance on growth relies on a very large number of either irrelevant or weak instruments. These problematic instruments prevent reliable causal inferences about the effect of financial depth on growth. Further evidence suggests that the near-multicollinearity of the financial proxies, combined with the weak instrument proliferation issue, fosters spurious regressions overfitting a few outliers.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 overviews data and methodology. Section 3 provides some preliminary comments on cross-country regressions. The paper delves into a complete reappraisal of the threshold estimates based on panel data estimates in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes this study.

## 2 Data and Methodology

### 2.1 Data and variables

The dataset is gathered from the usual sources. Throughout the study, the independent variable is economic growth, measured as the log-difference of real GDP per capita (WDI, World Bank, 2018). The study rests on credit to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a ratio of GDP (private credit) as a proxy for financial depth. The finance-growth literature commonly uses the amount of credit allocated to the private sector as it is likely to be associated with the functions exerted by the financial sector that can impact an economy's growth path.<sup>3</sup>

It is undoubtedly an imperfect substitute for the much broader concept of financial development. However, it has two main advantages. First, it has become one of the most commonly used financial depth measures and, thus, facilitates comparison with previous empirical work. Second and most importantly, among all proxies, private credit has the largest time and country coverage, which is essential when conducting a broad cross-country comparison. This variable is provided and actualized by Beck et al (2000a) and Cihak et al (2012).

All regressions are conducted based on a set of policy and nonpolicy control variables correlated with growth performance across countries. These control variables are common to growth empiric literature: the logarithm of initial GDP per capita to capture convergence and provide a dynamic feature in the panel estimates (Barro, 1991; Bun and Sarafidis, 2015), average years of education gathered from Barro and Lee (2013) to account for human capital, a measure of trade openness<sup>4</sup> (Frankel and Romer, 1999), and two measures of macroeconomic stabilization, the log of the inflation rate<sup>5</sup> (Barro, 1995; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002) and the log of government consumption normalized by GDP to account for fiscal adjustments (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Sala-i Martin et al, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Levine (2005) reports several financial functions, which boils down to producing ex-ante information about investment opportunities; improving ex-post monitoring of investment and exerting corporate governance; facilitating risk management and diversification; mobilizing and pooling savings; easing the exchange of goods and services.

<sup>4</sup> Computed as exports plus imports divided by GDP and gathered from WDI (World Bank, 2018).

<sup>5</sup> To deal with possible negative value using log of this variable, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation:  $\log(\pi) \equiv \log\left(\pi + \sqrt{\pi^2 + 1}\right)$ . The data is gathered from WDI (World Bank, 2018).

For comparison purposes with existing literature, this study also works with an older dataset gathered from Arcand et al (2015). This older dataset ranges from 1960 to 2010. Besides extending the sample length, it is worth noting that the new dataset does not exactly match the former. There are inevitable data revisions, where some values are reclassified as missing, and some become available. The correlations, however, are usually close to 0.98 within the sample (including the proxy for financial depth), except for the government consumption ratio, which is 0.94.

The new dataset results in additional countries and observations. It extends the scope of the study up to 2015, thereby including additional post-crisis observations. The paper focuses on the most extended period range. Indeed, one of the alleged strength of the non-linear estimates is to remain statistically significant in long samples where other linear specifications fail to find a significant association between finance and growth. The number of countries varies slightly depending on data availability and is always displayed in the tables containing the results.

## 2.2 Empirical Methodology

This study aims to reassess the finance-growth relationship, with a particular focus on the non-linear finding in its original methodological environment. A host of empirical papers have found evidence of a threshold in the finance-growth relationship. From a methodological perspective, they boil down to dynamic panel data estimates based on System GMM estimator using five-year periods to smooth out business cycle (Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Arcand et al, 2015; Sahay et al, 2015; Benczur et al, 2019; Cheng et al, 2020).

The standard estimated model proceeds as follows. Define the logarithmic growth in real GDP per capita for country  $i$  between  $t$  and  $t + k$  as:

$$\Delta y_{i,t+k} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{j=1}^k (y_{i,t+j} - y_{i,t-1+j}) \quad (1)$$

which translates into the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP. For a five-year spell, i.e.  $k = 5$ , equation (1) simplifies as:

$$\Delta y_{i,t+5} = \frac{1}{5} (y_{i,t+5} - y_{i,t})$$

Let's denote  $y_{i,t}$  as the initial level of log GDP per capita, and  $y_i^*$  the long-run (or steady-state) value. Generic forms of growth estimation equation are usually obtained from a first-order approximation of the neoclassical growth model (Mankiw, 1995), such that one can derive:

$$\Delta y_{i,t+k} = \lambda (y_{i,t} - y_i^*)$$

where  $\lambda$  is the classical conditional convergence parameter. Generally, for practical purposes, the literature implicitly assumes that  $y_i^*$  can be modeled as a linear function of several variables that impact the structure of the economy (Bekaert et al, 2005). The government's spending, inflation, average years of secondary schooling, and many other control variables enter the empirical growth studies on this account. The estimated growth model, non-linear and non-monotonic with respect to financial depth, has the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta y_{i,t+k} &= \lambda y_{i,t} + \beta_1 PC_{i,t} + \beta_2 PC_{i,t}^2 + \gamma \mathbf{x}_{i,t} + \nu_{it+k} \\ \nu_{it+k} &= \mu_i + \lambda_{t+k} + \varepsilon_{i,t+k} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where the subscripts  $i$  and  $t$  refer to cross-section unit and time period.  $PC_{i,t}$  is the ratio of private credit over GDP used as a proxy for financial development.  $\mathbf{x}_{i,t}$  is the set of control variables. Finally,  $\nu_{it}$  follows a two-way error component model where  $\mu_i$ ,  $\lambda_t$  and  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$  are respectively the country-specific effect, the period-specific effect and the error term. The inclusion of time dummies allows capturing period-specific effects, proxying for world economic conditions.

The non-linear and non-monotonic estimations are based on a linear term for private credit, augmented with its quadratic counterpart. The method proposed by Sasabuchi (1980) and developed by Lind and Mehlum (2011), henceforth SLM test, is suited to ascertain the location and relevance of the extremum point. It involves determining whether the marginal effect of finance on growth is significantly different from zero and positive at a low level of finance but negative at a high level, within-sample:

$$H_0 : (\beta_1 + 2\beta_2 PC_{\min} \leq 0) \cup (\beta_1 + 2\beta_2 PC_{\max} \geq 0) \text{ i.e monotone or U-shaped}$$

$$H_1 : (\beta_1 + 2\beta_2 PC_{\min} > 0) \cup (\beta_1 + 2\beta_2 PC_{\max} < 0) \text{ i.e inverted U-shaped.}$$

The estimation method relies on dynamic panel System GMM estimator, introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This GMM inference method has been applied extensively in economic growth and finance literature. It improves upon pure cross-country work in several respects. First, it deals with the dynamic component of the regression specification. It also fully controls for unobserved time- and country-specific effects. Finally, it accounts for some endogeneity in the variables, thereby allowing for a causal interpretation of the results.

### 3 Preliminary Comments on Cross-country Regressions

#### 3.1 Simple Cross-country Evidence

Before further delving into the panel estimates, this study first focuses on some cross-country evidence. The setup closely follows the econometric methodology of King and Levine (1993) and the early empirical growth literature (see Barro, 1991). Well aware of the various limitations stemming from endogeneity issues, this exercise is only intended as a preliminary reassessment of the threshold estimates. Naturally, panel data comes as serious help to get around many problems cross-sectional regressions fail to address. Therefore, the panel conclusions of the next sections should be viewed as more reliable.

The number of countries in the following cross-country regressions is substantially smaller than the subsequent panel estimates of section 4. This sample difference rests in the cross-country regressions structure, consisting of regressing the average annual growth observed over the sample with a combination of average observation and initial values. The latter requires at least one observation at the beginning of the sample, which is not available for most countries. The selection criteria is the availability of the data. To mitigate the issue and maximize the sample size, I follow Arcand et al (2015) and start a decade later, in 1970, instead of 1960. Once turning to panel estimates, this constraint no longer burdens the sample size.<sup>6</sup>

Table 1 reports various cross-country regressions. Column (1) provides a benchmark based on the old dataset. The point estimate associated with the linear term

<sup>6</sup> See Appendix section A on page 27 for details on the samples.

**Table 1** Cross-country OLS Between regressions.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Data	Old	New	New	New
Period	1970-2010	1970-2015	1970-2015	1970-2015
Specificity	–	–	w/o 3 obs.	strict OLS-BE
Private Credit	5.608*** (1.738)	4.908*** (1.627)	4.240 (2.871)	4.244** (1.701)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-3.202*** (1.075)	-2.432** (1.048)	-1.751 (2.591)	-1.770* (0.897)
Log(init. GDP/capita)	-0.611*** (0.173)	-0.752*** (0.152)	-0.716*** (0.156)	-0.735*** (0.161)
Log(school)	1.314** (0.501)	1.460*** (0.362)	1.465*** (0.361)	1.370*** (0.370)
Log(inflation)	-0.165 (0.139)	0.003 (0.153)	-0.005 (0.146)	0.022 (0.250)
Log(trade)	-0.017 (0.257)	0.224 (0.267)	0.249 (0.270)	0.195 (0.262)
Log(gov. cons.)	-0.796 (0.519)	-0.865 (0.559)	-1.032* (0.568)	-0.700 (0.543)
Observations	64	74	71	74
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.49	0.50	0.44
dGrowth/dPC=0	86%**	100%*	121%	120%
90% Fieller CI	[74%–111%]	[81%–181%]	[70%–∞]	[91%–308%]
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.02	0.08	0.41	0.18


*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of cross-country OLS Between regressions in which the dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. While the first column provides a benchmark of the typical non-linear result from the old dataset, the subsequent columns report various exercises based on the new data set expanding the period and country coverage. Column (2) presents a reassessment. Column (3) excludes CHE, JPN, and USA. Column (4) incorporates a slight methodological correction. The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

of private credit is positive, the quadratic term is negative, and both are statistically significant. It indicates that financial depth starts yielding negative returns as credit to the private sector reaches 86% of GDP. The reliability of this turning point, however, rests solely on the SLM test. With a low *p*-value of 0.02, the threshold is well identified.

Now focusing on the new dataset. Using additional available countries and extending the coverage up to 2015, the non-linear finding weakens. The threshold for private credit rises to 100% of GDP with a higher *p*-value of 0.08 for the SLM test. However, 96% of total observations are below this threshold. Only three countries experience a level of financial depth above the 100% of GDP threshold. None of them reach the 180% threshold above which the marginal effect of financial depth would become both negative and statistically significant.

Figure 2 plots the quadratic fit between financial depth and growth using the new expanded data. It shows that the curvature is due to only three countries above the threshold, namely: the United-States (USA), Japan (JPN), and Switzerland (CHE). The latter has a high private credit-to-GDP ratio because of the credit extended





**Fig. 2** Financial depth and growth using the new expanded data for 1970-2015. The solid black line plots the OLS quadratic fit of column (2), Table 1. The solid light lines are 95% Fieller confidence intervals. The vertical dotted red line marks the threshold estimate at 100%. Point labels are three-letter ISO country codes.

abroad by the two multinational banks UBS and Cr dit Suisse, which do not directly finance the Swiss economy.

Column (3) of Table 1 performs the same regression, this time without these three peculiar observations.<sup>7</sup> As expected, the linear and quadratic terms for private credit turn insignificant, and the SLM test indicates that the threshold estimate is no longer statistically relevant. The regression in column (3) emphasizes the dependency of the non-linear conclusion over a long period on a few observations driving the results.

Performing the regression without the quadratic term leads to a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the variable private credit.<sup>8</sup> In the same spirit, a linear spline regression allowing for different slopes when credit to the private sector is above and below 100% of GDP leads to similar conclusions. Financial depth is positively and significantly associated with economic growth when credit to the private sector is below 100% of GDP, and that it is not significantly correlated above this threshold.<sup>9</sup> Over a long period, the threshold estimation rests solely on three observations.

Finally, these estimates raise a methodological question. Strictly speaking, such cross-sectional regressions, focusing only on the permanent differences in mean levels between countries, corresponding to the “between” dimension, would impose a specific data processing. Columns (1) to (3) follow previous work and handle the data by computing the log and square of the average values of the variables before estimating with OLS. However, for the “between” and “within” dimensions to be orthogonal, one

<sup>7</sup> Both Japan (JPN) and Switzerland (CHE) display high *Dfbeta* statistics (Belsley et al, 1980). However, as the *Dfbeta* statistic works by dropping one observation at a time, the United-States (USA) does not display an outstanding statistic as it is caught between the other two observations. The *Dfbeta* statistic fails to grasp multiple outliers at once.

<sup>8</sup> The coefficient associated with private credit is 1.42 with a *p*-value of 0.02.

<sup>9</sup> Below 100% of GDP, the coefficient associated with private credit is 2.30 with a *p*-value of 0.003. Above, the coefficient drops to 0.33 with a *p*-value of 0.55.

would have to work with the average of the logs and squares and not the opposite. Column (4) provides estimates with this methodological correction. This “rigorous” cross-country dimension leads to a much higher threshold for private credit at 120% of GDP. Thus, the SLM test now rejects the presence of an inverted U-shape.

These new estimates reduce the confidence one can have in the conclusion that financial depth is detrimental to economic growth when credit to the private sector reaches 100% of GDP. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from cross-country regressions ignore within-country variation, and country-specific characteristics are most likely driving the results.

### 3.2 Misleading Identification Through Heteroscedasticity

To address the causality issue in these pure cross-sectional country-level regressions, one can use the instrumental variable estimator developed by Rigobon (2003) and Lewbel (2012), which relies on heteroscedasticity-constructed internal instruments (henceforth IH). It allows circumventing the lack of suited external instruments. The downside, as emphasized by Lewbel (2012, p.2), is that “the resulting identification is based on higher moments, and so is likely to provide less reliable estimates than identification based on standard exclusion restrictions.” Moreover, concern regarding potential weak instruments is real and does not boil down to a question of precision but rather of reliability. Precise estimates convey absolutely no information regarding their reliability. Therefore, weak instruments should be tested for. Thus, Table 2 performs the same regressions as in Table 1, starting with a benchmark threshold estimate from the old dataset, then with the new dataset up to 2010 and 2015. For each specification, Table 2 complements the estimates with tests for underidentification and weak instruments.

For the underidentification, Table 2 reports the  $p$ -values for the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) heteroscedasticity robust version of the Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis is that the structural equation is underidentified. A rejection of the null indicates that the smallest canonical correlation between the endogenous variables and the instruments is nonzero. Since the nonzero correlation condition is not enough, Table 2 also controls for weak-instruments by reporting the weak-instruments Wald statistics based on Cragg and Donald (1993), and its non-*iid* robust analog by Kleibergen and Paap (2006). The latter is better suited due to heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. These tests assess whether the instruments jointly explain enough variation to identify unbiased causal effects.

The additional diagnostics proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002) and Yogo (2004) complement these tests:  $p$ -values for the null hypotheses that the bias in the estimates on the endogenous variable is greater than 10% or 30% of the OLS bias, and  $p$ -values for the null hypotheses that the actual size of the  $t$ -test that the coefficient estimates equal zero at the 5% significance level is greater than 15% or 25%.<sup>10</sup> Finally, the table reports the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, robust to heteroscedasticity.

Columns (1) to (3) of Table 2 show that the coefficients associated with private credit are precisely estimated, roughly constant for the various regressions, and yield a threshold around 100% of GDP. However, the various specification tests

<sup>10</sup> Critical values for the Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic have not been tabulated, as it depends on the specifics of the *iid* assumption’s violation. Therefore, following others in the literature (see for more details Baum et al, 2007; Bazzi and Clemens, 2013), the critical values tabulated for the Cragg-Donald statistic are applied to the Kleibergen-Paap statistic.

**Table 2** Misleading cross-country IH regressions.

Data Period	IH-Between			IH-Strict Between	
	(1) Old 1970-2010	(2) New 1970-2010	(3) New 1970-2015	(4) New 1970-2010	(5) New 1970-2015
Private Credit	8.849*** (1.937)	8.883*** (2.577)	9.002*** (2.015)	-0.157 (3.674)	-0.110 (3.191)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-4.457*** (1.117)	-4.259*** (1.282)	-4.312*** (1.026)	-0.098 (1.497)	-0.048 (1.256)
	<i>Other parameter estimates omitted for clarity</i>				
Observations	64	77	74	77	74
N. instruments	10	10	10	10	10
Kleibergen-Paap LM test ( <i>p</i> -val)	0.12	0.05	0.06	0.18	0.13
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic	3.05	2.08	2.33	0.88	0.96
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size >10% ( <i>p</i> -val)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size >25% ( <i>p</i> -val)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias >10% ( <i>p</i> -val)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias >30% ( <i>p</i> -val)	0.41	0.76	0.67	0.99	0.99
Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic	5.19	4.28	4.78	1.06	1.11
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size >10% ( <i>p</i> -val)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size >25% ( <i>p</i> -val)	0.81	0.94	0.88	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias >10% ( <i>p</i> -val)	0.91	0.98	0.95	1.00	1.00
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias >30% ( <i>p</i> -val)	0.03	0.11	0.06	0.98	0.98
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.46	0.28	0.46	0.35	0.18
dGrowth/dPC=0	99%***	104%***	104%***	-80%	-115%
90% Fieller CI	[88%–117%]	[92%–121%]	[93%–120%]	–	–
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	–	–

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of cross-country IV regressions in which the dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. The identification strategy rests on the estimator developed by Rigobon (2003) and Lewbel (2012), and relies on heteroscedasticity-constructed internal instruments (IH). The following variables are included in the regressions but omitted in the table here for clarity: the logarithm of initial Gross Domestic Product per capita, average years of education, a measure of trade openness, the log of the inflation rate, and the log of government consumption normalized by GDP. While the first column provides a benchmark of the typical non-linear result from the old dataset, the subsequent columns report estimates based on the new dataset expanding the period and country coverage. Column (2) is based on the new dataset with the same time coverage as column (1) but with additional countries. Column (3) expands the coverage up to 2015. Columns (4-5) incorporate a slight methodological correction. The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

severely reduce the confidence one should have in these results. In column (1), the Kleibergen-Paap LM test of underidentification fails to reject the null hypothesis that the structural equation is underidentified. For all regressions, the Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap Wald-type statistics show that the instrumentation is very weak. Moreover, the high *p*-values for the various levels of relative OLS bias underlines that the instrumentation is far too weak to remove a substantial portion of OLS bias. Large *p*-values also indicates that the actual size of the *t*-test at the 5% level is greater than 25%. The precise estimates are a byproduct of either weak or irrelevant instruments.

Columns (4) and (5) deal with the methodological issue mentioned in the previous subsection 3.1. They provide estimates with the methodological correction, based on the exact specification of previous columns (2) and (3). This rigorous cross-country dimension leads to insignificant point estimates for the level of private credit and its squared term, along with a negative threshold for private credit. Thus, the SLM test

now trivially rejects the presence of an inverted U-shape. The thresholds estimates are highly sensitive to the specific data process.

The IH estimations suffer from weak instrumentation. Thus, not surprisingly, the point estimates from Table 2 are in line with those obtained from the OLS estimator in Table 1. This proximity does not point toward highly causal results. It would rather be a sign of untreated bias and persistent endogeneity as the instruments are far too weak to address these issues. By looking under the hood of the identification through heteroscedasticity, these simple tests shine brighter lights on its inability to yield a reliable identification of a causal impact from finance depth to economic growth.

Overall, plain vanilla cross-country regressions suffer from various biases “as serious as they are well-known” (Popov, 2018, p.10). First of all, it is almost impossible to account for all plausible growth determinants, raising issues about the omitted variable bias. Indeed, Durlauf et al (2005) have listed no less than 145 distinct variables in the various growth regressions throughout the literature. Parameter heterogeneity is also a non-negligible concern. Cross-country regressions pool together countries that differ vastly in their degree of financial and economic development leaving group differences unaccounted. The misspecification bias is also a notable limitation as the quadratic form is prone to overfitting outliers. Ultimately, cross-country regressions are exposed to simultaneity and endogeneity bias, which could drive the non-monotonic conclusion. For instance, the development level might likely be the driving force of both the average growth and private credit level –recall the famous words of Robinson (1952): “where enterprise leads, finance follows.” The cross-country setup is unsuited to address these limitations.

Determining where each bias precisely stands is unfortunately out of reach. Nevertheless, panel data comes as serious help to get around many of the problems cross-sectional regressions fail to address. Therefore, the panel conclusions are usually considered as more reliable. Indeed, switching from pure cross-country to panel data mobilizing the time-series dimension has significant advantages. Among them, estimates are no longer biased by omitted variables constant over time –the so-called fixed effects. Also, taking advantage of internal instrument techniques allows for consistent estimates of the endogenous models, if carefully and adequately cast.

## 4 More Reliable Panel Estimates?

### 4.1 A Very Influential Starting Point

Now turning to a pooled (cross-country and time-series) data set consisting of at most 140 countries and, for each of them, at most 11 non-overlapping five-year periods over 1960-2015.

The five-year spell length is commonly chosen in the literature for several reasons. First, the use of longer periods would significantly reduce the number of degrees of freedom, which is problematic when implementing dynamic panel data procedures. Secondly, five-year periods, as emphasized by Calderon et al (2002), follows the endogenous growth literature (e.g. Caselli et al, 1996; Easterly et al, 1997; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Forbes, 2000) where such period length is believed to purge out business-cycle fluctuations which could induce a negative coefficient on private credit. Indeed, the empirical growth literature usually averages out data over five-year spells in order to measure the steady-state relationship between the variables. Smoothing out data series supposedly removes useless variation from the data, enabling precise

**Table 3** Sequential anchoring of the five-year spells in dynamic panel regressions (1/2).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Data	Old	Old	Old	Old	Old
Coverage	1960-2010	1961-2011	1962-2007	1963-2008	1964-2009
Number of spells	10	10	9	9	9
Private Credit	3.621** (1.718)	0.171 (1.824)	0.780 (1.877)	0.084 (1.689)	1.971 (1.688)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-2.018*** (0.727)	-0.882 (0.774)	-0.749 (0.889)	-0.523 (0.782)	-1.418* (0.852)
	<i>Other parameter estimates omitted for clarity</i>				
N. instruments	318	318	254	254	254
N. countries	133	133	134	133	133
Observations	917	916	811	829	858
AR(2) ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.11	0.08	0.23	0.51	0.91
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
dGrowth/dPC=0	90%**	10%	52%	8%	69%
90% Fieller CI	[43%–113%]	–	–	–	[0%–124%]
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.03	0.46	0.40	0.48	0.19

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of panel regressions consisting of non-overlapping five-year spells. The dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. All regressions contain time fixed effects. The first column reports the best-attempted replication of the typical threshold result from the yearly version of the old dataset. Column (2) provides point estimates with a one-year forward shift for the starting point of each spell. The subsequent columns continue shifting forward by one year the beginning of the five-year spells. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) serial correlation test is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments fail to identify the same vector of parameters (see Parentes and Silva, 2012). Robust Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

parameter estimates. Indeed, Loayza and Rancière (2006) find that short-run surges in private credit appear to be a good predictor of both banking crises and slow growth. In the long run, a higher level of private credit is associated with higher economic growth. This tension between short-term and long-term effects justifies the use of low-frequency data to abstract from business-cycles. Finally, this is conveniently suited to the specifics of System GMM, as it requires a short panel characterized by large  $N$  and small  $T$  dimensions.

The growth variable is usually computed as the average annual growth rate within the five-year spell. All explanatory variables, however, are systematically based on the first observation of each five-year spell. The absence of averaging implies a substantial informational loss as well as a consistency loss. Excluding 80% of the observations would possibly expose the coefficient estimates to bias as it could mismeasure the true explanatory variables. Hence, is the starting point of the five-year spells influencing the results?

Table 3 shows regressions for sequential anchoring of the five-year spells based on the old dataset. Column (1) provides a benchmark (typical) non-linear conclusion. Column (2) provides point estimates with a one-year forward shift for the starting point of each spell, with an identical sample of countries, and one fewer observation (916 against 917 previously) due to data availability. The coefficients associated with the linear and quadratic term of private credit lose magnitude, and neither of them is statistically significant. The SLM test discards the inverted U-shape with a high

**Table 4** Sequential anchoring of the five-year spells in dynamic panel regressions (2/2).

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Data	New	New	New	New	New
Coverage	1960-2015	1961-2016	1962-2012	1963-2013	1964-2015
Number of spells	11	11	10	10	10
Private Credit	-0.170 (1.480)	2.851* (1.465)	1.085 (1.408)	0.940 (1.610)	1.027 (1.800)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-0.256 (0.703)	-1.217* (0.699)	-1.062* (0.612)	-0.901 (0.679)	-0.698 (0.721)
	<i>Other parameter estimates omitted for clarity</i>				
N. instruments	388	388	318	318	318
N. countries	140	140	138	138	138
Observations	1,055	1,085	965	970	987
AR(2) ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.40	0.01	0.11	0.56	0.85
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
dGrowth/dPC=0	–	117%*	51%	52%	73%
90% Fieller CI	–	[86%–426%]	[0%–95%]	–	–
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)	–	0.06	0.34	0.37	0.33

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of panel regressions consisting of non-overlapping five-year spells. The dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. All regressions contain time fixed effects. Each column presents one possible anchoring for the five-year spells in the new dataset. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) serial correlation test is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments fail to identify the same vector of parameters (see Parentes and Silva, 2012). Robust Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

*p*-value of 0.46. Through columns (3) to (5), the same exercise goes on by shifting forward by one year the beginning of the five-year spells. In the end, out of the five possible starting points presented in columns (1-5), only one supports the existence of a threshold.

Table 4 conducts the same exercise, this time based on the new dataset. The number of countries in the new dataset varies slightly from the old one.<sup>11</sup> The selection criteria is the availability of the data. Each column shifts forward by one year the beginning of the five-year spells. Very similar conclusions arise, as only one estimate out of the five possible anchors supports the presence of a significant threshold. Analogous conclusions are drawn from a restricted sample of the new dataset to match the country coverage of Table 3.

From these various anchoring exercises, a clear recommendation emerges. Averaging the explanatory variables within the five-year spell should be favored over initial values, except for the convergence variable.<sup>12</sup> It is preferable to keep more observations through data averaged over sub-periods, while controlling for endogeneity biases by

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix section A on page 27 for details on the samples.

<sup>12</sup> The work of Caselli et al (1996) is among the first attempts to use the GMM framework to estimate a Solow growth model. They make use of the Barro (1991) method, initially created for cross-sectional data, by adapting it for a panel framework. Already at this early stage, the problem related to extensive use of initial value was raised. They chose to work with the averaged annual growth rate of per capita GDP, but distinguished between state and control variables for the explanatory variables. Controls are averaged over the five-year intervals (government consumption, inflation rate, trade openness). In contrast, only states variables are taken at their initial value (initial level of per

properly instrumenting the explanatory variables.<sup>13</sup> Otherwise, coefficient estimates remain exposed to mismeasured true explanatory variables.

## 4.2 Abundant Weak Instruments

### 4.2.1 *An Instruments Proliferation Issue*

The dynamic panel System GMM estimator introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) comes in handy to work toward a causal reading of the estimates as no suited external instruments have emerged. However, the default implementation of this estimator generates a set of internal instruments whose number increases particularly quickly with the time dimension of the panel. The dramatic increase (somehow pandemic) in the instrument count is often referred to as *instruments proliferation*. The literature has documented several problems arising with excessive proliferation: overfitting of endogenous variable, weakened Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions, biased two-step variance estimators and imprecise estimates of the optimal weighting matrix.<sup>14</sup> Fortunately, there are two usual telltale signs: a number of instruments greater than the number of cross-sectional units (the number of countries), and a perfect Hansen test  $p$ -value of 1.00. The non-linear conclusions systematically meet both telltale signs.

Column (1) of Table 5 presents the typical non-linear conclusion based on the old dataset. The coefficient estimates on private credit are significant, and the SLM test corroborates the presence of an inverted U-shape relationship. It indicates that financial depth starts yielding negative returns as credit to the private sector reaches 90% of GDP. However, there are no less than 318 instruments in this default implementation of the System GMM estimator, for only 130 cross-sectional units. Along with the perfect  $p$ -value of 1.00 for the Hansen test, this casts doubts on the reliability of the result, with possible overfitting and failure to expunge the endogenous part as the tests would be weakened in this setup. Moreover, the AR(2) test for autocorrelation display a  $p$ -value of 0.11, which is too low to be considered safe. These tests are conservative, a value close to conventional thresholds should be viewed with a fair degree of caution.

Roodman (2009, p. 156) stresses that “results and specification tests should be aggressively tested for sensitivity to reduction in the number of instruments.” The remaining columns of Table 5 present the various instrument count reductions implemented as minimally arbitrary robustness checks to examine the behavior of the coefficient estimates and various specification tests.

Column (2) provides the first step of the robustness check strategy to reduce the number of instruments. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) states that the most distant instruments are generally those which offer the weakest correlation and are therefore the least relevant. Following others in the finance-growth literature, column (2) restricts the instrument matrix to a single lag (see for examples Levine et al, 2000; Beck et al, 2000b; Baltagi et al, 2009; Kose et al, 2009; Law and Singh, 2014).

capita GDP, the average number of years of schooling). Therefore all variables do not enter with the same treatment.

<sup>13</sup> Some papers have taken this path, see for example Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); Beck and Levine (2004); Rioja and Valev (2004); Beck et al (2014b); Law and Singh (2014).

<sup>14</sup> For more details, see Andersen and Sorensen (1996); Ziliak (1997); Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999); Koenker and Machado (1999); Hayashi (2000); Calderon et al (2002); Bowsher (2002); Alvarez and Arellano (2003); Han and Phillips (2006); Hayakawa (2007); Roodman (2009); Baltagi (2013).

**Table 5** Instrument proliferation in System GMM panel regressions for 1960-2010.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Instrument matrix:	GMM-type	GMM-type	COLLAPSED	GMM-type	COLLAPSED
Number of lags	ALL	1	ALL	ALL (PCA)	ALL (PCA)
Number of instruments	318	122	73	51	19
Private Credit	3.628** (1.726)	2.694 (2.025)	0.689 (2.972)	-3.267 (2.107)	-15.834 (10.411)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-2.021*** (1.726)	-1.970** (0.952)	-0.882 (1.390)	0.924 (0.964)	4.660 (3.357)
Log(init. GDP/cap.)	-0.728** (0.310)	-0.317 (0.305)	-0.957* (0.525)	-0.853 (0.541)	1.591 (1.917)
Log(school)	2.270*** (0.615)	2.016*** (0.745)	3.738*** (1.040)	5.568*** (1.438)	4.872** (1.910)
Log(inflation)	-0.273 (0.210)	-0.393** (0.198)	-0.875** (0.377)	-1.024*** (0.394)	-1.819*** (0.561)
Log(trade)	1.087** (0.511)	1.291* (0.759)	3.532** (1.437)	1.235 (0.876)	3.370 (2.977)
Log(gov. cons.)	-1.461** (0.742)	-2.474*** (0.594)	-1.452 (1.227)	-2.242** (0.995)	-1.652 (7.501)
Number of countries	133	133	133	133	133
Observations	917	917	917	917	917
AR(2) ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.11	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.02
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)	1.00	0.51	0.19	0.07	<0.01
dGrowth/dPC=0	90%**	68%	39%	–	–
90% Fieller CI	[42%–113%]	[–∞–93%]	–	–	–
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.03	0.16	0.47	0.34	0.14
PCA $R^2$	–	–	–	0.86	0.83

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of panel regressions consisting of ten non-overlapping five-year spells. The dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. All regressions contain time fixed effects. While the first column reports a replication of the typical threshold result from the old dataset for 1960-2010, the subsequent columns report various instrument reduction exercises. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) serial correlation test is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments fail to identify the same vector of parameters (see Parentes and Silva, 2012). The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

This brings the instruments count down to 122 instruments, below the usual rule of thumbs based on the number of cross-country observations. This time, the coefficient estimate for private credit in level loses significance, and the SLM test becomes inconclusive, rejecting the presence of an inverted U-shape. The usual specification tests now systematically reject at lower *p*-values, displaying a serious sign of second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test now returns a lower *p*-value of 0.51, much lower than the initial 1.00.

Collapsing the instrument matrix further reduces the instrument count. Whereas limiting the lag depth still relies on different sets of instruments for each time period, the collapsing works around with moment conditions applied such that each of them corresponds to all available periods (Calderon et al, 2002). It maintains the same amount of information from the original 318 columns instrument matrix, yet com-



bined into a smaller set.<sup>15</sup> The number of instruments now falls to 73. Column (3) displays results for this exercise. Both coefficient estimates for private credit in level and squared are no longer significant. Once again, the SLM test rejects the presence of an inverted U-shape between finance and growth. Moreover, the  $p$ -value of the AR(2) test now dips down to 0.02, confirming the previously suspected autocorrelation issue. The Hansen test's  $p$ -value falls to 0.18, as compared to the 1.00 for the default implementation.

The penultimate technique to reduce the instrument count without either cutting into the lag depth or the GMM-style construction of the instrument matrix is to replace the prolific instruments by their principal components (Kapetanios and Marcellino, 2010; Bai and Ng, 2010; Bontempi and Mammi, 2012). Column (4) presents results for this principal components analysis (PCA) technique, which enables to maintain a substantial amount of the information in the instruments into less extensive moment conditions. The identification now rests on 51 instruments. The coefficient estimates for private credit are insignificant, and of opposite sign as compared to the default implementation of column (1). Once again, the SLM test confirms the absence of an inverted U-shape. Other coefficients remain roughly in line with the default implementation, with slightly higher absolute values. Both the AR(2) test and Hansen test return very low  $p$ -values of 0.04 and 0.07 respectively, discarding the reliability of the results.

Finally, the last column combines PCA and collapse techniques, as Mehrhoff (2009) concludes that PCA performs reasonably well when the instrument matrix is collapsed prior to factorization (e.g. Beck et al, 2014a). Column (5) displays this ultimate reduction to 19 instruments. The point estimate and standard errors for private credit are more than four times higher in absolute value than in the baseline regression from column (1). Just as in column (4), private credit and its square term switch signs. The SLM test discards once again the presence of an inverted U-shape. The main specification tests now display extremely low  $p$ -values, discarding the adequacy of the model: 0.02 and 0.00 for the AR(2) and the Hansen test, respectively.

Overall, there is a substantial and systematic decrease in the  $p$ -values of both the Hansen test and the AR(2) test as the number of instruments falls. Given the overall dependence of the non-linear conclusion on a very high instrument count, these straightforward techniques highlight a strong possibility of overfitting and concerns of third-variable or reversed causation. The general dependence of the results on a specific instrument matrix also gives hints toward a weak instrument problem.

#### 4.2.2 *Far Too Weak Instruments*

A reliable causal inference of financial depth on growth requires the instruments to display a strong relationship with the endogenous explanatory variables. When this relationship is only weak, instrumental variable estimators are severely biased (see for a survey Murray, 2006; Mikusheva, 2013). The System GMM estimator is far from immune to the weak instruments' problem (Hayakawa, 2009; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010).

Measuring how much of the variation in the endogenous variables is explained by the internal instruments is crucial, and often remains unexplored. Most applications of the System GMM assume that instruments are strong. The issue goes far beyond the

<sup>15</sup> For an application to the finance-growth setup, see the work of Beck and Levine (2004) or Carkovic and Levine (2005).

**Table 6** Weak instruments in dynamic panel regressions.

Estimator	Difference equation			Levels equation	
	GMM-SYS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Collapsed IV matrix	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Private Credit	3.628** (1.726)	-5.110** (2.161)	1.380 (4.020)	4.247** (2.028)	16.220 (121.16)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-2.021*** (1.726)	0.536 (0.825)	-2.278 (1.896)	-2.765*** (0.996)	-11.390 (81.01)
<i>Other parameter estimates omitted for clarity</i>					
Observations	917	780	780	917	917
N. countries	133	130	130	133	133
N. instruments	318	261	57	65	16
IV: Lagged levels	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
IV: Lagged differences	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -value)		0.67	0.12	0.01	–
Kleibergen-Paap LM test ( <i>p</i> -value)		0.286	0.465	0.518	0.894
Cragg-Donald Wald statistic		0.89	0.68	0.83	0.002
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size > 10% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size > 25% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias > 10% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias > 30% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	0.999
Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic		3.17	0.85	1.15	0.002
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size > 10% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : <i>t</i> -test size > 25% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias > 10% ( <i>p</i> -value)		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
$H_0$ : rel. OLS bias > 30% ( <i>p</i> -value)		0.614	1.000	1.000	0.999

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of minimally arbitrary weak instrument test opening the “black box” of the System GMM estimator. The panel regressions are based on ten non-overlapping five-year spells and contain time fixed effects. The dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. While the first column simply reproduce the baseline result from the old dataset for 1960-2010 (see Table 5, column (1)), the subsequent columns report the decomposition of the System GMM following the “2SLS analogs” of Bazzi and Clemens (2013). Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

finance-growth literature. Indeed, testing for weak instruments is not straightforward in dynamic panel GMM regressions due to the absence of standardized tests.

To circumvent this issue, Bazzi and Clemens (2013) have come up with a simple “2SLS analog” technique. Since weak instrument tests are available within the 2SLS setup, carrying out the equivalent regression using 2SLS with the identical GMM-type instrument matrix provides “simple and transparent tests of instrument strength in a closely related setting” (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013, p. 167). This exercise requires to split the System GMM in two: the difference part and the level part.

Table 6 reports point estimates for this exercise along with various specification tests for the typical threshold from the old dataset. Once again, the table displays tests for underidentification (Kleibergen-Paap LM test) and weak instruments (Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap Wald tests).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> For further details on these tests, see the previous subsection 3.2 on page 9.

Column (1) provides the benchmark System GMM estimates. Column (2) presents 2SLS regressions of difference growth on differenced regressors, instrumented by lagged levels, analogous to the difference part of the System GMM estimator. Similarly, column (3) reproduces the exercise, this time with a collapsed instrument matrix. To complete the picture, columns (4) and (5) present a parallel exercise examining the level part of the System GMM estimator, in the same manner as the difference part. The level of growth is regressed on the level of explanatory variables, instrumented by lagged differences identical to the levels part of the System GMM estimator.

Each time, both the LM test of underidentification and the Wald-type statistics show that instrumentation is far too weak to remove a substantial portion of OLS bias. Large  $p$ -values also indicates that the actual size of the  $t$ -test at the 5% level is greater than 25%. These extremely high  $p$ -values, denoting a failure to reject the null of weak instruments, are not indicative of under-powered or biased tests as would a  $p$ -value of 1.00 for the Hansen test with instrument proliferation. The precise estimates are a byproduct of either weak or irrelevant instruments.

These simple 2SLS analogs open the “black box” surrounding the estimation strategy. They demonstrate the pervasiveness of abundant weak instruments in the System GMM setup underlying the non-linear conclusion, thereby casting severe doubts on its ability to yield any identification of a causal impact.

### 4.3 Near-Multicollinearity and Outliers’ Driven Threshold

Where is this inverted U-shape emerging from? Assessing the underlying mechanism driving the thresholds estimates requires to focus on a near-multicollinearity issue.


First, consider a classical suppressor, which refers to a regressor whose simple correlation coefficient with the dependent variable is below 0.1 in absolute value.<sup>17</sup> The presence of a classical suppressor induces a parameter identification issue. As previously emphasized in column (4) of Table 6, the level part of the System GMM estimates almost exclusively contributes to the identification of the non-linear conclusion. Moreover, the explanatory variable *Private Credit* is a classical suppressor in the level part of the System GMM estimate. It displays a coefficient of correlation with growth of  $\rho(PC, GR) = 0.007$ , far below the 0.1 threshold.<sup>18</sup>

Chatelain and Ralf (2014) have documented that including an additional classical suppressor, highly correlated with the first one, may lead to very large and statistically significant point estimates. Unfortunately, these results are spurious and outliers driven.

The typical additional classical suppressor in dynamic panel setup is the square term of the first one. The thresholds estimates fit the scenario of a highly correlated pair of classical suppressors. The *Private Credit* variable and its square counterpart are highly correlated with one another,  $\rho(PC, PC^2) = 0.93$ . And they both display a near-zero correlation with the dependent variable,  $\rho(PC^2, GR) = -0.03$ . Chatelain

<sup>17</sup> The 0.1 threshold for simple correlation implies that the explanatory variable would account for 1% of the variance of the dependent variable in a simple regression (Chatelain and Ralf, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> Which do not reject the null hypothesis  $H_0 : \rho(PC, GR) = 0$  at the 10% level for  $N = 917$  observations. The coefficient of correlation of private credit with growth for the first difference part of the System GMM is  $\rho(\Delta PC, \Delta GR) = -0.22$ , for the square of private credit with growth  $\rho(\Delta PC^2, \Delta GR) = -0.16$  and for both private credit terms  $\rho(\Delta PC, \Delta PC^2) = 0.86$ . Each of them rejects the null hypothesis  $H_0 : \rho = 0$  at the 10% level for  $N = 799$  observations. *Private Credit* is a classical suppressor only in the level part of the System GMM



**Fig. 3** Financial depth and growth for 1960-2010 in the old dataset. The solid black line plots the System GMM estimate of Table 5, column (1). The solid light lines are 95% Fieller confidence intervals. The vertical dotted red line marks the threshold estimated at a ratio of private credit over GDP of 90%. Point labels are three-letter ISO country codes followed by a time period digit (2 = 1965-1969, 3 = 1970-1974, etc.).

and Ralf (2014, p. 91) emphasize that “the spurious effect can be identified because its statistical significance is not robust to outliers.”

Figure 3 plots the quadratic fit between financial depth and growth in levels from the first column of Table 5. As only the level part of the System GMM estimator is exposed to the near-multicollinearity issue, and since it bears the weight of deriving the non-linear result, the scatter plot focuses on levels rather than on first-differences. Figure 3 provides visual support for the presence of several outliers. The most obvious ones are Liberia-1986 (LBR6), Saudi Arabia-1981 (SAU5), and Iceland-2006 (ISL10). The latter represents the tremendous expansion of three major Icelandic banks (Kaupthing, Landsbanki, and Glitnir) driven by the provision of credit in international financial markets. These banks defaulted in the wake of the 2007/8 financial crisis, which explains the negative average growth over the subsequent five years.

Furthermore, based on outstanding normalized residual squared, leverage, and  $Df\beta$ , there are three additional outliers: Gabon-1971 (GAB3), China-1991 (CHN7) and China-1996 (CHN8). The latter two are the sole China observations in the sample. Their position over the top of the bell-shaped curve induces high leverage on the curvature.

In Table 7, columns (1) and (2) provide outlier-free estimates of the baseline non-linear result (still suffering from weak instrument proliferation). Whether three or six outliers are dropped, each time, *Private Credit* is no longer statistically significant and loses in magnitude. The SLM test discards the relevance of a threshold. Note that in Tables 3 and 4, out of the five possible starting points presented through columns (1-5), only one supports the non-linear conclusion. The other four anchors do not include these outliers, which are specific to the chosen starting point. This evidence emphasizes the general dependence of the results on a set of outliers.

**Table 7** Near-multicollinearity, outliers and preferred dynamic panel regressions.

	GMM-SYS		OLS-FE		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Data	Old	Old	Old	Old	New
Specificity	w/o 3 outliers	w/o 6 outliers	–	w/o 6 outliers	–
Period	1960-2010	1960-2010	1960-2010	1960-2010	1960-2010
Private Credit	2.533 (1.929)	2.350 (1.688)	-0.531 (1.033)	-0.506 (1.017)	-0.455 (1.001)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-1.784* (0.937)	-1.623* (0.826)	-0.660 (0.469)	-0.863* (0.462)	-0.621 (0.517)
	<i>Other parameter estimates omitted for clarity</i>				
N. instruments	318	318	–	–	–
N. countries	133	132	133	132	138
Observations	914	911	917	911	956
AR(2) ( <i>p</i> -value)	0.16	0.04	–	–	–
Hansen test ( <i>p</i> -val)	1.00	1.00	–	–	–
dGrowth/dPC=0	71%	72%	–	–	–
90% Fieller CI	[0%–101%]	[0%–109%]	–	–	–
SLM <i>p</i> -value	0.15	0.14	–	–	–

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations in which the dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. All regressions contain time fixed effects. While the first column presents the baseline result from Table 5, column (1), dropping ISL10, LBR6, SAU5. Column (2) further drops GAB3, CHN7, and CHN8 from the sample. The subsequent columns report various OLS fixed effect regressions. The null hypothesis of the AR(2) serial correlation test is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that the instruments fail to identify the same vector of parameters (see Parentes and Silva, 2012). The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. The absence of *p*-value for columns (3) to (5) is due to a trivial rejection of the inverted U-shape. Robust Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.10$ .

The near-multicollinearity creates instability on the parameters and increases the weight of the outliers. The two issues are enhanced by the overfitting due to weak instrument proliferation (see section 4.2.2), which generates misleading estimates.

Instead of overcoming the endogeneity bias of cross-country regressions with misleading System GMM estimates, column (3) to (5) favor OLS fixed effect estimates. They are more reliable, in this setup, for several reasons. First, they adequately deal with the endogeneity stemming from time-invariant country's specifics. In the System GMM setup, only the difference equation controls for country fixed effect. The level equation, bearing most of the identification, does not control for such invariant country's characteristics. Second, the absence of instrument proliferation reduces the overfitting issue, thereby limiting the point estimate's sensitivity to outliers. Finally, as the GMM instruments are weak, the remaining endogeneity bias indeed remains unaddressed.

Column (3) shows OLS fixed effects estimates of the same model as the baseline results in column (1). Column (4) displays the OLS fixed effect estimates similar to column (2). Finally, column (5) presents the same regressions using this time the new dataset. Each time, the various point estimates for *Private Credit* and its square counterpart loose magnitude and are no longer statistically significant. Due to their signs, the SLM test trivially discards the relevance of a threshold. The near-multicollinearity

of the financial proxies, combined with the weak instrument proliferation issue, fosters spurious regressions overfitting outliers.

## 5 Conclusions

This paper investigates the relevance of a threshold beyond which financial depth tends to affect growth adversely. It seeks to understand why prior evidence relying on large panels led to such non-linear conclusions, where short panel or other estimations techniques failed to do so. Overall, the study contributes to analyzing the impact of financial development on economic growth from a methodological standpoint by opening the black box surrounding mainstream internal instrument estimation techniques.

This study provides a thorough reappraisal of recent advances in the finance-growth literature. By exploring the soundness of various widespread identification strategies, it presents a body of evidence reducing the confidence one can have in the thresholds estimates. Deriving new estimates, with additional data or slight changes in the methodology, casts further doubts about the existence and reliability of a financial tipping point, complementing the recent findings of Botev, Égert, and Jawadi (2019). The five-year spells' starting year influences the results, as only one out of five possible anchoring years supports the non-linear evidence. The present study demonstrates that the threshold conclusion requires a peculiar methodological setup relying on extensive use of either irrelevant or weak instruments. These problematic instruments, combined with the near-multicollinearity of the financial proxies, result in spurious threshold regressions overfitting a few outliers.

Overall, this paper's findings extend to the empirics a debate initiated by Romer (2016) and continued by Blanchard (2018) and Chatelain and Ralf (2018) on the excesses of macroeconomics as a scientific discipline: "The treatment of identification now is no more credible than in the early 1970s but escapes challenge because it is so much more opaque" (Romer, 2016, p.1). Theoretical macroeconomics has been spotlighted for its lack of transparency and complexity, blurring the interpretation and understanding of conclusions. The evidence suggests that this debate also echoes with applied macroeconomics. Internal instrument estimation techniques have precisely emerged to address the empirical struggle to identify a causal impact. However, these techniques have also substantially complexified the evaluation of the identification strategy's validity, to the point of becoming a "black box" (Roodman, 2009). Consequently, the –very real– identification issues are frequently overlooked by a considerable body of empirical research (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013).

Therefore, the various evidence presented in the paper pledges for a systematic investigation of the instruments' validity and relevance. Beyond the standard specification tests, studies should systematically report choices regarding the instrument matrix, the instrument count, and test for weak instruments.

Furthermore, the present paper provides statistical evidence against a non-monotonic estimation based on the level of financial depth. This being said, the relationship between finance and growth may not depend on the unconditional level of financial development but rather on the economy's general level of development. This paper does not intend to dismiss this eventuality. The evidence reported in the study acknowledges a great deal of uncertainty in disentangling the finance-growth nexus. Far from advocating that financial development is irrelevant to growth, this paper calls for additional research. It provides grounds to explore further the impact of the financial sector development on economic growth. Specifically, research will need to

provide stronger evidence of a causal impact and a better understanding of the various channels at work.

Ultimately, the search for general laws applicable to all countries at all times seems doomed to fail. Further research based on country-level data should focus on more homogeneous sets of countries and more recent periods. It would undoubtedly be more reliable and informative for devising suited policies to ensure that we make the most of the financial sector. Future research should also challenge the profession's consensus to study financial depth from the private sector's perspective solely. The financial sector's development also rests on providing finances to the public sector, indisputably affecting economic growth.

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## Appendix

### A Data Appendix

The data appendix consists of four tables (Tables A1 to A4) listing the countries within the different samples used throughout this study. For clarity, they are grouped by income group following the World Bank classification.

The number of countries in the cross-country regressions in section 3 is substantially smaller than the subsequent panel estimates from section 4. This sample difference rests in the cross-country regressions structure, consisting of regressing the average annual growth observed over the sample with a combination of average observation and initial values. The latter requires observations at the beginning of the sample, which is not available for most countries. To mitigate the issue, I follow Arcand et al (2015) and start a decade later, in 1970, instead of 1960, to maximize the sample size. Once turning to panel estimates, this constraint no longer burdens the sample size.

**Table A1** Various samples in the paper. (1/4) : Low income.

Country ISO-code	Income group	CROSS-COUNTRY			PANEL		
		Old 1970-2010	New 1970-2010	New 1970-2015	Old 1960-2010	New 1960-2010	New 1960-2015
AFG	Low income						✓
BDI	Low income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BEN	Low income				✓	✓	✓
CAF	Low income				✓	✓	✓
GMB	Low income				✓	✓	✓
HTI	Low income				✓	✓	✓
LBR	Low income				✓	✓	✓
MLI	Low income				✓	✓	✓
MOZ	Low income				✓	✓	✓
MWI	Low income				✓	✓	✓
NER	Low income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NPL	Low income				✓	✓	✓
RWA	Low income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SEN	Low income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SLE	Low income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TGO	Low income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TZA	Low income				✓	✓	✓
UGA	Low income				✓	✓	✓
ZWE	Low income				✓	✓	✓
	Total	3	6	6	18	18	19
	Overall sample total	64	77	74	132	137	140

**Table A2** Various samples in the paper. (2/4) : Lower middle income.

Country ISO-code	Income group	CROSS-COUNTRY			PANEL		
		Old 1970-2010	New 1970-2010	New 1970-2015	Old 1960-2010	New 1960-2010	New 1960-2015
ARM	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
BGD	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
BOL	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CIV	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CMR	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
COG	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EGY	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GHA	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GTM	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
HND	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IDN	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IND	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
JOR	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
KEN	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
KGZ	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
KHM	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
LAO	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
LKA	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
LSO	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
MAR	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MDA	Lower middle inc.					✓	✓
MMR	Lower middle inc.						✓
MNG	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
MRT	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
NIC	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
PAK	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PHL	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PNG	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
SDN	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SLV	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SWZ	Lower middle inc.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SYR	Lower middle inc.	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
TJK	Lower middle inc.					✓	✓
TUN	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
UKR	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
VNM	Lower middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
YEM	Lower middle inc.					✓	✓
ZMB	Lower middle inc.				✓		✓
	Total	18	19	19	34	36	38
	Overall sample total	64	77	74	132	137	140

**Table A3** Various samples in the paper. (3/4) : Upper middle income.

Country ISO-code	Income group	CROSS-COUNTRY			PANEL		
		Old 1970-2010	New 1970-2010	New 1970-2015	Old 1960-2010	New 1960-2010	New 1960-2015
ALB	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
ARG	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BGR	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
BLZ	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
BRA	Upper middle inc.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BWA	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
CHN	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
COL	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CRI	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
DOM	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
DZA	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
ECU	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FJI	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GAB	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GUY	Upper middle inc.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
HRV	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
IRN	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IRQ	Upper middle inc.		✓	✓		✓	✓
JAM	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
KAZ	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
LBY	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
MEX	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
MUS	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
MYS	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NAM	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
PAN	Upper middle inc.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PER	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
PRY	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ROU	Upper middle inc.					✓	✓
RUS	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
SRB	Upper middle inc.					✓	✓
THA	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TON	Upper middle inc.				✓	✓	✓
TUR	Upper middle inc.		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
VEN	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ZAF	Upper middle inc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Total	16	21	21	33	36	36
	Overall sample total	64	77	74	132	137	140

**Table A4** Various samples in the paper. (4/4) : High income.

Country ISO-code	Income group	CROSS-COUNTRY			PANEL		
		Old 1970-2010	New 1970-2010	New 1970-2015	Old 1960-2010	New 1960-2010	New 1960-2015
AUS	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
AUT	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BEL	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
BHR	High income				✓	✓	✓
BRB	High income				✓	✓	✓
BRN	High income				✓	✓	✓
CAN	High income	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
CHE	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CHL	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
CYP	High income				✓	✓	✓
CZE	High income				✓	✓	✓
DEU	High income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
DNK	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ESP	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
EST	High income				✓	✓	✓
FIN	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
FRA	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GBR	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GRC	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
HKG	High income				✓	✓	✓
HUN	High income				✓	✓	✓
IRL	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ISL	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ISR	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ITA	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
JPN	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
KOR	High income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
KWT	High income				✓	✓	✓
LTU	High income				✓	✓	✓
LUX	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
LVA	High income				✓	✓	✓
MAC	High income				✓	✓	✓
MLT	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NLD	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NOR	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
NZL	High income	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
POL	High income				✓	✓	✓
PRT	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
QAT	High income				✓	✓	✓
SAU	High income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SGP	High income		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SVK	High income				✓	✓	✓
SVN	High income				✓	✓	✓
SWE	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
TTO	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
URY	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
USA	High income	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Total	27	31	29	47	47	47
	Overall sample total	64	77	74	132	137	140

**Table A5** Correlation matrix.

CROSS-SECTIONAL 1970-2015 NEW sample of 74 observations							
	Growth	Log(in.GDP/cap)	Priv. Credit	(Priv. Credit) <sup>2</sup>	Log(school)	Log(infl.)	Log(trade)
Log(init.GDP/cap)	-0.0101	1					
Private Credit	0.275**	0.706***	1				
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.189	0.607***	0.953***	1			
Log(school)	0.349***	0.784***	0.657***	0.540***	1		
Log(inflation)	-0.133	-0.239**	-0.505***	-0.465***	-0.127	1	
Log(trade)	0.253**	0.129	0.148	0.034	0.215*	-0.429***	1
Log(gov. cons.)	-0.108	0.524***	0.386***	0.274**	0.361***	-0.284**	0.229*
CROSS-SECTIONAL 1970-2010 OLD sample of 64 observations							
	Growth	Log(in.GDP/cap)	Priv. Credit	(Priv. Credit) <sup>2</sup>	Log(school)	Log(infl.)	Log(trade)
Log(init.GDP/cap)	0.0456	1					
Private Credit	0.282**	0.735***	1				
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.200	0.659***	0.964***	1			
Log(school)	0.297**	0.816***	0.653***	0.564***	1		
Log(inflation)	-0.241*	-0.254**	-0.531***	-0.498***	-0.153	1	
Log(trade)	0.207	0.149	0.153	0.0602	0.246*	-0.368***	1
Log(gov. cons.)	0.0535	0.564***	0.495***	0.369***	0.466***	-0.362***	0.294**
PANEL 1960-2010 OLD sample of 917 observations							
	Growth	Log(in.GDP/cap)	Priv. Credit	(Priv. Credit) <sup>2</sup>	Log(school)	Log(infl.)	Log(trade)
Log(init.GDP/cap)	0.087***	1					
Private Credit	0.007	0.675***	1				
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-0.034	0.534***	0.929***	1			
Log(school)	0.168***	0.719***	0.511***	0.398***	1		
Log(inflation)	-0.110***	-0.165***	-0.276***	-0.234***	-0.020	1	
Log(trade)	0.059*	0.192***	0.206***	0.141***	0.308***	-0.167***	1
Log(gov. cons.)	-0.128***	0.348***	0.274***	0.187***	0.274***	-0.0913***	0.322***
PANEL 1960-2015 NEW sample of 1,055 observations							
	Growth	Log(in.GDP/cap)	Priv. Credit	(Priv. Credit) <sup>2</sup>	Log(school)	Log(infl.)	Log(trade)
Log(init.GDP/cap)	0.013	1					
Private Credit	-0.008	0.646***	1				
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-0.043	0.510***	0.936***	1			
Log(school)	0.134***	0.706***	0.521***	0.407***	1		
Log(inflation)	-0.095***	-0.164***	-0.291***	-0.262***	-0.060*	1	
Log(trade)	0.055*	0.208***	0.211***	0.138***	0.286***	-0.190***	1
Log(gov. cons.)	-0.089***	0.388***	0.266***	0.189***	0.299***	-0.073**	0.266***



**Table A6** Summary Statistics.

CROSS-SECTIONAL 1970-2015 NEW SAMPLE	Mean	$\sigma$	Obs.	Min	Max
Growth	1.779	1.228	74	-0.951	5.741
Log(init.GDP/cap)	8.255	1.384	74	5.581	10.79
Private Credit	0.465	0.334	74	0.044	1.547
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.326	0.441	74	0.002	2.394
Log(school)	1.683	0.555	74	-0.213	2.509
Log(inflation)	2.326	1.084	74	0.885	5.710
Log(trade)	4.129	0.549	74	3.013	5.836
Log(gov. cons.)	2.686	0.285	74	2.022	3.358
CROSS-SECTIONAL 1970-2010 OLD SAMPLE	Mean	$\sigma$	Obs.	Min	Max
Growth	1.745	1.103	64	-1.225	4.530
Log(init.GDP/cap)	7.789	1.458	64	4.841	10.14
Private Credit	0.479	0.343	64	0.042	1.366
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.346	0.448	64	0.002	1.865
Log(school)	1.719	0.529	64	0.346	2.502
Log(inflation)	2.386	1.025	64	1.031	5.844
Log(trade)	4.073	0.481	64	3.023	5.358
Log(gov. cons.)	2.673	0.308	64	1.937	3.461
PANEL 1960-2015 NEW SAMPLE	Mean	$\sigma$	Obs.	Min	Max
Growth	2.108	2.765	1055	-16.84	14.28
Log(init.GDP/cap)	8.432	1.492	1055	5.139	11.56
Private Credit	0.399	0.366	1055	0.011	2.261
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.294	0.556	1055	0.001	5.113
Log(school)	2.331	0.667	1055	0.371	3.291
Log(inflation)	2.475	1.378	1055	-2.065	10.06
Log(trade)	4.127	0.641	1055	-1.743	6.047
Log(gov. cons.)	2.643	0.372	1055	1.143	3.772
PANEL 1960-2010 OLD SAMPLE	Mean	$\sigma$	Obs.	Min	Max
Growth	2.024	2.766	917	-21.00	13.86
Log(init.GDP/cap)	7.796	1.548	917	4.606	10.89
Private Credit	0.400	0.370	917	0.007	2.698
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	0.297	0.576	917	0.000	7.277
Log(school)	2.278	0.671	917	0.265	3.274
Log(inflation)	2.495	1.211	917	-3.564	6.908
Log(trade)	4.118	0.599	917	2.049	6.082
Log(gov. cons.)	2.653	0.390	917	1.169	3.828

## B Additional Cross-Country Robustness Checks

### B.1 Sample Dependency

The evidence in Figure 2 and the third column in Table 1 presented in section 3 on page 6 are consistent with three observations driving the curvature and thereby the threshold estimate. These observations are the United-States (USA), Japan (JPN), and Switzerland (CHE). Both Japan (JPN) and Switzerland (CHE) display high *Dfbeta* statistics (Belsley et al, 1980). However, as the *Dfbeta* statistic works by dropping one observation at a time, the United-States (USA) does not display an outstanding statistic as it is caught between the other two observations. The *Dfbeta* statistic fails to grasp multiple outliers at once.

As expected, the linear and quadratic terms for private credit turn insignificant when dropping these three observations. The SLM test indicates that the threshold estimate is no longer statistically relevant. The regression in section 3 emphasizes the dependency of the non-linear conclusion over a long period on a few observations driving the results.

To strengthen the argument that the whole non-monotonic conclusion is sample sensitive, I conduct two additional robustness checks. The first one consists of removing a handful of countries at a time based on their initial GDP per capita in 1970. Groups include five countries of similar development levels. Each column presents one estimate of the overall sample minus one group of five observations.

This exercise checks whether or not removing a few developing (especially low-income) countries could reinforce the non-monotonic conclusion and recreate a curvature. Estimates from Table A7 emphasize that it is not the case. Dropping the low-income countries in Column (1) returns an insignificant threshold, rejecting the non-monotonic conclusion. Dropping other groups unveil some interesting patterns. First, the SLM test barely supports a non-monotonic fit with a p-value close to 0.1. However, dropping a group of 5 observations in Columns (1), (6), and (15) discard the presence of a threshold. These additional estimates highlight the general dependency of the non-linear conclusion over a long period on a few observations driving the results.

Table A8 presents a similar exercise, this time grouping countries based on their average private credit ratio over 1970-2015. Dropping groups one by one unveil once again some striking patterns. First, the SLM test barely supports a non-monotonic fit with a p-value close to 0.10. However, dropping a group of 5 observations in Columns (6), (7), (11), and (15) discard the presence of a threshold. Recall that, up to Column (15), the various samples still include the United-States (USA), Japan (JPN), and Switzerland (CHE). This additional exercise emphasizes the overall dependency of the non-linear conclusion over a long period on a few observations driving the results.

**Table A7** Sequential removal of observations sorted by initial GDP per capita.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Log(init. GDP/capita)	-0.713*** (0.108)	-0.750*** (0.183)	-0.747*** (0.162)	-0.765*** (0.149)	-0.784*** (0.145)	-0.666*** (0.166)	-0.776*** (0.153)	-0.770*** (0.154)	-0.803*** (0.151)	-0.774*** (0.162)	-0.771*** (0.162)	-0.750*** (0.154)	-0.740*** (0.153)	-0.739*** (0.158)	-0.733*** (0.165)
Private Credit	4.725** (1.606)	4.780** (1.572)	4.515* (1.811)	4.837** (1.795)	6.562*** (1.069)	4.249* (1.628)	4.772** (1.649)	4.571** (1.659)	5.453*** (1.501)	4.722** (1.783)	4.838** (1.775)	4.817** (1.672)	5.812** (1.912)	4.790** (1.625)	4.506** (1.577)
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-2.214* (1.082)	-2.284* (0.998)	-2.310* (1.129)	-2.471* (1.174)	-3.409*** (1.027)	-2.025 (1.031)	-2.400* (1.074)	-2.263* (1.063)	-2.586* (1.029)	-2.454* (1.081)	-2.435* (1.108)	-2.364* (1.078)	-3.222* (1.355)	-2.362* (1.048)	-2.031* (0.984)
Log(school)	1.294*** (0.389)	1.277* (0.527)	1.611*** (0.356)	1.687*** (0.346)	1.431*** (0.347)	1.239** (0.376)	1.556*** (0.365)	1.522*** (0.368)	1.420*** (0.364)	1.584*** (0.382)	1.408*** (0.394)	1.469*** (0.366)	1.392*** (0.358)	1.484*** (0.381)	1.442*** (0.374)
Log(inflation)	0.062 (0.160)	0.008 (0.153)	-0.047 (0.154)	-0.021 (0.162)	0.024 (0.124)	0.034 (0.133)	-0.003 (0.174)	-0.023 (0.153)	0.011 (0.172)	-0.002 (0.157)	-0.001 (0.156)	-0.006 (0.169)	0.015 (0.161)	-0.021 (0.158)	0.007 (0.156)
Log(trade)	0.334 (0.280)	0.283 (0.263)	0.237 (0.272)	0.163 (0.282)	0.150 (0.241)	0.339 (0.280)	0.255 (0.272)	0.238 (0.278)	0.238 (0.290)	-0.005 (0.267)	0.172 (0.281)	0.221 (0.279)	0.246 (0.273)	0.181 (0.300)	0.268 (0.296)
Log(gov. cons.)	-0.819 (0.561)	-0.619 (0.569)	-0.821 (0.575)	-1.194 (0.613)	-1.197* (0.501)	-0.704 (0.614)	-0.872 (0.556)	-0.787 (0.558)	-0.818 (0.579)	-0.628 (0.549)	-0.949 (0.582)	-0.910 (0.624)	-0.970 (0.588)	-0.797 (0.584)	-1.011 (0.581)
Observations	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	70
R <sup>2</sup>	0.47	0.45	0.49	0.53	0.57	0.41	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.47	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50
dGrowth/GPC=0	107% [85%-265%]	105%* [83%-197%]	98%* [77%-205%]	0.98%* [79%-202%]	96%* [81%-126%]	105% [80%-291%]	99%* [80%-189%]	101%* [81%-208%]	105%* [87%-176%]	96%* [77%-158%]	99%* [79%-185%]	102%* [74%-202%]	90%* [74%-152%]	101%* [80%-193%]	111% [87%-269%]
90% Feller CI	0.13	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.13	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.09	0.15
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)															

*Notes:* This table reports the results of a set of cross-country OLS Between regressions in which the dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. The robustness exercise consists of removing five observations at a time for countries sorted by their initial GDP per capita in 1970. Each column present one estimate of the overall sample minus the following observations:  
 Column 1: BDI, IND, PAK, RWA, SLE  
 Column 2: IDN, KEN, LKA, NER, TGO  
 Column 3: CMR, EGY, SDN, SEN, THA  
 Column 4: GHA, MAR, PHI, PRY, SWZ  
 Column 5: BOL, COG, DOM, HND, IRQ  
 Column 6: CIV, GTM, GUY, KOR, MYS  
 Column 7: COL, ECU, FJI, PER, SLV  
 Column 8: CRJ, JAM, MLT, PAN, TUR  
 Column 9: BRA, CHL, MEX, URY, ZAF  
 Column 10: ARG, GAB, HUN, SGP, TTO  
 Column 11: ESP, GRC, IRL, PRT, VEN  
 Column 12: FIN, GBR, ISL, ISR, ITA  
 Column 13: AUT, BEL, DEU, FRA, JPN  
 Column 14: AUS, NLD, SAU, SWE, USA  
 Column 15: CHE, DNK, LUX, NOR  
 The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. Robust Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \* *p* < 0.10.

**Table A8** Sequential removal of observations sorted by average private credit ratio.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	
Log(init. GDP/capita)	-0.748*** (0.142)	-0.789*** (0.166)	-0.707*** (0.170)	-0.830*** (0.148)	-0.774*** (0.164)	-0.677*** (0.164)	-0.768*** (0.171)	-0.758*** (0.151)	-0.783*** (0.155)	-0.762*** (0.156)	-0.678*** (0.147)	-0.741*** (0.156)	-0.743*** (0.175)	-0.779*** (0.151)	-0.768*** (0.146)	
Private Credit	6.120*** (1.594)	5.176** (1.906)	5.245** (1.746)	4.807** (1.613)	4.531** (1.586)	4.722** (1.678)	4.966** (1.593)	4.995** (1.661)	4.433* (1.680)	5.026** (1.710)	4.254* (1.625)	4.636** (1.665)	4.455* (2.017)	4.665** (1.697)	3.403 (2.812)	
(Private Credit) <sup>2</sup>	-3.321** (1.061)	-2.527* (1.164)	-2.646* (1.142)	-2.316* (1.022)	-2.220* (1.018)	-2.240* (1.082)	-2.321* (1.047)	-2.579* (1.097)	-2.250* (1.049)	-2.503* (1.105)	-2.007 (1.065)	-2.298* (1.063)	-2.251 (1.164)	-2.393* (1.047)	-0.473 (2.450)	
Log(school)	1.638*** (0.336)	1.298** (0.454)	1.412*** (0.406)	1.511*** (0.380)	1.487*** (0.379)	1.253** (0.386)	1.433*** (0.370)	1.575*** (0.352)	1.623*** (0.386)	1.475*** (0.366)	1.291*** (0.364)	1.456*** (0.369)	1.538*** (0.400)	1.586*** (0.352)	1.494*** (0.351)	
Log(inflation)	-0.086 (0.131)	-0.008 (0.151)	0.035 (0.191)	-0.031 (0.152)	0.005 (0.155)	0.044 (0.153)	0.151 (0.154)	-0.010 (0.158)	-0.076 (0.162)	0.004 (0.170)	0.022 (0.159)	0.022 (0.159)	-0.009 (0.157)	-0.021 (0.158)	-0.037 (0.149)	0.025 (0.146)
Log(trade)	0.162 (0.238)	0.151 (0.282)	0.151 (0.287)	0.284 (0.258)	0.256 (0.276)	0.359 (0.270)	0.396 (0.273)	0.235 (0.260)	0.252 (0.266)	0.231 (0.272)	0.243 (0.311)	0.168 (0.285)	0.172 (0.322)	0.014 (0.266)	0.183 (0.257)	0.183 (0.257)
Log(gov. cons.)	-1.327** (0.459)	-0.747 (0.588)	-1.040 (0.629)	-0.698 (0.575)	-0.633 (0.604)	-0.731 (0.556)	-0.798 (0.576)	-1.137* (0.564)	-0.819 (0.573)	-0.907 (0.623)	-0.907 (0.560)	-0.793 (0.576)	-0.925 (0.576)	-0.791 (0.592)	-0.583 (0.564)	-0.964 (0.551)
Observations	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	70	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.44	0.48	0.53	0.49	0.47	0.51	0.53	0.50	0.48	0.43	0.46	0.44	0.47	0.54	
dGrowth/APC=0	92%*** [77%-124%]	102%* [83%-193%]	99%* [80%-176%]	104%* [83%-195%]	102%* [81%-204%]	105% [83%-247%]	107% [85%-222%]	97%* [78%-167%]	98%* [77%-192%]	100%* [81%-185%]	106% [81%-383%]	100%* [80%-201%]	99%* [78%-225%]	97%* [78%-164%]	360% -	360% -
90% Fieiler CI	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.06	-	-
SLM ( <i>p</i> -value)																

Notes: This table reports the results of a set of cross-country OLS Between regressions in which the dependent variable is the average real GDP per capita growth rate. The robustness exercise consists of removing five observations at a time for countries sorted by their average private credit level between 1970 and 2015. Each column present one estimate of the overall sample minus the following observations: Column 1: GHA, IRQ, RWA, SDN, SLE; Column 2: BDI, CMR, COG, GAB, NER; Column 3: ARG, GTM, LKA, PER, SWZ; Column 4: ECU, MEX, PRY, TGO, TUR; Column 5: DOM, JAM, KEN, FAK, SEN; Column 6: CIV, CRI, IDN, IND, URY; Column 7: BOL, COL, EGY, GUY, VEN; Column 8: HND, IRN, MAR, PHL, SVK; Column 9: BEL, BRA, FIJ, SAU, TTO; Column 10: CHL, FIN, GRC, ISR, PAN; Column 11: AUS, FRA, IRL, ITA, KOR; Column 12: AUT, DNK, ISL, MLT, NOR; Column 13: LUX, MYS, NLD, PRT, THA; Column 14: DEU, ESP, GBR, SGP, SWE; Column 15: CHE, JPN, USA, ZAF.

The SLM test provides *p*-value for the relevance of the estimated threshold. Robust Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* *p* < 0.01, \*\* *p* < 0.05, \* *p* < 0.10.